ML20082D192

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Forwards Suppl 2 to Quantitative Info on Revised Fire Analysis for Limerick Generating Station,Severe Accident Risk Assessment
ML20082D192
Person / Time
Site: Limerick  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/17/1983
From: Kemper J
PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To: Schwencer A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20082D194 List:
References
NUDOCS 8311220340
Download: ML20082D192 (7)


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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 M ARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699

~190I PHILADELPHIA, PA.19101 JO H N S. k F "P'.R s

.... 7.U .~o 1.c November 17, 1983 Docket Nos. 50-352 50-353 Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 6 2 Severe Accident Risk Assessment (SARA)

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

On July 15, 1983 a report on the impact of recent design changes on severe accident risk was transmitted to you. Instructions were provided to incorporate this report as Supp1t-ment I to SARA. During our September 26, 1983 meeting with the NRC Staff and Brookhaven National Laboratory reviewers, we presented the confirmatory details on SARA Supplement 1. Documentation of this information is contained in the enclosed SARA Supplement 2. Also enclosed I

are a revised Table of Contents page xi for Volumes 1 and 2, instructions for SARA updating and a revised response to NRC Equipment Qualification Branch Question Q2. The previous response to Question 2 was sent to you with our August 24, 1983 letter.

Twenty copics of each of these items are provided.

Very truly yours, ,

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Enclosures Copy to: (See Attached Service List) 8311220340 831117 PDR ADOCK 05000352 F pyg l se ana:e.a ssr'

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1 cc: Judge Lawrence Brenner (w/ enclosure) l Judge Richard F. Cole (w/ enclosure) '

Judge Peter A. Morris (w/ enclosure) ,

Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq. (w/ enclosure) 1 Ann P. Hodadon (w/o enclosure)

Mr. Frank R. Romano (w/o enclosure) ,

Mr. Robert L. Anthony (w/o enclosure) ,

Mr. Marvin I. Lewis (w/o enclosure)

Judith A. Dorsey, Esq. (w/ enclosure)

Charles W. Elliott, Esq. (w/ enclosure)

Jacqueline I. Ruttenberg (w/o enclosure)

Thomas Y . Au , E=q . (w/o enclosure)

Mr. Thomss Gerusky (w/o ericlosure)

Director, Pennsylvania Emergency (w/o enclosure)

Management Agency Mr. Steven P. Hershey (w/o enclosure)

Angus Love, Esq. (w/o enclosure)

Mr. Joseph H. White, III (w/o enclosure)

David Wersan, Esq. (w/o enclosure)

Robert J. Sugarman, Esq. (w/o enclosure)

Martha W. Bush, Esq. (w/o enclosure) -

Spence W. Perry, Esq. (w/o enclosure)

Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Board' (w/o enclosure)

Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel (w/o enclosure) I Docket & Service Section (w/o enclosure) i Robert E. Weatherwax (w/ enclosure) i e

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EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION Q2 Chattering of relays are observed to begin at low acceleration level, and, depending on particular electric circuit design, may cause interruption to the performance of a related safety system.

F\gnificance'of such interruption and failure of control system, t general, should be included in the event tree model.

RESPONSE

A review of relevant control circuits indicates that for the high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems, chattering of relays due to an earthquake should not result in other than a brief interruption in the oper-ation of these systems. - This is because, while these systems may be tripped due-to relay chatter in the isolation circuits, they can be reset by simple reset actions by the oparators in the con-trol room. The~ Limerick Transient Response Implementation Procu-dures (TRIP), based on the symptom-oriented Owners' Group Eraergency Procedure Guidelines, direct the operators' attention to the use of HPCI or RCIC once the water level has fallen to the minimal +12.5 inches value. Control circuits associated with circuit breakers for other pumps and the power distribution sys-tem may require resetting following relay chatter. This is accomplished easily by means of pushbuttons located at the breaker cabinets..

Philadelphia Electric Company is intending to develop special procedures to aid operators in recovering from an earthquake.-

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5e 2 Revision-1, 11/8/83

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LIMERICK GENERATING STATION SEVERE ACCIDENT RISK ASSESSMENT (NUS Report No. 4161)

The following additions and revisions to the SARA study are attached:

1) Supplement 2, entitled " Quantitative Information on revised fire analysis for Limerick Generating Station,"-dated November 1983.
2) Insertion tabs for supplements (1) and (2).
3) Revised table of contents pages (xi) for volumes I and II, dated

. November 15, 1983.

Supplement (1), which was issued in July 1983, and the enclosed supple-ment (2) should be incorporated at the end of volume I.

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