ML20080M994
| ML20080M994 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 09/29/1983 |
| From: | Conn W BURNS & ROE CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-83-022-000 BRGO-RO-83-041, BRGO-RO-83-41, PT21-83-022-000, PT21-83-22, NUDOCS 8310040331 | |
| Download: ML20080M994 (2) | |
Text
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O g Burns and Roe,Inc.
601 Williams Boulevard a Richland, Washington 99352 e Tel:(509) 943-8200
Subject:
Work Order 3900-4000 Washington Public Power Supply System Main office WNP-2 550 Kinderkamack Road Oradell, New Jersey 07649 CAC Valve Power Supply (201)265-2000 Responds to:
NA September 29, 1983 BRGO-R0-83-014 Response Required:
NA Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention: Director
Dear Sir:
This letter is to report to you a condition we have deemed reportable under 10CFR21. This was discussed with R. Dodds of your Region V staff on September 28, 1983.
The concern is that the control circuits for valves CAC-FCV-1A and IB, which are safety related, are powered from a non-Class lE power supply.
Valves CAC-FCV-1A and IB must be capable of isolating (closing) and opening post accident in order to meet their safety related design re-l quirements. Failure of the non-Class lE power supply post accident would prevent subsequent valve opening which is necessary in order to control oxygen concentration within primary containment.
Complete details are provided in the evaluation attached.
I If you have further questions, please contact W.G. Conn at (509) 943-t l.
8241.
WGC:MCD:lvs Very truly yours,
(-
Attachment cc: BPA - Mr. W.S. Chin W.G. Conn 6
l SS - Mr. B.A. Holmberg, w/a Project Licensing Supervisor l
SS - Mr. L.T. Harrold, w/a g}
SS - Mr. J.G. Tellefson, w/a i
SS - Mr. R.T. Johnson, w/a NRC - Mr. J.B. Martin, w/a
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CAC-VALVE POWER SUPPLY #83 DESCRIPTION OF DEFICIEECY
-The control circuits for CAC-FCV-1A and IB which are safety related i
are powered from a non-Class 1E power supply.
SAFETY IMPLICATION
'CAC-FCV-1A and IB must be capable of isolating (closing) and opening post accident in order to meet their safety related design require-ments. Failure of the non-Class 1E power supply post accident would prevent subsequent valve opening which is necessary in order to control oxygen concentration within primary containment.
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CAUSE OF DEFICIENCY j
Failure to recognize that the valves have two safety functions e Isolation (close)
Oxygen / Hydrogen recombination (open) e The isolation function is provided since the valve operator fails in the closed position on loss of power.
The failure to. provide Class 1E power supplies to the subject valves is considered to be a random error.
ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE There are no generic considerations associated with this deficiency.
Correction of the specific is sufficient to preclude recurrence.
CORRECTIVE ACTION FED 218-E-C105 has been issued to provide divisionalized Class 1E power supplies to the two valves.
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