ML20083C781
| ML20083C781 | |
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|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1983 |
| From: | ENVIROSPHERE CO. |
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| NUDOCS 8312270018 | |
| Download: ML20083C781 (109) | |
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I DETAILED REPORT ON THE EVACUATION OF l
DECEMBER 11,1982
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envirospherecompany A Dmson of EBASCO SERVICES INCORPORATED
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FOR:
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
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DECEMBER 1983 hDR DO K O 00 382 S
I PREFACE On December 11, 1982, an explosion and fire occurred at the Union Carbide Taft Plant, near Taft, Louisiana.
Subsequent to the explosion, it was determined that it would be necessary to evacuate an estimated 16,000 people in St.
Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes. The evacuation of these people was carried out successfully during the early morning hours of December 11.
Louisiana Power & Light Company, the owner of the Waterford SES-Unit No. 3, a new nuclear generating station located in the vicinity of the Union Carbide facility, has been very active in the eh rgency planning process in these two parishes. Therefore, because of its interest in promoting effective emergency planning, LP&L retained Envirosphere Company, a Division of Ebasco Services, to conduct a detailed study of the evacuation. This report documents the results of that study.
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TABLE OF 00NTENTS Section No.
Title Py CHAPTER I OVERVIEW CHAPTER II MET 10D OF ANALYSIS 2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE MET 10D0 LOGY 2
2.2 INFORMATION GATHERING 2
2.3 INFORMATION ANALYSIS 3
CHAPTER III
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BACKCROUND INFORMATION 3.1 AREA GE0 GRAPHY 5
3.2 POPUIATION CHARACTERISTICS 7
3.3 TRANSPORTATION NEIWORKS 9
3.4 INSTITUTIONAL SIRUCTURE 10
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3.5 STATUS OF THE PARISHES' DfERGENCY PLANS 12 3.6 WATHER CONDITIONS 12
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CM M R IV SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
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4.1 DECEMBER 10, 1982 14 4.2 DECEMBER 11, 1982 15 r
L 4.3 DECEMBER 12, 1982 27 CHAPTER V ANALYSIS OF THE EVACUATION 5.1 IS IARGE SCALE EVACUATION AN EFFECTIVE PROTECTIVE ACTION?
28 5.2 TO WHAT EXTENT WERE THE MECHANICS OF THE EVACUATION CARRIED OUT IN AN EFFICIENT AND TIMELY MANNER?
30 5.3 DID MANAGEMENT OF THE EVACUATION FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY? 41 5.4 HOW IDNG DID IT TAKE TO EVACUATE?
41 CHAPTER VI CONCLUSIONS i
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)
LIST OF TABLES TABLE 1 METEOROLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS FROM NEW ORLEANS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FOR DECEMBER 11, 1982 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATE 10 MILE AREA AROUND THE UNION CARBIDE TAFT PLANT j
l FIGURE 2 AREA EVACUATED AROUND THE UNION CARBIDE TAFT PLANT APPENDICES APPENDIX 1:
EMERGENCY PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED APPENDIX 2:
QUESTIONNAIRE APPENDIX 3:
BACKQt0UND DATA APPENDIX 4:
DETAILED DISCUSSION OF SELECTED COMPONENTS OF THE EVACUATION APPENDIX 5:
INDUSTRIAL RESPONSE 11
CHAPTER I OVERVIEW
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In the early morning hours of Saturday, December 11, 1982, an acrolein storage tank in the Union Carbide Taf t Plant in Taf t, Louisiana, exploded. Acrolein is a highly toxic substance. Because of the danger associated with the large quantity of acrolein in this tank and the potential dager associated with the explosion of other nearby acrolein f
tanks, an area between three and a half and five miles from the plant was evacuated. This evacuation area included petrochemical and other
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industrial facilities and residential areas in portions of St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes.
The evacuation was successfully and effectively executed in a relatively short time. Among the individual communities involved, none took longer than two and a half hours to evacuate the majority of their population, once notification of the public had started. Starting from the time the decision was made to evacuate, the majority of the population lef t the entire area within two and a half to three and a half hours.
Few problems were encountered and officials were able to resolve the problems which did arise. The success of the evacuation reflects the soundness of emergency preparedness in these parishes and the ability of emergency preparedness officials to implement them.
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Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L) has been extensively involved in emergency planning in these parishes because of its Waterford Steam
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Electric Station (SES) - Unit No. 3 nuclear generating station. LP&L pemeived this event as an opponunity to evaluate the effectiveness of evacuation, based upon actual experience in these parishes. LP&L therefore commissioned a detailed analysis of the events associated with the Union Carbide evacuation. This reporc represents the findings of the f
analysis and documents the entire evacuation event. In particular, the report investigates the event from the perspective of both its component
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activitic-s (i.e., notification, evacuation, confirmation, security, etc.)
and the behavior of the evacuees during the emergency.
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CHAPTER II PETIDD OF ANALYSIS The magnitude and the complexity of the evacuation which occurred in the area around the Union Carbide Taf t Plant necessitated the development of an organized method to gather and analyze the appropriate information.
This section discusses the method utilized tot 1) u,nstruct a detailed description of the sequence of the evacuation and related activities and
- 2) analyze the effectiveness of the response to this emergency.
2.1 OVERVIl!W OF THE ME1HODOIDGY The development of comprehensive emergency management systems for responding to natural and man made disasters in the United States has generated interest in a number of issues concerning the affected population's behavioral response, and the expertise and responsiveness of the emergency personnel during an emergency. The evacuation in response to the Union Carbide explosion provided an excellent opportunity to f
L analyze the significance of some of these issues.
h The initial step in the methodology to study the evacuation was to enumerate these issues. The issues posed at the outset of the study were the following:
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Is large scale evacuation an effective protective action in this area of Louisiana?
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To what extent were the mechanics of the evacuation carried out in an efficient and timely manner?
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Did the management of the evacuation function effectively?
4 How long did it take to evacuate?
2.2 INFORMATION CATHERING The information for this study was collected primarily through personal interviews with key emergency planning personnel in each parish and t he 2
state who were involved with the event. These officials included emergency preparedness / civil defense and Sheriff's Department personnel from each parish, local fire department and ambulance service officers, anj Louisiana State Police staff. Representatives of the industries in L
the affected area were also interviewed. A complete list of all interviewees is given in Appendix 1.
The interviews were conducted using a prepared, open-ended questionnaire. The questionnaire used for these interviews is included as Appendix 2.
The questionnaire served as a guide and a checklist during each interview, and questioning was expanded, condensed, or L
modified to appropriately interrogate each interviewee. All interviews were conducted during the period January 10 to January 20, 1983, by two
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individuals, in person or via telephone. The individuals conducting 'the interviews have extensive familiarity with the local population
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characteristics, land use, and transportation network in the crea, as well as a good understanding of emergency planning issues and procedures.
In addition to the personal interviews, information was also collected using other written acurces such as telephone and radio log =, Thc=c written sources were utilized in reconstructing the timing of events during the evacuation.
Additional background information wac obtained from available literature to assist in understanding the relevant environmental and institutional characteristics of the area as they could affect the evacuation and the population evacuated. Background information is also helpful in comparing this evacuation to other similar emergencies wnich have occurred elsewhere. This information included data on meteorological
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conditions, the highway network, the characteristice of the population, surrounding land use, and other factors. This background information is summarized in Chapter 3 and presented in Appendix 3.
2.3 INFORMATION ANALYSIS The information gathered from the interviews and logs was utilized in an analysis which had two objectives: to provide a detailed description of
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the sequence of the evacuation, and to evaluate those issues posed at the outset of the study or which arose during the interview process.
In order to analyze any specific issue concerning the evacuation which took place on December 11, 1982, it is necessary to have an understanding of tha sequence of events which occur red before, during and after the evacuation. With the information gained from the interviews and logs, a detailed description of the sequence of actions and situations which occurred was prepared. The description is presented in Chapter 4 and l
includes an hour-by-hour account over the period of time when activities and events were most intense and rapidly changing.
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With the description of the sequence of events, and with the information, I
opinions, and judgments of the interviewees, each of the issues posed at the outset of the study was analyzed and evaluated. In addition, issues which emerged or were clarified during the infonnation gathering process were also evaluated. Special emphasis was placed on the identification and evaluation of any areas of emergency preparedness which could be improved for use during future emergencies. The results of this analysis are contained in Chapter 5.
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The final step of the methodology was to utilize the analysis of the r
evacuation to formulate and/or identify conclusions concerning the L
event. These conclusions are summarized in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER III BACKGOUND INFORMATION In order to understand the evacuation event, it is important to investigate the baseline conditions, both physical and institutional, under which the evacuation occurred. These baseline conditions are important because they affect both the decisions made by officials concerning the methods utilized to conduct the tvacuation process and the results of the evacualion itself.
Included in these baseline considerations are the geography of the affected area, the demographic characteristics of the evacuated populations, the transportation network, the existing emergency planning framework, and the weather conditions during the event. In addition to providing a better understanding of this event, this information may be useful in comparing the results of f
this evacuation with other similar events elsewhere in the nation.
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3.1 AREA GEOGRAPHY
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The Mississippi River is the predominant natural feature within a five mile radius of the Union Carbide Taf t Plant. The river essentially bisects the area evacuated, flowing from the west to east. At the time of the evacuation, there was no bridge connecting the two sides of the Mississippi in this area. However, the Hale Boggs Bridge connecting Luling on the west bank and Destrehan on the east bank was opened in October 1983.
The two parishes here, St. Charles and St. Joan the Baptist, are each divided approximately in half by the river. Because of this situation, reference is often made in this report to the " east bank" and " west bank" of each parish. Figure 1 illustrates this geography. On the map, the
" east bank" comprises those areas which are actually north of the river in these parishes, while the " west bank" lies south of the river.
The largest land use category within this area is wetlands, both forested and nonforested. Agricultural uses comprise the next largest land use within the five mile radius. Other categorie; of land include forest land, water (mostly the Mississippi River) and barren land. Urban or built up land comprise the smallest component of land usage in the five mile area.
Urban or built-up land and agricultural land are generally concentrated within one to two miles of the Fassissippi River. A large portion of the urban or built-up land is industrial, composed of large refineries, petrochemical complexes and electric power generating stations located along the banks of the Mississippi River.
The Union Carbide Taft Plant is located on the west bank of the Mississippi River in Taft, Louisiana, approximately 24 miles west of New Orlean s.
Adjacent to the Union Carbide site are LP&L's Waterford SES, Occicental Chemical, Beker Industries, Witco Chemical and Shell Chemical Taft Plant. Other industries located across the river f rom the Union Cartiue Taf t Plant include the Shell Chemical and Refining Complex in Nor,co, LP&L's Little Gypsy SES, CATX Terminals, Good Hope Refineries and Big Three Industries.
Residential acreage comprises the second largest portion of the urban and i
built-up land category and is composed primarily of communities flanking the river. Nearby residential communities include Hahnville, Norco, Taft, Killona and New Sarpy in St. Charles Parish, and Lucy and Laplace in st. John the Baptist Parish. The 1980 populatienc of thece placcc were the following:
Hahnville, 2,947; Norco, 4,416; New Sarpy, 2249; Taf t and Killona, 689; Lucy, 2,685; and LaFlace, 16,112 (most of Laplace was not evacuated).
Section 3.4 presents a more complete discussion of residential population in the evacuated area.
On the morning of the evacuation, Union Carbide recommended evacuation of a five uile area.
Af ter consideration of all factors, parish of ficials ordered the evacuation of all towns within a 3.5 to 5 mile area surrounding the Union Carbide Taf t Plant. This inclucea all of ti.e industries and towns mentioned above with exception of a small portion of Hahnville in St. Charles Parish and Laplace in St. John the Baptist Pa ris h.
The area which was evacuated is shown on Figure 2.
The actual cor. figuration of the evacuated area was dictated by the judgment of parish emergency preparedness officials and the natural geography of the area such as wetland areas and other uninhabitated areas at the perimeter of the area evacuated.
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3.2 POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS The general demographic characteristics for the evacuation area surrounding the Union Carbide Taf t Plant were derived from the 1980 U S Census Data for Louisiana. The population, housing and transportation data in this report were obtained for each enumeration district and designated place and summed to obtain a total for the evacuated area. A map showing the enumeration districts and designated places is included in Appendix 3 as Figure 3-1.
Some of the enumeration districts (e.g.,120 and 103u in St. John the Baptist Parish) include some people who reside outside the evacuated area (see Figure 3-1 in Appendix 3). This means that the data may present a population which is larger than that which actually evacuated.
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evacuated area, the data presented are a reasonable estimate of the number and the characteristics of the people evacuated. The demographic Jata are given in Appendix 3 in Tables 3-1 through 3-4.
L According to the 1980 U S Census Bureau, there were 15,232 people living in the evacuated area around the Union Carbide Taf t Plant. Of this total, 4,036 persons (26.5%) resided in St. John the Baptist Parish and 11,196 people (73.5%) lived in St. Charles Parish.
rhe 4,036 people evacuated within St. John the Baptist Parish are 12.6% of the total parish population of 31,924 persons. Within St. Charles Parish, the 11,196 people evacuated represent 30.0% of the total parish population.
The main concentration of population evacuated within St. John the Baptist Parish is located on the east bank of the Mississippi River south of Laplace, and on the west bank of the river near Lucy. Within the area evacuated in St. Charles Parish, most of the populated areas are located in New Sarpy, Norco and Hahnville. The distribution of the 1980 population by enumeration district is given in Appendix 3 in Table 3-1.
To obtain a more current estimate of the population within the evacuated area, the 1970-1980 growth rates for each parish were applied to the 1980 U S Census data to derive a 1982 population estimate by parish for the 7
evacuated area.
St. John the Baptist Parish grew at an average annual rate of 2.97% which yields an estimated 1982 population of 4,279 for that portion of the evacuated area.
St. Charles Parish grew at an average annual rate of 2.35% during the period between 1970 to 1980, resulting in an estimated 1982 population of 11,728 in the St. Charles part of the evacuated area. Therefore, the total 1982 population estimate for the evacuated area is 16,007.
The age structure of the population within the evacuated area shows that the age dependent population, those persons 5 years or younger and 65 years and older, comprises 18.7% of the total population, while the majority of people are between the ages of 6 and 64 years. Table 3-2 in Appendix 3 presents the 1980 U S Census Bureau data for the population by age and sex.
Statewide, an analysis of the 1980 U S Census Bureau figures reveals that persons 5 years or younger and 65 years and older comprise about 16.9% of the total population, and the age category of 6 to 64 years make up the remaining 83.1%.
In 1980 there were 5,208 housing units within the area evacuated,1,413 (27.1%) in St. John the Baptist Parish and 3,795 (72.9%) in St. Charles Pa ris h.
The overall household size within this area is 2.92 persons per household (see Table 3-3 in Appendix 3).
Total housing units for the State of Louisiana in 1980 were 1,548,419.
With a total 1980 state population of 4,205,900 persons, the average size of household on a statewide basis is 2.7 persons.
Information on the number of occupied housing units with vehicles available within the evacuated area is presented in Table 3-4 of Appendix 3.
The most important information within this table relative to the evacuation deals with those households without a car.
Families dependent on public or other means of transportation (neighbors' cars) are concentrated near Lucy in St. John the Baptist Parish and in Hahnville and No rc o in S t.
Charles Parish. Overall, only 636 households do not own their own cars (13. 5%),1,531 households own one car (32.4%),1,683 8
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households own two cars (35.6%) and 874 households (18.5%) own three or more cars (see Table 3-4 of Appendix 3).
In Louisiana in 1980, there were 195,812 households which did not own cars (about 13.9%), 483,227 households which owned one car (about 34.2%),
481, 617 households with two cars (approximately 34.1%) and 251,132 (about 17.8%) households which owned three or more cars. These figures indicate close correlation with figures for the parishes under investigation.
In St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes, lists of bedridden or disabled persons within each parish who may require an ambulance, van or closed bed truck to be evacuated are maintained. According to these lists, there were a total of 39 bedridden or disabled people in the evacuated area who would have required assistance in evacuating during the Union Carbide emergency. Ten of these people reside in the area evacuated in St. Charles Parish and 29 reside in St. John the Baptist Pa rish.
3.3 TRANSPORTATION NETWORKS f
The transportation network within the evacuated area is dominated by the Mississippi River. In the vicinity of the Union Carbide Taf t Plant, the river's depth is sufficient to accommodate large oceangoing vessels, and it is utilized by the industries around the ' Union Carbide Taf t Plant to receive raw materials and to ship finished products.
Two lane roads essentially parallel the river levee system on each side of the river.
These river roads include: Route 18 on the west bank of the river; and Routes 628 and 48 on the east bank. The latter two are located, respectively, west and east of the Bonnet Carre Floodway. A heavy concentration of industry is located en these river roads within the evacuated area. On the west bank, egreso from the area is provided along Route 18, and also along Route 3127, which provides egress to the west, or via Route 90 to the east,
Routes 3160, 3141, and 3142 connect Route 18 with Route 3127. On tLe east bank, egress from the evacuated area is provided via Route 48 (in both the east and north directions),
4 Route 628 to the west, and via Routes 638, 636 to Route 51 in either the ecst or west directions. Figure 1 shows the locations of the roadways.
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The Hale Boggs Bridge, which was opened in October,1983, spans the Mississippi River between Luling and Destrehan, three miles east of Hahnville. The bridge connects Route 18 (west bank) to Route 48 (east bank). This bridge was under construction and unavailable for usage in December, 1982.
A Missouri-Pacific Railroad line runs basically parallel to the river on the west bank. This line is utilized to transport freight and is not used as a passenger line. There are also two rail train lines on the east bank.
These are the Louisiana Arkansas and the Illinois Central Gulf.
No public transportation systems, excepting available school buses and an Avondale Shipyard labor bus, were utilized during the evacuation.
3.4 INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE f
This section presents a brief overview of the established organization
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and structure used by the St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Pa rishe s to manage responses to emergencies such as the Union Carbide evacuation.
This description is summarized from detailed documentation prepared for the emergency planning undertaken by the parishes largely in response to the presence of LP&L's nuclear generating station, Waterford SES-Unit No 3.
In accordance with the Louisiana Disaster Act of 1974, the President of the Police Jury or the Parish President is responsible for emergency preparedness operations.
Therefore, in the event of an accident, natural disaster, or other major emergency requiring evacuation, the Parish or Police Jury President must authorize such an action. The governor is also empowered to authorize an evacuation.
In the case of St. Charles Parish, the Parish President relies on the St. Charles Department of Emergency Preparedness and the Sheriff 's Department for advice and implementation of the authorized response. The St. Charles Department of Energency Preparedness provides coordination within the parish f or the implementation of the protective action, and maintains an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in the Parish Courthouse 10
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at Hahnville on the west bank. The St. Charles Parish Sheriff 's Department is expected to provide assistance in a circumstance such as an evacuation in:
the control of civil order; communications; access to the af fected areas; notification of the public; and directing the implementation of protective actions.
In St. John the Baptist Parish, the emergency response structure is similar to that of St. Charles Parish. The Police Jury President is responsible for ordering a protective action such as evacuation, and the Civil Defense Director acts as the Police Jury President's chief of staff. The Civil Defense Director is based in the E0C, located in the l
Percy lierbert Of fice Building in Laplace on the east bank.
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In each parish, the director of emergency operations is provided with a staf f of of ficers with designated responsibilities, such as a communications of ficer, a law enf orcement officer, a transportation officer, etc.
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I In addition to the institutional structure at the parish level, various state agencies are available to assist in implementing the protective action, and, in accordance with the parish emergency plans, they have defined roles in law enforcement, communications, traf fic control and other services.
St. Charles Parish has access to an industrial " hotline" which provides a centralized communications network through which emergency information can be communicated between the EOC and all the industries in the pa ris h.
The system is a private tie-line, which provides the EOC the capability to initiate, answer or add any or all separate hotlines on a conf erence type call. The system is monitored 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day through the EOC and the sheriff's dispatcher office. When emergency preparedness personnel are not present in the EOC, hotline calls (and all other calls to the EOC) are directed to the sheriff's dispatcher office. The sheriff's dispatcher is then responsible for immediately contacting emergency operations personnel.
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I 3.5 STATUS OF THE PARlbHb ' EMERGENCY PLANS l
Both st. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parish officials are continually upgrading and refining their emergency plans to respond to industrial and transportation accidents and natural disasters which occur within their parishes.
In the past they have responded to hurricanes, I
chlorine and ammonia releases, to rail and ship accidents in the area and f
to the Union Carbide explosion, in addition to their plans for i
industrial and transportation related emergencies and natural disasters, L
parish of ficials have, since 1980, been developing emergency plans for the operation of LP&L's Waterford SES-Unit No. 3.
These plans and the associated implementing procedures, written to conf orm to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency Management Agency regulatory guidelines (NUREG-0654/FDiA REP-1, Revision 1, Criteria f or Freparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency kesponse Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants), will substantially supplement emergency planning within each parish.
At the time of the Union Carbide incident, the parish Emergency Plans and implementing Procedures for the Waterford SES-Unit No. 3 were not yet fully implemented. These plans will not be finalized until an emergency drill for the Waterford SES-Unit No. 3 is held and the plans and procedures are evaluated ard modified, as necessary, as a result of the d rill. Nevertheless, many of the interviewers for the present study cited the helpfulness of the emergency planning process f or the Waterford SES-Unit No. 3 in conducting the evacuatio n.
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3.6 WEATHER CONDITIONS 1he weather occurring in the area of the evacuation on December 11, 1962, was generally rainy and foggy with limited visibility, followed by a sharp drop in temperature.
This weather pattern can be documented through the use of the hourly f
weather observations recorded by the National Weather Service Office at New Orleans International Airport. The airport is approximately 13 miles 12
east of the evacuated area and, generally, the weather occurring there is considered representative of the weather experienced in the Union Carbiae site area. The hourly observations are presented in Table 1.
As can be seen f rom this table, between midnight and 5 a.m. light rain with fog occurred which limited the visibility at the airport to four miles or less and produced 0.08 inches of rain. kinds during this period were between 5 to 12 mph and were out of the southwest.
The rainf all intensity increased during the next three hours, becoming heavy at times with accumulations of 1.14 inches occurring. Visibility as low as 1.75 miles was experienced and winds continued to originate f rom a southwesterly direction. A sharp change in the weather occurred af ter 9:00 a.m. when the rain gradually ended and the winds shif tea to a northerly direction (N-NE).
This wind pattern brought colder air into the area and reduced the temperature, which had reached a maximum of 70*F at 5:55 a.m., to the mid 60's.
The northerly wind persisted until 1:00 l
p.m. when light winds from the WSW returned, bringirs light rain and the l
visibility was less than three miles in the area.
From 5:09 p.m. throubh midr.igh t the light rain changed to light drizzle and eventually ended.
Visibility gradually increased and strong northerly winds gusting up to 33 mph began. This pattern further reduced the temperature, with the area experiencing a 10 F drop in temperature (f rom 59 F to 49 F) in three hour s.
During the next day, December 12, the visibility reachea seven miles and the skies began to clear as the weather system producing the rain moved out of the area.
The temperature remained in the high 30's to mid 40's as strong nort' erly winos,. between 9 to 22 mph with gusts up to 28 mph, persisted throughout the day.
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CHAPTER IV SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 4
A chronological account of the major actions taken and the situations which occurred between late evening on December 10, 1982 to mid-afternoon
.on December 12, 1982 is provided in this section.
The chronology is given by the hour of the day and provides a description of the actions taken by the organizations during that time.
j The development of the sequence of events is based on personal interviews of local and industrial officials, conducted between January 10-20, 1983,
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and on available telephone and radio logs. Since many of the events described are based on personal interviews, some of the times cited are i
estimates based on the interviewees' recollection. However, some of the times cited below are taken from logs recorded by the various organizations involved in the evacuation.
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4.1.1 8 P.M..to 12-Midnight According to Witco Chemical, an industry adjacent to the Union Carbide site, they were informed of a problem at Union Carbide at about 8 p.m.
and could observe unusual activity on the Union Carbide site. Shell Chemical Taf t, an industry which is also adjacent to the Union Carbide Taf t Plant, said they heard alanns at Union Carbide at 11:30 p.m.
The Louisiana State Police Hazardous Substance Control Unit noted in their report that at approximately 10:00 p.m. Union Carbice officials knew that the acrolein was heating up in the tadks.
John Lucas, the Director of the Department of Emergency Preparedness in St. Charles Parish, noted that between 10 and 11 p.m. Union Carbide employees started to call their families at home to inf orm them of the 14
eme rg 'ncy.
Union Carbide officials, at a later meeting with the St.
Charles Parish Officials, which was held to critique the evacuation, indicated that at about 11 p.m. they started to evacuate nonessential personnel from certain areas of their plant site.
4.2 DECE3BER 11, 1982 4.2.1 Midnight to 1 A.M.
At about 12:09 a.m. the St. Charles Parish sheriff's dispatcher noted that Union Carbide called and related that an acrolein tank was overheating inside the plant. At this time, they indicated that everything was under control. At approximately 12:31 a.m. the St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Department attempted to contact the Director of Emergency Preparedness.
Because it was not possible to initially contact him, they called Jules Hymel, the Assistant Director of the Department of Emergency Preparedness in St. Charles Parish, to inform him of the situation at Union Carbide.
Union Carbide again called the Sheriff's Department at 12:38 a.m. to advise them that the acrolein tank was overheating and that they were evacuating the south side of the plant. They requested that the Sherif f 's Department remain on standby.
The acrolein tank exploded at approximately 12:45 a.m.
The explosion could be heard up to several miles away and reportedly blew out windows in the town of Norco approximately 1.5 miles to the northeast of the plant. The Luling Ferry,. " Ascension," reported the explosion to the Sheriff's Department at 12:52 a.m.
At 12:55 a.m. Union Carbide called the sheriff's dispatcher and informed them that the acrolein tank had exploded and that they needed Plantation Road and La 3127 blocked off. By 1:02 a.m. access control points were 15
established at La 3160, La 3127 and La 3141. Figure 2 shows the locations of these access control points relative to the Union Carbide Taf t Plant.
Af ter the explosion, Witco Chemical began to shut down their operation, and LP&L's Waterford SES-Units No.1 and 2 and Beker Industries called the Sheriff's Department to obtain more infonnation on the explosion.
Shell Chemical Taf t stated that fumes and white particulate material were observed in the air.
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Shortly af ter 1 a.m., several of the sheriff's units on the road indicated that they were detecting strong odors on La 18 in the vicinity of Taf t.
At 1:12 a.m. Union Carbide advised that the units should pull out of the area because the vapor could be hazardous, and requested that access control points be established at the intersection of La 3127 and US 90, and on La 3127 at the St. John the Baptist Parish line.
By 1:05 a.m. Bertram Madere, the St. John the Baptist Civil Defense.
Director, had opened up the St. John the Baptist Parish EOC in Laplace.
At the same time volunteer fire departments were calling intc the St. Charles Parish EOC. At 1:15 a.m. the Hahnville Fire Department made contact with the EOC. At 1:30 a.m. the Laplace Fire Department sent out a rescue unit to the Little Gypsy SES across the river from Union Carbide to observe the situation.
The United States Coast Guard (USCG) Captain of the Port (C0TP) was informed of the explosion at 1:10 a.m. by one of their pollution prevention teams who were in the area at the time. At 1:20 a.m. the officer on duty called Union Carbide to confirm that an explosion had occurred in their plant. The USCG then proceeded to call the St. Charles Parish Sheriff, the State Police Water Warning Network and the Vessel Traf fic System (VTS).
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At 1:18 a.m. the St. Charles Sheriff's Department called the St. John the Baptist Sheriff's Department to inform them of the situation at Union Ca rbide.
Shortly thereaf ter, at 1:20 a.m., Union Carbide advised that there was a fire in the acrolein tank. At 1:27 a.m. the Sheriff 's Depa rtment activated the St. Charles Parish E0C and by 1:33 a.m., Jules Hymel, the Assistant Director of Dmergency Preparedness had arrived at the EOC, At 1: 50 a.m. Union Carbide called to advise the EOC that the acrolein was burning off and that the situation should improve.
During this period of time, industries in the area were calling the St.
Charles EOC to establish where the explosion had occurred and which chemical was involved.
Between 1:00 and 1:20 a.m. the State Police Troop B in New Orleans contacted their Hazardous Substance Control Group in Baton Rouge to itionn them of the explosion.
Trooper Michael O'Neil, and Ross Williams i
of the Louisiana Department of Natural Re.ources, lef t immediately from Baton Rouge f or Taf t.
By this time several State Troopers from Troop B in New Orleans were already at the Union Carbide Taf t Plant and assisting the St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Department at the access control points.
4.2.3 2 A.M. to 3 A.M.
Sometime af ter the explosion, people living in Taf t and Hahnville near the Union Carbide site began to evacuate on their own.
A St. Charles Parish s teriff's unit at the intersection of La 3160 and La 18 called the dispatcher at 2:03 a.m. and indicated that local people, who had started to evacuate, wanted to know if they could go back to their homes. At about 1:30 a.m., on their way to the EOC, the St. Charles Parish Assistant Director of Emergency Preparedness and Tyrell Cornwell, the Chief Sheriff's Dispatcher, had noted a group of about 20 cars at La 18 and La 52 in luling. Since no official word was given to evacuate, all these people were told they could return to their homes.
17
Petween 2:10 and 2:20 a.m., Union Carbide called the St. Charles Parish EOC and told them the fire was still burning and that there was no danger to the public at this time.
At LP&L's Waterford SES-Unit No. 3, the Security Officer noted that even though no evacuation had been required or called for by officials, all the contractors were notified and workers were allowed to go home.
At the St. John the Baptist Parish EOC, Bertram hadere, the Director of the St. John the Baptist Civil Defense, and Bob Brennan, the Deputy Director of Field Operations, decided that if the emergency escalated they should have a representative of the EOC on the west bank of the river. At 2:30 a.m.,
the Deputy Director lef t to bo to the west bank.
The Director also called Van Gilmore, the Communications Officer, to inform him of the situation.
l In the St. Charles EOC, Jerry Hines, the St. Charles Hospital Ambulance Director, was contacted and told to stand by.
Witco Chemical said they received a call from the Sheriff's Department at about 2:47 a.m. to inform them that River Road (Ln 18) was closed by I
roadblock between Killona and La 3160.
4.2.4 3 A.M. to 4 A.M.
Be tween 3:00 and 4:00 a.m., the situation at Union Carbide was still the same and the tanks continued to burn.
The LP6L Waterford SES-Unit No. 3 security log noted that at 3:07 a.m.
they called the Sheriff's Department and were informed that access control points had been established at the intersections of La 18 and La 3160; La 3127 and La 3160; La 3142 and La 3127; and La 18 and La 3142.
Shell Chemical Taf t Plant noticed that the wind had shif ted and was blowing vapors onto their site. People on the plant site were using air 18
packs while outside. Since some vapors were getting into the control room, the air conditioner was shut off and the staf f moved inside the control room.
Max Mason, Shif t Superintendent at LP&L's Little Gypsy SES, said he sent four subcontractors home at about 3 a.m.
Trooper O'Neil, from the State Police Hazardous Substance Control Group, arrived at the Union Carbide site at about 3 a.m.
4.2.5 4 A.M. to 5 A.M.
From the time of the explosion until 4:00 a.m., Union Carbide officiais were assessing what had happened and exactly how many tanks of acrolein were involved. At about 4:18 a.m., af ter discussions with the sheriff and the State Police, Union Carbide recommended that a five mile radius area be evacuated. This included the towns of Killona, Taf t, Good Hope, New Sarpy, Montz and Norco. The area which was evacuated on the west bank extended from Lucy in St. John the Baptist Psrish to Court House Lane in Hahnville in St. Charles Parish. On the east bank the area evacuated included all residents living south of US 61 from McReine Road in St. John the Baptist Parish up to and including the town of New Sarpy in St. Charles Parish.
When the Assistant Director of the Department of Emergency Preparedness in St., Charles Parish was advised of Union Carbide's recommendation to evacuate, he called Kevin Friloux, the St. Charles Parish President, at 4:25 a.m., to inform him of the situation and to request permission to evacuate the area. Consideration of available information by parish officials resulted in the decision to evacuate populated areas within 3.5 to 5 miles of the Union Carbide Taf t Plant. The Parish President issued the evacuation order at 4:30 a.m. on December 11, 1982.
The St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Departcant began to mobilize their personnel between 4:00 a.m. and 4:15 a.m.
The State Police Tactical Unit was called out at 4:45 a.m. to assist the parish Sheriff's Departments at 19
- ------ j
access control points and in evacuating the area.
By about 4:30 a.m.,
the Taf t area had begun to evacuat e.
At 4:27 a.m., the Assistant Director of the Department of Emergency Preparedness contacted Larry Sesser, Chief of Physical Plant Operations in St. Charles Parish Public Schools, to request that schools be opened as shelters for those people evacuating.
Immediately af ter this call, the Assistant Director called Barry Mahady, the head of bus transportation for St. Charles Public Schools, to request school buses be made available f or any people needing transportation out of the evacuated a re a.
The Assistant Director also called radio station WCKW at this time to ask them to broadcast the evacuation message to the public.
The St. Charles Parish Sheriff logs indicate that at about 4:20 a.m.
Union Carbide Taf t Plant workers were leaving the site. At 4:43 a.m.,
the St. Charles Parish EOC advised the Sheriff 's Department that no j
incoming Union Carbide personnel were to be allowed into the site area.
All Union Carbide personnel were to report to the north parking lot of Monsanto outside of Luling. Union Carbide was using Monsanto as an of fsite emergency operations center and as a staging area for the personnel ec=ing to work.
In addition, the St. Charles Parish EOC began to notify the volunteer fire departments in the area. The Hahnville, Killona and Norco Fire Departments were notified at about 4:50 a.m. and told to stand by for an evacuation. The EOC also began to notify some of the industries in the area of the need to evacuate.
In St. John the Baptist Parish, the Civil Defense Director said he was informed of the recommendation to evacuate at about 4:50 a.m.
He immediately called Dovie Gendron, President of the St. John the Baptist Police Jury, and requested permission to evacuate certain areas of St.
John the Baptist Parish which were in the area to be evacuated.
Receiving an approval to evacuate, the Civil Defense Director began the evacuation procedures by about 5:00 a.m.
20
4.2.6 5 A.M. to 6 A.M.
By 5 a.m. on Saturdey morning, notification of the population was initiated in St. Charles Parish. At about this time, the USCG established a safety zone on the Mississippi River between River Miles 125 and 130 and began to notify ships. Between 5:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m.
all the volunteer fire departments were contacted and began to notify the population of the need to evacuat e.
On the west bank, in St. Charles Parish, the Hahnville and Killona Fire Departments were responsible for notifying the residents. The hahnville Fire Department had approximately 22 people notifying the public. The fire trucks went out into the streets between 5:15 and 5:30 a.m. sounding their sirens and announcing the evacuation over the public address (PA) system. This took approximately one hour to complete. Af ter the first time through the area, teams of firemen went door-to-door to make sure everyone had heard the message. This took an additional 1-1/2 to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
In Killona, there were about nine firemen who notified the residents to leave. The notification started at about 5:00 a.m.
One fire truck went through the streets announcing the need to evacuate. In addition, a sheriff's deputy assisted the notificatica of people in Killona.
On the east bank in St. Charles Parish, the Norco and East St. Charles Fire Departments were responsible for notifying the public. Robert Loupe, the Norco Fire Chief, stated that he had 25 to 27 men doing the notifica tion. Starting at about 5:00 a.m., it took approximately one hour to make the first pass through with the fire trucks, during which time they'also began knocking on doors.
The East St. Charles Fire Department had 12 firemen doing the notification which began at approximately 5:30 a.m.
They completed the notification within 1 to 1-1/2 hours. They too made an initial run with the fire trucks and then followed this by going door-to-door.
In St. John the Baptist Parish, the sheriff's personnel, the fire departments, and civil defense workers did the notification. On the east 21
bank approximately 16 sheriff's personnel,10 firemen, and 4 civil defense personnel notified everyone within 1 to 1-1/2 hours from the s ta rt of notification. On the west bank the civil defense personnel and 25 firemen were doing the notification. Here, it took approximately a half hour to notify everyone. On both sides of the river, the notification was done with sirens and PA systems. Emergency workers on the west bank also went door-to-door to notify the public. On the east bank, notification personnel would knock on a door only if it was not apparent that the household had heard the message.
Between approxima:;1y 4:45 a.m. and 5:15 a.m. most of the industries were notified that an evacuation was taking place in the area. Most of the industries on the west bank closed down their operations, keeping only essential personnel to safeguard their plants. LP&L's Waterf ord SES-Unit No. 3 released all non nuclear trained security personnel leaving approximately seven security personnel onsite and another five LP&L operations personnel in the control room. Witco, Ecker, Shell Chemical Taf t and Occidental Chemical all indicated that plant shutdown and l
evacuation of some of their personnel began during this period. On the l
west bank, only LP&L's Waterf ord SES-Units 1 and 2 did not evacuate.
On che east bank, the only industry which evacuated was Bayou Steel.
Officials at Bayou Steel were notified by the St. John the Baptist Sheriff 's Department of the evacuation at 5:00 a.m.
The whole plant with the exception of 3 to 4 people was evacuated at about 5:45 a.m.
Other industries on the east bank, though notified of the evacuation, chose not to shut down. These included the Shell Chemical Complex in Norco, GATX Terminals and Good Hope Refinery in Good Hope, and Big Three Industries in Norco.
At LP&L's Little Gypsy SES, Max Mason, the Shift Superintendent, heard about the evacuation on radio station WCKW at approximately 4:45 a.m..
He then called Hillary Otillio, the Plant Manager. The Plant Manager called the St. Charles Sheriff's Department at about 5:05 a.m. and was told there were no plans to evacuate the east bank at this time. The 22
Plant Manager was told that the east bank was being evacuated at 6.04 a.m. when he again called the Sheriff's Department. Af ter discussing the situation with the Plant Superintendent, they decided to keep the plant running unless the situation worsened.
By 5:15 a.m.,
Beverly Robein, the Executive Director of the St. Charle s and St. John the Baptist Parishes Red Cross was notified and had begun to mobilize the Red Cross personnel in the are a.
In St. John the Baptist Parish the evacuation had started shortly af ter 5:00 a.m.
The Laplace Fire Department started notifying the public at about 5:20 a.m.
On the west bank, Bob Brennan, the Deputy Director of the St. John the Baptist Parish Of fice of Civil Defense, set up a command nost on River Road just to the west of the town of Lucy. The Deputy Director observed that traf fic was leaving the area before he could get his men in position; however, this did not prevent him from establishing his access control point s.
By 5:30 a.m., the State Police Tactical Unit was fully mobilized and in place. By about 5:50 to b:00 a.m., access control points had been established at the following intersections:
La 3127 and La 631 La 18 and Courthouse Lane in Hahnville La 48 in New Sarpy US 61 north of New Sarpy La 636 (McReine Rd) and La b28 (River Rd)
US 61 and La 636 La 3127 and St. John Parish Line La 18 just west of the town of Lucy 4.2.7 6 A.M. to 7 A.M.
Be tween 6 :00 and 7 :00 a.m., the St. Charles Parish Sherif t 's Department was receiving a number of calls f rom bedridden people and people without cars in the area.
When they received a call concerning a bedridden person they would dispatch an ambulance to the addres s.
23
At 6:00 a.m.
the evacuation of the town of Killona was completed.
Most of the residents went to West St. John High School in Edgard.
At approximately 6 :10 a.m., according to the St. John the Baptist Parish Civil Defense Director, the east bank of St. John the Baptist Parish haa finished evacuating. By o:30 a.m.
the west bank of the parish had been evacuated.
Between 6:00 - 6:30 a.m., about one hour af ter they started, all of the St. Charles Parish fire departments had completed their initial notification. At this time some fire departments went around a second time knocking on door s.
The USCG began to of ficially broadcast that the Mississippi River was closed to navigation between River Miles 130 and 125 at about o:20 a.m.
At this time, they also began to call river pilots as well as other river facilities that are located in or would be working in this part of the river.
In addition, at 6:50 a.m.
the USCG dispatched represent 3tives of the COTP to the St. Charles Parish EOC.
4.2.8 7 A.M. to 8 A. h.
By about 7:00 a.m., radio station WCKW stopped broadcasting the evacuation message.
Robert Loupe, Fire Chief of the Norco Fire Department, noted that by 7:00 a.m. about 90 percent of the people of Norco had been evacuated.
Be tween 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., the St. Charles Sherif f's Department continued to receive phone calls concerning elderly or bedridden people.
By 7:30 a.m.
the Sheriff's Department indicated that the evacuation was complete except for bedridden patients.
The USCG finished calling all the river f acilities in the area by 7 :20 a.m.
24
Barry Mahady, in charge of the St. Charles Parish school buses, said that by 8:00 a.m. the buses had finished picking up people without cars. A total of two school buses and a labor bus were utilized during the evacuatio n.
4.2.9 8 A. M. to 9 A.M.
Jerry Hines, the Director of St. Charles Hospital ambulances, said che ambulance on the east bank had finished picking people up by 8:00 a.m.
According to the St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Department, between 8:30 and 9:00 a.m. all of the bedridden people were evacuated.
Randy Robert, the East St. Charles Fire Department Chief (New Sarpy) said that by 8:00 a.m. all of the people in his area had evacuated with the exception of the bedridden people and that by 8:20 a.m., all of the bedridden people had been evacuated. By 8:00 a.m., the evacuation had i
been completed in Hahnville, according to Neil Haydel, the Fire Chief.
4.2.10 The Remainder of the Day From 9 a.m. until the evacuation order was terminated on the following day, most of the actions taken within the evacuated area were by emergercy personnel who were involved in securing the area or involved in controlling the situation at Union Carbide. During this time, the State Police and sheriff's personnel staf fed the access control points and patrolled the area to ensure that there was no vandalism. Personnel at the access control pointc were also responsible for escorting shif t workers into the industrial plants, os well as residents who needed to return to their homes to obtain medicine and warmer clothing.
The following is a summary of some of the significant actions which occurred between 9:00 a.m. and midnight December 11, 1982:
10:00 a.m. - Occidental Chemical brought in a whole shif t to start up its plant.
25
10:15 a.m. - The USCG received a report f rom Gnots Barge Fleet in Destrehan, La. ( River Mile 119.5) that one of their fleet boat operators had smelled a choking odor.
10:32 a.m. - Because of the Gnots barge fleet report, the 00TP representative at the EOC recommended expanding the Mississippi River closure to River Mile 118.
11: 00 a.m. - Personnel reporting to Robert Chadborn, East Jefferson Hospital Ambulance Director, completed evacuating bedridden people on the east bank (inf ormation was not available on when ambulances lef t the evacuated area, but only when the last bedridden people were placed in facilities outside the evacuated area).
12:16 p.m. - USCG broadcast the message officially closing the Mississippi River to navigation from River Mile 130 to 118.
1:36 p.m.
- The Luling Ferry, " Ascension," went out of service for j
the public.
It was thereaf ter only used for emergency traffic.
2:45 p.m.
- The 00TP representatives at the St. Charles E0C reported that Union Carbide personnel still were unable to make a firm assessment of the situation at the plant. The fire appeared to be diminishing. However, if the fire went out, a decision would have to be made concerning reignition of the tanks for a controlled burn.
3: 00 p.m.
- Beker Industries started its plant back up.
10:00 p.m - The USCG reopened the river at this time with the stipulation that any vessel wishing to enter the restricted zone must receive authorization from the VTS. This would enable the USCG to keep track of the ships which were located in the evacuated area.
26
4.3 DECEMBER 12, 1982 On Sunday morning, December 12, 1982, a t approximately 10:00 a.m., a decision was made to terminate the evacuation order as of 12 noon that day. The end of the evacuation was announced over radio station WCKW at about 10:30 a.m.
The USCG officially opened the river to navigation at 11: 50 a.m.
l 1
27
CHAPTER V AhALYSIS OF THE EVACUA110N This chapter presents a discussion of each issue which was raised in Chapter 2 (Fkthod of Analysis). The fundamental conclusion is presented in Section 5.1, which deals with the issue of whether evacuation can be considered an ef fective response in an emergency. dections 5.2 and 5.3 deal with the details of the evacuation, including such issues as notification, traffic, communications, and management. Appendix 4 discusses in more depth areas for improvement which were identified during the evacuation, and explains how these are being reflected in the parish emergency planning process.
5.1 IS LARGE SCALE EVACUATION AN EFFECTIVE PROTECTIVE ACTION ?
The principal conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that evacuation is a viable protective measure in this area of Louisiana, as evidenced by the success with which it was carried out in the Union Carbide incident. This evacuation was, according to emergency prepateaness officials, one of the largest which has ever taken placr. in I
this area, and was considered successful by participants for these reasons:
1.
The great majority of the population was evacuated within two and a half hours f rom the start of notification; and within two and a half to three and a half hours of the decision to evacuate; 2.
The evacuation proceeded smoothly in spite of darkness, heavy rains and fog; 3.
There were no injuries due to traf fic accidents or any other cause connected with the evacuation; 4
Traf fic moved smoothly cut of the area with no long traf fic delays and only two minor accidents; 28
i 5.
The evacuees were orderly and cooperative in following the instructions of the emergency personnel while leaving the area; 4
6.
Emergency workers responded in a timely and responsible manner; and 7.
The evacuated area was effectively secured for the duration of the evacuatio n.
Both John Lucas and Bertram Madere, the chief emergency preparedness officials in each parish, and their key aides indicated that the evacuation went very smoothly. This opinion was corroborated at the 4
local level in discussions with firemen, sherif fs' deputies, school of ficials, and others who participated in the evacuation.
In conclusion, o,
there can be little question that officials and residents of this area are capable of effectively conducting a complete and large scale l
evacuation, such as took place with the Union Carbide explosion.
It should be noted that conditions exist in this area of Louisiana which facilitate evacuation. Among these conditions are:
I 1.
This area has been subjected to numerous evacuations in the past because of hurricanes and industrial accidents. John Lucas indice*ed that in his six years as Director of Emergency Preparedness for St. Charles Parish, he supervised fif teen evacuations. Bertram Madere said he supervises an average of two evacuations per year.
Several incerviewees commented tha t the experience of the populace makes evacuati;ns easier in this area of Louisiana.
2.
Several interviewees for this study indicatec that because many of the area residents either work in chemical industries or know someone who does, awareness levels are hi h with respect to the b
da ngers involved in industrial accidents. This knowledge causes the residents to appropriately respond when there is an evacua tio n.
29
3.
Another advantage in this area of Louisiana is the existence of a large measure of cooperation, planning, and experience among local emergency preparedness officials and others responsible for managing an evacuation. This is an outgrowth of the area's experience with emergencies.
however, it is also a result of the existence of trained emergency operations personnel, bo th parishes have viable emergency preparedness organizations, of fices, and equipment.
Key personnel in both agencies have received professional training in emergency preparedness.
In addition, they continually interact with other groups which are responsille for various facets of evacuation, such as sheriffs' personnel, fire departments, school of ficials, and industrial managers.
4, A final advantage is the efforts which have been undertaken for emergency plans for LP&L's Waterford SES-Unit No. 3 nuclear
_ genera ting station.
In response to requirements of the Ub Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Federal Emergency hanagement Agency, both parishes have been preparing extensive plans for dealing with emergencies at the nuclear power plant.
Many discussions and decisions have transpired during this planning proces s, and most have application to non-radiological emergencies which may occur. Many interviewees for the present study cited the helpfulness of the emergency planning process for the Waterford SES-Unit No. 3 in conducting the evacuation resulting from the Union Carbide incident.
5.2 TO WHAT EXTENT WERE TkE MECHANICS OF ThE EVACUAIION CARRIEL OUT Ih AN EFFIClENT AhD IIMELY hANNER?
Ihe mechanics of the evacuation involvec the following component activities: notification; routing of traffic; evacuating people dependent on public transportation; confirmation and security; response by industry; and management of reception centers. Each of these
. ac tivi ties, as it was carried out during the course of the evacuation, is
' discussed in the following sections. Additionally, population behavior 30
is also considered.
A detailed technical analysis of the areas for improvement which were noted during the evacuation, along with their relationship to the parish emergency planning process is presented in Appendix 4.
5.2.1 Notification 5.2.1.1 Notification of hesidents A " fan out" method was used to notify the public of the need to evacuate.
in this method of notification, police and fire department personnel " fan out" in the area to be evacuated, sounding vehicle sirens and announcing over the vehicles' PA syctem the need to evacuate. During the Union Carbide evacuation, the notification ras done primarily by the fire department personnel, with some aid from the sheriffs' departments and civil defense personnel. At the start of the evacuation, the sheriffs' departments were busy establishing access control points, and the fire departments assumed responsibility for notifying the residents.
The notification of the residents in the evacuation area went very well.
The notification took approximately one to one and a half hours to complete, depending on the size of the area being notified. There were no known instances of the public not being notified.
Two areas for future improvement identified during the notification of residents concerned the secpe of the fire departments' responsibilities in this procedure. First, the public was not informed to bring any supplies such as medications or sufficient clothing which they would require during the day.
Second, two of the six volunteer fire departments involved in the evacuation expressed concern that, in future eme rgencies, their personnel might be diverted from notification by other eme rg encies.
However, the public information brochure as well as the Public Broadcast Station announcements and the siren system, both planned f or use during emergencies at Waterford SES-Unit No. 3 and other similar emergencies as the Union Carbide incident, sill alleviate these concerns in future emergency activities. These items are discussed in more depth in Appendix 4.
31
5.2.1.2 Notification of Industries Immediately af ter the explosion occurred, and throughout the early morning hours of December 11, 1962, many industries in the area were in contact with the St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Department or the EOC to try to obtain information on the accident and the type of chemical involved.
According to the St. Charles Sheriff's Department logs, most of the industries in St. Charles Parish in the evacuated area were notified via the industrial hotline between 4:45 a.m. and 5:15 a.m. on December 11, 1982.
-In talking with the industries in the area af ter the evacuation, the following said they were notified of the evacuation at approximately 5 a.m., either through the hotline or by a deputy f rom the Sheriff's Department : Shell Chemical Taft, Occidental Chemical, LP&L's katerford
(
SEb Units 1, 2 and 3, Shell Chemical Complex liorco, GAIX Terminals, Gooo hope kefineries and Big Three Industries. Bayou Steel, which is in St.
John the Baptist Parish and which is not part of the hotline, was notified by deputies from St. John the Baptist Sheriff's Department.
Witco Chemical, Beker Industries, and LP&L's Little Gypsy SES say they were never officially contacted via the hotline, but found out about the evacuation by' either calling the St. Charles Parish EOC themselves or by listening to radio station WCKW.
It is clear that, regardless of how the notification took place, all industries received information of the evacuation in a timely manner.
However, several industries felt that the communication of information to the industries could be improved.
Based on information obtained f rom this evacuation, the procedures for notifying industries of emergencies are under review. Appendix 4 contains a detailed summary of the specific industrial concerns.
5.2.2 Routing of Traffic As discussed in Section 3.2, weather conditions durir6 the time of the evacuation were adverse.
It rained steadily, and visibility was poor due 32
to fog conditions in the area. Despite the poor weather conditions, there were no traffic problems. Traffic moved smoothly and in an orderly fashion with the average speed of the vehicles estimated to range between 30 and 45 mph.
There were only two minor traffic accidents, with no injuri es.
One occurred in Norco and was cleared away very quickly, and the other occurred outside the evacuated area in the parking lot at one of the shelters in St. John the Baptist Parish.
At the start of the evacuation, access control points (which prevent traf fic from entering the area, as well as assist in controlling and directing traffic) were established at the locations shown on Figure 2.
As the evacuation progressed, several of the access control points were repositioned and new ones were established to better control the entering traf fic and, as necessary, to expand the area being evacuated (see Figure 2).
Some of the interviewees indicated that the initial placement of some of the access control points (see Appendix 4 for more details) was improved during the course of the evacuation by repositioning them at locations with larger turning areas.
In addition to the access control points, traffic control points were also established at three locations in St. Charles Parish. These were located at Evangeline Road and US 61, Apple Street and US 61 in Norco and River Road and Apple Street in Norco.
With the exception of the access control point in St. John the Baptist Parish on the west bank, all of the access and traffic control points were manned by either parish sherif f deputies or State Police.
In St. Charles Parish several of the access control points were manned by the Jefferson Parish She riff 's Department. On the west bank in St. John the Baptist Parish the access control point at La 18 was manned by firemen and civil defense personnel.
The only significant traffic holdup which occurred involved people trying to enter the evacuated area.
These were primarily shift workers who were trying to get to work _t the industrial plants. These people were detained at the access control points until it was determined that they were required at the plant. Suggestions have been made to alleviate this 33
concern by issuing identification passes to the appropriate industrial shift workers. These traffic jams did not significantly impede the evacuees leaving the area.
5.2.3 Transportation Dependent Populatio n 5.2.3.1 People Without Cars Based on inf ormation available in the 1980 U S Census, there are an estimated 2,000 people in the evacuated area who do not own cars.
The parishes' emergency plans assume the need for approximately 44 school buses to evacuate those people without cars.
However, during the Union Carbide en.ergency only three buses were used to evacuate people without cars.
Approximately 1,600-1,700 of the people without cars received rides out of the area with their f riends and neighbors, while the remainder were provided transportation via buses.
This indicates that the "buday system", which is advocated by emergency picaners in this area as a means for assisting those without access to automobiles, worked well. The
" buddy system" is a system in which people who are evacuating the area in their own vehicles voluntarily of fer rides to neighbors, f riends and relatives whom they know require a ride to evacuate the area.
People in St. Char 1cs and St. John the Baptist Parishes have been told that in an emergency they should check with their neighbors and f riends to see if they rescire assistance in leaving the area.
Based on the reaction of the people during the Union Carbide evacuation, this " buddy system" works very well and was effective in helping a number of people to evacuate.
The remainder of the people without cars were transported f rom the area on school buses, and an Avondale Shipyard labor bus, which were mobilized to pick up people without any other means of transportation. Two school buses were used in St. Charles Parish, according to Barry hahady, the Director of School Bus Transportation in St. Charles Parish. He mobilized the two buses at about 5:30 a.m, one to pick people up on the west bank, and the other on the east bank. The buses were driven 34
along the street and picked up people who flaghed them down. The evacuees were then delivered to the reception centers, and the buses returned to the School Board Administration Building for further a ssignment. Barry Mahady stated that each bus took two trips and that they were never full on any of the trips. Each bus has a capacity of 60 persons.
In addition to these two buses, there are two school buses in the town of Killona which are available to evacuate people without cars. However, Saviour Cannon, the Chief of the Fire Department, said these buses lef t early with very few people on them.
To help evacuate the remainder of the people without cars, a volunteer firemen made two trips with the Avondale Shipyards labor bus.
The first time this bus was filled to capacity (over 60 people). On the second trip, the bus transported 10 to 12 people.
In St. John the Baptist Parish two buses were used on the east bank to pick up people who needed transportation. The buses drove behind fire trucks during notification to pick people up; approximately a dozen people obtained rides on them.
On the west bank no one required any I
assistance in leaving the area.
5.2.3.2 Disabled and Bedridden Persons Durirg the evacuation approximately eight ambulances were available to pick up bedridden persons. Two were from the St. Charles Hospital Ambulance Service; of these one was allocated to the east bank, and the other to the west bank. East Jefferson Hospital sent a total of four ambulances to the east bank. Two other ambulances from New Orleans were also present at the EOC, but were not used during the evacuation. The ambulances from St. Charles Hospital and East Jefferson Hospital began to pick up people between 5:00 and 6:00 a.m.
The lists of disabled and bedridden people in each parish indicate that there are 39 people in the evacuated area who would have required assistance in evacuating. However, duri g the evacuation only about 2v people required ambulance assistance in..eaving the area. On the west 35
bank only about 2 to 3 people required ambulance assistance in evacuating and on the east bank approximately 17 people required assistance. Nine of the latter group had been evacuated by the St. Charles Hospital ambulance by about 8 a.m.
The East Jefferson Hospital ambulances evacuated approximately 8 people. According to Robert Chadborn of the East Jefferson Hospital Ambulance Service, it took them until 10:30 a.m.
to 11:00 a.m. to locate a suitable reception point for these people.
Note that these times may be somewhat later than the actual completion of the evacuation; they represent the time when the last bedridden person was delivered to a hospital, af ter a period of trying to find a suitable reception center for them. Ambulance drivers from cutside St. Charles Parish were not as familiar with the area as the parish ambulance drivers and they were not sure where to take people once they were picked up.
In addition, at the time of the evacuation, a list of those persons in St.
Charles Parish requiring ambulance assistance to evacuate was not available in the EOC and this resulted in some delays in identifying these people. However, since the time of this evacuation, this concern has been alleviated by appointing a primary and backup Health / Medical Of ficer to assist at the EOC and by distributing a listing of persons requiring ambulance assistance to emergency workers.
This situation is discussed in more detail in Appendix 4.
In St. John the Baptist Parish the evacuation of disabled and infirm persons proceeded very smoothly. The St. John's EOC has a list of people who require transportation assistance. This list is updated yearly by the Parish Council on Aging. The list was distributed and used by the emergency workers to ensure that these people were evacuated in a timely fashion.
According to the Civil Defense Director, only two of these people required assistance in evacuating the area. These people, however, did not require an ambulance.
5.2.3.3 Jail The St. Charles Parish Jail is located in the Hahnville Courthouse on the edge of the evacuated area. During the evacuation, it was judged that the emergency was not severe enough to require the evacuation of the courthouse. However, a bus was mobilized and dedicated to evacuation of jail prisoners, just in case it became necessary to evacuate the courthouse.
36
5.2.4 Population Behavior 5.2.4.1 General Response According to the emergency workers who conducted the evacuation, the evacuees were extremely well behaved and cooperative throughout the evacuation. Many people had heard the explosion and were ready to leave when notified. When they did leave, most of them made sure that their friends and neighbors also had rides from the evacuated area. The only instance where people became somewhat anxious was in Killona when people without cars were trying to find rides.
However, these people obtained rides in car pools and buses which were available to transport them from the area. There was no evidence of any overreaction during the evacuation. Drivers'did not speed, and they were very willing to follow the instructions given by the emergency workers.
l There were a few instances of people who did not evacuate. In St.
Charles Parish, there were approximately 15 to 20 people who did not evacuate. In St. John the Baptist Parish there were only about 5 to 10 people who did not evacuate. These people, in total, amounted to less than 0.2% of the populatica in the evacuated area.
In both parishes the names and addresses of those people who refused to leave were recorded by the sheriffs' departments who patrolled the area af ter the evacuation.
5.2.4.2 Spontaneous Evacuation Spontaneous evacuation refers to people evacuating an area on their own volition without issuance of an official order to evacuate. Two types of spontaneous evacuation have been identified:
(1) evacuation shadow phenomenon and (2) spontaneous voluntary evacuation.
"The evacuation shadow phenomenon is the term used to describe the tendency of an official evacuation advisory to cause departure f rom a much larger area than was originally intended"(1).
In the Union (1)Zeigler, D.J., Brunn, S.D.,
and Johnson Jr., J.H, " Evacuation from a Nuclear Technological Disaster", in The Geographical Review, Vol. 71, Number 1, January,1981.
37
Carbide evacuation, the emergency workers interviewed were not aware of any shadow phenomenon in the area.
There was some spontaneous voluntary evacuation, i.e., people leaving the area before an official evacuation was authorized. This spontaneous evacuation occurred immediately af ter the explosion took place in those areas of Taf t and Hahnville which are adjacent to the Union Carbide Taf t Plant. People in these areas lef t their homes right after the explosion.
Later, af ter they were told no evacuation was officially authorized, they returned to their homes until officially notified to evacuate later on in the morning.
5.2.5 Response by Industry There are thirteen industries within the evacuated area.
These
[
industries produce products ranging from steel and electricity to chemicals, petrochemicals and refinery products. All of them are essentially 24-hour, 365 days / year operations. Shutdown of any one of these plants can take anywhere from a half hour to a few days depending upon the operations involved.
In some of the plante, to shut down in a l
shorter time frame could cause a potential problem in the safe and efficient operation of the facility.
During the Union Carbide incident, several industries in the area chose to shut down and keep only a few people onsite to safeguard their facilities. Others opted to continue operation until the situation at Union Carbide appeared to be getting worse.
In no case did the shutdown or evacuation procedures entail any safety hazards. Nor were any problems encountered at those plants which chose to remain in operation.
Appendix 5 contains a complete description of the actions taken by each of the industries during the evacuation, as well as an estimate of how long it would take to safely shut down each plant.
5.2.6 Vessels on the Mississippi River The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) was responsible for notifying ships in the Mississippi River of the emergency and for controlling access to that 38
part of the river within the evacuated area. All notifications were carried out promptly and in accord with regulations. When the ULCG closed the river to navigation, they did not patrol the river to ensure that the orders were followed. The order that was broaccast, however, is authorized by Federal Regulation 33CFR160.11. Failure to comply with this order could result in a fine of up to $50,000 or imprisonment not to exceed five years or both, or a civil penalty not to exceed $25,000. As far as the USCG knows, no ships disobeyed the order.
The only concern which the USCG expressed was with the ships already docked or anchored within the restricted zone. The USCG dealt with these ships on a case-by-case basis. Some ships decided to stay, others lifted anchor and lef t, or tried to make provisions to evacuate their crews.
The USCG aided as cuch as possible any ship which wished to leave the a re a.
5.2.7 Conf irmation and Security To confirm that the area had been evacuated, the sheriffs' deputies and firemen patrolled the evacuated area. They basically did this by observing if there was any activity in the area. Throughout the perioa when residents were gone, emergency personnel made periodic trips through the evacuated area to ensure that there were no fires and that vandalism or looting was not taking place. No one who was interviewed was aware of any vandalism or looting during the evacuation.
In addition to periodic inspections of homes in the area, sherif f s' deputies and State Troopers remained at access control points at the perimeter of the evacuated area. At the access control points there was a large number of people who requested authorization to enter the evacuated area. Some of these people were the industrial workers going to the plant for a change of shif ts who had to be detained in order to be properly identified before they were permitted into the area (see Appendix 4).
Evacuees, who wished to return to their homes to get medicine or warmer clothing were also at the roadblocks and they were escorted in and out of the evacuated area by either deputies or firemen'.
No one was permitted in unescorted.
39
5.2.8 Management of Reception Centers There were four shelters or reception centers to which the evacuees coula go during the evacuation.
In St. Charles Parish, the reception centers were at the Hahnville High School on the west bank and the Destrehan High School on the east bank; in St. John the Baptist Parish, at West St. John High School on the west bank and at John L. Ory School on the east bank.
Of the approximately 16,000 people who evacuated, only 1,950 to 2,000 stayed at the shelters throughout the evacuation.
All the other evacuees either stayed with f riends and relatives outside the evacuated area or went to motels.
At the start of the evacuation many more people registered at the
. reception centers then actually stayed Saturday ni ht.
As it became b
ap pa re nt that the evacuation was to be more than a few hours, several hundred people lef t the shelters to stay with f riends and relatives. At Hahnville High School it is estimated that approximately 600 to 700 t
evacuees actually registered at the reception center, but less than 500 stayed the night. At Destrehan High School approximately 1,500 people checked in, but only 1,000 stayed the night. West St. John high School had approximately 400 people who stayed overnight. The number of people who checked into the school is not available. At John L. Ory School several hundred people had registered by Saturday af ternoon; however, by Saturday night there were only 60 to 70 people who slept over.
Personnel at reception centers were responsible for keeping order, and providing food, bedding, and sanitary facilities for the evacuees, as well as for responding to any medical emergencies. A combination of Red Cross personnel, school authorities, sherif f s' deputies, and local volunteers attended to these duties. Overcrowding was somewhat of a problem at Destrehan nigh School, but other than this, no unusual difficulties occurred. One general concern expressed by many reception center workers interviewed for this study was that no leaders were assigned overall responsibility. Although some minor inconveniences were experienced at the reception centers, their operations went relatively smooth and most inconveniences, once identified, were alleviated by the inventiveness of the volunteers operating the centers. This issue is discussed in Appendix 4.
40
5.3 DIL hANAGEhnT OF THE EVACUATION FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY ?
When an evacuation is recommended in these parishes, authorization must be given by the authorized parish official, their approved representative or the governor. Once authorization is given, the parish emergency plans are activated, bringing into play a predetermined systematic division of responsibility among groups specifically charged with public protection.
The coordination of these groups is established f rom the parish EOC.
One EOC is located in each parish, Judging by the effectiveness of the evacuation, the parish EOC's performed their function quite well. The evacuation of 16,000 people in a rainstorm at a pre-dawn time, virtually without mishap, represents a substantial management accomplishment. The parish EOC's, which coordinated this evacuation, carried out their responsibilities in an effective manner.
During the course of the evacuation a few situations arose concerning the EOCs' management which indicated that changes may be helpful to more
-efficient functioning in future emergencies.
These concerns inclucea staffing, communications, security, and uncertainty about the nature of the evacuation order. These concerns are discussed in detail in Appendix 4.
According to the State Police, Union Carbide had two EOCs. One was on the Union Carbide site in the Administration building.
It was f rom this E0C that they were trying to handle the onsite situation. The secona EOC was offsite at the Monsanto Chemical Company in Luling. Union Carbide l
was using this EOC as a staging area for their incoming personnel as well as a planning office for addressing the situation on their own site.
These arrangements received praise f rom interviewees concerned with this aspect of the evacuatio n.
5.4 HOW LONG DID IT TAKE TO EVACL ATE?
In discussirs the amount of time it took to evacuate the area, no formal procedures or metnods have been used in this report for deciding when 41
notification started and the evacuation was completed. The times which are mentioned in this section are estimates based on the observations of the emergency personnel who were in the towns or at the access control points when it appeared that the last people had lef t.
The maximum time to evacuate any town in the evacuated area was 2-1/2 hours from the start of notification. Most of the firemen who were doing the notification said that the people were leaving very soon af ter they were notified. Most of the residents had heard the explosion earlier in, the morning, and were already awake when they were notified to evacuate.
Overall, the majority of the population had evacuated the area in approxicately 2-1/2 to 3-1/2 hours af ter the time the decision was made to evacuate. This includes the time needed to mobilize the emergency personnel (firemen, deputies, and bus drivers, etc.), the time required to notify the general public of the need to evacuate, as well as the time for the people to drive out of the area.
The time required to evacuate individual towns varied depending on the size of the area. According to Bertram Madere, the east bank of St. John the Baptist Parish was evacuated by 6:10 a.m., approximately one hour and ten minutes af ter he had given the word to evacuate. The west bank was evacuated by 6:30 a.m.
In St. Charles Parish, the decision to evacuate was made by the Parish President at 4:30 a.m.
By 6:00 a.m.
the town of killona had evacuated.
The Hahnville Fire Department said that by 8:00 a.m., three and a half hours after it was decided to evacuate, the towns of Hahnville and Taf t had been evacuated. On the east bank, the Norco firemen indicated that Norco, Good Hope and Montz had finished evacuating by 7:30 a.m.
By 6:00 a.m., according to the East St. Charles firemen, the town of New Sarpy, with the exception of some bedridden people, had been evacuated.
Randy Robert, the fire chief, indicated the bedridden people were evacuatea from New Sarpy by 8:20 a.m.
The evacuation took place in adverse weather conditions.
It was raining steadily and there was limited visibility due to fog conditions 42
throughout the time people were evacuating. Despite the inclement weather conditions, the emergency personnel conducting the evacuation said that the traf fic moved smoothly out of the area with very few significant traffic holdups or accidents.
Some bedridden people may have taken longer than three and a half hours to evacuate. As discussed above in Subsection 5.2.3.2, some difficulties occurred in St. Charles Parish in locating the bedridden people and in identifying which hospital or medical facility to take them to once they were picked up.
The St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Department states that all of the bedridden patients were not evacuated until about 9:00 a.m.
However, Robert Chadborn, the Ambulance Director for East Jefferson hospital, states that he finished finding a suitable reception center for bedridden patients at about 11:00 a.m.
The East Jefferson hospital Ambulance evacuated approximately eight people on the East bank of St.
Charles Parish.
43 l
Ch APTER VI CONCLUS10h5 The major conclusion of this study is that evacuation is a feasible protective action in this area of Louisiana. The evacuation which took place on December 11, 1982, as a result of the accident at the Union Carbide Taf t Plant,' was a succes s.
Nearly all of the people interviewed confirmed this judgment. The f ollowing points summarize the key findings of the evacuation:
1)
The decision to evacuate was made at around 4:30 a.m. on Saturday morninb, December 11, 1962. During the time of the evacuation it was raining and visibility was poor due to fog.
Despite the time of day and the weather conditions, it took 2-1/2 hours to evacuate the majority of the population af ter notification was initiated and about 2-1/2 to 3-1/2 hours to evacuate these people if the evacuation' time is calculatea from the time when the evacuation was officially authorized.
2)
Residents were promptly notified of the emergency using a fan out method of notification.
3)
There were only two minor traf fic accidents ano no substantial delays in traffic leaving the area.
4)
There was no evidence of panic or disorderly conduct on the part of the evacuee s.
5)
All the emergency workers responded in a timely and responsible manne r.
6)
There was no looting or vandalism in the areas evacuated.
As an aid for planning, this study has also identified areas which could be improved in future emergencies. These areas for improvement along with their resolution are discussed in Appendix 4.
44
(Sheet 1 of 2)
TABLE 1 METEOROLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS FROM NEW ORLEANS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FOR DECEMBER 11, 1982 Wind Time Visibility Direction Speed Temp (CST)
Weather (miles)
(degru s/ compass) (mph) (05) 0:30 Fog 1
110 ESE 5.8 0:55 Fog 1
130 SE 4.6 63 1:55 Fog 1
220 SW 4.6 64 2:31 Light Drizzle / Fog 1.5 220 SW 6.9 2:55 Light Rain / Fog 1.5 220 SW 6.9 66 3:09 Light Rain / Fog 3
220 SW 10.4 3:55 Light Rain / Fog 3
230 SW 11.5 67 4:10 Light Rain / Fog 4
210 SSW 10.4 4:55 Light Rain / Fog 4
230 SW 10.4 67 5:19 Heavy Rain / Fog 1
230 SW 11.5 5:27 Rain / Fog 4
230 SW 10.4 5:32 Heavy Rain Shower / Fog 0.75 230 SW 13.8 5:55 Heavy Rain Shower / Fog 1
230 SW 12.7 70 6:55 Light Rain Shower / Fog 2
240 SWS 11.5 69 7:08 High Rain / Fog 5
240 WSW 11.5 7:21 Light Rain / Fog 1.75 240 WSW 10.4 7:38 Light Rain / Fog 3
240 WSW
- 9. 2 7:55 Light Rain / Fog 3
240 WSW 8.1 69 8:55 Light Rain / Fog-3 250 WSW 8.1 69 9:39 Light Rain / Fog 0.5 320 NW 6.1 9:45 Light Rain / Fog 1
330 Nhv 9.2 9:54 Light Rain / Fog 1
350 N
9.2 66 10:17 Fog 5
350 N
10.4 10:54 Fog 6
10 N
9.2 65 11:55 Fog 4
20 NNE
- 5. 8 64 12:07 Fog 4
20 NNE 4.6 12:28 Fog 2
360 N
6.9 12:54 Fog 2
40 NE 5.8 64 13:31 Fog 2
Calm 13:54 Light Rain / Fog 2
240 WSW 4.6 64 14:08 Light Rain / Fog 1
240 WSW 4.6 14:43 Light Rain / Fog 1.75 Calm 14:54 Light Rain / Fog 1.75 250 WSW
- 3. 5 63 15:20 Light Rain / Fog 1.5 250 WSW 4.6 15:52 Light Rain / Fog 1.50 260 W
- 3. 5 63 16:40 Light Rain / Fog 2.5 340 NNW 9.2 16:54 Light Rain / Fog 3
280 W
8.1 62 17:09 Light Rain / Fog 3
330 NNW 11.5 17:54 No Precipitation or 7
330 NNW 15.0 59 Obstruction to Vision 18:54 Light Drizzle 3
330 Nhv 16.1 54 19:05 Light Drizzle 3
330 NNW 19.6
(Sheet 2 of 2)
TABLE 1 Wind Time Visibility Direction Speed Temp (CST)
Weather (miles)
(degrees / compass) (mph) (OF) 19:35 Light Drizzle 6
360 N
23.0 52 19:52 Light Drizzle 6
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360 N
23.0 48 Obstruction of Vision 22:54 No Precipitation or 7
10 N
25.3 46 Obstruction of Vision 23:54 No Precipitation or 7
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APPENDIX 1 EMERGENCY PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED 1
4
Sheet 1 of 5 APPENDIX 1 EMERGENCY PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED JANUARY 10, 1983 - JANUARY 20, 1983 STATE AND FEDERAL OFFICIALS Name and Title Affiliation Eric Chapman U.S. Coast Guard Lieutenant Waterway Safety Branch New Orleans, Louisiana Al Goodeau Louisiana State Police Lieutenant Hazardous Substance Control Baton Rouge, Louisiana Ronald Mayeaux State Police, Troop B Trooper New Orleans, Louisiana Michael O'Neil Louisiana State Police Trooper Hazardous Substance Control Baton Rouge, louisiana Gustave Von Bodungen Of fice of Environmental Program Administrator Affairs Air Quality Division Baton Rouge, Louisiana LOCAL OFFICIALS Barbara Barecca St. Charles Parish Department of Emergency Coordinator Pre paredness Hahnv111e, Louisiana Fobert Brennan St. John the Baptist Parish Deputy Director of Field Civil Defense Operations Laplace, louisiana William Bryant St. Charles Parish Sheriff Deputy Depa rtmen t Hahnville, Louisiana Saviour Cannon Killona Volunteer Fire Chief Fire Department Killona, Louisiana
Sheet 2 of 5 APPENDIX 1 LOCAL OFFICIALS (Cont'd)
Name and Title Affiliation Robert Chadborn East Jefferson Hospital Director Ambulance Service East Jefferson Hospital Kenner, Louisiana Tyrell Ccrnwell St. Charles Parish Dispatcher Sheriff Department Hahnville, Louisiana Michael Duhe
,St. John the Baptish Fire Deputy Civil Defense Laplace, Louisiana Frank Fagot Laplace Volunteer Fire Fire Chief Department Laplace, Louisiana Charles Faucheux St. Charles Parish Sherif f Deputy Department i
Hahnville, Louisiana Kevin Friloux St. Charles Parish President Hahnville, Iouisiana Dowie L. Gendron St. John the Baptist Parf sh President Police Jury Laplace, Louisiana Van Gilmore St. John the Baptist Communications Officer Civil Defense Laplace, Louisiana Neil Haydel Hahnville Volunteer Fire Department Fire Chief Hahnville, Iouisiana Leon Holmes St. Charles Parish Sheriff Assistant Chief Department Hahnville, Louisiana Jules Hymel St. Charles Parish Department of Asst Director Emergency Preparedness Hahnville, Louisiana J
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Sheet 3 of 5 APPENDIX 1 LOCAL OFFICIALS (Cont'd)
Name and Title Affiliation Lloyd Johnson St. John the Baptist Parish St. John the Baptist Sheriff Sheriff Department Laplace, Louisiana Robert Loupe Norco Volunteer Fire Fire Chief Department Norco, Louisiana s
John "Ikey" Lucas St. Charles Parish Depstement of Director Emergency Preparedness Hahnville, Louisiana Bert Madere St. John the Baptist Parish Director Civil Defense Laplace, Louisiana Barry Mahady St. Charles Parish Chief of Transportation Public Schools Luling, Louisiana Barry Minnich Luling Fire Department Fire Chief Luling, Louisiana i
1 Beverly Robein St. Charles and St. John Executive Secretary the Baptist Red Cross La Place, Louisiana Randy Robert East St. Charles Fire Chief Volunteer Fire Department New Sarpy, Louisiana Anthony Schaubert St. Charles Parish Director Public Works Hahnv111e, Louisiana I
Larry Sesser St. Charles Parish Chief of Physical Plant Public Schools i
Operations Luling, Louisiana Charles Wilson St. Charles Parish Sheriff l
St. Charles Parish Sheriff Department Hahnville, Louisiana e
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Sheet 4 of 5 APPENDIX 1 INDUSTRY OFFICIALS Name and Title Affiliation R. E. Alexander Shell Chemical Company Plant Manager Taft, Louisiana Polybutylene George Bailey LP&L Waterford-3 Emergency Planning Coordinator Killona, Louisiana Stese Baucom Big Three Industries Asst Plant Manager Norco, Louisiana Gregory M. Brou Union Carbide Corporation Department Head Ethylene Oxide /
Energy Systems Department Glycol Division Taft, Louisiana Joseph R. Daley Witco Chemical Corporation Vice President Taft, Louisiana Charlie Duhon Shell Complex Safety Superintendent &
Norco, Louisiana Onsite Emergency Coordinator Ben H. Farrow Beker Industries Corp Plant Manager Taft, Louisiana Brenda Fisette LP&L Waterford-3 Ebasco Personnel Killona, Louisiana Sergio Gutierrez LP&L Waterford 1 and 2 Plant Manager Killona, Louisiana George P. Haas Occidental Chemical Corporation Manager of Employee Relations Taft, Louisiana
& Environmental Dalton Hargraves Good Hope Refinery Director of Security Good Hope, Louisiana Art James Union Carbide Corporation Safety and Health Department Ethylene Oxide /
Glycol Division Taft, Louisiana J. Y. Jenkins LP&L Little Gypsy Operations Superintendent Montz, Louisiana W. B. Kennedy Shell Chemical Company Services Manager Taft Plant Taft, Louisiana
Sheet 5 of 5 APPENDIX 1 INDUSTRY OFFICIALS Name and Title Affiliation Ernie Martin Shell Complex Superintendent, Health, Safety Norco, Louisiana and Environment Max Mason LP&L Little Gypsy Shift Supervisor Montz, Louisiana Louis Mastroni LP&L Waterf ord-3 Safety Supervisor Killona, Louisiana Maurice R. Monie, Jr GATX Terminal, Corporation Terminal Manager Good Hope, Louisiana Daniel O'Rourke Good Hope Refinery Security Good Hope, Louisiana Hillary Otillio LP&L Little Gypsy Plant Manager Montz, Louisiana Ray Pelton Bayou Steel Director of Personnel Laplace, Louisiana Clete Russel LP&L Little Gypsy Asst Plant Manager Montz, Louisiana Marvin Thorning Witco Chemical Corporation l
Plant Manager Taft, Louisiana A. R. Zamanian Shell Chemical Company Process Manager Taft Plant Operations Department Ta f t, Iouisiana i
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J QUESTIONNAIRE 4
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EMERCENCY ORGANIZATION A.
Organizations Involved and Their Responsibilities
- 1) What state and local organizations were involved in the evacuation?
- 2) What role did the Parish Presidents take in the evacuation?
- 3) Were there any difficulties in the emergency organizational structure used during this evacuation?
- 4) Who was responsible for notifying the population?
- 5) Who was responsible for traffic control during the i
evacuation?
- 6) Who was responsible for confirming that everyone had evacuated?
- 7) Who was responsible for securing the area from vandalism and looting?
- 8) Were any volunteers used to help during the evacuation?
4
- 9) How many volunteers were used?
- 10). Were there too few or too many volunteers?
- 11) What responsibilities did the volunteers have?
B.
Command Decision Structure 4
- 12) What was the command decision structure used during the evacuation?
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How was it decided to use this structure?
- 14) Who decided to use this structure?
C.
Communications
- 15) Did you have a central operations center?
- 16) If you did have a central operations center, where was it located?
- 17) Who was in charge of the operations center?
- 18) How did personnel in the field communicate with the operations center?
- 19) How of ten and for what purposes did they communicate with l
the operations center 7 i
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- 20) Were there any problems with the communication system?
- 21) Were there any problems with the frequency of the
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- 22) Were there any problems with the commercial telephone lines during the evacuation?
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II. NOTIFICATION A.
Notification and Mobilization of Emergency Personnel,
- 1) What time did the accident occur?
- 2) What time were the parish officials notified of the accident?
- 3) How were the parish officials notified of the accident?
- 4) Who made the decision to evacuate?
- 5) What time was the decision to evacuate made?
- 6) How were the emergency personnel notified to mobilize?
- 7) What time were the emergen:y personnel notified to mobilize?
- 8) Were there any problems with the notification of emergency personnel?
- 9) How long did it take for the emergency personnel to mobilize?
- 10) Were there any problems with mobilization of emergency personnel?
B.
Notification of the Population
- 11) At what time was the population notified of the need to evacuate?
- 12) What means were used to notify the population? Was radio or o
TV used?
- 13) Was the notification staged (i.e., persons living closest to the' accident site notified first) or was the notification of the population started in all areas at the same time?
- 14) How many people were used to notify the public?
- 15) How many vehicles were used to notify the public?
- 16) How long did the notification take? How was this determined?
C.
Special Population Groups
- 17) How were persons in the wetlands or in inaccessible areas notified?
- 18) How were special institutions (i.e., jails, nursing home, etc.) notified? Problems?
- 19) What time were the special institutions notified?
- 20) How were the industries notified? (include W 1 & 2 and Little Gypsy)
- 21) Were there any problems in notifying the industries?
- 22) What time were the industries notified?
- 23) What time was the Coast Guard told to stop river traffic?
- 24) How did the Coast Guard notify the river traffic of the emergency?
- 25) How long did it take to close off the affected portion of the river to river traffic?
- 26) Were there any problems in notifying any portion of the public?
- 27) Was everyone in the affected area notified?
D.
Population Behavior
- 28) What message and instructions were given to the people when they were notified?
- 29) Did everyone understand the instructions.
If not why?
30 What waru the peoples' reactions to message and instructions given?
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III. EVACUATION (Include residents, institutions & industries)
A.
Ba ckground
- 1) At what time did people start to evacuate?
- 2) What area was evacuated?
- 3) How was this area decided upon?
- 4) Was there a shadow effect during the evacuation?
i.e., did people living outside the critical area evacuate their homes as well?
- 5) Approximately how many people were evacuated?
- 6) Approximately how many vehicles were evacuated?
B.
Evacuation Routes
?) Where were the people told to go when they were evacuated?
- 8) Were the people instructed to follow any specific routes when leaving the area?
- 9) Why and how were these routes specified?
- 10) Who chose these routes?
- 11) Were the directions followed? If not, why?
- 12) Were any routes unusable during' the evacuation?
- 13) If routes were unusable, why were they not used?
- 14) What were the most heavily used traf fic evacuation routes?
I
- 15) Can you estimate the speed of traffic (M.P.H.) on these routes?
- 16) How long did it take to evacuate the entire area? How was this determined?
- 17) How long did it take to evacuate vari'ous sectors within the five mile radius? How was this determined?
C.
Special Population Groups
- 18) How many disabled persons needed assistance in evecuating?
- 19) How were these disabled persons evacuated?
- 20) How many people other than disabled persons required assistance in evacuating?
- 21) How were these people evacuated?
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- 22) How many persons in special institutions were evacuated?
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- 23) How were these people evacuated?
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- 24) Did the industries in the area evacuate?
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- 25) How many industrial workers were evacuated?
- 26) How many buses, if any, were used during the evacuation?
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- 27) How many trips did they make?
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- 28) Who were the bus drivers?
- 29) Where did they come from?
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- 30) Did anyone object to driving the school buses?
- 31) If the institutions or industries did not evacuate, what other protective measures were employed?
D.
Traffic Movement i
Traffic Control
- 32) What type of traffic controls were used during the evacuation?
(i.e., barricades, traffic control personnel, etc.)
- 33) Where were the traffic control points located? (use a map to give exact location)
- 34) How many people were used for traffic control?
- 35) Where any roads made one way leaving the area?
(i.e., were in-bound lanes used for out-bound traffic)
- 36) Were there any problems in directing traffic?
- 37) Was there any attempt made to monitor the traffic during the evacuation?
- 38) If the traffic was monitored during the evacuation, how was it done?
- 39) Were there any adjustments made to the traffic routing during the evacuation?
- 40) If so how was it done?
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Traffic Congestion
- 41) Were there any areas of traf fic congestion or traf fic jams?
- 42) Where were these areas of traffic congestion? (Use a map to pin point areas)
- 43) What was the length of the traffic jams at these locations?
- 44) How long did it take for these areas to " clear" up? How were they cleared up?
- 45) What were the weather conditions during the evacuation?
- 46) Did the weather cause any problems or delay in the evacuation?
Traffic Accidents
- 47) kere there any traffic accidents during the evacuation?
- 48) How many accidents occurred?
- 49) How severe were the accident?
- 50) Did any of these accidents cause any delay in the evacuation?
- 51) What measures were taken to move damaged vehicles out of traffic?
- 52) If there were not accidents, what measures were planned in case there were any accidents?
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E.
Population Behavior
- 53) Did anyone refuse to evacnate?
- 54) If some persons did refuse to evacuate, how was the situation resolved?
- 55) Was there any panic or disorderly conduct during the evacuation? Explain?
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IV. CONFIRMATION AND SECURITY A.
Confinnation 1)
What means were used to confirm that all evacuees had lef t the area?
2)
Were there any problems in confirming that everyone had lef t the area?
3)
At what time did emergency personnel begin to confirm the area was evacuated?
4)
How long did it take to confirm the area was evacuated?
B.
Security 5)
How was the area secured af ter the evacuation to prevent looting and vandalism?
'i 6)
Were there any instances of looting or vandalism?
7)
Was access to the area completely prohibited or was traffic allowed to pass through?
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V.
RECEPTION CENTERS
- 1) Where were the reception centers?
- 2) Who arranged for their reception centers?
- 3) Were any families divided during the evacuation?
- 4) Was any attempt made to re' unite families? If so, How?
- 5) How many of the evacuees ma _'o use of the reception centers?
- 6) Were the reception center facilities adequate for the number of people they had to service?
i.e., was there enough food, beds, toilet facilities, etc.
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- 7) Were there any instances of disorderly behavior (arguments, fights, etc) at the reception centers?
- 8) How long did people stay at the reception centers?
- 9) When was the decision made to allow the people to return home?
- 10) Who made this decision?
- 11) Were there any problems whil'e the evacuees were returning home?
i
VI. SIMMARY 1)
If you could have improved upon the evacuation what changes would you make?
- 2) How useful were the St. John the Baptist and St. Charles Parish Plans in conducting the evacuation?
- 3) Do you have any other comments?
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APPENDIX 3 BACKGROUND DATA l
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TABLE 3-1 EVAWATED AREA 1980 TOTAL POPULATION ENUMERATION DISTRICIS 1980 POPULATION St. John the Baptist Parish 103u 1612 109 0
1 10 0
120 2424 TOTAL 4036 St. Charles Parish 907c 0
909 0
912 634 913 689 914 261 929 0
930 0
0540 2947 0965 2249 0975 4416 TOTAL 11196 I
Evacuated Area Total 15232 I
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1980 US Census Bureau Sununary Tape File 3A I
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TABLE 3-2 EVAOJATION AREA 1980 FOPULATION M Apf BY SEX ST. JDhN THE BAPTIST PARISH ST. CHARLES PARISH EVACUATIOk AREA 1DTAL ACE T>tal Female Male Total Female Male Total Female Male Less than 1 year 25 8
17 227 119 108 252 127 125 2 & 3 yrs 169 72 97 357 162 195 526 234 292 3 & 4 yrs 131 73 58 450 253 197 581 326 255 5 yrs 52 13 39 177 83 94 239 96 143 f
6 yrs 56 13 43 139 69 70 195 82 113 l
7 - 9 yrs 221 77 144 521 243 278 742 320 422
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10 - 13 yrs 344 166 178 910 4f 4 446 1254 630 624 14 yrs 152 79 73 227 92 135 379 171 206 15 yrs 51 36 15 332 151 181 383 187 196 i
16 yrs 140 57 83 230 157 73 370 214 156 17 yrs 116 36 80 21 9 92 127 335 128 207 18 yrs 61 29 32 223 99 124 284 128 156 19 yrs 27 47 40 220 117 103 307 164 143 20 yrs 85 33 52 274 139 135 359 172 187 21 yrs 88 17 71 371 208 163 459 225 234 27 - 24 yrs 191 87 104 758 315 443 949 402 547 25 - 29 yrs 408 201 207 876 412 464 7284 61 3 671 30 - 34 yrs 286 141 145 600 352 248 886 493 393 J
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35 - 44 yrs 447 200 247 1017 524 493 1464 724 740 l
45 - 54 yrs 353 168 185 1252 604 648 1605 772 833 l
55 - 59 yrs 185 94 91 464 242 222 64 9 336 313 i
60 - 61 yrs 39 27 12 128 65 63 167 92 75 l,
62 - 64 yrs 63 33 30 271 143 128 334 176 158 j
65 - 74 yrs 203 109 95 672 377 295 875 485 390 j
7 5 - 84 yrs 70 19 51 283 202 81 343 221 12 2 85 yrs & over 10 10 0
40 19 21 50 29 21 Total 4033 1844 2189 11238*
5703 5535 15271*
7547 7724 1
j Total population age by sex for St. Charles Parish is higher than the total population indicated in Table 3-1 due to an error in Hahnv111e data for this table.
J Sourc e: 1980 US Census Bureau Summary Tape File 3A, Table 15 1
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TABLE 3-3 HOUSING UNITS WITHIN THE EVACUATION AREA ENUMERATION DISTRICTS HOUSING UNITS St. John tne Baptist Parish
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103b 758 109 0
110 0
120 655 TOTAL 1413 s
St. Charles Parish 907C 0
909 0
912 215 913 208 914 71 929 0
930 0
0540 1041 0965 ~
713 0975 1547 TOTAL 3795 EVAWATION AREA TOTAL 5208 LOUISIANA STATE TOTAL 1,548,419 Sourc e:
1980, US Census Bureau Sum: nary Tape File 3A, Table 6
TABLE 3-4 NUMBER OF OCCUPIED HDUSING UNITS WITH VEHICLES AVAILABLE ENUMERATION NUMBER OF CARS DISTRICTS 0
1 2
3 or More Total St. John the Baptist Parish 103U 12 205 250 91 588 109 0
0 0
0 0
110 0
0 0
0 0
120 141 191 152 89 573 l
TOTAL' 153 396 432 180 1161 St. Charles Parish 907C 0
0 0
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909 0
0 0
0 0
912 0
27 105 57 189 913 65 45 60 27 197 914 22 19 8
12 61 929 0
0 0
0 0
930 0
0 0
0 0
0540 163 318 284 236 1001 0965 74 264 216 129 683 0975 159 462 578 233 1432 TOTAL 483 1135 1251 694 3563 EVAWATION AREA TOTAL 636 1531 1683 874 4724 Louisiana State Total 195,812 483,227 401,617 251,132 1,411,'/88 Source: 1980 US Census Bureau Sunsaary Tape File 3A, Tables 123 and 121
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
In St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes, a substantial effort has been made to develop emergency preparedness plans for the protection of the general public in the event of a disaster resulting from natural and man made causes. Over the years officials in both parishes have developed procedures for responding to disasters such as hurricanes and toxic chemical releases and explosions caused by industrial and transportation accidents. These procedures are continually being reviewed and, as necessary, modified as conditions change in each parish and to keep abreast with the state-of-the-art in emergency planning.
- In the past two to three years, emergency preparedness officials in St.
Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes, the State of Louisiana and LP&L have also been involved in developing state and parish emergency plans and implementing procedures for LP&L's Waterford SES-Unit No. 3.
The Waterford SES-Unit No. 3 plans and implementing procedures are a supplement to the existing plans and procedures in each parish. These plans, however, were not finalized and fully implemented at the time of the evacuation.
The success of the evacuation conducted in the early morning hours of December 11, 1982 was in a large part due to the extensive emergency planning which has been done in these parishes. However, as with any major movement of people involving complex interactions and decisions, circumstances arose which led to less than optimal performance in some areas, which can be improved in future emergencies requiring similar protective measures. This appendix discusses certain components of the evacuation and, in some instances, discusses how energency planning is being modified in these parishes to improve the emergency preparedness for future emergencies.
A.4.2 RESIDENTI AL, NOTIFICATION Two issues arose from the analysis of the process used for notification of residents during the evacuatian. One concerns the responsibilities of r
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fire departments, and the other concerns the message given to the public during the evacuation.
The first issue relates to the understanding of the responsibility of the fire departments to notify the public in Hahnville and Norco.
In St.
Charles Pa rish, the Hahnville and Norco Fire Departments have questioned whether it should be their responsibility to notify the public during an evacuation.
These fire departments feel that their responsibility is to directly respond to fires and hazardous material emergencies, and that they will be severely undennanned if these emergencies arise while they are notifying the public.
These two fire departments stated that the sheriff's personnel or other personnel should be responsible for the notification proces s.
In the case of the Union Carbide evacuation, the fire departments did effectively notify the public, because the sheriffs' staf fs were unavailable while establishing access control points.
I Other fire departments involved in the evacuation in St. Charles Parish did not indicate any confusion or reluctance concerning their responsibility to notify the public of the need to evacuate.
In St. John the Baptist Parish, it is clearly established that fire departments will notify the public in an emergency with assistance from the Sheriff's Department when necessary.
The questions concerning responsibility for notifying the public will be largely alleviated when the outdoor sirens installed for the-Waterford SES-Unit No. 3 become operational.
These outdoor sirens cover a 10-mile area around the station which encompasses the area evacuated during this emerg enc y.
The sirens will be controlled and operated by parish emergency preparedness officials, who will also be able to use the sirens, at their discre tion, for any non-radiological emergency within their parishes. (For a radiological emergency at the Waterford SES-Unit No. 3, use of the sirens is prescribed by the parish plans. ) The availability and use of the outdoor sirens will shorten the time needed for notification.
The second issue concerns the message given to the public during the em e rgency.
The public was informed that, because of an emergency 4-2 l
1
(explosion) at the Union Carbide Taf t Plant, they were being asked to evacuate their homes.
If the fire departments knew at the time of the notification, people were told which shelters were being opened.
Lastructions concerning the supplies and personal necessities to take during the evacuation were not given.
At the start of the evacuation, many people had not anticipated being away from their homes f or an extended period of time, and evacuated without taking sufficient clothing or medication which they would require during the day.
Later when it become apparent how long they might have to be away from their homes, some people wanted to reenter the evacuated area f or warmer clothing and for medication for diabetes and heart ailments.
In order to accomodate the needs of these people, the State Police and sheriffs' deputies escorted groups of people to their homes to obtain medicines, etc. and then immediately escorted them out of the evacuated area.
For use in f uture emergencies, both parishes will have a radio which will directly link them to station WCKW in Laplace. With this capability, parish emergency officials will be able to directly communicate to the public the appropriate protective action which should be followed, as well as the personal necessities people should take with them, should they have to leave their homes for an extended period of time.
In connection with the Waterf ord SES - Unit No. 3, pre-written notification meassages and public information materials have been developed f or the parish emergency plans.
The notification message specified in the proceduras indicates the personal necessities required during an evacuation, as well as information about reception centers.
The message will be read repeatedly over the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) radio and TV stations.
In addition, the public information brochure, which will be distributed periodically throughout the area, also contains this information, and can be referred to by the public at the time of an evacuation.
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-A.4.3 INDUSTRIAL NOTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION In St. Charles Parish, there is an industrial " hotline", which is a dedicated phone line between the parish EOC and the industries within the parish. With the hotline, industries are able to immediately contact the EOC in the event of an emergency. The Director of Emergency Preparedness can notify the industries of an emergency in the area. The hotline has established procedures which are to be followed by the industries and the director during any emergency.
The hotline is manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day. During the day (8 a.m. to 4 p.m.)
it rings directly in the EOC. At night and on weekends it is transferred to the St. Charles Parish sheriff's dispatcher office.
Questions were raised during the interview process regarding the use of the hotline. Many of the industrial representatives questioned whether Union Carbide should have notified the EOC sooner and whether the EOC was receiving sufficient follow up information from Union Carbide in a timely fashion.
Three of the industries (Witco, Beker, Little Gypsy SES) said that the EOC never initiated calls on the hotline to inform them of what had happened. These industries indicated that the only time the hotline cas used was when they called the EOC.
The industries that were contacted, or that used the hotline themselves during the emergency, indicated that the information they were receiving from the sheriff's dispatcher and the EOC later in the day was not sufficient to decide whether they should shut down and evacuate their own plants. This was largely due to the lack of information that the EOC personnel had themselves. The industries stated, however, that they would prefer to receive periodic calls, even if it is to learn that the situation has not changed since they were last contacted. Because of this situation, Occidental Chemical, Shell Complex (Norco) and the Little Gypsy SES called Union Carbide therselves to obtain better information.
4-4 l
4 hany of the industries in the area indicated a reluctance to use the hotline except when it is clearly necessary in the event of an incident at their plant. This reluctance is based on a concern that early use of the hotline will result in premature media involvement, especially when
- the hotline is answered by the sheriff's dispatcher. When the dispatcher radios tbc sheriff 's units, the news media can pick it up on their scanners.
Despite the factors mentioned above on the use of the industrial hotline, it must be emphasized that all the industries in the evacuated area were inf ooted of the situation.
Since the incident on December 11, 19 82, the St. Charles Parish Director of -Emergency Preparedness has made an effort to clarify to the industries the use of the hotline procedures in response to questions raised during the Union Carbide emergency. This included clarifying the various levels I
of emergencies at which industries are required to notity the EOC and the procedures the EOC personnel must follow to notify other industries in the area.
6 It should be noted that in harch,1963, when Union Carbide experienced an l
incident involving an overheating acrolein tank, the hotline was utilized effectively in providing prompt notification to the EOC and the surrounding industrie s, i
The Emergency Implementing Procedures for use in event of an emergency at the Waterford SES-Unit No. 3 provide guidance for responding to the concerns indicated above.
The procedures for use of the hotline, and the type and amount of information which LP&L must provide to emergency preparedness officials in the event of an emergency, are clearly defined in the document. Finally, it is important to note that these procedures specify actions for managing media involvement in the event of an emergency at Waterf ord 3.
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A.4.4 TRAFFIC ACCESS CONTROL POINTS Most of the emergency workers interviewed mentioned that it was very important to select access control point locations which had enough room to turn vehicles around, including tractor trailers. Some of the access control points were positioned where it was not possible to quickly and easily turn around incoming traffic.
In one such instance this interfered with those people attempting to leave the evacuated area.
This occurred at the access control point at La 3127 and La 3160.
Traffic coming into the risk area, primarily shif t workers at the industrial plants, was being stopped and turned around at this access control point. As the line of cars behind the access control point grew larger, cars in the middle of the line begin to turn around to go back out towards US 90.
These care caused a delay in traffic trying to leave the area.
This access control point was moved to La 3127 at the intersection of La 631 which alleviated the situation; incoming traffic here was detoured back out la 631, rather than turning it around on La 3127.
Another area where the position of the access control point influenced traffic flow was on La 3127, at the St. John the Baptist Parish line. At this point in the roadway there is not enough room, especially for large tractor trailers, to turn around. By repositioning the access control point at La _640 and La 3127, incoming traffic was detoured on La 640 without causing a significant delay in the traffic flow either coming in or going out of the evacuated area.
The control of traffic on main roads which evacuation traffic had to utilize also influenced vehicle movement. For example, when the La 3127/La 3160 access control point was moved down to US 90 at La 631 and La 3127, traffic flow was restricted again because traffic moving on US 90 was preventing the effective egress of traffic f rom La 3127. Access control points were set up on US 90 at La 3160 in Lone Star to resolve this difficulty by preventing traffic f rom traveling west on US 90.
This measure was sufficient to alleviate the problem which had developed on La 3127.
4-6
It should be noted that emergency personnel promptly recolved the difficulties which arose from the initial location of access control points and traffic control points by relocating roadblocks to more suitable locations.
In preparing the Energency Lnplementing Procedures f or the Waterford SES-Unit No. 3, emergency planners conducted a careful study of traffic and road patterns within the 10-mile radius of the generating station.
They then prepared a list of the best locations for access control and traffic control points.
This list is contained in the procedures, and is available for use in the event of any future major evacuation in the area.
A.4.5 EVACUATION OF DISAELED AND BEDRIDDEN PERSONS On the east bank of St. Charles Parish, four ambulances from East Jefferson Parish evacuated a total of eight bedridden people. The services of these ambulances were not utilized as effectively as they could have been, according to R. Chadborn, the Director of the East Jefferson Hospital Ambulance Service. Difficulties were experienced in locating the people to be transported, and in determining a hospital or reception center to receive them. This resulted in a slower evacuation for these eight people than would be possible with improved emergency implementing procedures. These ambulance drivers indicated that they did not find places for all bedridden persons to stay until 10:30 or 11:00 a.m.
This situation arose for three reasons.
First, a list of persons in the parish who would require special assistance (i.e., ambulances) in evacuating was not available to the emergency workers in the St. Charles Parish EOC at the time of the Union Carbide evacuation. According to the Director of Emergency Preparednes s, such a list had been developed by the State Welf are Department and the Parish Council on Aging. However, it had not yet been made available to the EOC workers by the time of the evacuation, and thus the emergency workers did not know who would require ambulance transportation or where they were located.
In order to locate the disabled and bedridden patients, the EOC workers relied on neighbors and friends to inform them of persons who required assistance, and on the people themselves to call and ask for help.
Once they were informed of a person who needed 4-7
assistance, an ambulance was dispatched to that location. However, since the ambulance drivers could not communicate directly with the St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Office, they had to return to the New Sarpy Sheriff's Subcenter af ter each run to be told cf the location of the next patient.
The list of disabled persons has since been made available to emergency workers, and is to be periodically updated and redistributed to the appropriate personnel.
Second, once the ambulances picked up the disabled or bedridden patients, it was not clear where to take them. All the hospitals in the area (River Parish Medical Center in Laplace, East Jefferson Hospital, Oschner Foundation Hospital, and St. Charles Hospital) were nearly full at the time of the evacuation and were not accepting people who were not ill.
Since these bedridden individuals did not require special medical care, the hospitals were reluctant to accept them. According to the East Jefferson Parish drivers, they took two people to River Parish Medical Center in Laplace, two to St. Charles Hospital in Luling, and four to other residences outside the evacuated area.
In the event of an emergency at the Waterford SES-Unit No. 3, plans call for the delivery of disabled people to a predetermined raception centers, where they will receive the care required. If necessary, they will later be transported to a hospital. These procedures are designed to eliminate the problem of confusion about a destination for disabled persons.
In addition, training seminars for the ambulance drivers are scheduled to be held in the future in order to instruct the drivers on the procedures to be followed during an emergency at Waterford 3.
The third reason f or the delays in evacuating bedridden people needing ambulances was that there was no staf f officer in the EOC at the time of the evacuation who had adequate knowledge of how and where people were to be transported. According to John Lucas, the Director of the St. Charle s Parish Department of Emergency Preparedness, this problem has been remedied since the time of the evacuation by the appointment of a primary and backup Health / Medical Officer who will serve at the EOC.
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A.4.6 JAIL During the Union Carbide evacuation, it was decided that it was not necessary to evacuate the jail located in the 9ahnville Courthouse.
However, a bus was positioned outside the courthouse in case it became necessary to evacuate the prisoners.
If it had become necessary to evacuate the jail, the Sheriff's Department would have followed the established procedures outlined in the St. Charles Parish Emergency Plan. According to these procedures, a St. Charles Parish school bus will be made available for transporting the prisoners out of the evacuated area.
In addition to the bus driver, eight guards are assigned to accompany inmates on the bus.
Additional staff will follow behind the bus in cars and provide support as needed. Prisoners are transported to a detention center in the predesignated support parishe s.
A.4.7 ACCESS TO THE EVACUATED AREA f
1 When the evacuation was initiated, access control points were established at the perimeter of the area (see Section 5.4).
Once people lef t the area, reentry was not permitted. This presented a problem to the key industrial personnel who were needed to assist in operations (either l
shutdown or normal activities) at their plants. At those industries which decided not to evacuate, shif t workers were delayed.
Industry officials resolved this by either going to the access control points with a list of names of the workers who were expected, or calling the EOC to inform them to authorize certain personnel to enter the evacuated area to work. This worked effectively, but it was not efficient because it created a traf fic delay at the access control points until each individual could be properly identified.
In addition, it also caused a number of key workers to be late for their shif t changes.
4 Af ter the Union Carbide emergency, many people involved in the evacuation recommended that the essential emergency personnel and plant shif t personnel be given special identification cards which would allow them 4-9
to be quickly checked through access control points. The implementation of such an identification system is being investigated by emergency preparedness officials in each parish.
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'A.4.8 MANAGIMENT OF RECEPTIDN CENTERS 4
i During interviews, the opinion was expressed that problems arose at reception centers, with respect to the provisions of food, supervision, and bedding.
When the reception centers were opened at the start of the evacuation, the Red Cross was notified. - They immediately sent personnel to Hahnville High School and John L. Ory School. West St. John High School was operated by volunteers from the parish civil defense and by school a
personnel. At Destrehan High School, no one was in charge until Councilman Warren Iandry arrived early in the morning. The Red Cross arrived at about 9:50 a.m.
People at the reception centers were very uncertain about who was responsible for obtaining food, medical supplies and bedding f or thc At Destrehan High School, food was ultimately provided in evacuees.
sufficient quantities by the Red Cross and by the Southern Baptist Convention of Norco. At other reception centers, emergency personnel either op6ned the school cafeteria or sent out f or food at. nearby fast f ood restaurants.
The principal cause of this situation at the reception centers was the uncertainty concerning who was in charge. Iarry Sesser, Chief of Plant Operations in St. Charles Parish School, felt that school of ficials were l'
responsible only for opening the shelters and protecting school prop ert y.
According to Sesser, the sheriffs' deputies are responsible f or law enf orcement and the Red Cross f or food and medical services.
However, because of a lack of staff, the Red Cross could not supervise the operation of all of the reception centers. Therefore, individual lines of responsibility evolved a.t each center.
While the initial uncertainty concerning leadership at reception centers undoubtedly contributed to some temporary inconveniences f or the l
4-10
evacuees, the situation was resolved by the inventiveness and effort of the volunteers. It is a credit to all involved that initial difficulties at the reception centers were overcome in every case.
In the future, one or several persons should be designated to be responsible for supervising the operation of each recepton center being used. In addition, this situation could be further improved by the appointment of an EOC staff member to coordinate the operation of all the reception centers.
The emergency plans developed for the Waterford SES-Unit No.3 call for the establishment of reception centers at previously identified locations outside the evacuated parishes.
These reception centers will be supervised by emergency personnel of the parishes in which the centers are located, and uncertainty concerning responsibility for operation of the reception centers is not likely to occur.
I A.4.9 EVACUATION DECISION Accordirg to Jules Hymel, the Assistant Director of the Department of Emergency Preparedness in St Charles Parish, the decision to evacuate was based on a recommendation of Union Carbide to the sheriff and the State Police. At present, further information about this decision has not been made available by Union Carbide. The actual authorization for the evacuation was made by the respective parish officials immediately af ter they received Union Carbide's recommendation to evacuate.
The only concern raised about the evacuation decision was whether it was a forced ev1cuation or a recommended evacuation.
In a recommended evacuation, the population is urged to leave due to the impending danger, but no one is f orced to leave.
In a forced evacuation, people are required to leave the area.
During the Union Carbide evacuatica, though the proper authority in each parish signed an order to evacuate the area, it is unclear whether it was a forced or recommended evacuation. Because not everyone was actually forced to leave the area, it would appear that it was not a forced 4-11
evacuation. Kevin Friloux, the St. Charles Parish President, said that if he signs an order to evacuate, the sheriff is empowered to force the evacuation. Dowie Gendron, President of the St. John the Baptist Police Jury, indicated he did not sign an order to forcibly evacuate residents.
Louisiana State Troopers felt that it may be dif ficult to convince people to evacuate if others are not evacuating, and to assure the evacuees that their property will be protected from those people remaining in the area. However, the record of the Union Carbide emergency indicates that neither concern arose because very few people refused to evacuate (see Subsection 5.2.4), and there was no evidence of any looting or disorderly behavior on the part of persons who remained in the area.
A.4.10 EOC MANAGEMENT During the evacuation, several concerns came to light involving EOC functions. These fall under the general headings of communications, staf fing and security.
a) Communications John Lucas, Director of the St. Charles Parish Office of Emergency Preparedness, noted that during the emergency there was a large number of phone calls into the EOC, and that only two phones were available in the EOC at the time.
This resulted in difficulties acintaining contact with emergency workers in the field.
In the future the EOC will have four phone lines for rumor control, as well as separate phone lines which can be used by each key staff officer to communicate with his field staff.
b) EOC Staffing In addition to the main EOC in each parish, there were also two other support EOCs, one in St. John the Baptist Parish on the west bank, and one established by Union Carbide at Monsanto in Luling. The St. John the Baptist Parish EOC on the west bank was primarily a command post established by the Deputy Director of Field Operations. The Deputy Director operated from his truck, which was sufficient to enable him to coordinate the evacuation and communicate with the main EOC.
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Nevertheless, emergency operations officials indicated that in future emergencies, the EOC communication van would be sent to the west bank in order to provide the workers with improved communications equipment and a place to rest and eat.
Aside from a sheriff's substation in New Sarpy, the St. Charles Parish EOC did not establish a support EOC on the east bank of the river. The evacuation was, for the most part, coordinated through the EOC in the parish courthouse on the west bank. This hindered the supervision of the reception centers, obtaining buses f or people without cars, and transporting bedridden people on the east bank. All of these operations could probably have been performed more quickly and efficiently if they had been coordinated by a representative of the EOC on the east bank of the river. The Assistant to the Parish President has since been appointed to undertake this task on the east bank during any future emerg encies.
With regard to staff organization, the St. Charles Parish EOC has, in addition to the EOC Coordinator, the Emergency Preparedness Director, the Assistant Emergency Preparedness Director, the Parish President, the Sheriff and nine staf f officers who are responsible for various aspects of the emergency. These include staff responsible for law enforcement, public works, risk / radiological assessment, publi c information, fire services, health and medical services, transportation services, school-service s, and communications.
During the Union Carbide evacuation it became apparent that a few more people should be added to the organization to make it run more smoothly.
First, even though there is a designated Health / Medical Officer, that person was unavailable on the night of the emergency and no backup had been assigned. This caused inefficiencies in transporting bedridden patients from the evacuated area (see Section A.4.4).
A backup Health / Medical Of ficer has now been assigned to the EOC.
Secondly, the placement of a Red Cross representative in the EOC would help coordinate the supplying and staffing of the reception centers.
A person has since been appointed to fulfill these responsibilities.
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Finally, a technical representative from the industry having the emergency, should be present in the EOC to support the Director of Emergency Preparedness by providing technical information about the eme rg enc y.
During the Union Carbide incident, Union Carbide sent two people to the EOC at 10 a.m. on Saturday, at the specific request of the
' EOC, but according to the EOC Director of Emergency Preparedness, they were unable to provide additional up-to-date information.
In the future, technical representatives from the industry having en emergency will be sent to the EOC to advise the Director of Emergency Preparedness of the conditions at the plant.
In the event of an emergency at the Waterford SES-Unit No. 3, this problem will not arise.
Emergency plans f or Waterf ord SES-Unit No. 3 specify a precise network of communications between the plant, the state, and both parish EOCs'. The type of information to be disseminated and the re sponsible individuals have been identified in advance, and technical support to t. 3 EOC is through established procedure s.
c) EOC Security One of the most repeated comments on this topic was that there were too
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many people in the St Charles Parish EOC. Most of these people were sheriffs' deputies from St. Charles or Jef ferson Parish, State Troopers, media representatives, and US Coast Guard personnel, who did not necessarily have to be in the EOC to perform their tasks.
Because of the excess number of people, the noise levels were high, interfering with those people attempting to make decisions, answer telephones and listen to radios.
In the future, identification cards will be issued to those personnel who actually need access to the EOC in an emergency. Additionally, security guards will be placed at all the entrances to the EOC to control entry of only those personnel who have proper identification.
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A.4.ll CONCLUSIONS Evaluation of the evacuation of about 16,000 people in St. Charles and St. John the Baptist Parishes on December 11, 1982 indicates that it was conducted in a successful manner. This is in large part due to the significant degree of emergency preparedness which these two parishes have undertaken. Although the evacuation is considered a success, emergency operations officials have noted several areas for improvement for future emergency situations involving evacuation of these residents.
Many of these identified areas for improvement are addressed in the St.
John the Baptist and St. Charles Parish response plan ~ for incidents at the Waterford SES-Unit No. 3 and the associated implementing procedure s.
Other areas for improvement have been brought to the attention of emergency operations officia3 s, who have taken appropriate actions to implement improvements. Therefore, it can be concluded that, by incorporating these improvements into the emergency preparedness framework of these parishes, the parishes will be even more prepared for any such similar emergencies involving evacuation of large numbers of re sident s.
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APPENDIX 5 INDUSTRIAL RESPONSE J
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Because of the importance of industrial evacuation and shutdown procedures to a successful evacuation, industry personnel were questioned extensively on these subjects. The information gathered during the study is presented in this appendix for future reference in emergency planning.
Union Carbide In talking with the local emergency preparedness officers, and based on a statement made by Union Carbide officials at a critique of the evacuation, it appears that Union Carbide began to evacuate some nonessential personnel somewhere between 10 and 11 p.m. on Friday December 10, 1982. According to State Police logs and the St. Charles Parish Sheriff's logs, at about midnight Union Carbide indicated they were evacuating the area of the plant around the acrolein tanks. At 12:38 a.m. they said the? were evacuating the south side of the plant.
It is not clear whether these people were evacuated offsite or just to cnother area within the Union Cartide facilities.
Af ter the explosion, it did not appear that they shut down the remainder of their operation. However, all incoming Union Carbide workers were ordered to report to the north parking lot of Monsanto in Luling. Union Carbide was using this as a staging area for their workers coming to work that morning.
In discussions with Union Carbide officials in the spring of 1980, in order to obtain information for LP&L's Waterford-3 Evacuation Time Estimate Report, it was determined that it would take approximately 24 to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to shut down the plant. Union Carbide would also require approximately 150 people to remain onsite to shut down the facility. On a typical day shift, there are approximately 1100 to 1500 Union Carbide workers onsite, in addition to any construction workers who may be there.
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Witco Chemical The personnel at Witco, uhich is adjacent to Union Carbide, were aware of the problem at the Union Carbide Plant at about 11 p.m. on Friday night.
They saio they could observe a lot of activity going on at the Union Carbide Plant. At 12:45, right af ter the explosion occurred, Witco began to shut down its plant. Everything but the boiler was shut down. The whole process took about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
At 5:00 a.m. when Witco called on the hotline and learned about the evacua tio n, they started to evacuate their site. Approximately 9 people left. Two remained to tend the boiler.
Tnese people had airpacks, anu, if necessary, they could have just turned off the boiler and lef t.
At about 8:00 a.m. five people came back into the plant to start it back up.
On the normal day shif t Witco has about 65 people onsite. On the night shif ts there are only about thirt een people onsite. Witco indicated that, if required they could shut down the plant in an emergency within about 30 minutes.
Shell Chemical Taf t At about 11:00 to 11:30 p.m. on Friday night the people at Shell Chemical Taf t, which is adjacent to Union Carbide, heard alarms on the Union Carbide site, but everything aeemed to be under control.
immediately af ter the explosion there was a concussion which caused some pump fa ilure s.
In addition, Shell personnel observed white particulate materials in the air, and they experienced irritating fumes. At 3:00 a.m. there was a wind shif t which blew vapors over the site.
Personnel who were outside at the time began to use airpacks. The air conditioner in the control room was turned of f and most of the staff moved inside.
At 5:00 a.m. Shell received a call f rom the Parish EOC informing them that the area was being evacuated. At that point shutdown was initiated. They used all available personnel for 15 to 20 minutes to help secure the plant operations. Af terwards, a total of eight people 5-2
left. Tour people remained until about 6:00 to 8:30 a.m., during which time relief crews arrived-The plant operators at Shell Chemical Taf t indicatea that their operation can be shut down in minutes. however, the system needs to be flushed out; otherwise it will solidify snd then it would take weeks to clean.
It takes 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to flush the system. Procedures are being developed to secure the plant and make it safe within one hour.
Shell has about 65 people onsite during a normal workday. On night and weekend shif ts there are a total of 12 people onsite. Based on their actions during the Union Carbide incident, it appears that all but four of these workers could leave during an emergency.
Occidental Chemical The people at Occidental Chemical say that approximately five minutes before the explosion occurred they received a phone call f rom Union Caroide inf orming them of the emergency. Right af ter the explosion, Occidental instituted an emergency shutdown procedure which took about four to six hours to complete. At 5:15 they received a phone call on the hotline from the Parish EOC telling them to evacuate the plant. At i
approximately 5:45 a.m. eighteen people were evacuated. Eight people remained onsite to continue to bring the plant down. These people were equipped with air packs and handheld radios.
At 10 a.m. a whole new shif t was brought in to prepare the plant for nonmal opera tion.
However, the night shif t was again reduced because the danger at Union Carbide had increased again.
George Haas, the Plant Manager, stated that Occidental presently has about 222 people on the peak shif t.
This number could increase to 300 if they ever restart three units which are presently shut down for economic reasons.
If they had to evacuate the day shif t (222 people),180 people couln be evacuated within half an hour.
The other 42 would be useo to shut the plant down.
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According to haas, the plant can be shut down within a minimum of two hours and up to a maximum of 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />. However, the shorter the amount of time given for the shutdown procedures, the more dangerous the operation becomes.
Beker Industries At 12:47 a.m., immediately af ter the explosion occurred, Beker called on the hotline to see what had happened. All the Sheriff 's Office could tell. them was that. the explosion. cook place on the Union Carbide site.
Beker is tied in with Occidental Chemical's water system. At 5:00 a.m.
Occidental called Beker to tell them they were shutting the water of f in order to evacuate the site.
Beker then tuned into WCKW and heard the bulletin concerning the evacuation.
I Since Occidental was turning the water off, Beker's plant was inopera ble.
Employees, therefore, were given the option to go home.
host stayed because they cidn't feel it necessary to leave. Eventually most of the people did leave. By 7:30 a.m.
there were only 4 people in the plant and the plant facilities had been secured.
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At the time of the explosion there were 22 people at the plant. During a peak shif t at the plant there are approximately 140 plant workers and 5 to 10 vendors and subcontractors.
I Luring the evacuation it took 30 minutes to secure the plant. Hank Farrow, the Plant Manager, indicates that in the direst of emergencies it can be done in 10 minutes, but this is expensive because all the product must be fla red of f.
Optimally, they say it would take 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to safely shut down the plant.
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LP&L Waterford SES-Unit No. 3 According to the security logs at LP&L's Waterford-3, the security people heard the explosion at 12:45. Howevcr, they were unable to confirm that it occurred at Union Carbide until 1:02 a.m. when they spoke to the plant manager at Union Carbide. At 1:52 the Parish Emergency Preparedness advised that all personnel should stay indoors if possible. By 2:15 the nuclear operations supervisor informed the security office that no evacuation was necessary, but that workers were going home and that he was calling all the contractors.
It is estimated that about 300 to 500 workers lef t at this time.
At 5:08 an evacuation of the site was ordered and all non nuclear trained security and all construction workers were informed to leave. Only 13 people remained onsite, five people in the control room and eight in i
security.
Since the Waterf ord-3 Unit is presently not operational, it was decided that, if necessary, everyone could leave. Once the plant becomes operational, the control room is designed so that the plant can operate during an offsite emergency such as happened at Union Carbide.
LP&L Waterford SES-Units No 1 and 2 At Waterford 1 and 2 there were about five people onsite at the time of the accident. At 1:25 a.m. the plant called the EOC to find out what had happened. At 5:08 a.m. the EOC called to advise that the area was being evacuated. Since the wind was blowing away from the plar.t, all of the people decided to remain ac the site.
Personnel at Waterf ord 1 and 2 indicated that if they had to shut down they could do it safely and economically within a half hour.
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Shell Complex Norco The Shell Complex in Norco indicated that they were notified of the evacuation at 4:50 to 5:00 a.m.
When they were notified, they were told it was not necessary to evacuate the industries in the area and that they could keep emerEency persoitnel.
Af ter they were notified of the evacuation they initiated their own emergency plan. Key management and emergency personnel were notified, emergency equipment was checked and their own onsite emergency operations center was activiated. Only a few nonessential personnel were permitted to leave and the plant itself was kept running. At 9 a.m., Shell said they contacted Union Carbide to get more information on the si.tuation.
The Shell people indicated that shutting down their plant is not considered an option unless there is a very serious catastrophe. It would take anywhere from 48 to 7S hours to shut down their sita and they would require a minimum shif t of 125 to 150 peopic to do it.
At the peak hour of the day they have about 2,000 people onsite. All but 150 of tho.-
people could leave in an emargency.
t GATX Terminals GATX was notified of the evacuation at about 4:50 a.m.
Maurice Monie, the Plant Manager, said he was notified at 5:00 a.m.
He said that when he arrived at the site, the Sheriff's Department told him that the industries could continue to operate.
At the time of the accident there were approximately eleven people onsite. In the Waterford-3 Evacuation Time Estimate Report, GATX is estimated to have a peak employment of 120 people.
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t Monie indicated that in an emergency they could safely shut the tett aal down in three to four hours.
Big Three Industries Only three men were working at Big Three at the time of the accident.
During a normal workday there are approximately 19 to 20 people at the plant.
When Big Three heard about the evacuation, they did not shut down the plant, but they did suspend all o'utside activities for the duration of the emergency. They said that it is almost impossible to shut down their operations since they supply products to many of the industries along the river. The only way they could shut down is if the other industries in the area also closed down.
If this happened they could shut down their own plant within about 30 minutes.
Good Hope Refinery The people et Good Hope do not recall when they were notified that an evacuation was taking place in the area. However, they did not evacuate i
anyone or make plans to shut down the plant.
They estimate that there were approximately 120 people onsite during the evacuation. A normal work f orce consists of approximately 300 to 400 people. They also indicated that it would probably take a day or more to shut down their plant.
LP&L Little Gypsy At 1:02 a.m. Max Mason, the Shif t Superintendent at Little Gypsy, called the Sheriff's Office to obtain information on what happened at Union Carbide. He followed this with a call to Union Carbide to obtain more information on the material that was involved.
He stated that the LP&L people were having trouble bienthing onsite, so he gave everyone airpacks 5-7
suspended all outside work. At 3 a.m. he sent four subcontractors haue who were working onsite.
At a bout 5 :00 a.m., lb son called hillary Otillio, the Flant Mana er.
a Otillio called the St. Charles Parish Sheriff 's Office on the east bank at 5:05 a.m. and was told that no evacuation was planned f or the east bank at that time.
They were informed that an evacuation was taking place at about 6:00 a.m. when Otillio again called the Sherif f's Office.
In addition, some fireuen came to the f ront gate to inform them of the evacuation.
Besides the four subcontractors and the SECuri ty guard, no one CISO left the site.
Five people remained to keep the plant runni ng.
If it had been necessary, they could have shut the plant down within an hour to an hour and a half.
Approximately 160 people are onsite during the day. All but five could leave during an eme rgency, bayou Steel l
Bayou Steel was notified of the evacuation at about 5 a.m. when the St.
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John the Baptist Sheriff 's Deputies came to the f ront gate.
Between 5 to 5:30 they instituted procedures to shut down the plant. By about 5:45 a.m. everyone had been evacuated with the exception of three or four people.
There was about 120 people at the plant a t the time of the eme rgency. At 6:30 a.m.
they were told they could have a skeleton crew on the site.
Ten people stayed at the plant between 6:30 a.m. Sa turd ay morning until naon Sunday when the evacuation was terminated.
They saio that on a nonnal workday there would be about 300 people onsite, and to safely shut cown the plant takes anywhere f rom a half hour to an hour.
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