ML20082E826
| ML20082E826 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 04/06/1995 |
| From: | Dennis Morey SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9504110355 | |
| Download: ML20082E826 (4) | |
Text
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Southe'rn Nudear Operating Company; y 'h Nr*1eIer*o$e*c"t the somem elecmcspem '~ April 6, 1995 Docket Numbers: 50-348 - 10 CFR 2.201; 50-364. ~ U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN! Document ControlDesk Washington, DC 20555 L ' Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP) Reply to the Notice of Violation l NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-348/95-03 and 50-364/95-03 ' Ladies and Gentlemen: As requested by your transmittal dated March 7,1995, this letter responds to Notice of Violation 50-348/95-03-03, " Failure to Perform AFD Surveillance Requirements". The - Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) response to Notice of Violation 50-348/ 95-03-03 is provided in the Attachment. If there are any questions, please advise. Respectfully submitted,' Dave Morey REM /maf:95-03. DOC Attachment cc: Mr. S D. Ebneter Mr. B. L. Siegel Mr. T. M. Ross 110157 0 b kDobk !booI48 Q PDR .- -.J
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6 b ATTACHMENT RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION 50-348/95-03-03
v 3y 1 7 u N', Response to Notice of Violation 50-348/95-03-03
- Notice of Violation 50-348/95-03-03 states the following:
-Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements 4.2.1.1.b requires determining j that indicated Axial Flux Difference (AFD) during power operation above 15% is -{ within its limits by " monitoring and logging the indicated Axial Flux Difference m for each operable excore channel at least once per hour for the first 24 hours and L at least once per 30 minutes thereafter, when the Axial Flux Difference Alarm is 'q inoperable." Contrary to the above: j At about 5:00 p.m., on April 24,1994, during initial startup from its twelfth refueling outage, Unit 1 exceeded 15% power with the AFD alarm in an inoperable condition due to the licensee's failure to input the new " Fuel Cycle 13" AFD target band constants into the plant computer. This condition was not recognized until about 4:30 p.m. on April 26 (with Unit I at approximately 48% power), whereupon plant operators began to monitor and log AFD. Consequently, for almost 48 hours, plant operators did not monitor and log AFD for each operable excore detector while the AFD alarm was inoperable. Admimmion or Denimi The violation occurred as described in the Notice of Violation. Reason for Violation At 1630, on April 26,1994, with Unit 1 in Mode I holding at 48% power for flux mapping following a normal startup from a refueling outage, it was concluded that Main Control Board Annunciator FC4, Differential Flux Deviation Alert, was inoperable due to the axial flux target band values not being updated in the plant computer. The initial evaluation of this event concluded that a Technical Specification (TS) surveillance had not been missed. Subsequent discussions with the FNP Resident inspector lead to the determination that surveillance requirements had not been met once the reactor reached 15% power on April 24 with FC4 inoperable in that Axial Flux DifTerence (AFD) was not logged. This event was reported per LER 95-002-00,- Although the surveillance is not documented, control room operators routinely monitor AFD which ' is an indication on the main control board. The only credible condition that would cause AFD to deviate from its target band is significant rod motion or power changes that result in xenon oscillations. For these events, operators are aware of the impact to AFD and closely monitor this parameter. The times when AFD was out of the band were logged in the Reactor Operator Log and W.- -,e , ~ - - - - v,,,, ~
u 'V* ~ Attachment - Response to Violation 50-348/95-03-03 Page 2 all TS action requirements for this condition were met. Therefore this event had no safety significance. The cause of this event was personnel error. Reactor Engineering personnel failed to ensure that the plant computer was updated with current core design values prior to startup following refueling. In addition, the Control Room personnel did not recognize Annunciator FC4 as inoperable and therefore, did not commence the TS surveillance requirement to initiate a surveillance test procedure until April 26, approximately 50 hours later. Corrective Actions Taken and Results Achieved Upon determining that Annunciator FC4 was inoperable, logging of AFD was initiated to comply with Technical Specifications. The proper axial lia!. target band values were entered into the plant computer on April 27, 1994. Corrective Steps to Avoid Further Victation Appropriate personnel were coached on this event. Appropriate unit operating procedures have been revised to ensure that the differential flux target band values are current in the plant computer for the initial startup prior to 15% reactor power. Date of Full Compliance February 17,1995 3 i + i _}}