ML20080J750
| ML20080J750 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/13/1984 |
| From: | Palomino F NEW YORK, STATE OF |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL-3, NUDOCS 8402150180 | |
| Download: ML20080J750 (20) | |
Text
7 DOCKETED K t !C UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'a4 i C l ', P12 :20 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
)
(Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
.)
Unit 1)'
)
)
,=
1._,
REPRESENTING THE MEMORANDUM OF COVERNOR MARIO CUOMO,
' STATE OF NEN YORK; IN OPPOSITION TO LILCO'S MOTION TO COMPEL' EXPEDITED PROD'UCTION OF DOCUMENTS BY NEW YORK STATE This answer has been. prepared in o,pposition to LILCO's motion to compel exped'Ited prodifetion of docum'ents by New York State, datedFebrua}y.6, 1984.. For the, reasons set forth in detail below, tlis State of'New york respectfully urges that the Board deny LILCO's. mcitiion.
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I.
Background
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A prelim,.inaly,obti$rvation is ~in order concerning the y
bizarro procedure 4pon which,LILCOis' motion is premised.
- ; /
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. Argualily,.it may have been proper, funder the NRC's Rules of Prac,tice, for L,ILCO to file a motion requ,esting the Board to l
w order New York'SEate to fils an' expedited response to a LILCO Request for 'Doctiment Production.W Whether the Board granted such a motion or not, the stat.e would subsequently file its l
Tf"_See, discussion bel'ow which explains why (a) LILCO is
- however, not entitled'to file a document" request,eand~(b) the LILCO Request fai'Is to meet the relevancy and particuiarity p
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.requiremehts of 10 CFR PartT2.'
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l response'to the LILCO Document Request, pursuant to 10 CFR @
2.741(d).
If,.upon review of the State's response, LILCO 1
determined that it needed to seek additional Board involve-ment ~with~ respect to any of the State's responses (including objections or assertions of privilege), it could file a motion to compel production of withheld documents pursuant to 4
10'CFR.
2.740(f), which would, in turn, result in the parties' submission to the Board of arguments concerning particular claims made with respect to particular documents.
j i
i-Thus, if the State chose to seek a protective order pursuant t
to 10 CFR 2.740(c), it would set forth the basis for its decision to withhold documents, and, in respo'nse, LILCO could 1
-' attempt either to establish that claimed privileges did not
- apply to particular' documents or to demonstrate a compelling i
-need that would overcome a qualified privilege.
This is the normal established discovery procedure under the NRC regulations.
r In filing the instant motion, however, LILCO has, with-out explanation or justification,-asked this Board to ignore l-j normal NRC procedures.
LILCO has asked the Board to order-the State actually to produce, on an_ expedited basis, large l
L numbers.of documents before the State has even been given the i
opportunity to respond to the request, much less file motions b
for protective orders (assuming LILCO were to seek an order compelling production after reviewing the State's response).
Thus, the bizarre procedure proposed by LILCO involves (1) depriving New York State of its right and obligation under 10 I
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CFR 2.741(d) to file a' response to LILCO's document request; (2) eliminating the obligation of LILCO to satisfy the threshold relevancy and particularity requirements for discovery set forth in 10 CFR @@ 2.740(b)(1), 2.741(c), and Part 2, Appendix ~A,Section IV(a); (3) eliminating the re-quirement that LILCO meet its burden of proof in establishing its need or entitlement to documents objected to or withheld for reasons set forth in a response as required by 10 CFR @@
2.730, 2.'32, and 2.740(f); and (4) depriving New York State of its right to file a motion for a protective order, if necessary, as provided in 10 CFR @ 2.740(c).
LILCO has pro-vided no factual or legal basis which could justify this Board's adoption of:the procedure proposed by LILCO in its Motion, and the Board should refuse to do so.
In making its d'o'cument request, LILCO exclusively relied on a portion of a nine-page inventory of certain documents.
The New York State Disaster Preparedness Commission ("DPC") prepared the inventory in the summer of 1983 in response to a request for documents under the New York State Freedom of Information Law.
The responsive documents generally pertained to two subjects:
proposed procedural rules and regulations of the DPC; and materials prepared prior to or in 1982 relating to offsite response to a Shoreham accident to be implemented by the County of Suffolk and the State of New York.
The nine-page inventory lists on pages 1-5 documents that were produced at that time pursuant to the New York State Freedom of Information Law, and on pages 6-9, documents
that were withheld at that time based on exemptions involving, among others, governmental and executive privilege, attorney-client privilege, and the attorney work product doctrine.
LILCO only knows the contents of pages 5-9 of the listing, which it attached to its Request.
Nonethe-less, LILCO requests this Board to order New York State to produce " forthwith"S! not just the nine pages which comprise the entire listing, but also a copy of "each and every document referred to in the listing."
See Request at 1.
II.
DISCUSSION A.
LILCO is Not Entitled to Expedited Document Discovery LILCO premises its document request and motion for expedited production on the assertion that it "recently became aware" of the existence of the document listing, and that there was "no purpose to pursuing it prior to New York State's entry into this proceeding."
Motion at 1 and 3.
In fact, the partial listing which constitutes LILCO's document request was sent to LILCO on December 16, 1983 in response to a request made by LILCO's counsel to the DPC for publicly filed comments relating to proposed rules and regulations of the DPC.
See February 6, 1984 letter from Irwin to Zahnleuter attached to LILCO's Motion.
LILCO knew of the Governor's participation in this proceeding in early January, 1984.
S/ In its Request dated February 6, 1984 LILCO asked for production "no later than February 8."
l Clearly, LILCO knew of the existence of the listing and possessed its alleged " purpose to pursue" it prior to January 27, 1984, when this Board entertained discussion of what disc very LILCO believed was necessary with respect to New York State.
No mention was ever made by LILCO counsel, prior to or on January 27, concerning any desire for document dis-covery of any kind, much less relating to the subject list-ing.
This is significant because during the discussion on the record on January 27, the Board expressly asked "about the status of the agreement concerning discovery" with respect to New York State (Tr. 3624), and the only discovery requetited by LILCO and incorporated into the schedule set by the Board, was depositions of State witnesses.
(See Tr.
3626, 3643, 3647).
LILCO made no request for, nor did the Board grant LILCO the right to conduct, document discovery.
Moreover, LILCO's alleged need for " expedition" is LILCO's own creation.
If it had indicated earlier, at the appropriate time, its desire for document discovery, that additional step in the discovery process could have been factored into the scheduling decision.
Clearly, given LILCO's knowledge of the existence of the listing upon which it now relies, its desire for document discovery could and should have been raised much earlier.
B.
LILCO's Document Request Fails to Setisfy Particularity and Relevance Requests Even assuming LILCO were entitled to document dis-covery, under 10 CFR Section 2.740(b)(1), a party "may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the proceeding...."
A document request must also ' describe each item with reascn-able particularity."
10 CFR @ 2.741(c).
LILCO has failed to satisfy either of these requirements.
First, in its request for documents, LILCO asks for a copy of each and every document referred to in the listing.
LILCO requests all these documents, even though it has no knowledge of what documents are identified on pages 1-4 of that listing.
Clearly, since LILCO does not know even the identity of approximately one half of the documents it re-quests, it cannot properly allege, as it has, that such docu-ments are "obviously central" to issues being litigated be-fore this Board.
See LILCO Motion at 2 and 3.
This portion f
of LILCO's rcquest is a classic fishing expedition that is expressly barred under the NRC's regulations.
Section IV(a)
{
i of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix A states:
1 Once the key.iesues in controversy are identified in the special prehearing conference order _.
., discovery may proceed, and will be limited to those t
matters.
In no event should the parties be permitted to conduct a " fishing expedition (Emphasis added) i L
Second, despite LILCO's assertion that the requested docu-ments are "obviously central to an understanding of New York State's position" on the LILCO Plan (see Motion at 2 and 3), many of the documents identified on the pages of the listing attached to the LILCO request (i.e.,
pages 5-9) clearly have nothing what-ever to do with "New York State's position" on any emergency response plan at all, much less LILCO's Plan.
Rather, as is plain from the description in the listing, they have to do with proposed regulations of the New York Slate Disaster Preparedness Commission (see, e.g.,
page 9 of attachment to request).
The pro-posed procedural rules and regulations of the DPC cover topics such as voting procedures, quorum requirements and the conduct of meet-ings.
None of the proposed procedural regulations even concern sub-stantive matters, such as standards for the review of offsite emer-gency plans for nuclear power plants, much less any particular plan or Shoreham.
Documcnts which are related to the DPC's proposed rules and regulations clearly are irrelevant to this proceeding.
- Thus, none of LILCO's discussion of the alleged " obvious centrality" or even relevance of the requested documents applies to the docu-ments that deal solely with proposed rules and regulations governing the conduct of a New York State agency.
Third, LILCO is incorrect in asserting that any of the requested documents relate to a " position" of New York State concerning any Shoreham-related plan, much less LILCO's.
As the listing itself reveals, the vast majority of the documents iden-tified on pages 6-9 are draft, non-final materials containing opinion, conjecture and deliberative information.
It is specious to suggest that such materials indicate a formal " position" by the State, when on their face, they are plainly very preliminary views of staff members of cne State commission.
Furthermore, as LILCO knows, the DPC never even convened a meeting to review any Shoreham-related materials, much less arrived at a " position" concerning those materialn.
Indeed, a temporary restraining order was issue'd e-joining the DPC from taking such action.
Sub-sequently the DPC entered into a stipulation (to which LILCO was also a party) agreeing not to take that action.
Thus, LILCO is simply wrong in asserting that the requested documents relate to a New York State " position," given the fact that no " position" was reached during the time frame covered by the documents.
Fourth, LILCO's assertion that the requested documents con-cern an alleged " review" by New York State of a so-called "Shoreham Offsite Emergency Response Plan" (Motion at 1 and 2) is also a misleading mischaracterization of the facts.
As LILCO well knows but neglected to inform the Board, the so-called " plan" that allegedly was " reviewed" by some staff members of the New York State DPC was, first of all, not a " plan" at all; rather, it consisted of some draft materials prepared prior to 1982 by two Suffolk County employees.
Those draft materials were allegedly " completed" by LILCO and packaged by LILCO into binders labeled "Suffolk County Offsite Emergency Response Plan," and then submitted by LILCO to the DPC staff.
Thus, the materials allegedly " reviewed" by New York State dealt with a proposed emergency response " plan" to be implemented by County and other authorized governmental officials and employees.
Clearly, the " review" of those materials has no relevance to the plan being litigated before this Board which is one to be imple-mented by LILCO employees.
Moreover, following the " review" by certain DPC staff mem-bers of the materials submitted to them by LILCO, LILCO appar-ently revised those materials into the form it labeled "the LILCO-County Plan" which it submitted to this Board in May 1983.
The Bo3rd expressly ruled in June 1983 that this litigation would not deal with that so-called " plan."
Order Limiting Scope of Submissions (June 10, 1983).
And, that "LILCO-County Plan" was already one generation removed from the draft materials pur-portedly " reviewed" by New York State, Thus, this Board has already ruled that a " plan" which was one revision closer to the one now before the Board than was the one allegedly " reviewed" by New York State, is not relevant to this proceeding.
Li,LCO states in footnote 1 of its Motion that the so-called i
"LILCO-County" Plan is similar in some respects to Revision 0 of the LILCO Transition Plan.
How9ver, the Transition Plan which this Board has agreed to consider in this proceeding involves implementation of the entire emergency response by LILCO cmployees; therefore, it is a completely different proposal from i
that contained in either the materials allegedly " reviewed" by the' State or the "LILCO-County" Plan.
And, in addition to that substantial difference which permeates ti:e entire Plan, all aspects of Revision 0 are also one more generation removed from l
the materials allegedly " reviewed" by the State.
I I
9.
Finally, the Plan that is currently before this Board and the subject of contentions and litigation is Revision 3 of the LILCO Transition Plan -- three more generations removed.
- Thus, even ignoring the dispositive fact that the Board has already ruled that a proposed emergency response to be implemented by County or State officials is not relevant to this proceeding, the materials to which the requested documents relate, even if they could be said to have consti tuted a " plan" of some sort, have undergone at least five substantial revisions prior to the crea-tion of the Plan now before this Board.
Clearly, LILCO's bald, unsupported assertion that the requested documents, half of which it cannot even identify, relate to a State review of something it calls a "Shoreham offsite emergency response plan" fails to satisfy the threshold relevancy and pleading requirements of 10 CFR S 2.740 and 2.741.
Fifth, nowhere in its Request'or its Motion does LILCO even purport to relate any of the documents it requests to admitted Group II contentions.
Such a showing is an additional threshold requirement of proper discovery under 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix A.d[ Furthernore, LILCO could not make such a showing, had it acknowledged its obligation to do so, given both the vague, non-particularized identification of those documents it identifies
$! LILCO's assertion of a right to discovery as to anything it believes may be vaguely related to offsite emergency planning is particularly inappropriate at this stage of these proceedings.
Unless the Board intends to permit full-blown discovery of the type that consumed more than four months prior to the submission of Group I testimony, LILCO should be required to make a particularized showing that requested discovery is necessary and relevant to specific contentions upon which testimony has not yet been filed.
(pages 5-9 of the listing) and the total lack of identification of the rest of the documents it requests (pages 1-4).
Because LILCO has failed to meet even the most basic pleading require-ments of 10 CFR
@ 2.740, 2.741 and Part 2 Appendix A, its Request and its Motion should be summarily denied.
C.
LILCO's Arguments Concerning its Entitlement to Requested Documents are Unfounded.
The State believes that the defects in LILCO's Request and Motion and the fact that the State has not yet had an oppor-tunity to review fully or respond to the LILCO Request, make it unnecessary and inappropriate for the Board to reach the merits of LILCO's Motion at this time.
Nonetheless, based on a prelimi-nary review, it is clear that LILCO's arguments concerning the various categories'of documents identified in the New York State listing are unfounded and wrong as a matter of law.
First, LILCO asserts:
There should be no controversy about production of documents preceding para-graph 3 on page 5 of the listing (i.e.,
the documents LILCO is unable even to identify], since they have already been produced under the NY FOIA.
(Motion at 4).
Clearly, what may or may not be subject to pro-duction under New York's Freedom of Information Law in response to a particular request (not described by LILCO) filed purcuant to that law, has no bearing upon the propriety of a document request or the production of documents under the NRC regulations in this proceeding.
LILCO's conclusory statement fails even to address, much less to establish the relevance to admitted g
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l contentions in this proceeding of the unidentified documents on the missing pages 1-4 of the listing.
There is no basis for re-quiring the State to produce those unidentified materials.
Second, LILCO argues.
Documents withheld by New York State under either categories "A" or "B" do not fall within any recognizable category of exemption or privilege under the Commis-I sion's Rules of Practice, and any docu-ments marked only as withheld subject to those two categories should be ordered to be turned over forthwith.
Motion at 5.4/
In making this argument, LILCO misstates both the facts and the law.
It is clear from a reading of the explanation on pages 5-6, and the descriptions of the documents themselves on pages 6-9 of the State's listing, that coded exemptions "A" and "B" represent an assertion of executive privilege.
Moreover, contrary to LILCO's assertion, both this Board and the Brenner Board have expressly ruled that such a privilege is recognized in NRC pro-ceedinge, and that if it is a qualified rather than an absolute privilege, it can be overcome only by a shoving of compelling need for disclosure.
Specifically, this Board's November 1, 1983 Memorandum and Order Ruling on Suffolk County Motion to Compel FEMA to Produce Documents
(" FEMA Order") is controlling -- and dispositive -- here.
The Board stated as follows:
As pertinent here, " executive privilege" has been described by several other names:
deliberative process of AI The documents referred to by LILCO in this statement are 25 of the 38 documents listed on pages 6-9, specifically, the first four listed on page 6, all but the third document listed on page 7, all but the ninth, tenth and last documents on page 8, and the first, fifth and eighth documents on page 9.
government privilege, governmental functions privilege, and intra-govern-mental documents privilege.
The case law discussing this privilege has also con-sidered exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act.
5 U.S.C.
552(b)(5).
This statutory provision exempts from required disclosure " inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a pri-vate party in litigation with the agency."
This provision has been inter-preted by the courts in harmony with the doctrine of " executive privilege" so that deliberative materials produced in the administrative decision making process are protected from disclosure while purely factual materials are not pro-tected from disclosure.
. Agency documents which reflect advisory opinions, recommendations, or delibera-tions fall within " executive privilege."
The reason for protecting the con-fidentiality of communications between high government officials and those who advise and assist them is to achieve the goal of receiving the most candid advice without regard for appearances or self interest of the adviser.
(Citations omitted).
FEMA Order at 6-7.
In the FEMA Order the Board was faced with a claim of execu-l tive privilege by FEMA with respect to documents the disclosure of which, FEMA asserted, would reveal " intra-departmental mem-oranda and communications containing opinions, recommendations, and deliberations pertaining to decisions" of FEMA, and would have a " chilling effect" on the ability of FEMA to receive written comments and opinions in the future.
FEMA Order at 8.
The Board found that " Executive privilege is not limited to l
policy formulation but extends to the agency's decision making l
process," and that "[a]s long as the documents in controversy i
l consist of advisory opinions, recommendations or deliberations in l
l l
the agency decision making process, we find that they fall within the dcctrine of ' executive privilege.
FEMA Order at 9.
It is clear from a review of the Board's FEMA Order and pages 5-9 of the State's listing, that New York State has asserted executive privilege (i.e., coded exemptions "A" or "B") with respect to very document listed on pages 6-9.,5!
Assuming arguendo that LILCO's requests were proper and directed to relevant documents, it is well established that LILCO may not obtain any of those documents unless it demonstrates a compelling need for disclosure.
See FEMA Order at 5-6, 10-12, and case authority cited therein.
LILCO makes no such showing in its Request, and therefore the Request should be denied.
In addition, LILCO's suggestion in footnote 1 on page 2 of its Motion that selected rulings by the Brenner Board on ques-tions of privilege raised by Suffolk County in 1982 have any relevance to the LILCO request for document production by New York State is, on its iace, untrue.
LILCO has misrepresented to this Board the actions of the Brenner Board by implying that all Suffolk County objections to discovery requests based on asser-tions vf privilege were overruled.
This is simply not true.
The Brenner Board explicitly recognized, and sustained many of the County's objections based upon, executive or governmental I! Of course, since New York State has not been given the opportunity, provided under the rules, to file its response to the LILCO request, the privilege claim has not been made to this Board in the precise form required in the FEMA Order (i.e.,
by Affidavit by the appropriate agency director).
If the Board were to rule that LILCO is entitled to the fishing expedition type of document discovery which it seeks, the State would, in its response, set forth its objections in the appropriate form.
i privilege, attorney-client privilege, and the attorney work pro-duct doctrine.
See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shbreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-82, 16 NRC 1144, 1156-1179 (1982).
Even more importantly, any Brenner Board rulings werc made with respect to privilege claims made by a different party, with dif-
-ferent grounds and bases, with respect to different documents, produced by different parties, under different circumstances, for diffe' rent purposes, and such rulings related to different dis-covery requests, concerning different contentions, in a different proceeding!
To suggest, as LILCO does, that 1982 Brenner Board rulings on Suffolk County assertions of privilege are in any way binding upon the State of New York or this Board, in the context of the LILCO's pending discovery request in this proceeding, is specious and should be rejected.
Third, LILCO asserts:
Documents withheld on the basis of exemp-tion "C" (material prepared in contempla-tion for litigation),
"D" (attorney work product), and "E"
(attorney-client privi-lege) also should be turned over immedi-ately unless withholding is justified on a document-by-document basis by New York
^
State.
Motion at 5.
In making this argument, LILCO once again has placed the cart before the horse and its argument is without basis.
The State has already acuerted these privileges, in a clear manner, "on a document-by-document basis," in the listing which LILCO has.
The burden is on LILCO to demonstrate, on a document-by-document basis, either that the privilege is impro-perly or incorrectly asserted, or that LILCO has a compelling r
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need for particular documents that outweighs the State's asserted right to confidentiality.
LILCO has made no such showing.
Instead, it attempts improperly to shift its own burden of proof under 10 CFR 99 2.730, 2.732, and 2.740(f)(1), to New York State.
This LILCO attempt should be denied.
D.
LILCO's Request Imposes Undue Burdens and is Prejudicial to New York State LILCO's discovery request comes at a time when, pur-suant to direction of the Board, the State of New York is pre-paring for and attending depositions of its Group II witnesses, witnesses and counsel are reviewing the Plan and contentions and preparing Group II testimony, considering rebuttal and supple-mental Group I testimony, reviewing depositions of Group I wit-nesses, reviewing the Group I hearing record, and preparing for hearing on the State's Group I testimony.
If the State of New York is ordered to respond to LILCO's request for documents, especially on an expedited basis, the State of New York will have to bear the additional burdens of searching through all of the DPC's-files in order to locate the documents, preparing a response, and, presumably filing and responding to motions for protective orders and motions to compel production.
This cer-tainly will unfairly prejudice the State of New York because it will impose a substantial burden of expedited discovery response, durirg a very tight pre-hearing schedule.
Such a requirement has generally not been imposed by this Board on other parties in this proceeding and, given the untimeliness of LILCO's request, should not now be imposed on the State.
III. Conclusion LILCO's Document Request appears to be a transparent effort to subvert the discovery process in this proceeding.
While LILCO may well wish to obtain the requested documents for its own poli-tical or other purposes, it should not be permitted to distort and abuse the NRC's discovery procedures to obtain them, absent the required particularized pleading, and showings of relevance and compelling need, and without even acknowledging the rights of New York State under the NRC rules.
This Board should not coun-tenance this LILCO tactic.
In accordance with the above, the State of New York respectfully urges the Board to deny LILCO's motion.
Respectfully submitted, MARIO CUOMO, Governor of the State of New York h J.7h l
Fabtan G. ' Palomino I
Special Counsel to the Governor of the State of New York 1
l DATED:
February /3, 1984 l
Albany, New York l
G i
l
O UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Stjety and Licensing Board
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
)
(Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of MEMORANDUM OF GOVERNOR MARIO CUOMO, REPT;ESENTING THE STATE OF NEW YORK, IN OPPOSITION TO LILCO'S MOTION TO COMPEL EXPEDITED PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS BY NEW YORK STATE dated February 13, 1984, have been served to the following this 13th day of February 1984 by U.S. mail, first class, except as otherwise noted.
James A. Laurenson, Chairman
- Ralph Shapiro, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Cammer and Shapiro U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9 East 40th Street Washington, D.C.
20555 New York, New York 10016 Dr. Jerry R. Kline
- Howard L. Blau, Esq.
Administrative Judge 217 Newbridge Road Atomic Safety and Licensing Loard Hicksville, New York 11801 l
l U.S.
Nuclear Regu'latory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.##
Hunton & Williams P.O.
Box 1535 707 East Main Street l
Mr. Frederick J.
Shon
- Richmond, Virginia 23212 l
Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mr. Jay Dunkleberger l
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission New York State Energy Office l
Washington, D.C.
20555 Agency Building 2 l
Empire State Plaza Edward M.
Barrett, Esq.
Albany, New York 12223 General Counsel Long Island Lighting Company James B. Dougherty, Esq.
250 Old Country Road 3045 Porter Street, N.W.
Mineola, New York 11501 Washington, D.C.
20008 i
Lc
- Mr. Brian McCaffrey Stephen B.
Latham, Esq.
Long Island Lighting Company Twomey, Latham & Shea 175 East Old Country Road P.O.
Box 398 Hicksville, New York 11801 33 West Second Street Riverhead, New York 11901 Jef f Smi th Marc W. Goldsmith Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Energy Research Group, Inc.
P.O.
Box 618 400-1 Totten Pond Road Nor.th Country Road Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 Wading River, New York 11792 Joel Blau, Esq.
MHB Technical Associates New York Public Service Commission 1723 Hamilton Avenue The Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller Suite K Building San Jose, California 95125 Empire State Plaza Albany, New York-12223 Hon. Peter F. Cohalan Suffolk County Executive Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
H.
Lee Dennison Building Suffolk County Attorney Veterans Memorial Highway H.
Lee Dennison Building Hauppauge, New York 11768 Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Ezra I.
Bialik, Esq.
Panel Assistant Attorney General U.S.
Nuclear Regul.atory Commission Environmental Protection Washington, D.C.
20555 Bureau New York State Department Docketing and Service Section of Law Office of the Secretary 2 World Trade Center U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission New York, New York 10047 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Bernard M.
Bordenick, Esq.*
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory David A. Repka, Esq.
Commission U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.#
Stuart Diamond Staff Counsel Environment / Energy Writer New York State Public NEWSDAY Service Commission Long Island, New York 11747 3 Rockefeller Plaza Albany, New York 12223 e
s
,_g
- Stewart M. Glass, Esq.
Gerald C. Crotty, Esq.
Regional Counsel Counsel to the Governor Federal Emergency Management Executive Chamber Agency State Capitol 26 Federal Plaza, Room 1349 Albany, New York 12224 New York, New York 10278 Nora Bredes Executive Director Shoreham opponents coalition' 195 East Main Street Smithtown, New York 11787 Eleanor L. Frucc!, Esq.*
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Spence Perry, Esq.
Associate General Counsel Federal Emergency Management Acency Washington, D.C.
20472
/
swt m
Fabian G.
Palomino
/
Special Counsel to the Governor of the State of New Yort DATE:
February 13, 1984 By Hand
- By Telecopy By Federal Express
~
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