ML20083J533

Final Rept of Potentially Reportable Deficiency 130 Re Possible Loss of Annulus Vacuum Control in Shield Bldg Ventilation Sys Motor Operated Valves.Initially Reported on 831115.Item Not Reportable Under 10CFR50.55(e)

ML20083J533
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	12/21/1983
From:	Gerrets T LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 130, W3K83-2004, NUDOCS 8401100184
Download: ML20083J533 (2)

Text

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LOUISIANA P O W E R & L I G H T! P O BOX 6008 *

,42 Ot<AnONOe Srneer NEW ORLEANS. LOUISIANA 70174. (504) 366-2345

'$E E dvs E Decembec 21, 1983 u

W3K83-2004 Q-3-A35.07 l

Mr. John T. Collins l'

E20E Regional Administrator, Region IV l

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission I

g4 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012

~

REFERENCE:

Telecon C. Hooper (LP&L) and D. Hannicut (NRC, Region IV) on November 15, 1983

SUBJECT:

Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Potentially Reportable Deficiency No. 130

" Loss of Annulus Vacuum Control, Potential For" Final Reporc On November 15, 1983, a problem with the Shield Building Ventilation System (SBVS) motor operated valves was reported as Potentially Reportable Deficiency No. 130 Further evaluation of the previously described condition indicates this condition is not considered reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).

EVALUATION There is an interlock designed into SBVS that will prevent the SBVS fans (E-17 SA/SB) from starting if the filter train inlet or outlet isolation valves are closed. During preoperational testing on train A, this interlock was tested by closing the train inlet valve (2HV-B160A) and de-energizing the breaker to its motor operator. When the attempt was made to start the system, the breakers on the motor operators to the filter train outlet (2HV-3158A) and either the exhaust (2HV-B162A) or recirculating (2HV-B164A) valves tripped.

The above tests were thus conducted under an abnormal circumstance. That is, the inlet damper to the filter train was closed and de-energized. Under this configuration, that particular filter train would have been unavailable irrespective of the breakers on the other two valves tripping. The MOVs have operated properly when tested under normal circumstances, i.e., when opening was attempted without any valve de-energized. The fact that these valves tripped while in the abnormal configuration would not theref p have affected the SBVSs ability to respond on an SIAS.

8401100184 831221 PDR ADOCK 05000382 Jc_- 27 I

S PDR

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Mr. John T. Collins December 21, 1983 W3K83-2004 Page 2 Although the breaker sizes have been changed, as a result of the problem identified by this test, the original breaker sizes would not have adversely affected safety if left uncorrected and this PRD is therefore considered not reportable.

Very truly yours, T. F. Gerrets Quality Assurance Manager TFG:CNH:SSTG cc: Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 (15 copies)

Director Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Mr. E. L. Blake Shaw, Pittman, Potts, s Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20036 Mr. W. M. Stevenson Monroe & Lemann 1424 Whitney Building New Orleans, Louisiana 70130

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