ML20083E748

Part 21 Rept Re Incorrect Installation of Solenoid Operated Containment Isolation Valves 83-23.Caused by Insufficient Instructions.Design Changes Issued

ML20083E748
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	12/09/1983
From:	Conn W BURNS & ROE CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
REF-PT21-83-095-000 BRGO-RO-83-18, PT21-83-095-000, PT21-83-95, NUDOCS 8312290393
Download: ML20083E748 (2)

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dh W Burr:c and Roe,Inc.

601 Williams Blvt a Richland, Washington 99352 m Tel(509)9434200

Subject:

Work Order 3900/4000 Washington Public Power Supply System WNP-2 Incorrect Installation of Solenoid Operated l Containment Isolation Valves Responds to: N/A December 9,1983 l BRG0-R0-83-18 Response Req'd: N/A  ;

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Director

Dear Sir:

This letter is to report to you a condition we have deemed to be reportable under 10CFR21. The condition relates to incorrect orientation of solenoid operated containment isolation valves and was discuned with Mr. D. Haist of your. Region V office on December 9,1983.

Ccmplete details are contained in the attached report.

If you have any questions, please contact W. G. Conn at (509) 943-8241.

l Very truly yours, W. G. Conn

! Licensing Supervisor WGC/sw l

Attachment l cc: BPA - Mr. W. S. Chin SS - Mr. G. L. Gelhaus, w/a l SS - Mr. L. T. Harrold, w/a l SS - Mr. J. G. Tellefson, w/a l SS - Mr. R. T. Johnson, w/a i NRC - Mr. J. B. Martin, w/a Region V l

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8312290393 831209 PDR ADOCK 05000397 S PDR

/I INCORRECT INSTALLATION OF S0LEN0ID OPERATED CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES #83-23 Description of Deficiency Several small solenoid operated primary containment isolation valves were found installed such that containment pressure would act to unseat the valve. Thus, during a design basis isolation event, these valves would leak excessively.

Date and Method of Discovery This deficiency was first identified to Burns and Roe on November 15, 1983. Ex-cessive valva leakage was originally identified by the Supply System Test and Startup organization during local leak rate testing as required by 10CFR50 Appen-dix J some two weeks earlier. , . .

Safety Implication .

Excessive Isolation Valve leakage during a design basis isolation event could re-sult in exceeding 10CFR100 limits regarding radiation dose at the Site boundary.

Cause of Deficiency The cause of this deficiency is that Burns and Roe, Inc. did not provide sufficient instructions to the installation contractors to assure proper orientation of the '

valves. However, this was due, in large part, to the sequence of design, procure-ment and installation. That is, the installation contractors were also responsible for procurement of the isolation valves in accordance with general specification re-quirements. The requirement for a specific installation orientation could only be determined after a specific manufacturer and valve type were selected by the con-tractor. It could be argued that the contractor was responsible for correct orien-tation since he did the procurement.

Applicability to Other Projects l

This type of deficiency is potentially applicable to other projects. However,100 percent functional (leakage) testing as required by 10CFR50 Appendix J would pre-clude it from remaining undetected. That is, all incorrectly installed solenoid l operated isolation valves would be identified due to excessive leakage and would be corrected.

Action to Prevent Recurrence A complete review of the installed orientation of all solenoid operated containment isolation valves was performed. All deficiencies were identified and corrective action taken through design modification (PED).

Corrective Action Design Changes (PED's) have been issued to correct the installed orientation for all deficient valves.

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