ML20083E953
| ML20083E953 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 12/14/1983 |
| From: | Sorensen G WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM |
| To: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 303, GO2-83-1163, GOE-83-1163, NUDOCS 8312300059 | |
| Download: ML20083E953 (2) | |
Text
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Washington Public Power Supply 5@fdl P.O. Box 968 3000 GeorgeWashingtonWay Richland, Washington 99~352 (509)372-5000 December 14, 1983 603 DEC 19 RI12:.5g G02-83-ll63 REGl0iiVl.tE Mr. J. B.-Martin Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596
Subject:
NUCLEAR PROJECT N0. 2 10CFR50.55(e) REPORTABLE CONDITION #303 INCORRECT INSTALLATION OF SOLEN 0ID OPERATED CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES
Reference:
Telecon dated 12/2/83, R.T. Johnson to D. Haist, same subject.
In accordance with the provisions of 10CFR50.55(e), your office was informed by the reference of the above subject condition. The attachment provides the Project's final response on Condition #303.
If there are any questions concerning this matter, please contact Roger Johnson, WNP-2 Project-QA Manager, (509) 377-2501, extension 2712.
"m.:%s G. C. Sorensen Manager, Regulatory Programs JGT/kd
Attachment:
As stated cc:
W.S. Chin, BPA N.D. Lewis, EFSEC A. Toth, NRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk, NRC 8312300059 832214 PDR ADOCK 0500C397 S
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WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEii NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-397 LICENSE NO. CPPR-93 10CFR50.55(e) CONDITION #303 INCORRECT INSTALLATION OF SOLEN 0ID OPERATED CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency Several small solenoid operated primary containment isolation valves were found installed such that contair. ment pressure would act to unseat the valve. Thus, during a design basis isolation event, these valves would leak excessively.
Date and Method of Discovery This deficiency was first identified to Burns and Roe on November 15, 1983 and was reported by Burns and Roe as t Part 21 in letter BRGO-R0-83-13.
Exces-sive valve leakage was originally identified by the Supply System Test and Startup organization during local leak rate testing as required by 10CFR50 l
Appendix J.
Safety Implication Excessive isolation valve leakage during a design basis isolation event could l
result in exceeding 10CFR100 limits regarding radiation dose at the Site l
boundary.
Cause of the Deficiency i
The cause of this deficiency is that Burns and Roe, Inc. did not provide suffi-l cient instructions to the installation contractors to assure proper orientation of the valves. However, this was due, in large part, to the sequence of design, procurement and installation. That is, the installation contractors were also I
responsible for procurement of the isolation valves in accordance with general specification requirements. The requirement for a specific installation orienta-tion could only be determined afi.er a specific manufacturer and valve type were selected by'the contractor.
It could be argued that the contractor was l
responsit,le for correct orientation since he did the procurement.
Applicability to Other Projects This type of deficiency is potentially applicable to other projects. However, 100 percent functional (leakage) testing as required by 10CFR50 Appendix J would preclude it from remaining undetected. That is, all incorrectly installed solenoid cperated isolation valves would be identified due to excessive leakage and would be corrected.
Action to Prevent Recurrence A complete review of the installed orientation of all solenoid operated contain-ment isolation valves was performed. All deficiencies were identified and corrective action taken through design modification (PED).
Corrective Action Design Changes (PED's) have been issued to correct the installed orientation for 34 deficient. valves and all work has been completed to-date.
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