ML20082U012
| ML20082U012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1983 |
| From: | Mark Miller KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL-3, NUDOCS 8312160210 | |
| Download: ML20082U012 (25) | |
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l DOCKETED usnac UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 83 DEC 14 P2:17 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board r:
r-
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CQ4PANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
)
(Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station;
)
Unit 1)
)
)
SUFFOLK COUNTY OBJECTIONS TO PREHEARING CONFERENCE OF COUNSEL ORDERS AND' MOTION'FOR' RECONSIDERATION I.
Introduction On December 1; 1983; the Licensing Board; at the conclu-sion of the Prehearing Conference of Counsel; ruled on' motions-to strike testimony submitted on behalf of LILCO and -Suffolk County on Contention 25 (Role Conflict).
The-Board.also announced a revised schedule for " Group II" issues.
On December 2; 1983; the Board confirmed these matters in writing.
See Order Confinning Changes in Schedule With Regard _ to " Group II" Contentions and Rulings on Motions to Strike.
With respect to the motions to strike - portions of the par-ties' role. conflict. testimony; the Board granted.'all the motions tnat had been filed.1/
As a result; the Board struck
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LILCCihad moved to strike the' Testimony.of_Juanita Zuckerman; et-al.'on behalf of Suffolk County regarding Contention 25.D (hereinafter; the " school teachers'~testi-mony");.the' Staff ~had moved to. strike pages 12'18 of.the Testimony of Stephenicole on; behalf of SuffolkJCountyL regarding Contention 25 (hereinafter;-the " Cole testimo-(Footnote cont'd next.pa 6
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in its entirety the County's school teachers' testimony on role conflict and its effect on early dismissals from schools.
The Board also struck portions of Dr. Cole's testimony regarding results of a survey of volunteer firemen conducted by the Coun-ty.
With respect to the schedule for the Group II issues, the Board ruled that there was no reason to delay the hearing schedule until such time as FEMA can review the LILCO Plan and submit findings regarding the adequacy of that Plan.
- However, following LILCO's disclosure that it again was revising its Plan, the Board postponed the hearing schedule on Group II issues for a period of three weeks.
Pursuant to 10 CFR $2.752(c), Suffolk County hereby objects to and moves the Board to reconsider its rulings with respect to:
1.
Proceeding with the schedule on Group II issues prior to release and review by the parties of the FEMA findings regarding the adequacy of the LILCO Plan; (Footnote cont'd from previous page) ny"), and Suffolk County had moved to strike Questions and Answers 29; 30, 31, 37 and 38, portions of Answers.65 and 82; and Attachment 7 of the Testimony of Matthew C.
Cordaro; et al. on behalf of LILCO regarding Contention 25.
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.s 2.
Striking in its entirety the County's school teachers' testimony; and 3.
Striking the Cole testimony regarding the volunteer firemen survey on role conflict.
II.
The Board's Ruling With Respect to the FEMA Review Prejudices Suffolk County and Requires Bifurcated Consideration of Emergency' Planning' Issues Following telephone conference calls betw'een the Board and the parties on October 24 and 25; 1983; it was agreed that the schedule for consideration of emergency planning issues should be revised to treat separately Contentions 23; 25 and 65
(" Group I") and all other admitted Contentions and Subcontentions (" Group II").
See Order Establishing Revised Schedule; dated October 26; 1983; at 2.
This division was a result of negotiations between the parties and took into account the fact that the FEMA Regional Assistance Committee
("RAC") review of the LILCO Plan; then due to be completed by December 1; 1983; was not going to address the Group I issues.
Thus, it was determined that the parties could proceed with the filing of testimony and other pretrial matters regarding the Group I issues; as well as with the hearings regarding those issues, without awaiting FEMA's review.
I On November 10; however; the NRC Staff; notwithstanding its prior assurances to the Board and the parties that the FEMA
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RAC review would be completed by December 1, agreed to a FEMA request for a 60-day extension of time in which to complete its RAC review.
As a result, the FEMA review is now not due to be completed until February 1, 1984.
This unanticipated extension and its impact upon the schedule for consideration of emergency planning issues led the Board to revise its agenda for the December 1 Conference of Counsel by adding the matter of scheduling to the agenda.
See Order Establishing Supplemental Agenda for Conference of Counsel, dated November 18, 1983, at 4-5.
During the Conference of Counsel; the County requested that the schedule for the Group II issues be keyed to receipt and review by the parties of the FEMA RAC review.
This request was denied by the Board.
Tr. at 789.
The County submits that the Board's decision to proceed with the schedule for Group II issues; in advance of the FEMA RAC review; is contrary to pro-cedural requirements and prejudicial to the County.
The Board should accordingly reverse its decision.
The County recognizes that in light of the Board's deci-sion to postpone the entire schedule on Group II issues for a period of three weeks (see Tr. at 789-90), testimony on Group II issues will now not be due until February 8.
Thus; it is i
conceivable that the County's testimony will not have to be filed until after the FEMA RAC review is complet'ed.2/ However; 2/
Under the present schedule; ho. wever; other Group II mat-ters,- such as filing and responding to summary disposition (Footnote cont'd next page).
this assumes (1) that the FEMA schedule will not be further delayed and (2) that the RAC review; once completed, will be immediately provided to the Board and the parties without any delay.
It also assumes that if FEMA somehow meets its February 1 goal, the parties will have sufficient time in the intervening seven days to review and understand the RAC find-ings, obtain necessary clarifying data, and incorporate all this into testimony due to be filed on February 8.
None of these assumptions is realistic.
As noted by FEMA at the Conference'of Counsel, as of December 1, work had not been started on Revision 2 of the LILCO Plan.
Tr. at 721.
Indeed; according to FEMA; a number of the members of the RAC Committee had not even finished re-viewing Revision 1 as of that date.
Tr. at 722.
LILCO has now advised the Board and the parties that a " Revision 3" to the LILCO Plan will be forthcoming in a few weeks.
It is entirely unrealistic; absent a categorical commitment by FEMA; to expect-that the RAC Committee will meet the February 1 schedule in light of this development.
(Footnote cont'd from previous page)
I motions; will have to.go forward before the FEMA RAC review is completed.
See, Order Confirming Changes in Schedule With Regard to " Group II" Contentions and. Rulings on Motions to Strike; dated December 2, 1983; at 3.
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-5.
Even assuming that BEMA meets the February 1 date; howev-er, it is unrealistic to expect that the PAC Committee's find-ings could be distributed to the Board and the parties in suf-f'cient time for the Eastimony r.ow due on February 8 to take i
such findings into consideration.
Following completion of the RAC Committee review; it will likely be necessary for there to be some intra-agency review of these findings.
Even if the RAC Committee's findings are provided to the parties on the very day that they are completed; one week is just not enough time to evaluate the entire RAC review and its conclusions; to obtain the clarifications which inevitably will be necessary; and to take the RAC review and conclusions into account in the testimony which will be filed with this Board.
Thus; as a practical mntter; it seems clear that; under the Board's revised schedule; testimony on the Group II issues will have to be filed in advance of the FEMA RAC review or; at the very least; prior to the time that it will take for the parties to assess fully FEMA's work product.
For the reasons discussed below; this would likely result in bifurcating the hearing process so as to place FEMA and the NRC Staff in a favored status vis-a-vis the other parti'es.
This should not be allowed. -
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The County understands that this Board's ruling requires all parties to file testimony on the Group II issues by February 8.
FEMA and the NRC Staff; however; have previously asserted that they will not be able to put in any testimony until approximately three weeks after completion of the RAC review.
See; e.g.,
Tr. at 725-26.
It is therefore realistic to expect that FEMA; and perhaps the Staff; will seek an exemp-tion of the February 8 filing date.
The County believes that it would be fundamentally unfair for either FEMA or the Staff to be exempt from filing testimony until some time after the other parties have been required to go forward with their testimony.
This is especially true since, under 10 CFR $50.47(a)(2); each finding made pursuant to F EMA ' s RAC review is likely to constitute a " rebuttable pre-sumption" on the adequacy or inadequacy of reviewed items.
In order to be in a position to rebut such a presumption; the parties need time to evaluate FEMA's findings and-to gain an understanding of the underlying rationale for those findings.
This requires the Board to take two actions:
1.
Permit a reasonable period for discovery by the parties of FEMA and the RAC Committee members;d/ and 3/
The previous discovery of FEMA personnel clearly was not an adequate opportunity to understand FEMA's position since the RAC review on which FEMA intends to rely had not even begun when that previous discovery was taken.
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2.
Permit the parties time to digest the discovery and the FEMA findings and to then incorporate such data; as appropriate; into their testimony.
Requiring the parties to file in advance of the RAC review puts the cart before the horse and would result in denying essential data to the parties at the very time they would be preparing testimony.
This is obviously contrary to orderly procedure and to the regulatory scheme that is envisioned by
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the " rebuttable presumption" provision of the NRC's regula-tions.
The County submits that this Board's actions should encourage procedural fairness and orderly procedure pursuant to applicable regulations.
However; the Board's ruling in this case will instead foster confusion; wasted resources and piece-meal litigation.
Because of the status of FEMA's findings under Section 50.47(a)(2); both fairness and the necessary meaning of that regulation require that there-be an opportunity for the County or any other party to confront FEMA's findings on timely and reasonable terms.
Singling out suffolk County --
and LILCO -- and requiring them to file testimony either before l
the Staff and FEMA or before the RAC-review is released and reviewed by the parties would; at a minimum; require that the l
County and LILCO have an absolute right to file additional l
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testimony and/or to bring back witnesses after the RAC review is completed and/or the FEMA / Staff testimony is filed.
- Indeed, if the present schedule holds; there must be an absolute'right to recall an entire witness panel to inquire into the FEMA / Staff testimony or the RAC findings.
Such piecemeal and fragmented litigation is neither effi-cient nor capable of helping to make a complete record.
It ex-acerbates the parties' workloads and results in wasting time and resources.
In the County's view; there is no conceivable good reason for the Board's scheduling decision.
What appears to be the Board's desire for a fast-paced trial should not be converted into the pursuit of an abstract goal which takes pre-cedence over the need for a full and fair hearing.
There is no need to rush this proceeding:
LILCO's continuing diesel gener-ator problems provide ample room for deliberate consideration of all parties' views.
Thus; this Board should not compel the parties or itself to make hurried assessments of the details of the LILCO Plan.
The fact is that FEMA has the lead federal responsibility in this area; and the NRC has agreed to rely on its advice.4/
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The FEMA /NRC Memorandum of Understanding describes the 4
role of FEMA in NRC licensing proceedings.
45 Fed. Reg. 82713 (December 16, 1980).
The clear import of the Memo-randum is that FEMA will provide licensing proceedings the benefit of its evaluation of offsite emergency plans. 1 i
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f FEMA has stressed that it needs at least until February 1; 1984 to perform its detailed review of the LILCO Plan and at least three weeks thereafter to prepare testimony.
There is no reason that Suffolk County or any other party should 'ce required to meet a more demanding schedule; especially given the status accorded to FEMA's views by Section 50.47(a)(2).
Therefore, the only sensible course is to await FEMA's RAC review so that the testimony which will be filed by the parties will be more relevant and therefore more meaningful.
The County therefore requests that the Board reconsider' its ruling and defer the hearing schedule on the Group II issues until such tbme as the FEMA RAC review has been released and reviewed by all the parties and necessary discovery of FEMA and the RAC Committee members has taken place.
The County believes that approximately one month would be a sufficient amount of time for such review and discovery and would permit the hearings on the Group II issues to proceed in an orderly; fair and efficient manner.
III. The Board Erred in Striking Portions of the County's Role Conflict Testimony In its November 18; 1983 " Order Establishing Supplemental Agenda for Conference of Counsel;" the Board expressly set forth the agenda for the December 1 Conference of Counsel.
That agenda did not include consideration of motions to strike;
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although the Board certainly knew that such motions were required to be filed by the parties on November 28; prior to the scheduled Conference of Counsel.
Seel e.g.; Order Establishing Revised Schedule; dated October 26; 1983; at 3.
Nor was the County otherwise given any indication by the Board prior to December 1 that it intended to hear arguments on motions to strike at the December 1 Conference.
'Tr. at 765-66.
The County believes that; under these circumstances; the Board erred in requiring argument; over County objections (Tr.
765-66), on the Staff and LILCO motions to strike portions of
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the County's role conflict testimony.
Section 2.730(c) of the Commission's Rules of Practice makes clear that a party is en-titled to file an answer and opposition to such motions.
Here; however; the County was given no opportunity to respond.to such motions in writing; or even to review carefully and prepare for
. hile the Board does have authority to alter time W
argument.
limits under the rules; it is'not at all clear'that the Board may dispense with written responses to non-discovery motions; particularly when no advance warning is provided. - See 10 CFR
{2.730(h).
The Board's actions on December,1 are especially
' disturbing to the County because.this was not a case'where there was-a need for the Board to dispose of the motions on December 1; there would _have been no prejudice. to anyone Lif the 3.
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Board had asked for the County to file written responges on December 5 and then ruled on the motions on December 6, at the start of the hearings.
As it were, however, the Board did not wait, and this caused substantial prejudice to the County which; unlike LILCO; had not filed a written opposition to the pending motions at the time of the Board's ruling.
A.
The School Teachers' Testimony In moving to strike in its entirety the County's school teachers' testimony; LILCO asserted that (1) the testimony proffered by the witnesses was unreliable and therefore irrele-vant and (2) LILCO had been unfairly disadvantaged by the tes-timony; because those witnesses were not identified by the County during discovery and because the witnesses relied on documents that were not prcduced during discovery.
LILCO Motion at 2.
In striking the County's testimony; the Board did not address LILCO's assertion that it' had been unfairly disadvantaged by the testimony.
Instead, it found that the testimony was not relevant under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence "because it does not have probative value to establish that the facts asserted therein are more probable than they would be without the evidence."
Tr. at 791.
Further; to the extent that the testimony was relevant; the..
Board found that it should be excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because of " considerations of undue delay; waste of time; or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
Id.
In the Board's view; the testimony was cumula-tive to the testimony of the school administrators offered by the County.5/
The County submits that there was no basis for the Board's ruling to strike the school teachers' testimony for lack of relevancy.
Nor was there any basis for finding that the testi-many should have been excluded as cumulative in nature.
The Board's ruling was based upon its view of Federal civil court rules.
However, such rules do not apply as iron-clad rules in NRC proceedings.
By its very terms; the Atomic Energy Act subjects NRC proceedings to the Administrative Procedure I
Act -- not to the Federal Rules.
There was therefore no justi-fication for the Board to rivet itself to its view of the Federal Rules, especially when under the Administrative Proce-dure Act and the NRC's own rules (10 CFR 2.743(c)), the school teachers' testimony is clearly relevant and admissible.
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See Testimony of Jeffers; et al. on behalf of Suffolk County regarding Contention 23 Thereinafter; " school ad-ministrators' testimony").
Even L7,LCO, in its motion to strike the teachers' testimo-i ny, acknowledged that, if true, the testimony was "of consequence to the determination of the action."
LILCO Motion at 6.
Having said this, LILCO attacked the credibility of the school teacher witnesses; and asserted that the testimony was not true.
Credibility issues;- however; go to the weight, and not the admissibility; of testimony and are for this Board to decide at the hearings, through cross-examination of the witness panel, not by ploy of a motion to strike.
Unfortunately; the Board's ruling did not provide any reasons for why the Board considered the school teachers' tes-timony to be without probative value and thus irrelevant.
Thus, it must be assumed that the Board relied on the arguments made by LILCO in its motion.
In the County's view, however; none of LILCO's arguments justifies the Board's action.
First, LILCO's motion asserts that the school teacher witnesses are not presented as technical expert witnesses.
Thus; according to LILCO, they are not qualified to testify on teacher behavior and their testimony is not reliable.
LILCO Motion at 7.
This argument; however, is just not relevant to.
the testimony presented.
The school teacher witnesses are; as pointed out at the Conference of Counsel; fact witnesses.
Their testimony.
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concerns facts based on their personal knowledge and experiences.
For this reason, it is immaterial that they are not qualified as technical experts.
There is no requirement under the NRC's rules or elsewhere that a witness be a technical expe.rt.
Their testimony le of value because of what they know as the persons closest to certain aspects of the role conflict issues admitted by the Board for litigation in this proceeding.
Accordingly; this portion of the LILCO motion should have been rejected.
LILCO's motion also asserts that the school teachers' tes-timony is unreliable because there is no indication that they statistically represent some larger group; such s the popula-tion of teachers in the EPZ.
LILCO Motion at 7.
- however, there is no requirement anywhere' contrary to LILCO's asser-i tion, that witnesses have to represent a statistical sample of other people engaged in the same profession or otherwise like them.
Indeed, LILCO has not shown that its witnesses represent a statistically significant sample of some larger group.
For example; - there is no showing by LILCO that Messrs.. Dynes and Mileti statistically represent all sociologists.
This fact does not mean; however, that their testimony should be rejected by the Board.
Nor should the school ~ teachers'~ testimony be rejected.
The fact that the. teachers' testimony does not on
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its face indicate that they represent a statistical sample of other teachers is wholly irrelevant.
Relevancy; however, is established by the fact that these witnesses are testifying about matters which are within their personal knowledge and ex-s perience.
LILCO therefore misses the mark in asserting that the school teacher witnesses should be struck since it cannot be established that their representations can be reliably gen-eralized to all school teachers.
LILCO Motion at 8.
Moreover; these witnesses; in addition to asserting that many teachers will not remain on duty in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham; also testify about the effects of implementing an early dismissal plan in the absence of sufficient numbers of school teachers and other personnel.
LILCO's argument about statistical samples does not even address this portion of the testimony; which is purely factual in its nature and about which these witnesses are clearly com-petent to testify.
Surely; the testimony of the school teach-era is reliable in this regard and the Board erred in excluding it.
Finally; LILCO's motion asserts that none of the school teacher witnesses state that they personally would not remain with school children in the event of an emergency at Shoreham and that their testimony therefore cannot be viewed as.
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8 representing even their personal views on role conflict.
LILCO Motion at 8-9.
Notwithstanding this assertion; there is no in-dication that the testimony is not reliable and therefore not relevant.
LILCO could always determine whether these particular teachers will remain on duty by asking them that question on cross-examination.
Excluding the testimony alto-gether; however; if based on this ground; can only be construed as a punitive measure for the witnesses' failure to personalize how they would behave in the event of an emergency at Shoreham.
The County recognizes that the Board also struck the school teachers' testimony on the ground that it was cumulative to the school administrators' testimony.
Again; the County disagrees strongly with the Board's. ruling.' As previously noted; the school teachers were submitted as fact witnesses on two matters.
First; their testimony addressed how early dis-missals take place -- that is; the personnel required to imple-ment early dismissals; and What can occur if such personnel are not available.
Second; their testimony addressed Whether; in fact, teachers in the school districts within the EPZ will remain available in the event of an emergency at' Shoreham.
Admittedly; some of this' subject matter is also addressed by the school administrators' testimony.
However; this does 4
not justify the Board's decision to-strike the school teachers' -.
testimony in its entirety.
The knowledge and personal experiences of school teachers differ in some respects from i
that of the administrators of the schools.
They are in the classrooms with the students and are best able to address the issues of role conflict from that position.
The perspectives of school teachers and school administra-I tors also differ in some regards.
The County's school teacher panel, if permitted to testify; could, for example; discuss their experiences, responsibilities and duties during early dismissals.
They could also relate their views regarding whether school teachers will experience role conflict during an emergency at Shoreham.
These views would be based upon their
' conversations and discussions with other teachers and their personal observations and beliefs about what other teachers
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will do.
Such testimony would be different in kind 'from the.
testimony of the school administrators and should not have been struck on the basis that there may be some cumulative testimony between the two groups.
B.
The Cole Testimony In. striking.that portion of'Dr. Cole's testimony discussing the results.cf the volunteer-firemen survey-conducted by-the County.(pages 12-18); the Board remarked only that the testimony _was struck "as'being irrelevant."- Tr. at-18'--
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1 792.
The County submits that the Board's ruling in this regard was clearly in error.
j The Board's conclusory finding provides no reason why the l
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Cole testimony was determined to be irrelevant.
The County as-sumes, therefore; that the reasons were those argued by the l
Staff in its motion to strike.
'Those arguments; however; fail to justify the Board's action.
The Staff first asserts that the volunteer firemen survey addressed in the Cole testimony is irrelevant because the LILCO Plan does not rely on firemen.6/ -Staff Motion at 2.
- However, the resultsoof that survey;-as interpreted by County experts; indicate that a substantial number of emergency workers that l
l are relied upon by LILCO will not report for duty in the ev.ent of an emergency at Shoreham.
Indeed; if the Board will simply review the testimony of Drs. Johnson and Erikson, it will see that; in their expert opinion; the results of Dr. Cole's firemen's' survey are highly probative of how other emergency workers relied -upon under the LILCO Plan will respond to role con flicts.
For the Board to term the firemen's survey _irrele-vant is thus to reject the expert opinion of County' witnesses before they even have an opportunity to testify.
6/
The LILCO Plan does assume that volunteer, firemen; al-though not relied upon to perfonn evacuation functions; t
will perform their normal jobs in the. event of 'a Shoreham
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accident. Y
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The Staff also asserts that the volunteer firemen survey is irrelevant because it does not include the Wading River Fire Department, which is the closest fire department to Shoreham.1/
Staff Motion at 2.
The Staff does not attempt to explain why
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this makes the survey irrelevant; n.or; in the County's view, could the Staff do.so.
The fact that this particular fire I
department was not surveyed is of no consequence with respect to the purposes of'the survey; i.e.,
to provide an indication of the relative proportion of individuals accustomed to reacting to emergency situations who would not report for duty; or would not report promptly; in the event of an emergency at Shoreham.
By any standard, there fore; the Cole testimony is relevant and should not have been excluded by this Board.
Not just Dr.
Cole, but also Ers. Erikson and Johnson, as noted above, rely on the survey and find it to be indicative of whether emergency workers would experience role conflict if there were an accident at Shoreham.
The survey results apply; therefore; not 7/
The Staff's irrelevancy argument is completely inconsis-tent and should have been rejected by the Board.
The FEMA witness on Contention 25 contends that bus drivers at Indian Point will report in the event of an emergency at that plant and argues that this supports a conclusion that bus drivers at Shoreham will also report.
Since the Indian Point drivers of course will not report in a Shoreham emergency; under the Staff's theory the FEMA tes-timony should be excluded. _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _
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just to volunteer firemen, but also, for example, to LILCO per-sonnel who may be members of volunteer fire departments, ambu-lance drivers, medical and paramedical personnel and American Red Cross personnel.8/
See Cole testimony at 18.
Moreover, the survey also provides an indication of how other people who are expected by LILCO to perform emergency functions (such as LILCO employees, Brookhaven employees, school, medical, transportation and volunteer personnel) are likely to respond.
Indeed, there is no reason to believe that these other emergency workers, relied upon by LILCO, will react any differently to a rolc conflict-producing situation than did the firemen surveyed.
In fact, many of these workers are more likely to resolve role conflict in favor of their family responsibilities since, unlike volunteer firemen, they are not experienced in responding to life-or health-threatening situa-tions.
See Cole testimony at 18.
For these reasons, the Staff's argument and the Board's finding that the testimony is irrolevant, in effect, do nothing more than take issue with the expert opinion of the County's witnesses.
It was inappropriate for the Board to have excluded such. testimony on this basis.
Instead, the Board should have inquired about the testimony and the reasons for the survey's relevancy to other emergency workers during cross-examination 8/
See Tr. at 1126, where LILCO witness Weismantle testified that, as of last August, apparently 118 LERO workers were members of volunteer fire departments. A
of the County's witnesses.
This issue goes to the weight, not the admissibility; of the testimony.
IV.
Conclusion
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For the reasons set forth above; Suffolk County respect-fully submits that the Board should reconsider and reverse its rulings with respect to proceeding with the schedule on Group II issues prior to release and review by the parties of the FEMA findings regarding the adequacy of the LILCO Plan; LILCO's i
motion to strike the school teachers' testimony on Contention 25.D in its entirety; and the Staff's motion to strike portions 3
j of the Cole testimony on Contention 25.
l Respectfully submitted; 1
i David J.
Gilmartin Patricia A.
Dempsey Suffolk, County Department of Law H.
Lee Dennison Building Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge; New York 11788 t
41 Herbert H.' Brown Lawrence Coe Lanpher i
Michael S.
Miller KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL; 1
CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W.,
Suite 800 Washington; D.C.
20036 l
Attorneys for-Suffolk County I
i
(
Dated:
December 8, 1983 i r 1
__w
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
)
(Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of SUFFOLK COUNTY OBJECTIONS TO PREHEARING CONFERENCE OF COUNSEL ORDERS AND MOTION FOR RE-CONSIDERATION, dated December 8,1983, have been served to the following by U.S. mail, first class, except where noted, this 4th day of December 1983.
- James A - Laurenson, Chair; nan Ralph Shapiro, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Cammer and Shapiro U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9 East 40th Street Washington, D.C.
"20555 New York, New York 10016
- Dr. Jerry R.
Kline Howard'L. Blau, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 217 Newbridge Road U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Hicksville, New York 11801 Washington, D.C.
20555 4-
- W.. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.
- Mr. Frederick J.
Shon Hunton & Williams Atomic Safety and Licensing Board P.O.
Box 1535 i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 707 East Main Street Washington, D.C.
20555 Richmond, Virginia -23212 Edward M. Barrett, Esq.
General Counsel Mr.' Jay Dunkleberger Long Island' Lighting Company New York State EnergyJOffice 250 Old Country Road Agency l Building 2 Mineola, New York-11501 Empire _ State Plaza.
Albany, New York. 12223 Mr. Brian McCaffrey Long Island Lighting Company-Stephen B.
Latham,-Esq.
175 East Old Country Road Twomey,..Latham &'Shea Hicksville, New York - 11801 33 West Second Street-Riverhead, New York11901 a
my 9
a
)
e e-e' ye y i
+a
Nora Bredes Docketing and Service Section Executive Director Office of the Secretary Shoreham Opponents Coalition U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
195 East Main Street Washington, D.C.
20555 Smithtown, New York 11787 Hon. Peter Cohalan Marc W. Goldsmith Suffolk County Executive Energy Research Group, Inc.
H.
Lee Dennison Building 400-1 Totten Pond Road Veterans Memorial Highway Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 Hauppauge, New York 11788 MHB Technical Associates Eleanor L.
Frucci, Esq.
1723 Hamilton Avenue Atomic Safety and Licensing Suite K Board Panel San Jose, California 95125 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Washington, D.C.
20555 Joel Blau, Esq.
New York Public Service Comm.
Ezra I. Bialik, Esq.
The Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller Assistant Attorney General Building Environmental Protection Bur.
Empire State Plaza New York State Dept. of Law Albany, New York 12223 2 World Trade Center New York, New York 10047 David J. Gilmartin, Esq.
Suffolk County Attorney Atomic Safety and Licensing H.
Lee Dennison Building Appeal Board Veterans Memorial Highway U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Hauppauge, New York 11788 Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Jonathan D.
Feinberg, Esq.
Board Panel Staff Counsel, New York State U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Public Service Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 3 Rockefeller Plaza Albany, New York 12223 Bernard M.
Bordenick, Esq.
David A. Repka, Esq.
Stewart M. Glass, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Counsel Washington, D.C.
20555 Federal Emergency Management Agency Stuart Diamond 26 Federal Plaza, Room 1349 Environment / Energy Writer New York, New York 10278 NEWSDAY Long Island, New York 11747 James B.
Dougherty, Esq.
3045 Porter Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20008 -
~.
Spence Perry, Esq.
i Associate General Counsel Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C.
20472 Mr. Jeff Smith Shoreham Nuclear Power Station P.O. Box 618 North Country Road Wading River, New York 11792 Michael S.
Miller KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M' Street, N.W.,
Suite 800 Washington, D.C.
20036 DATED:
December 8, 1983 By Hand
- By Federal Express on December 8, 1983 i :
,