ML20082B371
| ML20082B371 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 11/03/1983 |
| From: | Foster D GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, GN-274, NUDOCS 8311210160 | |
| Download: ML20082B371 (3) | |
Text
Geora a Power Company 333 Piedmort Averse Atlant. Georg a 30308 Te!rphone 404 526 7726 Mung Addren Post Oftce Bon 4545 Anant+ Goorg a 30102 L
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- o. o. rosier v;ce P,eset ea c-a: wager W90e Project November 3, 1983 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement File: X78G03-M49 Region II-Suite 3100 Log:
GN-274 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Reference:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant-Units 1 and 2 50-424, 50-425; Transamerica Delaval-Class 1E Cable Attention: Mr. James P. O'Reilly Gentlemen:
Georgia Power Company has completed an evaluation of the above referenced subject and, based upon the results of the evaluation, has concluded that it constitutes a significant deficiency pursuant to the requirements of Part 10 CFR 50.55(e). Since Transamerica Delaval reported this problem as a substantial safety hazard in their September 27, 1983, letter to the NRC, Georgia Power Company is not reporting this event under Part 10 CFR 21. Enclosed is a copy of our evaluation and a copy of the letter from Transamerica Delaval to the NRC.
This response contains no proprietary information and may be placed in the NRC public Document Room upon receipt.
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U. S. Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C.
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R. J. Kelly R. H. Pinson E. D. Groover 1
R. E. Conway B. M. Guthrie L. T. Gucwa i
G. F. Head R. A. Thomas M. Malcom J. T. Beckham, Jr.
J. A. Bailey' G. Bockhold D. N. MacLemore
- 0. Batum P. D. Rice D. E. Dutton H. H. Gregory, III J. L. Vota W. F. Sanders C. W. Hayes 0311210160 831103 PDRADOCK05000g ggy,tygg e
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4 EVALUATION FOR A SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCY TRANSAMERICA DELAVAL-CLASS 1E ELECTRICAL CABLES Initial Report:
On October 3,1983, Mr. C. W. Hayes of Georgia Power Company reported a potential deficiency to Mr. J. Rogge of the NRC concerning the qualification of certain class lE electrical cables on the Transamerica Delaval' diesel generators.
Backgrcund Information:
On November 4,1983, Transamerica Delaval reported the failure of some 1E electrical cable to pass the IEEE-383 flame test. The November 4, 1982, letter referenced a Service Information Memo (SIM) No. 361 dated October 21, 1982. At this time, Transamerica Delaval stated that the loss of these cables would not adversely affect the engine's ability to carry out its specified function. Replacement of the following cables with class 1E cable was recommended.
(a) Shielded cable from the terminal block to the Airpax tachometer relay in the engine control panel.
4 (b) Shielded cable from the Airpax magnetic pickups to the junction boxes installed on the side of the engine.
1 (c) The multiconductor cable from the engine side mounted junction box to the Woodward governor actuator.
Transamerica Delaval conducted another review in September,1983, and on September 27, 1983, they reported to the NRC a substantial safety hazard concern-ing the engine mounted electrical cables which could result in engine performance deterioration. The cables in question are:
i (a) Shielded cables which run from the magnetic pick-ups to the engine junction boxes.
(b) The multiconductor cable which runs from the engine terminal box to the Woodward governor actuator.
For item (a), Transamerica Delaval concluded a' problem could exist only if the ambient temperature exceeded 129* F.
Engineering Evaluation:
1 The multiconductor cable to the Woodward governor. actuator provides automatic engine control for the proper loading of the diesels.
Failure of this cable would result in the governor operating as a hydraulic speed sensing governor.
I Operation in this manner would allow the engine to run and carry load, but would provide a slightly slower response to load change or load pick-up. Load pick-up may not be achieved within the 9.5 second time limit in the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) FSAR, Section 8.3.1.1.3F.
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Evaluation for a Significant Deficiency Transamerica Delaval-Class lE Electrical Cables Page 2 The multiconductor cable is rated for 75 C (167 F).
Evaluation has shown that if the ambient temperature is 98.5 F and if the diesel generator is required to be operated, the heat frcm the diesel and the ambient temperature will i
result in the exceeding of the 75 C rating. Section 9.4.7.1.1 of the VEGP FSAR concerning the Diesel Generator Building Ventilation System indicates the maximum ambient temperature of the building will be 120 F with the diesel generator operating. Therefore operation of the diesels would result in the exceeding of the temperature rating.
The standby diesel generators provide an emergency source of onsite power to safety-related equipment to ensure continued operation following an accident occurring coincident with a loss of offsite power.
Failure of the multiconductor cable could result in the failure of the diesel generator to pick-up loads properly.
A review was made to determine if a breakdown had occurred in the quality 4
assurance program of Transamerica Delaval. This review concluded that the program is adequate. A full-scope audit was conducted by Bechtel Procurement Supplier Quality Department on September 14-16, 1983.
Other cable reviewed was:
the shielded cable from the terminal block to the Airpax tachometer relay in the engine control panel, The shielded cable on the engine from the Airpax magnetic pickups to t
the junction boxes.
i These shielded cables provide the " ready to load" signal required to automatically i
M ose the diesel generator output circuit breaker. This signal also indicates that starting air should be turned off. As analyzed by Delaval, these cables t
are rated for 80 C (170 F). The expected operating temperature would exceed the j
manufacturer's rating when the amb,ient tenperature is greater than 129 F.
Since the design bases of the diesel. generator building will keep the ambient temperature below 120 F, the cables would satisfactorily operate, except when a fire exists.
(Note, these cables failed the IEEE-383 flame test.)
Corrective Action:
The abovt referenced cables will be replaced with 90 C (194 F) IEEE-qualified cable. These cables are fully qualified and the 90 C rating will ensure their temperature rating will not be exceeded. Georgia Power Company has ordered These cables will be repl~ ced when the diesel generator is replacement cable.
a disassembled for the heat-treatment of the piston skirts. Mr. W. R. Evans of Georgia Power Company will be responsible for this corcective action.
==
Conclusion:==
A significant deficiency exists since a failure of the diesels to perform their designed function is possible under certain conditions, which could occur during the lifetime of the units. This is representative of a deficiency in the final design as approved and released for construction such that the design does not conform to the bases stated in the VEGP FSAR.
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