ML20082T069

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Responds to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in IE Insp Repts 50-272/83-15 & 50-311/83-12.Corrective Actions:Maint Procedure A-21 Revised & Integrated Operating Procedure Will Be Revised by 840131
ML20082T069
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 12/09/1983
From: Liden E
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Starostecki R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 8312150142
Download: ML20082T069 (4)


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r E-OPSMG Pubhc Service Electnc and Gas Company P O Box 236 Hancocks Bndge New Jmsn 08038 E

A Nuclear Depanment December 9, 1983 P

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region 1

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King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

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Attention:

Mr. Richard W.

Sterostecki, Director

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n Division of Project and Resident Programs

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Gentlemen:

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..qn NRC COMBINED INSPECTION 50-272/83-15, 50-311/83-12

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EO SALEM GENERATING STATION g

UNITS NO. 1 AND 2

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SEPTEMBER 28 THROUGH OCTOBER 6, 1983 p

As a result of the inspection conducted on September 23 -

October 6, 1963 and in accordance with the NRC Enforcement p

Policy (10 CPR 2, Appendix C) published in the Federal Register on March 9, 1982 (47 FR 9987), the following violation was E

identified:

k ITEM OF VIOLATION:

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Technical Specification 6.8.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.33, P

Revision 2, November 1978, require written procedures for r-control of iaintenance on safety-related equipment.

E-Administrative Procedure 9,

" Control of Station

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Maintenance", Section 9.3, requires conducting post k-maintenance retesting on all safety-related systems in h.

accordance with the Technical Specifications Surveillance Procedures to determine system operability whenever a system p'

is to be returned to service following maintenance.

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8.4 of AP-9 requires the Senior Shift Supervisor / Shift Supervisor to ensure all retest requirements have been completed satisfactorily.

Contrary to the above, as of August 30, 1983, the shift supervisor had not signed the retest completed block on the work order form and no retest had been performed foliawing maintenance completed on valve 22SJ156 on July 16, 1983

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under work order No. 931747.

This valve had been considered

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operable to support plant operation at power during periods 7

between July 27 and August 30, 1983.

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U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 12/09/83

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REPLY TO ITEM OF VIOLATION:

The No. 22 Hot Leg Safety Injection check valve, 22SJ156, developed a valve body to bonnet leak on a previous occasion.

A temporary furmanited repair was made to the valve and the leak was stopped.

The t empora ry furmanited repair started leaking and work order MD-931747 was issued on July 12, 1983 for the permanent repair of the leak.

The permanent repair of the valvc was done in accordance with the disposition of the deficiency report that was issued when the check valve was originally furmanited.

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The deficiency report and work order required that the furmanite clamp be removed and the furmanited areas be cleaned and permanent repairs be made to the olve to stop the valve body to bonnet leak.

The work order was processed and classified as safety related and required retest criteria be designated in accordance with established Station urocedures.

Maintenance Planning processed the work order a r.J specified that retest was required as per SP(0) 4.0.5 and Maintenance Procedure M17C.

The repair to the valve was completed on July 16, 1983 as follows:

the turmanite clamp was removed, the furmanited areas were cleaned-up, the four valve studs were removed and replaced, a new gasket was installed and the valve bonnet was reinstalled and tightened down.

No internal repairs were performed on the valve and procedures M17C and M14A were utilized during the repair.

These procedures required an internal inspection for material present in the valve body that could interfere with the operability of the valve.

On July 16, 1983, the work order was turned over to the 1~

Operations Department for retest.

The retest requirements listed on the work order referenc(d a generic set of Surveillance Procecures, SP(0) 4.0.5, as the retest f

procedure.

This group of procedures contains no specific test criteria for 22SJ156.

The Technical Specification which contains the test criteria for the valve is 4.4.7.2.c.

The procedure which addressos thic Technical Specification is SP(0) 4.4.7.2.1.

Since no specific retest

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procedure was specified ror the valve on the work order, m.

retest was completed.

The work order was returned to the Maintenance Department for normal document close-out and was not returne6 to the Operations Department until August 31, 1983.

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Nuclear Regulatory Commission 12/09/83 On August 31, 1983, the open work order was again reviewed by the same individual, and based or, the fact that no specific retest procedure was specified for the valve on the work order, other than SP(0) 4.0.5 which had previously been determined not to.be applicable, the retest requirements were signed off as not applicable.

An investigation into the event was conducted to determine the specific cause of the event.

The investigation revealed that the retest specified by Maintenance Procedure A-21 was incorrect in that it did not indicate that leakage testing was required in accordance with Technical Specification 4.4.7.2.1.c.

This requirement was also missed by the shif t supervision.

ACTION TAKEN TO CORRECT AND RESULTS ACHIEVED:

Upon notification by the NRC inspectors that the valve had not been retested as required by Technical Specification 4.4.7.2.c the valve was leak rate tested and was found to be satisfactory.

A review of Maintenance Procedure A-21 was performed to ensure that valve retest requirements are performed in accordance with the appropriate Technical Specifications.

A revised A-21 was issued on November 2, 1983.

ACTION THAT WILL BE TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATIONS:

The Integrat3d Operating Procedure will be revised by January 31, 1984 to include a specific procedural step to require the Senior Shift Supervisor / Shift Supervisor to verify all completed work orders that have been turned over to Operations for post maintenance testing prior to mode change.

These work orders shall be evaluated to ensure no retest requirements are outstanding which would affect systems, equipment, or components that are required to be operable for the next intended oprational mode.

A continuing effort to improve the Post Maintenance Test / Retest Program at the station is in progress; this endeavor includes the evaluations being performed in accordance with PSE&G Action 2.4.3.

These improvements are aimed at increasing the reliability of the information available to those personnel who are designing the Test / Retest requirements, providing a means for Nuclear Engineering evaluation and interaction, and to provide a more uniform listing of the requirements between station departments.

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i U.S.. Nuclear-Regulatory Commission 12/09/83 l

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i DATE'WHEN FULL COMPLIANCE WILL BE' ACHIEVED:

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.We are now' in full compliance regarding the post-maintenance retesting of. valve 22SJ156.

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Liden Manager - Nuclear Licensing and Regulation CC:

Director, Office of: Inspection and Enforcement l Nuclear l Regulatory Commission Washington,' D.C.

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Mr. Donald C.

Fischer Licensing-Project Manager lMr..; James Linville' Senior Resident Inspector I

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