ML20081K045

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Contentions for Litigation Re State of Nh Evacuation Time Study.New Evacuation Time Study Not Res Judicata to Phase I of Proceedings.Certificate of Svc Encl
ML20081K045
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/28/1983
From: Backus R
SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE, SOUTH HAMPTON, NH
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8311090240
Download: ML20081K045 (12)


Text

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FILED: Oc t o b emf.BJ.i.19 83 n .. ..

UNITED STATES OF Ai1 ERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSlON .g3 jg 3) yg BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD v

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_ : 3 In the matter of:

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF Docket Nos. 50-443 OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al 50-444 OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)

S AP L ' S CONTENT ION S ON N EW H AMP SH IRE EVACUATION.TlME STUDY Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. {2.714(b), the Seacoast Anti-Polution.

Leagu e ("SAPL") submits the following Contentions for litigation in

, this proceeding. The Contentions relate to the recently submitted New Hampshi re Evacua t ion Time Study, submitted as Appendix E to the State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans.

Submission of Contentions on the ETS is timely notwithstanding litigation of the evacuation time estimates submitted by the Applicants for its Final Safety Analysis Report. The Evacuation l

Time Study was not available prior to September, and therefore was not li t igated in Phase I of these proceedings. The Study was prepared specifically in accordance with the requirements of NUREG-0654, and is meant to provide the evacuation time estimate guidance for the

! State end Local RERPs. This document utilizes different I

methodologies, different data bases and yields different results than those estimates litigated in August. Therefore, Contentions l

. based on the newly released Evacuation Time btudy are not res judicata l

with respect to Phase I of these proceedings. ~

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8311090240 831028 l PDR ADOCK 05000443 '

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CONTENTIONS

1. The Evacuation Time Study (hereafter "ETS") does not describe with particularity how, in the event that an evacuation is ordered, 100% of the EPZ population will be notified within a maximum of 15 minutes. Specifically, the ETS does not state how many emergency response personnel will be required to carry out 100% notification, nor does it state which organizations will provide sufficient notification personnel to do the job.

BASIS: Achieving 100 % notification within 15 minutes is an enormous task with numerous implications for resources commitment. The use of mobile P/A units requires personnel and vehicles. The ETS does not state how many persons will be required to supplement the public siren notification, how many vehicles will be required, and does not state the preplanned routes for mobile P/A vehicle drivers to avoid notification overlap and to ensure 100% coverage. Most importantly, the study does not state which governmental entities will supply the personnel to carry out mobile notification. If police, fire, civil defense, and other persons must commit themselves to going into the field and manning mobile P/A units, they will be temporarily precluded from carrying out other assigned tasks crucial to effective implementation of state and local RERPs. Such tasks would involved such crucial duties as traffic control, medical response, communications coordination, moni toring of radiation, or any number of duties assigned by the plans.

II. The Evacuation Time Study overestimates the time required for an orderly evacuation in that it does not make sufficient provision for public transportation and emergency medical vehicles.

Specifically, there is no indication that contracts have been es tablished between governmental ent i t ies and pr ivate owners of buses and emergency medical vehicles relied upon in the plans.

BASIS: There is no assurance that the buses and emergency medical vehicles required by and cited in the ETS will actually be available in the event that an evacuation is ordered. Absent any indication of established contract obligations on the part of transportation companies to provide evacuation vehicles, stating that privately owned vehicles are available is without legal or factual support, and is an insufficient basis for planning purposes. It is for this reason that NUREG-0654 requires letters of agreement to be included.

with evacuation plans. It is quite possible that many companies owning vehicles which are relied upon in the ETS, will not risk the contamination of their vehicles or employees, and will not contract

. tith appropriate authorities.

It is also possible that private t ranspor tation contractors will not agree to take on the contractual obligations in the event of an emergency given their potential liability to a third-par ty injured in an evacuation not withstanding the third-par ty's reliance on the cont ractors to get them out of the EPZ in time.

III. The evacuat ion t ime estimates contained in the ETS are inaccurate and overly optimistic in that they assume those persons responsible for driving the public transpor tation vehicles and emergency medical vehicles will actually do so, rather than first assuring the saf ety of their own families or leaving the area all together.

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BASIS: The Voorhees Report indicates that local officials believe that " School bus drivers will refuse to enter or remain in the EPZ because of the radiation exposure danager." (At 10.)

The local of ficials have voiced a reasonable and logical concern, and that concern has not been addressed in the Evacuation Time Study.

There is no reason to believe that school bus drivers, whether employed by the towns directly or by the private transportation contractor, will be willing to risk their own lives and in their view the lives of their families by dutifully remaining within the EPZ to carry out the evacuation plans. This assumption is even more unlikely since the ETS relies upon the willingness of some drivers to return to the EPZ more than once to complete the evacuation due to the tremendous shortfall of available vehicles. Many drivers have simply refused to accept this responsibility should it arise.

IV. The evacuation time estimates provided in the ETS are unreliable, and overly optimistic because they fall to account for the impact of traffic accidents which could increase the estimates signifIcantly.

BASIS: The ETS states that "The clear time estimates contained in Table 16 represent the optimum evacuation time and as such could be subject to increases if an unexpected event should occur." ETS, page v-7. Examples of such " unexpected events" include vehicle breakdowns on busy evacuation routes and the lack of general supervision at critical traffic-control locations.

It is entirely likely that under certain circumstances, there might be numerous serious accidents at a number of locations within the egress route network. In other cases, there might be no accidents.

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I The same is true with respect to traffic control. Consequently, I

< uncertainty bounds should be established for the estimates given the potential for great variation depending upon the circumstances in any given scenar io. Those uncer tainty bounds have not been provided, s

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and should be_ established if these evacuation time estimates are to be relied upon by decision makers in the event of a serious radiological emergency.

V. The evacuation time estimates contained in the ETS are inaccurate and everly optimis tic because they assume that the public will respond r a t ionally and obed i en t ly t.o eme r gency no t i f i ca t ion , and that dr i ver s will obey traffic rules and traffic control mechanisms. This assumption is false and disregards the potential for panic and its impact upon an orderly evacuation.

BASIS: In sworn testimony presented on behalf of Suffolk County, New York , Susan Seager , P rof es sor at the Cent er of Human Environmen t s, City University of New, York, concludes that:

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" Existing psychological resecrch suggests that a number of psychological factors may intefere with successful management of a radiological emergency. Various studies report a large discrepancy between lay opinion concerning the danger of nuclear power and exper t opinion. The public tends to see the occurrence of a radiological emergency that kills large numbers of people as relatively likely.

This fear is likely to influence response to an emergency in the direction of leading to either defensive avoidance of~ information and emergency preparedness or in the direction of a tendency to over react. Both responses

! could occur simultaneously. This state of af f airs is made more difficult to remedy by a history of expert ,

underestimation of the dangers related to nuclear energy and by the technical complexity and expert disagreement about probabilities and dangers. The danger of nuclear power' presents problems of risk evaluation to both the public and the experts because of its complexity and the

' undertain state of scientific knowledge. The problem of traf fic congestion further complicates an evacuation. The exerience of traf fic congestion will add to the likelihood f

that people will not be able to ef fectively comprehend the 7

relative advantages and disadvantages of various courses of action. It increases the likelihood of f rustrat ion and irrational behavior, including possible aggressive behavior."

Similar conclusions have also been reached in detailed studies of Long Island, NewYork residents living in proximity to the Shoreham nuclear power facility. A repor t prepared by James H. Johnson, Jr. , ,

.Ph. D. , Department of Geography, University of Cali fornia, and Donald

-J. Zeigler, Ph. D., Department of Geography and Political Science, ,

Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia for Su f f olk County, New York also concludes that nuclear' accidents are likely to give rise to higher levels of extreme behavior than has been reported in studies.

of non-radiological emergencies. In general, the Zeigler and Johnson Study concludes that people tend to ignore of ficial instructions and

" spontaneously evacuate" in the event of a radiological emergency.

The research of Prof essors Seager, Zeigler and Johnson into the area of psycho log i ca l, . i s sues related to radiological emergency planning raises serious questions about the desirability of any plan that fails to even discuss and account for behaviorial variation.

This is particularly true with regard to Seabrook and its proximity to extremely high populuation densities.

Of additional importance in this proceeding is the nature of the beaches as recreational areas. Families of ten spli t up to pursue separate interests, agreeing to rendezvous later. In the event of a sudden public notification of a radiological emergency, it is entirely reasonable that parents would not depart the area without

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first gathering their families together. The confusion and panic resulting f rom such a situation would be catestrophic to the ef for ts

of police and other emergency personnel to initiate and maintain an orderly evacuation.

Also, resident children attend schools throughout the area, of ten with relocation centers dif f erent f rom those assigned to their parents. Confusion and panic could forseeably result from this situation as wel.l. Parents would be reasonably expected to attempt to pickup their children from school, or to return from the EPZ from their assigned location centers when their children do not show up.

A11 reasonably forseeable scenarios of this type would seriously i disrupt the evacuation process.

Due to the extent of the available literature on the subject' '

of psychological issues and radiological emergency planning, it is crucial that the Evacuation Time Study address the issues of l behaviorial response directly. Failure to do so it to ignor what lay persons and psychological experts alike agree is a reasonably f oreseeable result of emergency not i fication: panic and its negative impacts on protective response. Thi s i s par t icular ly impor tant wi th

respect to the ETS's traf fic model, since it of ten assums that persons wi11 walt in their autos in backed up traffie jams and " queue: " to 4

enter the f low of t ra f f ic. It i s en t i re ly like ly tha t pe r sons would i

only wait a limited amount of time before deciding to abandon their cars to pursue evacuation on foot. The sight of other persons beginning foot evacuation would have a compound ef f ect among persons waiting in such jams, and would forseeably result in large numbers of vehicles being abandoned with no hope of their removal from the egress routes.

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VI. SA?L hereby suppor t s and adopts as i t s own NECNP contentions 3, 4, 5, G,.and 8 along with their accompanying Bases, as filed before this Board October 13, 1983.

VII. The evacuation time estimates contained in the ETS are unduly optimistic in that they do not sufficiently account for the time required to evacuate nonambulatory patients afflicted with serious ,

. medical complications who are confined to nursing homes and other health care facilities.

BASIS: It is likely that some nonambu la tory pa t ien t s in health care institutions will require the commitment of substantial time and resources for evacuation purposes due to medical and other.

complicatioins. Many may require special preparation and transporation considerations due to serious health condi tions. The ETS states flatly:

... it is also possible that a small number of nonambulatory patients at hospitals may not be able to evacuate because of-i medical complications, although the figures developed for transit needs and clear time estimates assume all institutionalized populations will be evacuated.

ETS, page v-7.

First, the above s ta tement implies that some hospi tal pat ients will ac tually be lef t behind in the event of a radiological emergency serious enough to warrant evacuation of the general population.

Aside from the ethical implications of such a policy, the practical constraints on such an option would be significant, and would have a tremendous impact on evacuation time estimates.

l The serious condition of the patients would naturally require

. staff per'sonnel to remain behind to assume the patients' care and feeding. This would in many cases, include doctors, nurses, cooks, pharmacists, and numerous other physical plant support personnel.

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1 Sone of the evacuation plans submitted to date by any par ty make provisions f or continuing care af ter evacuation of all other persons.

in fact, such an alternative would not be at all feasible since it is unlikely that numerous hospital / health care institution personnel would be willing to remain in the EPZ to take care of a handful of nonevacuable patients.

The only reasonable alternative i n such a situation would be to at tempt evacuation of all patients, regardless of their condition.

However, preparation and transportation of such persons would take tremendous amounts of time, not to mention resouces. In addition, it would divert the attention of many health care personnel away-from the preparation of countless other patients. The conclusion of the Evacuation Time Study thct 100% of the " institutionalized persons" can be prepared in 88 minutes, is ent i rely unr eali s t ic, and without factual. support. There is no description anywhere of precisely how health care personnel will be prepared t'o cope with a full scale evacuation in terms of staff support and equipment resources.

VIII. The evacuation time estimates contained in the ETS are inaccurate and overly optimistic in that they do not take into account the numerous difficuties associated with notifying and evacuating ,

i handicapped persons present within the ten mile EPZ.

BASIS: Approximately 10% of New Hampshire citizens are handicapped, i.e., blind, deaf, mobility-impaired, etc. There i s no reason to b e l i e v e t h'a t the handicapped population within the ten mile EPZ, is below average in terms of this ratio. Handicapped persons clearly requi re -special consideration both i n terms of notification and

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evacuation. For example, reliance upon si rens to not if y deaf per sons living at home would be difficult, especially if such an evacuation were ordered at night. Similarly, since many handicapped persons-are in the low income segment of the population and cannot afford private automobiles, their reliance upon public transportation for ef f ective evacuation may not be possible in the event that the school buses or other public transportation vehicles are not equipped to handle their specific transportation needs.

It is clear-that there are a significant number of handicapped persons within the EPZ, and the ETS does not account in any way for any of the special considerations associated wi th their evacuation.

Respectfully submitted, Seabrook Anti-Pollution League By Its Attorneys BACKUS, SHEA & MEYER I

l BY: 26 MI Aotie r t K fWc ktis i 116 Lowell St., Box 516 Manchester, N.H. 03105 Tel: (603) 668-7272 Dated: October 28, 1983 f

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u a s :. G,r ~c.u ,. \ C 1 ..u DATED: October 28, 13S3 1, Robert A. Backus, hereby certi!y that I have n: ailed to the attached list of people, first-class,

..ostage prepaid a ec?> of the enclosed. If served by I 9 0 6 r a ;, t-.XprGSs or ENpress .t.in - 1 it is so jndiCated by w

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.O y e b-ian Cassidc Helen Hoyt, Chm. Thomas G. Dignan, Esq.

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'.'narles Cross. Esc. William S. Jordan, II, Esq. Mr. Angie !.:achiros , Chirm.

.i5 :*anlowcod Ave. ' Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq. Board of Selectmen P.O. i3cx 366 1725 I Street, N.W. Town of Newtrary Portsmouth, Gi 03S01 Suite 506 Newbury, hL4 09150 Washington, DC 20006 Edward Meany Dr. Muray Tye, President Sand'a Gauvutis Tc.m of Rye Sun Valley Assoc. TOAn of Kinsington 155 Washington Road 280 Haverhill Street RFD 1 lye, NH 03870 I.awrence, hl4 01840 Fast Kensington, NH 03S27

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