ML20082U420
| ML20082U420 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1995 |
| From: | Mueller J NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20082U413 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-95-012, EA-95-12, NUDOCS 9505050069 | |
| Download: ML20082U420 (9) | |
Text
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H Nebraska Public Power District
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P.0,SOM IIROWNV 98321 14.8950081 Idergh 23,1995 s
Dweeter, Office of Enforcement U 2. Nuoleer Regulatory Commission Attenhon: Document Control Desk Weehirgton, D.C. 20555 Subleet:
Reply to a Notice of Violatiori and Enforcement Discretion, dated February 21, 1995 (EA 95-012)
(NRC Investigation Report No. 4-93-020R and EA 94-177)
Cooper Nuclear Station, NRC Docket 60-298, DPR-40 Reference 1.
NRC Letter from James L. Milhoan to NPPD dated November 10,1994,
" Demand for Information."
2.
NPPD Letter from Guy R. Horn to NRC dated December 12, 1994,
" Cooper Nuclear Station-Reply of NPPD to Demand for information of November 10,1994."
3.
NPPD Lotter from Guy R. Horn to NRC dated December 23, 1994, regarding Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) improvements.
aance n.
Thee letter and its Attachment constitute Nebraska Public Power District's (the-District) reply to the subpoot Notice of Violation (NOV) and Enforcemerit Discretion in accordance with 10 CFR 2,201. The violations alleged in the NOV pertain to the movement of heavy loads over erauhotoel fuel prior to establishing secondary containrpent integrity at Cooper Nuclear Station l
(CMS) in Merch of 1993, in sum, Part A of the NOV states that the reactor pressure vessel IIFV) heesi, dryer, and separator were moved withotit secondary containment integrity being estehnehod in violation of Technical Specification {TS) 3.7.C.1.d (secondary containment inceptey resquired during movement of loads which have the potential to damage irradiated fuel).
Port 5 of the NOV states that the Procedure Change Notices (PCNs) approved to eliminate the iw:::hel requirement for secondary containment hntegrity during removal of the reactor pressure veeeel head, dryer, and separator were not accurate in all materlat respects as required by 10 CFR 50.9.
The Distnet takes the violations seriously and has conducted a careful and thorough review of this metter. The District's letter to the NRC dated December 12,1994 (Reference 2), in roepense to the NRC Demand for Information (DFI) (EA 94-177) (Reference 1), has addressed the suhetence of the violations, l
9505050069 950428 PDR ADOCK 05000298 O
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's Doester, Office of Enforcen.ont U. $. Nuo6eer Regulatory Commission Moreh 23,1995 Pese 2 of 3 Whh respect to the violation of 10 CFR 50.0, the District stated in Reference 2 (page 5) that Wie PCN form seviewed by the Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) on March 9,1993 shouN have been complete and accurate in all material respects, but contained some potentL '!v confusing information concerning TS Amendment 147 and, arguably, TS Amendment 150.
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.J;, the District admits the violation of 10 CFR 50.9 as explained in the attached NOV response (Attachment 1).
Whh roepect to Part A of the NOV, in hindsight, we understand how the decision reached by SOftC could be viewed as a nonconservative interpretation of TS 3.7.C.1.d.
The District, therefore, accepts this violation. TS 3.7.C.1.d does not explicitly describe the movement of MPV desseembly loads or specify other loads that are covered. At the time of the March 9, 1883 SORC approval of the procedure changes associated with movement of the RPV eeemesmbly loads,it could not be established with certainty that the proposed changes could be mede consistently with the Technical Specifications.
As repeted on page 4 of the NOV, the District has documented the improvements made and p6enned to ensure that the processes used to review proposed changes to the Technical Speesfleselone and associated procedures are appropriate (see References 2 and 3 in addition to Wee responsive actions discussed under Violations A and B of this document).
The IstC stated that it had determined not to propose e civil penalty for the violations. Instead, the SWIC exercised enforcement discretion (as described in Section Vll.B.6 of the NRC Enterumment Policy,10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C). The District agrees with the NRC's exercise of enforeement discretion and believes that no purpose would be served by the imposition of a civil pensity.
Sheidd you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact my office.
Sincere 6y, 6
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Jeetn M. MueNer Acteg Vice-President, Nuclear Attachment oc:
magional Administrator USNRC Region IV NRC Resident inspector Cooper Nuclear Station NPG Distribution
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U. S. 90usteer Regulatory Commission Moreh 23,1995 Page 3 of 3 STATE Of" NEBRASKA)
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ISMAHA COUNTY
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J. H. Museer, being first duty sworn, deposes and says that he is an authorized representative of 1lhe Mehreeks Public Power District, a public corporation and political subdivision of the State of Nobreaka; that he is duly authorized to submit this response on behalf of Nebraska Public Pmser Descrict; and that the statements contained herein are true to the best of his knowledge and benef.
nl J. H. MueQer Ruheestbed in my prosonce and sworn to before me this d3 day of
,1995.
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@ 005 Ateeshment 1 to NL99tOO81 Page 1 of 5 REPLY TO FEBRUARY 21,1995 NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION - EA NO.95-012 (NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 4-93-020R AND EA 94-177)
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION NRC DOCKET NO. 50-298, LICENSE DPR 46 in its letter to the District dated February 21,1995, the NRC Identified two violations of NRC respAromerrts. These violations were classified as a single Soverity Level 111 problem.
The pert 6ouler violations (Parts A and 8 of the NOV) and the District's replies are set forth ino6ew.
. ant nf Vinf ation A T=aminal Specsfication (TS) 3.7.C1.d, " Secondary Containment," requires that secondar; annanhanennt integrity shall he maintained in all modes {firradiatedfuel is being handled in the senamenry twetainneent andloads which couldpotentially damage irradiatedfuct are being nsoved ime ne,,icendary ccatainntent.
Cannewysotheabove, on March 10,1993, th e reactorpressure vessel head, dryer, and separator, neinh newe loads that had thepotential to damage irradiatedfuel, were moved in the secondary j
eeneninnennt without ' secondary containment integrity being maintained Dre results of a annunhance test conducted to demonstrate secondary containment integrity, performed on hfarch A 198l9, mere unsatisfadory. The test was not satisfadorityperformed untilMarch 11,1993.
A >- =:nn ne nnnial of vintation For the reasons discussed below, the District accepts the violation.
Amamana fDf_Vinf atinn P
As explained in Reference 2 (page 34), the language of TS 3.7.C.1.d ("... no loads which could potentially damage irradiated fuel...") could be considered unclear. The TS provides a functional standard, as opposed to a definite quantifiable standard, for sistermining which loads are permitted to be moved without prior testing to verify nooendary containment integrity. A judgment must be made as to whether a particular beel could potentially damage irradiated fuel. This leaves the TS open to differing luttespretetfons. The SORC, at the March 9,1993 meeting, made a judgment as to the meerw of TS 3.7.C.1.d. The District accepts that the SORC decision could be viewed as nonconservative as underscored in the NOV.
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@ 006 Aeteshsenent 1 to 90L9000001 Page 2 of 6 1ho District believed that various documents including NUREG-0612 and General sectric POIC 88-11 (discussed in detailin Reference 2) provided a threshold of load movements Wiet could occur without additional analysis:
In accordance with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy loads at Nuclear Power Plants" (July 1980), the District had chosen to utilize a single failure proof design for the reactor building crane. As allowed by NUREG-0612, this was done in lieu of a load drop analysis demonstrating that the effects of dropping heavy loads such as the RPV head and internals would remain within specified limits, The.
NRC accepted the District's Phase I implementation of NUREG-0612 guidelines in a Safety Evaluation Report dated October 31,1983. Accordingly, the failure of the crane was not considered credible.
The interpretation that TS 3.7.C.1.d did not include disassembly loads appeared ooncistent with a docketed NRC Staff position (March 28,1988 memorandum from NRC Project Manager to the Distr lct and NRC (nspection Report 88-07, page 9, dated May 11, 1988). that the performance of the secondary containment surveillance test was not required until actual handling of irradiated fuel was to begin.
Therefore, RPV disassembly could proceed prior to completing the secondary containment leak test as long as the test was successfully completed " prior to refueling," which had been interpreted by the NRC to mean prior to actual movement of irradiated fuel.
It was not the District's intent when it took the initiative in 1991 to amend TS 3.7.C.1.d (approved by the NRC as Amendment 147) to change its prior practices for RPV disassembly. The District had performed such heavy load movements during prior outages. As explained in Reference 2, the provision added to TS 3.7.C.1.d in 1991 was intended to address the movement of much smaller loads (e.g., a local power range monitor over the open RPV or the spent fuel pool), which were not necessarily as well controlled as movement of heavy loads.
The District believes that it is entitled to rely on its choice of using a single-failure proof stone, in lieu of providing analysis of heavy load drops, as a sneans of Teducing the potentlei for accidental dropping of heavy loads in accordance with NUREG-0612.
Museover, the NRC indicated prior (1983) acceptance of the District's Phase i NUREG-0012 implementation (where this position was articulated).
Canaantive Stane Talean and the_Results.Achlexed 1
The District has implemented broad based actions to ensure the effectiveness of SORC as detailed in the Phase 1 Performance improvement Plan Action (see also Reference 3).
The actions taken include:
1.
Changing the composition of SORC with the addition of the new Plant Manager (Chairman), the new Engineering Manager (Vice Chairman), and the new Operations Manager; 2.
The new SORC Chairman has established new standards and expectations for SORC meetings, with a broadened focus on the nuclear safety aspects of the i
issues presented;
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A SORC Adtrunistrator has been appointed to improve meeting coordination and conduct, as well as the quality and completeness of SORC records; l
4 4.
The governing procedure for the SORC was revised, it now more accurately describes SORC activities and clarifies SORC's focus on issues relevant to nuclear safety and the proper identification and eddressing of safety implications:
5.
A Nuclear Safety Training course has been provided to SORC members and alternates.
The District believes that it is prudent to have Secondary Containment Integrity estubhahed prior to RPV disassembly. Accordingly, the associated procedures have been revised tc reflect this.
Camrmetive Stana That Will Rm Taken to Avnid Further Vinf atinna he District has proposed changes to the CNS Technical Specifications which, among other changes, would clearly and more specifically restrict the ability to move heavy leeds which could potentially damage irradiated fuel.
J The District has commissioned an improved Standard Technical Specifications conversion assessment for CNS the purpose of which is to determine thr. feasibility and practicality of converting to the Improved Standard Technical Specifications.
Completion of this assessment is expected by mid-year,1995. One advantage of the improved Standard Technical Specifications is the enhanced Bases Section which doeoribes in detail the meaning and purpose of each Technical Specification.
j Dmen When Full f'nmnlinne., twill R_n Achinund CNG is in full compliance with the requirements for maintaining Secondary Containment integr6ty when loads that could potentially damage irradiated fuel are being moved in the Secondary Containment.
Besternant.oLVinIatinr2_B 10 CPR 50.9, " Completeness and Accuracy ofInformation," requires, in part, that information reqeared by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditionx, tu he maintained by the nommaan shall be compide and accurate in all material respects.
Comewry to the above, Procedure Change Notices (PCNs), datedMarch 9,1993, pertaining to Nahneenance Procedures 24.4, 24.5, and 7.4.6, which are records required by the TS to be annannenned, were not accurate in all material respects The PC% approved changes tu anainaneance procedures which eliminated the requirement that secondary containment integrity benanineninedduring removalofthe reactorpressure vesselhead, dryer, andseparator. Sedian 64Ae ICNs stated in part, " teds. spec changes [ amendments to thefacility operating license] 147 and 150 removed the requirements to demonstrate secondary containment prior to the time the pinnary containment is openedfor refueling," and Section S ofthe PCNs indicate that the PCNs eenanninrted a change to the Technical Specifications approved by License Amendments 147and IM infed, LicenseAmendment 117imposeda requirement to maintain secondary containment annyiny during movement of loads with the potential to damage irradiatedfuct, and ndther
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r-Asemahanent 1 to MLee60061 Pese 4 et 5 LAmenee Amendment 147 nor 150 constitutedprior approval of the changes to Maintenance henahner 7,4.4, 7.4.S, and 74.6 to eliminatethe requirementfor secondary containment integrity buring reactorpressure vessel head, dryer, and separator removal. These inaccuracies were namment because the decision ofshe Station Operations Review Comnuttee to approve the PCNs sennhed he ne movemort ofthe reactor vesselpressure head [ sic], dryer, and separator in violation af15.t.7.C1.d Admisalon.nn.Dncial to. Violation The District admits the violation.
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' -m f nr Vinf atinn As explained in detail on pages 25-32 of Reference 2, the District concurs that the
'wdormation on the PCN forms should have been complete and accurate in all material roepects, but were partially in error and potentially confusing. Specifically, Section 5 uf the PCNs dated March 9,1993 indicated that the proposed revisions to procedures inweeved a change to the Technical Specifications and Section a contained a statement ineessing that TS Amendment 147 " removed" requirements to demonstrate secondary sentainment capability prior to the time the primary containment is opened for refueling.
The District's review indicated that the errors in the PCN forms were inadvertent. The sedesences in question were added for the purpose of disclosing to SORC members the reeutts of research on the proposed procedure changes, including NUREG-0612 and eeher pertinent documents, which indicated that prior TS amendments (147 and 150) were relevant to the procedure changes under consideration.
Corrective Steps.Iakeo_and_theleiults.Achievad To avoid the possibility of confusion involving the relationship between previous TS emendments and proposed changes to procedures, the PCN form has been revised to eek specifically if a Tech Spec change is required prior to PCN approval.
The specific PCNs dated March 9,1993, pertaining to Maintenance Procedures 7.4.4, 7.4.5, and 7.4.6 have been superseded by subsequent procedure revisions.
The PCN files for the affected procedures have been annotated to indicate the decrepancies that existed as referenced in this NOV.
The Phase 1 Performance Improvement Plan for improving SORC effectiveness has been n.-Ced. The District believes that the corrective actions (discussed in more detail in Violation A) have improved SORC ability to ensure completeness and accuracy of information.
(%,enntiva_Stant That Will Re Taken_to_ Avoid Further Vielstions The District believes that the PCN form change coupled with the previously noted broad beoed corrective actions to restore the effectiveness of SORC will avoid further violetions of this nature and enhance the safety culture at CNS.
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Asendument 1
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- to M1 Puem 5 et 5 Lima _When Full Onmnfinnen Will Re Ar hieved M
to the PCN form discrepancies referenced in the NOV, the District is in full l
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' IST Of NRC COMMITMENTS.
l ATTACHMENT 3 l
i Cerroependence No: NIE950081 h imLlewing table identifies those actions conmitted to by the District in this eseemset.
Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or f= lammed actions by the District.
They are described to the NRC for the NRC's hion and are not regulatory commitments.
Please notify the Licensing Itemept at Cooper Nuclear Station of any questions regarding this doctanent or any asseeisted regulatory commitments.
COMMITTED DATE COMMITMENT h District has commissioned an Improved Standard OR OUTAGE Toeinnical Specifications conversion assessment for CNS the purpose of which is to determine the feasibility and June 30, 1995 practicality of converting Lo the Improved Standard
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A-1 Snecifications.
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ps0CEDURE NUMBER 0. 42 l
REVISION NUMBER 0 l
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