ML20081K424

Responds to NRC Re Violations & Enforcement Discretion Noted in Insp of Plant.Corrective Actions: Addition of New Plant Manager,New Engineering Manager & New Operations Manager

ML20081K424
Person / Time
Site:	Cooper
Issue date:	03/23/1995
From:	Mueller J NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE), NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
2.201, EA-95-012, EA-95-12, NLS950021, NUDOCS 9503290098
Download: ML20081K424 (9)

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P.O. BOX NFB SKA 68321 T&Ni M Nebraska Public Power District _

NLS950081 March 23,1995 Director, Office of Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Reply to a Notice of Violation and Enforcement Discretion, dated February 21, 1995 (EA 95-012)

(NRC Investigation Report No. 4-93-020R and EA 94-177)

Cooper Nuclear Station, NRC Docket 50-298, DPR-46

Reference:

1. NRC Letter from James L. Milhoan to NPPD dated November 10,1994,

" Demand for Information."

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2. NPPD Letter from Guy R. Horn to NRC dated December 12, 1994,

" Cooper Nuclear Station- Reply of NPPD to Demand for Information of November 10,1994."

3. NPPD Letter from Guy R. Horn to NRC dated December 23, 1994, regarding Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) improvements.

Gentlemen:

This letter and its Attachment constitute Nebraska Public Power District's (the District) reply to the subject Notice of Violation (NOV) and Enforcement Discretion in accordance with 10 CFR 2.201. The violations alleged in the NOV pertain to the movement of heavy loads over irradit ted fuel prior to establishing secondary containment integrity at Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS. in March of 1993. In sum, Part A of the NOV states that the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head, dryer, and separator were moved without secondary containment integrity being i established in violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.C.1.d (secondary containment integrity required during movement of loads which have the potential to damage irradiated fuel).

Part B of the NOV states that the Procedure Change Notices (PCNs) approved to eliminate the procedural requirement for secondary containment integrity during removal of the reactor pressure vessel head, dryer, and separator were not accurate in all material respects as required l by 10 CFR 50.9.

The District takes the violations seriously and has conducted a careful and thorough review of this matter. The District's letter to the NRC dated December 12,1994 (Reference 2), in response to the NRC Demand for information (DFI) (EA 94-177) (Reference 1), has addrsssed the substance ogvj9%tyns. ,

9503290098 950323 }8 PDR ADOCK 05000298 ,

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. Director, Offica of Enforcemtnt U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 23,1995 Page 2 of 3 With respect to the violation of 10 CFR 50.9, the District stated in Reference 2 (page 5) that I the PCN form reviewed by the Station Operations Revie w Committee (SORC) on March 9,1993 i should have been complete and accurate in all material espects, but contained some potentially confusing information concerning TS Amendment 147 and, arguably, TS Amendment 150.

Accordingly, the District admits the violation of 10 CFD 50.9 as explained in the attached NOV response (Attachment 1). ,

With respect to Part A of the NOV, in hindsight, we understand how the decision reached by SORC could be viewed as a nonconservative interpretation of TS 3.7.C.1.d. The District, therefore, accepts this violation. TS 3.7.C.1.d does not explicitly describe the movement of RPV disassembly loads or specify other loads that are covered. At the time of the March 9, 1993 SORC approval of the procedure changes associated with movement of the RPV disassembly loads,it could no2 be established with certainty that the proposed changes could be made consistently with the Technical Specifications. ,

As requested on page 4 of the NOV, the District has documented the improvements made and planned to ensure that the processes used to review proposed changes to the Technical Specifications and associated procedures are appropriate (see References 2 and 3 in addition to the responsive actions discussed under Violations A and B of this document).

The NRC stated that it had determined not to propose a civil penalty for the violations. Instead, ,

the NRC exercised enforcement discretion (as described in Section Vll.B.6 of the NRC Enforcement Policy,10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C). The District agrees with the NRC's exercise of enforcement discretion and believes that no purpose would be served by the imposition of a civil penalty. ,

l Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact my office. <

Sincerely, i l

l MM John H. Mueller Acting Vice-President, Nuclear Attachment cc: Regional Administrator USNRC Region IV NRC Resident Inspector Cooper Nuclear Station NPG Distribution l l

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. Dircct:r, Offica of Enfore:m:nt I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  !

March 23,1995 Page 3 of 3

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STATE OF NEBRASKA)

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NEMAHA COUNTY )

J. H. Mueller, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an authorized representative of the Nebraska Public Power District, a public corporation and political subdivision of the State of Nebraska; that he is duly authorized to submit this response on behalf of Nebraska Public Power District; and that the statements contained herein are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.

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J. H. Mueiler Subscribed in my presence and sworn to before me this 23 day of Lfft4Ib ,1995.

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- Attzchment 1  :

to NLS950081. l Page 1 of 5- .l

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REPLY TO FEBRUARY 21,1995 NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION - EA NO.95-012 I (NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 4-93-020R AND EA 94-177) [

COOPER NUCLEAR STATION NRC DOCKET NO. 50-298, LICENSE DPR  :

i In its letter to the District dated February 21,1995, the NRC identified two violations of NRC :

requirements. These violations were classified as a single Severity Level lli problem.

The particular violations (Parts A and B of the NOV) and the District's replies are set forth

- below:

Statement _of_Violatian_A Technical Specification (15) 3.7.C.I.d, " Secondary Containment," requires that secondary containment integrity shall be maintained in allmodes ifirradiatedfuelis being handledin the secondary containment andloads which couldpotentially damage irradiatedfuel are being moved '

in the secondary containment. ,

i Contrary sc the above, on March 10,1993, the reactorpressure vessel head, dryer, and separator,  ;

which were loads that had thepotential to damage irradiatedfuel, were movedin the secondary I containment without secondary containment integrity being maintained. . The results of a surveillance test cemduded to demonstrate secondary containment integrity, performed on March 8,1993, were unsatisfactory. The test was not satisfactorily performed untilMarch 11,1993. . ,

Admissiottor_Denialnf_ Violation i i

For the reasons discussed below, the District accepts the violation.

ReasonsJor_ Violation )

As explained in Reference 2 (page 34), the language of TS 3.7.C.1.d (". . . no loads I which could potentially damage irradiated fuel . . .") could be considered unclear. The i TS provides a functional standard, as opposed to a definite quantifiabla standard, for i determining which loads are permitted to be moved without prior testing to verify secondary containment integrity. A judgment must be made as to whether a particular load could potentially damage irradiated fuel. This leaves the TS open to differing interpretations. The SORC, at the March 9,1993 meeting, made a judgment as to the intent of TS 3.7.C.1.d. The District accepts that the SORC decision could be viewed as I

nonconservative as underscored in the NOV.

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- Attachm:nt 1 ~l to NLS950081 Page 2 of,5 The District believed that various documents including NUREG-0612 and General Electric PRC 88-11 (discussed in detailin Reference 2) provided a threshold of load movements that could occur without additional analysis:

In accordance with NUREG-0612, " Control of Heavy loads at Nuclear Power Plants" (July 1980), the District had chosen to utilize a single-failure proof design for the reactor building crane. As allowed by NUREG-0612, this was done in lieu of a load drop analysis demonstrating that the effects of dropping heavy loads such as the RPV head and internals would remain within specified limits. The NRC accepted the District's Phase Iimplementation of NUREG-0612 guidelines in a Safety Evaluation Report dated October 31,1983. Accordingly, the failure j of the crane was not considered credible.

l The interpretation that TS 3.7.C.1.d did not include disassembly loads appeared I

consistent with a docketed NRC Staff position (March 28,1988 memorandum from NRC Project Manager to the District and NRC Inspection Report 88-07, page 9, dated May 11, 1988) that the performance of the secondary containment surveillance test was not required until actual handling of irradiated fuel was to begin. Therefore, RPV disassembly could proceed prior to completing the secondary containment leak test as long as the test was successfully completed " prior to refueling," which had br.en interpreted by the NRC to mean prior to actual movement of irradiated fuel.

It was not the District's intent when it took the initiative in 1991 to amend TS 3.7.C.1.d (approved by the NRC as Amendment 147) to change its prior practices for RPV disassembly. The District had performed such heavy load movements during prior outages. As explained in Reference 2. the provision added to TS 3.7.C.1.d in 1991 was intended to address the movement of much smaller loads (e.g., a local power range monitor over the open RPV or the spent fuel pool), which were not necessarily as well controlled as movement of heavy loads.

The District believes that it is entitled to rely on its choice of using a single-f ailure proof crane, in lieu of providing analysis of heavy load drops, as a means of reducing the potential for accidental dropping of heavy loads in accordance with NUREG-0612.

Moreover, the NRC indicated prior (1983) acceptance of the District's Phase i NUREG-0612 implementation (where this position was articulated).

Corrective 3tepslaken_and_thallesultsLAchieved The District has implemented broad based actions to ensure the effectiveness of SORC as detailed in the Phase i Performance Improvement Plan Action (see also Reference 3).

The actions taken include:

1. Changing the composition of SORC with the addition of the new Plant Manager (Chairman), the new Engineering Manager (Vice Chairman), and the new Operations Manager;

2. The new SORC Chairman has established new standards and expectations for SORC meetings, with a broadened focus on the nuclear safety aspects of the l

issues presented;

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' 3. A'SORC Administrator has been appointed to improve meeting coordination and '

conduct, es.well as the quality and completeness of SORC records;

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4. The governing procedure for the SORC was revised. it now more accurately  ;

describes SORC activities and clarifies SORC's focus on issues relevant to . t nuclear safety and the proper identification and addressing of safety implications: 'f

5. ' A Nuclear Safety Training course has b'een provided to SORC' members and'  ;

alternates. l The District believes that it is prudent to have Secondary Containment Integrity.,

established prior to RPV disassembly. Accordingly, the associated procedures have been j revised to reflect this. l

Correctiva_ Steps That_WilLBa Takan to Avoidfurther Viniations v

The District has proposed changes to the CNS Technical Specifications which, among other changes, would clearly and more specifically restrict the ability to move heavy  !

loads which could potentially damage irradiated fuel.

The District has commissioned an Improved Standard Technical Specifications  ;

conversion assessment for CNS the purpose of which is to determine the feasibility and l practicality of converting to the improved Standard Technical ' Specifications. 1 Completion of this assessment is expected by mid-year,1995. One advantage of the )

Improved Standard-Technical Specifications is the enhanced Bases Section which I describes in detail the meaning and purpose of each Technical Specification, j l

Data _When Full Compliance Will Be Achiavad -

CNS is in full compliance with the requirements for maintaining Secondary Containment- 'l Integrity when loads that could potentially damage irradiated fuel are being moved in the Secondary Containment. .

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Statement _nf_ViolatiorLB  ;

10 CFR 50.9, " Completeness andAccuracy ofInformation," requires, in part, that information l required by the Commission 's regulations, orders, or license conditions, to be maintained by the .I licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.  !

I Contrary to the above, Procedure Change Notices (PCNs), dated March 9,1993, pertaining to Maintenance Procedures 7.4.4, 7.4.5, and 7.4.6, which are records required by the TS to be maintained, were not accurate in all material respects. The PCNs approved changes to ,

maintenanceprocedures which eliminated the requirement that secondary containment integrity  ;

he maintained during removal ofthe readorpressure vessel head, dryer, and separator. Sedion  !

i 6 ofthe PCNs stated, in part, " tech. spec changes l amendments to thefacility operating license] 147 and 150 removed the requirements to demonstrate secondary containment prior to the time the .

primary containment is openedfor refueling," and Sedian S ofthe PCNs indicate that the PCNs  :

constituted a change to the Technical Specifications approved by License Amendments 147 and 'l 150. Infad, License Amendment 147 imposed a requirement to maintain secondary containment l integrity during movement ofloads with the potential to damage irradiatedfuel, and neither

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' to NLS950081 Page 4 of 5 License Amendment 147 por 150 constitutedprior approval of the changes to Maintenance lyocedures 7.4.4, 7.4.5, and 7.4.6 to eliminate the requirementfor secondary containment integrity  :

during reactor pressure vessel head, dryer, and separator removal. These inaccuracies were material because the decision ofthe Station Operations Review Committee to approve the PCNs resultedin the nun'ement ofthe reactor vessdpressure head [ sic], dryer, and separator in violation of TS 3. 7.C1.d.

Adtnission_ar_Danialta_ Violation The District admits the violation.

Reasons _for._ Violation As explained in detail on pages 25-32 of Reference 2, the District concurs that the information on the PCN forms should have been complete and accurate in all material respects, but were partially in error and potentially confusing. Specifically, Section 5 of the PCNs dated March 9,1993 indicated that the proposed revisions to procedures involved a change to the Technical Specifications and Section 8 contained a statement indicating that TS Amendment 147 " removed" requirements to demonstrate secondary containment capability prior to the time the primary containment is opened for refueling.

The District's review indicated that the errors in the PCN forms were inadvertent. The references in question were added for the purpose of disclosing to SORC members the  ;

results of research on the proposed procedure changes, including NUREG-0612 and other pertinent documents, which indicated that prior TS amendments (147 and 150) were relevant to the procedure changes under consideration.

Correctiva_Stepslaken_and_tha_Besults.Achiavad To avoid the possibility of confusion involving the relationship between previous TS amendments and proposed changes to procedures, the PCN form has been revised to ask specifically if a Tech Spec change is required prior to PCN approval.

The specific PCNs dated March 9,1993, pertaining to Maintenance Procedures 7.4.4, 7.4.5, and 7.4.6 have been superseded by subsequent procedure revisions.

The PCN files for the affected procedures have been annotated to indicate the discrepancies that existed as referenced in this NOV.  ;

The Phase 1 Performance improvement Plan for improving SORC effectiveness has been completed. The District believes that the corrective actions (discussed in more detail in Violation A) have improved SORC ability to ensure completeness and accuracy of information.

Corrective _Stepslhat_WilLBelaken_ta. Avoid _Eurther_Vintations The District believes that the PCN form change coupled with the previously noted broad based corrective actions to restore the effectiveness of SORC will avoid further violations of this nature and enhance the safety culture at CNS.

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Data _When' Full Comnliance Will En Achiaved With respect to the PCN form discrepancies referenced in the NOV, the District is in full -

. compliance.

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o l LIST OF WRC COMMITMENTS l ATTACHMENT 3 l Correspohdence No: NLS950081 The following table identifies those actions conunitted to by the District in this document. Any other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by the District. They are described to the NRC for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Licensing Manager at Cooper Nuclear Station of any questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.

COMMITTED DATE COMMITMENT OR OUTAGE The District has commissioned an Improved Standard Technical Specifications conversion assessment for CNS June 30, 1995 the purpose of which is to determine the feasibility and practicality of converting to the Improved Standard Technical Specifications.

PROCEDURE NUMBER 0. 42 REVISION NUMBER 0 PAGE 10 OF 16