ML20081D447
| ML20081D447 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Midland |
| Issue date: | 10/02/1983 |
| From: | Jackie Cook CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.) |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, 23803, 83-08-#1, 83-8-#1, NUDOCS 8311010190 | |
| Download: ML20081D447 (7) | |
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Comp 8ny v'" ''"' - Proi'' E"s'"'"s and Construction Generet offices: 1945 West Pernell Road, Jackson, MI 49201 e (517) 788 0453 October 2, 1983 83-08 #1 Mr J G Keppler Regional Administrator US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 MIDLAND ENERGY CENTER PROJECT DOCKET NOS 50-329 AND 50-330 CHECK VALVES IN COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM FILE:
0.4.9.80 SERIAL: 23803 On September 2. W R Bird notifled Mr J Harrison and Mr R Cardner of your staff of a 50.55(e) reportable condition concerning incorrectly installed check valves in the component cooling water system. This letter is a final report in that the process and part corrective actions are completely described in the attached report, along with the schedule for replacing the check valves.
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JWC/WRB/lr Attachments: 1) MCAR-1, Report No 72, dated 9/2/83 l
- 2) MCAR-72, Final Report, dated September 15, 1983,
" Incorrectly Installed Check Valves in the Component Cooling Water System" CC: Document Control Desk, NRC l
Washington, DC RJCook, NRC Resident Inspector Midland Nuclear Plant DHood, USNRC NRR 8311010190 831002 N]
PDR ADOCK 05000329 4
S 00T 31983 OC0983-0028A-MP01
2 83-08 #1 Serial 23803 OM/0L SERVICE LIST Mr Frank J Kelley Atomic Safety & Licensing Attorney General of the Appeal Board State of Michigan U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ms Carole Steinberg, Esq Washington, DC 20555 Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Mr C R Stephens (3) 720 Law Building Chief, Docketing & Services Lansing, MI 48913 U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Secretary Washington, DC 20555 Mr Myron M Cherry, Esq Suite 3700 Ms Mary Sinclair Three First National Plaza 5711 Summerset Street Chicago, IL 60602 Midland, MI 48640 Mr Wendell H Marshall Mr William D Paton, Esq RFD 10 Counsel for the NRC Staff Midland, MI 48640 U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr Charles Bechhoefer, Esq Atomic Safety & Licensing Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Panel Board Panel U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Dr Frederick P Cowan Ms Barbara Stamiris 6152 N Verde Trail 5795 North River Road Apt B-125 Rt 3 Boca Raton, FL 33433 Freeland, MI 48623 Mr Fred C Williams Mr Jerry Harbour Isham, Lincoln & Beale Atomic Safety & Licensing 1120 Connecticut Ave, NW, Suite 325 Board Panel Washington, DC 20036 U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Mr James E Brunner, Esq Mr M I Miller, Esq Consumers Power Company Isham, Lincoln & Beale 212 West Michigan Avenue Three First National Plaza Jackson, MI 49201 52nd Floor Chicago, IL 60602 Mr D F Judd Mr John Demeester, Esq Babcock & Wilcox Dow Chemical Building PO Box 1260 Michigan Division
-Lynchburg, VA 24505 Midland, MI 48640 Mr Steve Gadler, Esq Ms Lynne Bernebei 2120 Carter Avenue Government Accountability Project St Paul, MN 55108 1901 Q Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 September 6, 1983
ATTACHf EITT 1 127286 "erian 2323 l
QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM" MANAGEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORT MCAR 1 REPORT NO.
72 l
JOB NO. 7220 Q NO.
DATE 9/2/83 l' DESCRIPTION (including references):
During a review of the Installation at the Midland site, a concern was raised involving ten nuclear class 2 check valves in the component cooling water (CCW) inlet piping to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal coolers. The valves in question are located in vertical sections of piping with flow I
upward, which is an acceptable design condition when using check valves quellfled for vertical installation. Contrary to this, the components procured for this application are not functional when installed in the vertical position.
(continued)
- RECOMMENDED ACTION (Optional) l) Revise and issue design change as required to applicable drawings and schedule.
- 2) Review all Q check valves locateo in vertical sections of piping to ensure that valves are of the correct type and will f unction in accordance with FSAR and system design criteria.
31 Determine root cause of deficiency and take appropriate corrective action to preclude recurrence.
- 4) Issue Interim or final report by 9/16/83.
REFERRED TO EXENGINEERING O CONSTRUCTION O OA MANAGEMENT O
[M YA/83 O PROCUREMENT ISSUED BY Protect OA Enoneer /
Date
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11 REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY NOTIF D CLIENT 9// M S O NO
[3YES Date Project Manager [
til CAUSE CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN AUTHORIZED BY Date STANDARD DLSTRIBUTON ADDITONAL DLSTRIBUTON AS APPROPRIATE DIVISON OA MANAGER ENGn.'EERING MANAGER FORMAL REPORTTO CLIENT MANAGER OF OA BPC WOJECT ENGINEER (If Section11 Applies)
Data GPD. OA MANAGER OE SUPERVISOR PD Q A M GER CONST"UCTON MANAGER PROJ SUPT /PROJ CONSTR MANAGER PROJECT MANAGER CLIENT CHIEF CONSTR OC ENGINEER CORRECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTED DfVISON PROCURENT MGR PROJ PROCUREMENT MGR PROCUREMENT SUPPLIER OUALITY MGR AND DfV SUPPLIER QUALITY MGR VERIFIED BY Protect QA Engineer Date
'Desenbe in space provkled at:d attach reference docurnent.
AAPD 0161
O V)
'd q n, 9/l/83 Page 2 127286 DESCRIPTICtd (continued):
In the event of RCP seal cooler failure, the subject check valves would fall to perform their Intended function, thus allowing a ccrnbination of pressurl2ed seal injection and reactor coolant to flow back into the CCW system and discharge to the containment atmosphere or auxiliary building, resulting in potentially unacceptable radiation dosage levels for such an event.
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ATTACliMENT P Serial: 23803
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Bechtel Associates Professional Corporation SUBJ MCAR 72 1400 :0 rocorrect1y insta11ed Check va1yes in the Component Cooling Water System FINAL REPORT DATE:
September 15, 1983 PROJECT:
Consumers Power Company Midland Plant Units 1 & 2 Bechtel Job 7220 Introduction This report provides the final status and course of corrective action required pursuant to MCAR 72.
Description of Deficiency The original design of the component cooling water (CCW) inlet piping (2-1/2"-1CBB-9.-10,-11, ar.J -12 and 2-1/2"-2CBB-9.-10,-11, and -12) to the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal coolers shows ten of sixteen 2-1/2-inch, ANSI 1,500-pound, carbon steel nuclear Class 2 check valves in vertical sections of piping with flow upward. The actual valves procured and installed were lift-type check valves.
The concern regards the function of these valves in the event of an RCP seal cooler rupture. This potential rupture could involve a backflow of radioactive coolant that could ultimately breach the reactor coolant pressure boundary through a relief valve in the CCW piping system within the reactor building.
In addition, pressurization of the CCW header within the containment may lead to failure of the disk in the ANSI
'50-pound carbon steel nuclear Class 2 containment isolation check valve, pressurizing the piping outside containment where further failure could result in loss of high-pressore isolation capabilities.
Summary of Investination and Historical Backaround In the original design of the piping system, check valves 416-2-323,
-324. -327
-328. -329, and -330 (Isometric Drawing 7220-N-616, Sh 4(Q)], and check valves 417-2-373, -374, -375, and -376 [ Isometric Drawing 7220-M-617, Sh 4(Q)] were located in close proximity to the RCP seals to minimize the distance of potential backflow (2,126 psis and up to 555F) and subsequent heating of the piping system. The valves in question were located in vertical sections of piping with flow upward.
This is an acceptable design condition when using check valves qualified for vertical installation. Upon receipt of the vendor drawings from the valve manufacturer, the holds were removed from the piping isometric drawings to allow fabrication and installation to proceed.
It was not noted at that time that the valves purchased were lift check valves that must be located in horizontal piping to operate properly.
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I28507 Bechtel Associates Professional Corporation MCAR 72 FINAL REPORT lZ8o00 Page 2 Analysis of Safety Implication Because the check valves mounted in vertical runs of piping will not function as intended, the upstream portion of the line would be pressurized and a combination'of seal injection (of approximately 2,170 psig at 140F) and reactor coolant (2,126 psig at 555F) may partially backflow into the CCW inlet piping. This combined flow could discharge to the containment atmosphere through a relief valve in the CCW system.
Also, the ANSI 150-pound containment isolation check valve could fail, thus permitting backflow into the auxiliary building with no high-pressure isolation capabilities.
The doses for such an event have not been analyzed in the FSAR. Because the resultant doses could adversely affect public health and safety, it is concluded that if this had remained uncorrected, it could have adversely affected the safe operation of the Midland nuclear plant.
Probable Cause Inattention to details of installation requirements for the check valves during review of the vendor drawings and later in releasing holds on the valves on piping Isometric Drawings 7220-M-616, Sh 4(Q) and h-617 Sh 4(Q), is the root cause of this problem.
Corrective Action 1.
Replacement check valves have been purchased that will function in a vertical run of piping and will be installed in the piping systems in accordance with the revised piping isometric drawings (M-616, Sh 4(Q), Rev 9, issued May 5, 1983, and M-617, Sh 4(Q), Rev 17, issued May 26, 1983] before fuel load in each unit.
2.
A review by purchase order to identify all Q-listed check valves that may not function when installed in a vertical run of piping was completed. As a result, only lift check valves and lift-stop check valves procured under purchase Order 7220-M-1188 (Items 6.1, 8.1, 8.2, and 9.3) were identified as a concern and reviewed against the applicable piping isometric drawings. All lift check valves other than those that are the subject of this NCAR were fLand to be designed in horizontal pipe runs in accordance with vendor requirements. Also, lift-stop check valves were reviewed against the applicable piping isometric drawing and found to be designed in horizontal runs of piping in accordance with vendor requirements.
3.
The necessity of reviewing in detail the vendor's installation requirements to ensure equipment will operate as intended has been emphasized to plant design personnel involved in plant layout and piping design (
Reference:
Com 128166).
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Bechtel Associates Professional Corporation MCAR 72.
FINAL IRMA 0 0 12850/
Page 3 Reportability Based on the safety implications, this deficiency was reported to the NRC in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.55(e) on September 2, 1983.
Submitted by:
y R.F. Tulloch Plant Design Group Supervisor Approved by:
u-n co E.M. Hughes N
j Project Engineer l
Concurrence by:
B.R. Klein Plant Design Chief Engineer C
l Concurrence by:
E.H. Smith Engineering Manager Concurrence by:
hr M.A. Dietrich 7 Project Quality Assurance Engineer RFT/TC/sunc* (PD) 0459u