ML20080N214
| ML20080N214 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 02/21/1984 |
| From: | Weiss E HARMON & WEISS, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 79-429-09-SP, 79-429-9-SP, ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8402220153 | |
| Download: ML20080N214 (17) | |
Text
- - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ -.
00CKETED U%RC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE COMMISSION
'84 FE9 21 P4:25 In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
)
Docket No. 50-289 (Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
(Restart)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
)
UNION OF CONCERNED SCI'ENTISTS ' COMMENTS ON LIST OF INTEGRITY ISSUES IN RESTART PROCEEDING The Commission has asked the parties to address the questions of whether the list of integrity issues attached to a January 20, 1984 memo from Secretary Chilk to the parties is accurate and complete, whether the issues are resolved or unresolved and which unresolved issues must be resolved bef ore restart.
We address the completeness and accuracy questions below, by adding to and modifying some questions.
Our approach to the question of which issues must be resolved as a condition of plant operat' ion is straightforward.
All of the issues listed under Roman Numerals I and II are clearly within the scope of the pending Appeal Board review of the adjudicatory record of the restart proceeding and are unrcsolved pending Appeal Board decision.
The issues in Section III A (TMI-2 leak rate falsification) and III B ( TMI leak rate falsification) also fall within this category.
The Appeal Board has already ordered the record reopened on the 8402220153 840221 PDR ADOCK 050002e9 g
, ~~
-Hartman allegations ~regarding TMI-2 leak rate falsification, thus ruling thaO the seriousness of the matter has the potential to determine the outcome of the case.
The Aamodts
~
have recently moved f or reopening on the TMI-l leak rate issue and both the Staff and GPU have responding by stating that the TMI-1 issue is logically within the scope of the reopened proceeding on the'Hartman allegations.
It is our view that all of these questions should be considered by.the Appeal Board and a comprehensive opinion issued deciding, on the basis of the record, whether or not GPU
-has the competence and integrity to be entrusted to operate TMI-2.
This ' decision must be made af ter consideration of all of the relevant record evidence.
It is futile to try to rate the
" impor tance" in the abstract of individual issues in the remarkably long list that has been assembled.
A decision can only come from considering them cumulatively; while one or two incidents might be excused as-isolated lapses, the nature of the case.against GPU.is compelling because of the number and duration' of the incidents, both before and af ter the TMI-2 accident.
The remarkably lengthy list of integrity issues is
~
. testament to the-folly of considering issues in isolation.
It should also be noted that the Hartman allegations are in a unique procedural status.
As the Appeal Board noted, the Licensing Board decision was made explicitly conditional on
l~
. resolution of the Hartman investigation which it had not been presented sufficient information to evaluate.
Thus, the licensing Board decision was never " closed" as to the leak rate falsification issue.
ALAB-738, Aug. 31, 1983, sl. op, at 21.
The Appeal Board understood that the gravity of these charges carried the potential f or dictating the outcome on management integrity and ordered evidence to be taken.
Before that could happen, the Commission (without stating reasons) suspended the reopended hearings.
Therefore, despite the fact that both the Licensing and Appeal Boards accepted the relevance and importance of the Hartman allegations to the question of management competence and integrity, there has never been any consideration of that evidence by any NRC adjudicatory panel.
l-There is, thus, no operative decision which considers all of the relevant evidence.
Under these circumstances, an NRC decision authorizing restart would be arbitrary and capricious.
Legally, it is the equivalent of authorizing operation before the Licensing Board had reached a decision.
The questions flowing from the operator cheating incident are also in a different class than other issues considered by the Licensing Board.
These issues, which go well beyond the honesty of individual operators and involve the adminstration and substance of GPU's enhanced operator training program ordered af ter the TMI-2 accident as well as the nature of GPU's t
)
i
-4_
response to the cheating, were first decided by the Special Master who heard the evidence.
His conclusions were far more straightforward and more damning than those of the Licensing Board (e.g. The Special Master concluded that the requirements of the Commission's order related to post-TMI-2 training were and that the integrity of the operations staff'of TMI-2 not met as a whole was compromised).
It falls to the Appeal Board to reconcile two very different decisions.
The Commission has no basis for prejudging the matter by assuming that the Licensing Board's is the correct view, yet that would be.the plain effect of authori-ing restart.
As to the issues which are not part of the adjudicatory proceeding, some were already the subject of motions to reopen the record.
The Parks / King /Gishchel, BETA /RHR, and Keaten Report issues, III C,'III D and III E, were covered by.the TMIA motion to the Appeal Board which was partially granted on August 31, 1983 as to the leak rate falsification question.
The motions were denied as to the other issues essentially because the NRC's investigations had not yet proceeded far enough to yield the information necessary to evaluate the seriousness of the issues.
Their relevance is clear and they should f airly be considered within the adjudication at least until the 01 investigations are completed.
The remainder of the issues are not strictly part of the adjudication because they arose or came to light later and are g
l
-S-not the subject of motions to reopen the record.
However, each of them has come before the Commission as it considers the "immediate effectiveness" question.
The Commission's view is that its immediate effectiveness deliberations are not subject to the procedure requirements of adjudications.
Therefore, ti.e standards for reopening the record are inapposite as to the Commission's consideration of these issues.
Monetheless, even if the Commission is exercising broad discretion in deciding whether to lift the immediate effectiveness of the suspension order of 1979, it is not f r ee to simply disregard issues and facts which have come before it bearing on the reasons which compelled shutdown to begin with.
The capability of GPU management was explicitly one of these issues.
CLI-79-8, 10 NRC 141, 143, 145, (1979).
In essence, the Commission cannot have it both ways.
Having determined that its immediate effectiveness review is not limited to consideration of the facts on the record, it cannot proceed to ignore extra-record material which reflects adversely on GPU management.
Agency " discretion" is not license to act arbitrarily.
Therefore, any such facts must be considered by the Commission prior to restart.
As we have noted before, the Commission's artificial separation of the immediate ef fectiveness review f rom review of the record has led it into a procedural nightmare, as new facts have come to light which add to the case against GPU l
. management.
Rather than allowing these isues to be ventilated in the only rell'able way - as part of the hearings - the Commission has treated them in an ad hoc fashion based largely on the untested assertions of interested parties.
It is not too late to put this proceeding back into a form in which all relevant issues can be rationally and reliable weighed and decided.
The Commission need only allow the Appeal Board to do its job by lifting the order suspending the reopened proceeding and letting the chips fall where they may.
In other words,
'what is first required before plant operation is a decision based'on a full record, determining whether or not GPU has the requisite competence and character to operate the plant.
Our additions to and modifications of the list of open isrues follow:
I.
A.
Question ~1 shbuld be restated to delete the word
" willfully",'which has been interpreted by some NRC personnel to connote an intention to cause harm.
It is irrelevant whether there is an intention to cause harm to public safety.
The f ollowing should be substituted:
1.
Was information withheld so as to downplay the seriousness of the TMI-2 situation?
D.
-Contrary to the phrasing of this topic heading, the issue is certainly not whether the licensee is " committed to establishing" an adequate training program.
The issue is whether the record shows that licensee has established such a
' t t
. ~
training program and in particular, one that meets the Commission's order of August 9, 1979.
After five years the
~
only legitimate measure of GPU's competence and attitude is performance, not promises.
Additional questions for the section are as follows:
-Did the post-TMI training program meet the requirements of the Commission's order of August 9, 1979?
LBP-82-34B, 15 NRC 918, 1054 (1982).
-Who bears responsibility f or a post-TMI training program that relied excessively on rote memorization at best tangentially related to the skills needed to safely operate the plant?
See LBP-82-34B, 15 NRC 918, 1017-1020, 1054(1982).
-Did licensee " permit an attitude to develop which caused the cheating to occur?"
Id at 1053.
-Did the " pattern of loose quiz administration" continue.after licensee had promised the Licensing Board twice that it had corrected the deficiencies in the training program?
Id.
at 1019-1020 (1 250).
-What are the implications regarding GPU competence and integrity of the f act that Dr. Robert Long, who was in charge of the training program found so lax, who could not be said to "f ully understand" his responsibility and who falsely testified that open book quizzes had been prohibited has been promoted by GPU?
LBP-82-56, 16 NRC 281, 356-358, 379-381.
3
_a
-If GPU management was unaware of the weakness of its post TMI training program, does that reflect adversely on its competence?
C.
The topic heading should be changed as follows:
"Did management pursue, tolerate or permit activities prior to 'the' accident that posed a potential risk to public health and safety?
(changes are indicated by underlining).
Questions 1 should also be rephrased as follows:
1.
Did GPU unduly defer safety related maintenance and repair?
The issue as phrased by NRC would focus entirely on whether GPU's procedures were met, thus assuming without question that the procedures were adequate.
The appropriate issue, on the contrary, is whether safety related work was delayed unduly, whether or not that delay was allowed by internal procedures.
E.
The following questions should be added:
2.
With-whom did Diekamp consult before writing to Udall?
What questions did he ask and what information was he given?
i 3.
If Diekamp was not aware of the specific situation at I
l the p' ant, what was the basis for his assertions to Udall?
II.
Issues Raised By The Cheating Incident.
A.
Adequacy of Management Response to Cheating Question 1 should be rephrased as follows:
a
I- ' '-
_9_
l.
Did management constrain the NRC investigation by having management representatives sit through NRC interviews?
The word " willfully" has been deleted since, as noted above, NRC personnel interpret this as connoting intention to do actual harm.
Instead, the following question should be added after question 1:
-Was there a legitimate purpose for GPU's insistence on sitting through NRC interviews?
Question 2 is a key one concerning the adequacy of GPU's investigation of the cheating.
It should be expanded as follows:
-Was the so-called " Wilson investigation" presented to the Special Master as " independent" when, in fact, Wilson was a lawyer with a longstanding relationship with GPU?
-Did GPU claim that persons were innocent who had obviously cheated?
-Who bears responsibility for the Wilson investigation?
-Was the Wilson investigation a coverup?
-Was management culpable in its unquestioning endorsement of the.results of the Wilson investigation?
-Did management show a genuine committment to discovering the full extent of the cheating?
m.....
. -Did management show a genuine committment to discovering and removing those responsible f or the cl?. mate that allowed routing cheating on weekly quizzes? LBP-82-56, 16 NRC 281, 357 (1 2324).
Who bears responsibility for the routine cheating on weekly quizzes?
Id.
Questions.3 asks whether management imposed appropriate sanctions on those who cheated.
The question is far too narrow.
The following should be added:
-Did management impose appropriate sanctions on those who permitted a climate of disdain for the training and testing program to exist? LBP-82-34B, 15 NRC 918, 1014-1020.
B.
Management's Knowledge of and/or Involvement in Cheating.
-The following questions should be added:
-Did management permit an climate of disrespect for the training program to exist which allowed cheating on weekly quizzes and the NRC exam?
-Who knew that " cooperation" or " group effort" on weekly quizzes was routine?
Who should have know?
s Did Ross know?
-Given the occurrence of routine " cooperation" on weekly post-TMI training quizzes and cheating on NRC's exam, what are the conclusions to be drawn regarding GPU management competence as well as integrity?
i
i s-C.. ExtentEof. Cheating.
Add the following:
-Does the extent of cheating reflect adversely on management's competence? i.e. does it show that management had a lack of interest or sufficient control over the post-TMI training program?
-Does Mr. Long have sufficient integrity to supervise training?
D.
Training and Testing Program GPU's competence and integrity must be measured primarily by its performance.
Therefore, the following questions should lx2 added:
-How does licensee's administration of its post-TMI training and testing program reflect on management
. competence and attitude?
-Did licensee's training and testing program meet the
. Commission's August, 1979 order?
-Did licensee's training and testing program ensure that operators learned the skills necessary to safely operate the plant i.e. - did it ensure that they have the requisite level of competence?
E.
' Licensee's System for Certifying Candidates.
The questions surrounding the f alse certification of VV are
'much~ broader than indicated.
The following should be added:
-Who reviewed the 8/3/79 letter certifying VV7 i
_ i.-
e 12 -
-Was VV ever properly retested on all of the sections on which he cheated?
See letter from E.R. Weiss to Commissioners, August 26, 1983.
-Was false testimony given to the Special Mascer to the effect that VV'had been retested on all sections?
-Was NRC f alsely told' that VV had been retested on Section A?.(Id.)
-Does GPU endorse the conclusions of the so-called
" Speaker-Report" that VV did not cheat?
If not, why did it forward the report to the Commission and Appeal Board without qualification?
-Did GPU adequately investigate the VV incident?
Does it consider the Speaker Report an adequate investigation?
See Union of Concerned Scientists Comments on Investigation of VV and O Inciden.t.
July
' 21', 1983.
^
-Does GPU endorse Speaker's conclusion that
" bureaucratic oversight" accounts for GPU's claim to i
NRC that VV scored 89.1% on Category A?
The following section should be added:
F.
Licensee's Pattern of Response to Discovery of Wrongdoing
~
-1
. Taken in the aggregate, do GPU's response to operator cheating (the " Wilson investigation"), i ts response to the false certification of VV (the " Speaker Report"),
its response to the leak rate falsification allegation
,~,e r--
m
-n---
--mv
-p
,. (failure to disclose the Faegre and Benson Report and f ailure to attempt to learn who was involved in and/or bears responsibility for leak rate falsification) and its response to the accident itself (the Keaten Report) establish a pattern of conduct unacceptable f or a nuclear license?
III.
A.
Hartman Matter The following should be added:
-Who knew that leak rates were being falsified?
-Who knew that " unacceptable" leak rates were being destroyed?
-If Met Ed believed that the limit on leak rate was overly restrictive, why didn't it request a license amendment?
-If management was unaware of the leak rate falsification, does this reflect adversely on its competence?
C.
Parks / King /Gischell Allegations on Technical Violations and Harassment and Intimidation.
Question #2 asks whether management was " intending to cut corners to_the detriment of safety."
Whether management adtually intended to create unsafe conditions is surely beside ths point.
Presumably only a sabteur would act with such iriten tion.
Question 2 should be replaced with the following:
{
l
. -Did financial considerations have a role in decisions to circumvent procedural requirements?
-If GPU felt that the procedures in place were
. inappropriate for the clean up, why didn' t GPU seek to have the procedures charged?
-Did GPU exercise insuf ficient control over Bechtel?
E.
Keaten Report Issues The f ollowing should be added:
-Is management's current claim that it considered the Keaten report only for internal use truthful?
J.
Technical Issues The following questions should be added:
-Has GPU deliberately delayed implementing long-term items so as to be "r eady" f or restart?
See Union of Concerned Scientists' Comments on NRC Staff Response to GPU's Management Proposal, Jan 25, 1984, p.6 and n.ll. $/
-Did current GPUN President Clark mislead the Commission about the seismic qualification of the TMI-l emergency f eadwater system?
See Undon of 1/
During the recent tour of TMI-l by the NRC task force investigating the status of compliance by B&W reactors with the long-term lessons learned, GPU stated that all of the long term plant modifications could be completed by January, 1985 if the plant were shut down during 1984.
However, it was also stated that some long-term modifications were not being begun because GPU expected authorization to restart soon.
Concerned Scientists' Comments on the Commission's Ex Parte M'eeting of December 17, 1983.
, Jan.
7, 1983, pp 7-10, 15, 26,
-Did current GPUN President Clark mislead the Commission by indicating that delays in implementing NRC fire protection rules were due solely to GPU's desire to improve over the minimum requirements, when in fhet many, requests were for " schedular exemptions" (i.e. deadline extensions) only?
See Union of Concerned Scientists; Island Unit 1 Restart, Dec. 5, 1983, pp.
2-4.
-Did GPU Director of TMI-l Hukill mislead the Commission by stating that the highpoint vent are
" installed" without informing the Commission that serious unrese]ved questions make them currently unusable?
Id. at 4-5.
t Respectfully submitted, i
Ellyn R. Weiss HARMON, WEISS & JOP. DAN 1725.1 Street, N.W.
Suite 506 Washington, D.C.
20006 (202) 833-9070
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
[
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION T4 FEB 21 P4:25 In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No [. bbg/m N @u METROPOLITAN EDISION COMPANY
.)
5282HSP
)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
ASLBP 79-429-09-SP
)
(Restart Remand on)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
Managemen't)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby. certify that copies of the UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS' COMMENTS ON LIST OF INTEGRITY ISSUES IN RESTART PROCEEDING have been served on the following by first class mail, postage prepaid this 21st day of February, 1984, or as otherwise indicated.
'*Nunzio Palladino, Chairman Sheldon J. Wolfe
'U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Commission Licensing Board Panel Washington, D.C.
20555 881 West Outer Drive Oak Ridge, TN 37830
- Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner Gustave A.
Linenberger U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory Atomic Safety and Commission Licensing Board Panel Washington,,.D.C. 20555-5000 Hermitage Drive Raleigh, NC.
27612
- Frederick.M. Bernthal, Commissioner Judge Gary L. Milhollin U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 1815 Jefferson St.
Commission Madison, Wisconsin 53711 Washington, D.C.
20555
- Thomas Roberts, Commissioner
- *Ju dge Ga ry J. Edles, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Chairman
' Commission Atomic Safety and Washington, D.C.
20555 Licensing Appeal Board.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
- James Asselstine, Commissioner
- Judge John H.
Buck U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Atomic Safety and Commission Licensing Appeal Board Washington,_D.C. 20555' Panel l
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ivan W. Smith, Chairman Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D.C.
20555 Board Panel U.S.. Nuclear ~ Regulatory Commission Washington,
,.C.
20555-
Judge Chr istine N. Kohl Counsel for NRC Staff Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of Executive Legal Appeal Board Panel Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission '
Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Judge Reginald L. Gotchy Docketing and Service Atomic Safety and Licensing Section Appeal Board Panel Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Mrs. Marjorie Aamodt George F. Tr owbridge, Esq.
R.D.
15 Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Coatsville, PA 19320 Trowbridge 1800 M Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Douglas R.
Blazey, Esquire Public Information and Chief Counsel Resource Center Dept. of Enyt'l. Res.
1037 Maclay Street 514 Executive House Harrisburg, PA. 17103 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Louise Bradford Michael McBride, Esq.
Three Mile Island Alert LeBeouf, Lamb, Leiby &
325 Peffer Street MacC r ae Harrisburg, PA 17102 1333 New Hampshire Ave.
Suite 1100 Washington, D.C.
20036 Jordan D.
Cunningham, Esq.
Fox, Farr & Cunningham 2320 North Second Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 Dr. Judith H. Johnsrud Dr. Chauncey Kepford Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power 433 Orlando Avenue State College, PA. 16801 John A.
Levin, Esq.
Assistant Counsel Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission Post Office Box 3265 Harrisburg, PA 17120 Ms. Gail B.
Phelps 245 West Philadelphia Street York, PA 17404 u---
Ar 211/d R. Weiss j
p Mr. G. W. Knighton February 15 ' 984 -
3 PGandE. Letter No. 'DCL-84-057 Page Two 2.
Operating Procedure EP OP-1 (Loss of Coolant Accident) provides for verification of ECCS flow approximately every 15 minutes during the cold leg recirculation phase.
3.
Surveillance Procedure STP I-1A (Modes 1, 2 and 3 shift checklist) is used to ensure Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2 is met. This surveillance requirement requires that MOVs 8701 and 8702 be
~ciosed with power to the valve operators removed. STP I-1A (Modes 4 and 5 shift checklist) requires that HOVs 8701 and 8702 have the power to the valve operators removed.
Reactor Coolant Loop 4 to RHR Pump Suction)g Valves 8701 and 8702, Survei11ance Procedure STP V-3MS (Exercisin
'4.
, STP V-7A (Relay Actuation Verification For RHR Valves 8701 and 8702) and STP V-7C (Leak Test of RHR Suction Valves 8701 and 8702) contain the precaution that the breakers for MOVs 8701 and 8702 shall be maintained in the open position at all times, except when it is necessary to stroke the valves.
5.
. Administrative 1y, instructions are located on the control board next to the valve switches. These instructions state that the breakers for MOVs 8701 and 8702 shall be maintained in the open position at all times, except when it is necessary to stroke the valves.
1-rindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of thir letter and return it fr. the enclosed addressed envelope.
Sincerely,
- ()
cc:
J. B. Martin
-d.O.Schuyler Service List s
- 6-k E
i
- - - _. -,..,, ~.
_ _ _._,~._....., _ _ _ __ _, _,
-.. - _. _ -.. _ _ _, _, _, _. _ _... _