ML20082U742
| ML20082U742 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1995 |
| From: | Barkhurst R ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20082U746 | List: |
| References | |
| W3F1-95-0053, W3F1-95-53, NUDOCS 9505050293 | |
| Download: ML20082U742 (8) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:,; + I" "s ""* " " '"" * ' 5 = ENTERGY Ven L A 70066-0751 E E! 504 739 6661 Ross P. Barkhurst . l w w.ncem,ms Vtn.so n, '; W3F1-95-0053 A4.05 PR May 2, 1995 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Waterford 3 SES l Docket No. 50-382 [ License No. NPF-38 Technical Specification Change Request NPF-38-166 Gentlemen: The attached description and safety analysis supports a change to the Waterford 3 Technical Specifications (TS). This proposed change will modify specification 3/4.7.12, Essential Services Chilled Water System to accurately reflect the system's normal operating alignment and eliminate redundant surveillance requirements. This proposed change is based on the Combustion Engineering improved Standard Technical Specifications (STS) approved and issued by the NRC as NUREG 1432. The proposed change has been evaluated in accordance with 10CFR50.91(a)(1)_ l using criteria in 10CFR50.92(c) and it has been determined that the proposed change involves no significant hazards considerations. The Plant Operations Review and Safety Review Committees have reviewed and accepted the proposed change based on the evaluation mentioned above. i t 9505050293 950502 PDR ADOCK 05000382 P PDR.., I $\\
Y p-g (' Technical Specification Change Request NPF-38-165-l- W3F1-95-0053 Page 2 May.2, 1995 i Should.'you have any questions.or comments concerning this request, please. contact' Paul Caropino at (504)739-6692. j Very truly yours, R.P. Barkhurst 1 t. L Vice President, Operations .l Waterford 3 -{ .' i RPB/PLC/ssf
Attachment:
Affidavit NPF-38-166 cc: L.J. Callan, NRC Region IV C.P. Patel, NRC-NRR l R.B. McGehee i t N.S. Reynolds NRC Resident Inspectors Office Administrator Radiation Protection Division (State of Louisiana) i American Nuclear Insurers 'i l 1 l i .l -._.-_. -. ~,
y L-UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of ) ) Entergy Operations, Incorporated ) Docket No. 50-382 Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station ) l AFFIDAVIT l R.P. Barkhurst, being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says that he is Vice President Operations - Waterford 3 of Entergy Operations,. Incorporated; that he is duly authorized to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the attached Technical Specification Change Request NPF-38-166; that he.is familiar with the content thereof; and that the matters set forth therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief. t R.P. Barkhurst Vice President Operations - Waterford 3 STATE OF LOUISIANA ) ) ss PARISH OF ST. CHARLES ) Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the Parish and ' State above named this 2"O day of M (\\i , 1995. r ..VC. Notary-Public 7 \\ My Commission expires Lo s 'Tei L i F E-
I DESCRIPTION AND SAFETY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CHANGE NPF-38-166 The proposed change will modify 3/4.7.12, Essential Services Chilled Water System by deleting Surveillance Requirement 4.7.12.1 (b). It will also delete the redundant surveillance requirements of 4.7.12.2. This proposed change is based on the Combustion Engineering improved Standard Technical Specifications (STS) approved and issued by the NRC as NUREG 1432. Existina Specification See Attachment A Proposed Specification See Attachment B Backaround The Essential Services Chilled Water System (ESCWS) is designed to supply 42*F chilled water to the chilled water cooling coils during normal plant operation, and only to those chilled water cooling coils serving the essential spaces during design basis accident conditions. The system is designed so that a single failure of any component, assuming a loss of offsite power, cannot result in complete loss of chilled water to those chilled water cooling coils serving the essential spaces. The ESCWS furnishes chilled water for space cooling purposes and rejects the heat through the Component Cooling Water System to the Ultimate Heat Sink. The ESCWS consists of three 100 percent capacity subsystems. These subsystems are designed such that chilled water is circulated, from any two of the subsystems, through three loops which serve equipment in various parts of the Reactor Auxiliary Building. Two of the three loops serve safety-related air handling units; the third one serves non-safety air handling units. During a design basis accident, the non-safety loop is isolated from the remainder of the system and the two safety-related loops are isolated from each other so that each operating subsystem serves a safety-related loop while the non-safety loop receives no chilled water. Each chiller unit is equipped with a solid state capacity control system. The refrigerant heat removal capacity is controlled by positioning the compressor suction inlet guide vanes. A temperature sensing device in the chilled water line downstream from the chiller produces signals which are transmitted to an automatic guide vane operator. A decrease in the chilled water temperature causes the guide vanes to move toward the closed position to limit the amount of refrigerant which evaporates in the cooler. An increase in the chilled water temperature causes the guide vanes to move toward the open position. 1
Each chiller, its associated chilled water pump, system valves, the systems served by it and the control systems are all connected electrically to the associated A, B, j and A/B safety electrical distribution systems. Each chilled water pump is 1 interlocked with its associated chiller so that the pump operates when the chiller is activated. The associated chilled water pump for each chiller must start and establish flow before the chiller can start. i The ESCWS system flowpath changes with the plant mode of operation. During normal j operation, several non-safety related air handling systems are supplied with chilled water in addition to safety related air handling systems. The majority of the air handling systems cooling coils have flow control valves which control the amount of chilled water flow to the cooling coils based on temperature within the space to be cooled. When the heat load is low, the flow control valves close significantly to reduce the amount of chilled water supplied to the air handling systems, thus reducing the total flow through the ESCWS. If total flow is reduced sufficiently a recirculation valve automatically opens to maintain a minimum water flowrate through the chiller unit. During accident operation, the non-safety related air handling systems are isolated from the chilled water supply and return headers. Therefore, only safety related air handling systems are supplied with chilled water. Due to safety related equipment operation, the heat load within the spaces to be cooled by chilled water increases and the flow control valves open more to allow additional chilled water flow to the air handling systems cooling coils. The chiller capacity control units maintain the water temperature at or below 42*F. The individual air handling unit cooling coil flow control valves are all fail open valves which ensure that chilled water flow will not be interrupted to the air handling systems. Descriotion The ESCWS is designed to supply 42*F chilled water to essential chilled water cooling coils during normal plant operation and to only those cooling coils which service safety related equipment following an accident. The ESCWS is balanced for a design accident flow of 500 gpm. The chilled water pumps are rated at 525 gpm. Technical Specification Surveillance 4.7.12.1(b) utilizes 42 F and the accident { design flow of 500 gpm as a requirement for operability, however, as discussed in the Background section, the normal system configuration and system heat load is significantly different from the accident condition configuration and system heat load. In addition, the heat loading requirements of the system will vary throughout the year due to the varying environmental conditions. During normal operation chilled water flow requirements will be less than the design accident flow of 500 gpm. The chiller capacity control feature is designed to maintain the chilled water temperature at 5:42 F under all of the varying flow and heat load conditions. The capacity control unit will load the chiller in direct 2
m l response to system demands. The capacity of the chiller is significantly affected by heat load and flow. The current surveillance requirement of verifying 642 F outlet temperature, absent accident load conditions, provides no additional assurances that the chiller is working at design capacity. NUREG 1432 recognized the above and eliminated verification of outlet temperature as part of the improved technical specification program. The proposed Surveillance Requirements 4.7.12.l(a),(b) and (c) as well as Surveillance Requirement 4.0.5 provide adequate determination of Essential Services Chilled Water system operability. The chilled water pumps are tested in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda, ) by operations surveillance procedures. Chilled water flow is established quarterly as an initial condition during the performance of In-Service testing for the Chilled Water pumps. Surveillance Requirement 4.7.12.1(a) requires verification of CHW valves once per 31 days. Operation's surveillance procedures provide instructions i for the verification of chilled water valves in their proper position. The proposed i Surveillance Requirements 4.7.12.1(b) and (c) require verification every 18 months that the chiller unit, pumps and automatic valves properly actuate on a safety injection actuation test signal. Operation's surveillance procedures verify that these components properly actuate. Additionally, the Auxiliary Operators monitor the chiller operation every shift and log local parameters associated with each i operating chiller unit. Chilled water inlet and outlet temperature are among the ] parameters monitored. This verifies that the chiller capacity control system is functioning properly and that the chiller is being maintained within its normal operating parameters. With the Chilled Water pumps verified to be operating correctly via ASME Section XI, and the valves verified to be correctly aligned, along with the components being verified to properly actuate on a safety injection signal, Waterford 3 has adequate determination of system operability. The deletion of the 500 gpm flow requirement and 42 F verification will not reduce the level of operability assurance. Surveillance Requirement 4.7.12.2 is a requirement to ensure that backu; ssential services chilled water pump and chiller are operable whenever it is functioning as part of one of the required essential services chilled water loops. This requirement is redundant to the requirements of section 4.0, Surveillance Requirements. Waterford 3 ensures that all applicable surveillances have been performed or are within the required performance intervals for equipment operability prior to placing backup equipment in service. Removing this Surveillance Requirement statement does not reduce the level of plant protection or assurance of operability for the Essential Chilled Water system. This change will also make Waterford 3's Technical Specification consistent with the new Standard Technical Specifications (STS) NUREG 1432 Surveillance Requirement 3.7.10.1 and consistent with other Waterford 3 Technical Specifications with installed backup units (i.e.: A/B safety components). ) l 3 l
r.. Safety Analysis The proposed change described above shall be deemed to involve a significant hazards consideration if there is a positive finding in any of the following areas: 1. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
Response
No This proposed change deletes the Surveillance Requirement 4.7.12.1.(b) to check chilled water temperature s 42 F at a flow rate of 2 500gpm. The flow is assured under the provisions of the surveillance testing procedures done pursuant to Technical Specification 4.0.5. Since flow is assured pursuant to ASME, Section XI testing, the deletion of the flow rate surveillance requirement would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The current surveillance requirement of verifying 542 F outlet temperature, absent accident load conditions, provides no additional assurances that the chiller is working at design capacity. Performance of routine maintenance maintains the chiller within its original design parameters. Additionally, the Auxiliary Operators monitor the chiller operation every shift and log local parameters associated with each operating chiller unit. Chilled water inlet and outlet temperature are among the parameters monitored. This verifies that the chiller capacity control system is functioning properly and that the chiller is being maintained within its normal operating parameters. The Surveillance Requirement 4.7.12.2 is also a redundant requirement maintained by Section 4.0, Surveillance Requirements. Therefore, the proposed change will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated. 2. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change create the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
Response
No. The proposed change will not alter the operation of the plant or the manner in which the plant is operated. The chilled water flow is assured pursuant to ASME Section XI testing procedures for the chilled water pumps associated with the chiller units. Additionally, performance of routine maintenance maintains the chillers within original design parameters assuring that the chillers will 4
i operate to maintain chilled water temperature within original: design parameters. There is no reduction.in the quality of inputs needed to demonstrate that the ESCWS is operable; therefore, the; proposed change will i not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. { 3. Will operation of the facility in accordance with this proposed change involve a significant' reduction in a margin of safety? I
Response
No The proposed change removes redundant requirements consistent with the improved STS NUREG 1432. The operation of the Chilled Water system will not be impacted by this proposed change. The level of safety is being maintained i by surveillance procedures and Surveillance Requirements established in other. sections of the Technical Specifications. Therefore, the proposed change will j not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Safety and Sianificant Hazards Determination I Based on the above safety analysis, it is concluded that: (1) the' proposed i change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration as defined by 10CFR50.92; and (2) there is a reasonable assurance that the health and safety of. the public will not be endangered by the proposed change; and (3) this action l will not result in a condition which significantly alters the impact of the station on the environment as described in the NRC final environmental statement. l l If I i l 5 ,}}