ML20081C023

Part 21 Rept Re Design Deficiency Involving Combination Supports for Class IE Cable Trays & HVAC Ducts.Initially Reported on 831025.Due to Misclassification,Supports Specified W/Less than Full safety-related QA Program

ML20081C023
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek, Callaway, 05000000
Issue date:	10/27/1983
From:	Meyers B BECHTEL GROUP, INC.
To:	Deyoung R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
References
REF-PT21-83-031-000 10CFR-50.55E, BLSM-83-269, PT21-83-031-000, PT21-83-31, NUDOCS 8310310074
Download: ML20081C023 (3)

Text

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Bechtel Power Corporation Engineers - Censtructors 15740 Shady Grove Road Caithersburg, Marybnd 20877 301 - 258-3000 October 27, 1983 50-432.

Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement y%

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

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Dear Mr. DeYoung:

BLSM- 83/269 File: 0490.4 SNUPPS Project, Bechtel Job No.10466 Design Deficiency Involving Combination Supports for Class IE

' Electrical Cable Trays and HVAC Ducts On October 25, 1983, Mr. R. Baer of your office was informed by Bechtel (J. Kroehler) of a SNUPPS Project design deficiency reportable under 10 CFR 21 involving nine combination supports for Class lE electrical cable trays and HVAC ducts which had been incorrectly classified and issued as " Seismic II/I" rather than safety-related "Q".

Five supports are located in the Reactor Building and fr.ur in the Auxili-ary Building at each of the SNUPPS units - Callaway and Wolf Creek.

Seismic II/I items are those portions of structures, systems, and com-ponents whose continued function is not required, but whose failure l caused by a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), could reduce the function of a Seismic Category I structure, system or component to an unaccept-able safety level. The QA Program for Seismic II/I items utilizes portions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix B program as necessary to satisfy

the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classifi-cation," Regulatory Position C.4.

l As a result of the misclassification, the procurement, installation, and inspection for these supports was specified with less than a full safety-related QA Program. In addition to the misclassification, the five sup-ports in the Reactor Building were analyzed seismically, employing assum-tions for support rigidity that were not suitably conservative for this application.

8310310074 831027

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I Bechtel Power Corporation Mr. Richard DeYoung October 27, 1983 BLSM 83/269 Page 2

-Bechtel concludes that these supports could be damaged during a seismic event such that'the cable trays and, therefore the cables, would not have sufficient support to assure an uninterrupted supply of power to safeguards systems. The capability for safe shutdown of the plant could be compromised.

The deficiency was identified on October 21, 1983 during a joint Civil and Mechanical Engineering review of Seismic II/I HVAC duct supports in the SNUPPS scale model, when it was discovered that some of the supports being reviewed were also supporting Class lE electrical cable trays in addition to non-category I HVAC ducts. Engineering subsequently deter-mined that each plant has a total of twenty supports containing both cable trays and HVAC ducts. The classifications of the other eleven supports were made correctly.

Bechtel plans to re-analyze the five supports in the Reactor Building for adequacy of seismic design. Supports will be modified if required.

The procurement, installation, and inspection of the nine affected sup-ports will also be reviewed for compliance with requirements for safety-related structures.

l Mr. Baer was informed that SNUPPS plans to notify NRC Regions III and IV of this generic deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR I 50.55(e). He indicated that a separate 10 CFR 21 report would not be necessary if the requirements for 10 CFR 21 reporting are addressed in the 10 CFR 50.55(e) report.

j Mr. Baer was informed that while this deficiency was detected in the SNUPPS

! design, it resulted from a breakdown in the exchange of design information among several Engineering disciplines, and was not necessarily unique to the SNUPPS units. The Bechtel policy is to issue Management Corrective Action Reports (MCARs) to all other Bechtel nuclear projects whenever significant deficiencies are detected, so that reviews for applicability can be performed. That practice will be observed for this deficiency.

This problem was also discussed with Mr. E. Kelly of the Region I Office.

Sincerely ours M

! rnard L. Meyers roject Manager JKJ/jmd l

cc: See Page 3 E

, l Bechtel Power Corporation Mr. Richard DeYoung October 27, 1983 BLSM- 83/269 Page 3 i

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cc: Mr. R. Baer, Office of Inspection & Enforcement, USNRC, Washington, D.C.

Dr. T. E. Murley, Director, Region I, USNRC Mr. J. A. Keppler, Director, Region III, USNRC Mr. J. Collins, Director, Region IV, USNRC Mr. N. A. Petrick, SNUPPS Mr. S. J. Seiken, SNUPPS Mr. E. W. Creel, Kansas Gas & Electric Co.

Mr. F. D. Field, Union Electric Co.

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' Bechtel Power Corporation Engineers - Constructors 15740 Shady Grove Road Gaithersburg, Maryland 20877 301 - 258-3000 October 27, 1983 5o-432.

Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection & Enforcement y$3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 ih

Dear Mr. DeYoung:

BLSM- 83/269 File: 0490.4 SNUPPS Project, Bechtel Job No.10466 Design Deficiency Involving Combination Supports for Class lE Electrical Cable Trays and HVAC Ducts On October 25, 1983, Mr. R. Baer of your office was informed by Bechtel (J. Kroehler) of a SNUPPS Project design deficiency reportable under 10 CFR 21 involving nine combination supports for Class lE electrical cable trays and HVAC ducts which had been incorrec'tly classified and issued as " Seismic II/I" rather than safety-related "Q".

Five supports are located in the Reactor Building and four in the Auxili-ary Building at each of the SNUPPS units - Callaway and Wolf Creek.

Seismic II/I items are those portions of structures, systems, and com-ponents whose continued function is not required, but whose failure caused by a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), could reduce the function of a Seismic Category I structure, system or component to an unaccept-able safety level. The QA Program for Seismic II/I items utilizes portions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix B program as necessary to satisfy the requirements of NRC Regulatory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classifi-cation," Regulatory Position C.4.

As a result of the misclassification, the procurement, installation, and inspection for these supports was specified with less than a full safety-related QA Program. In addition to the misclassification, the five sup-ports in the Reactor Building were analyzed seismically, employing assum-tions for support rigidity that were not suitably conservative for this application.

8310310074 831027

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7 O-A Bechtel Power Corporation Mr. Richard DeYoung October 27, 1983 BLSM 83/269 Page 2 Bechtel concludes that these supports could be damaged during a seismic event such that the cable trays and, therefore the cables, would not have sufficient support to assure an uninterrupted supply of power to safeguards systems. The capability for safe shutdown of the plant could be compromised.

The deficiency was identified on October 21, 1983 during a joint Civil and Mechanical Engineering review of Seismic II/I HVAC duct supports in the SNUPPS scale model, when it was discovered that some of the supports being reviewed were also supporting Class lE electrical cable trays in addition to non-category I HVAC ducts. Engineering subsequently deter-mined that each plant has a total of twenty supports containing both cable trays and HVAC ducts. The classifications of the other eleven supports were made correctly.

Bechtel plans to re-analyze the five supports in the Reactor Building for adequacy of seismic design. Supports will be modified if required.

The procurement, installation, and inspection of the nine affected sup-ports will also be reviewed for compliance with requirements for safety-related structures.

Mr. Baer was informed that SNUPPS plans to notify NRC Regions III and IV of this generic deficiency in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e). He indicated that a separate 10 CFR 21 report would not be necessary if the requirements for 10 CFR 21 reporting are addressed in the 10 CFR 50.55(e) report.

Mr. Baer was informed that while this deficiency was detected in the SNUPPS design, it resulted from a breakdown in the exchange of design information among several Engineering disciplines, and was not necessarily unique to the SNUPPS units. The Bechtel policy is to issue Management Corrective Action Reports (MCARs) to all other Bechtel nuclear projects whenever significant deficiencies are detected, so that reviews for applicability can be performed. That practice will be observed for this deficiency.

This problem was also discussed with Mr. E. Kelly of the Region I Office. -

Sincerely ours M

rnard L. Meyers roject Manager JKJ/jmd cc: See Page 3 L

Bechtel Power Corporation Mr. Richard DeYoung October 27, 1983 BLSM- 83/269 Page 3

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cc: Mr. R. Baer, Office of Inspection & Enforcement, USNRC, Washington, D.C.

Dr. T. E. Murley, Director, Region I, USNRC Mr. J. A. Keppler, Director, Region III, USNRC Mr. J. Collins, Director, Region IV, USNRC Mr. N. A. Petrick, SNUPPS Mr. S. J. Seiken, SNUPPS Mr. E. W. Creel, Kansas Gas & Electric Co.

Mr. F. D. Field, Union Electric Co.

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