ML20080H001
| ML20080H001 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1983 |
| From: | Uderitz R Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20080G969 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8309200415 | |
| Download: ML20080H001 (21) | |
Text
.
l 4.
i x
~
Richard A.Uderitz Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O Box 230. Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 000 935 6010 Vice President -
Nuclear August 4, 1983 Mr. Thomas T.
Martin, Director Division of Engineering and Technical Programs U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Dear Mr. Martin:
NRC INSPECTION 50-311/83-14 SALEM GENERATING STATION NO. 2 UNIT APRIL 17 THRU 20, 1983 The following is our response to the notice of violation identi-fled as a result of the inspection conducted on April 17 - 22, 1983.
This response was delayed in the interest of completeness as. discussed with Mr. J.
R. White of your staff.
ITEMS OF VIOLATION:
Item A 10CFR 20.103(a)(3) requires that licensees use suitable l-measurements of concentrations of radioactive material in air for detecting and evaluating airborne radioactivity for purposes I
of determining compliance with the requirements of 10CFR 20.103.
10CFR 20.103(a)(1) provides quarterly limits for intake of airborne radioactivity.
Contrary to the above:
On April 16, 1983, during three separate drilling and cleaning operations of a nozzle dam stud located inside the No. 22 steam generator, no measurements of the concentrations of radioactive materials present therein were made for purposes of determining compliance with 10CFR 20.103.
Personnel entered the steam generator immediately before and af ter the drilling to clean the area being drilled with an air gun.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement IV).
8309200415 830907 PDR ADOCK 05000311 PM G
Mr. Thomas T.
Martin, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8/4/83 Reply to Item A Elevated contamination levels in the No. 22 Steam Generator (SG) were the result of a Westinghouse Bolt Removal project.
The loose debris from this and other work became airborne when the nearby No. 22 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) was test run.
This RCP will draw 20,000 cubic feet of air per minute for cooling pur-poses.
The RCP is located adjacent to the SG, and with the sudden change of air flow, the contamination from the SG and SG tent area was drawn out by the RCP motor toward the RCP area.
The pe::sonnel that were in the vicinity of the RCP were exposed to unexpected radioactive airborne concentrations which were higher than normal.
-It should be noted that an air sample from the waterbox was taken immediately prior to the drilling operation.
Addition-ally, numerous samples had been taken previously in the SG tent, bowl, and platform areas during this outage and during previous outages revealing elevated airborne radionuclide concentrations in the SG waterbox.
As a result of these observations, all SG
" bowl" work is performed in multiple sets of protective clothing with airline-full face respiratory protective equipment.
Since the SG " jumps" are of very short duration and the turn-around time is very large on determining activity levels from air samples when compared to jump times (several minutes, typically two minutes), the practicality of taking individual samples for
,3
/ each " jump" is limited.
~
4 The requirements of 10CFR 20.103(a)(b) state that suitable measurements of airborne concentrations of radioactivity must be made for determining compliance with the requirements of 10CFR 20.103(a)(1).
It should be noted that measurements by them-selves do not ensure compliance with the exposure limits, but rather the preventive action taken prior to the work dictates whether compliance is achieved.
In other words, when airborne concentrations increase, various levels of respiratory protec-tive equipment can be utilized to prevent exceedance of the regulatory limits.
If the concentration levels exceed those levels for which the highest rated respiratory protective devices can protect against for a given exposure duration, then th e activity must be terminated and the individuals must be removed to an area of lower airborne contamination.
Since the drilling operation workers were already employing air-supplied full-face respiratory protection (with a protection factor of 2000) and their " stay" time was restricted below 10 minutes (usually 6 minutes), the expected variations in airborne concentrations in the SG would not jeopardize our ability to limit the amount of radioactivity inhaled below the quarterly
.e Mr. Thomas T. Martin, Director U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8/4/83 limits (520 MPC-hours).
This conclusion is borne out by the whole body counts done on these " jumpers."
The air concentration which would require us to suspend operations is several orders of magnitude greater than any observed air concentration at Salem station including the SG bowl (waterbox).
The quantity of removable contamination to achieve such elevated concentrations is very high (on the order of tens of curies).
Since the total potential source term for high airborne activity in the steam generator is finite and the waterbox had been hydrolazed prior to this evolution, it appears that our air sampling measurements were adequate to ensure compliance with 10CFR 20.103.
l However, we are investigating potential improvements in our means to detect changes in conditions within the SG bowl which might warrant suspension of work activities.
As a result of our review of the events occurring on April 16, 1983, several areas of improvement in our containment air sampling program during outages have been identified.
Although at least 17 air samples were taken during the period of interest, it appears that we can enhance our knowledge of changing conditions within containment.
This improvement requires prompt recognition of conditions changing respiratory requirements for various operations in containment.
The specific actions taken by PSE&G in regards to this matter are discussed below.
Actions to Prevent Recurrence:
1.
The Radiation Protection Department will revise the procecare governing surveys (RPI 4.001) to ensure samples are taken from the containment building at least once per hour during routine containment outage conditions where the l
potential for high airborne radioactivity exists.
This procedure will be revised by September 30, 1983.
2.
Direct-indicating air monitoring devices will be evaluated for use to monitor changing airborne concentrations near sources of high contamination during the outages.
For example, recording air monitor devices can be employed for the SG platform area in the future.
Additionally, we are investigating other means to verify that the respiratory protection provided to workers within the SG bowl is suitable to maintain compliance with 10CFR 20.
The improvements that will be adopted will conform to ALARA requirements as well as to proper sampling practices (e.g.,
the ability to differentiate between respirable contamination and gross large-particle contamination).
These actions will be completed by the next refueling outage on Unit No. 2.
.+
Mr. Thomas T.
Martin, Director U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8/4/83 3.
The ALARA program at Salem Generating Station (SGS) is being strengthened to provide better pre-job ALARA review. for all jobs requiring a Radiation Exposure Permit.
The enhanced pre-job ALARA review will include the incorporation of specific air sampling requirements for jobs having the potential for changing airborne concentrations.
Improvements and procedural modifications are scheduled for implementation by January 19, 1984.
Item B 10CFR 20.103 states in paragraph (b), in part, "The licensee shall, as a precautionary procedure, use process or other engineering controls, to the extent practicable, to limit con-centrations of radioactive materials in air to levels below those which delimit an airborne radioactivity area as defined in 20.203(d)(1)(ii)..."
Contrary to the above:
On April 16, 1983, an installed airborne radioactivity removal system was not used to limit airborne radio-activity concentrations inside the No. 22 Steam Gen-erator or in the vicinity thereof.
Airborne radio-activity concentrations measured in the work vicinity ranged from 52 to 168 times the value specified in 20.203(d)(1)(ii).
This is a Severity Level IV viola-tion (Supplement IV).
Reply to Item B At 1650 on April 15, a Radiation Protection (R.P.) Supervisor requested that No. 22 Iodine Removal Unit (IRU) be placed in service for a test.
As a result of a miscommunication between the Radiation Protection and Operations Departments, the IRU was never placed in service.
However, the R.P.
Department recorded the Public Address (PA) announcement by Operations in the shift log (the announcement was incorrect), as verification that the IRU was operating when SG work began approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> later.
It is difficult to determine whether or not the IRU would have prevented the personnel contamination to those in the RCP area in this particular event.
Personnel in the SG tent area were protected, however, by their respiratory equipment.
Based on our evaluation of events, the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) motor test run may have rendered any available air removal units s
T e
Mr. Thomas T.
Martin, Director U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8/4/83 inadequate.
Nevertheless, it is believed that proper engineering controls were not exercised.
The most significant cause of the contamination spread appears to be the operation of the nearby RCP.
The RCP motor test run should thus not be allowed to take place concurrently with any high contamination job within containment.
Actions to Prevent Recurrence:
1.
A form has been developed to document requests to the Operations Department to place in service any system that the Radiation Protection Department feels will aid in maintaining exposures ALARA.
This should assure the communications are complete.
2.
Improved communications and a strengthened ALARA program should promote the scheduling of plant evolutions to avoid any adverse impact on maintenance work in progress.
The attachments to this letter contain more detailed material than our summary previously provided to the NRC inspectors.
The attachments provide clarification regarding the interpretation of which MPC-hours were used from the various methods available.
Sincerely, kh Attachments CC:
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. Donald C.
Fischer Licensing Project Manager Mr. Leif Norrholm Senior Resident Inspector
V Rich:rd A. Uderitz Pubhc Seri,u Electric and Gas Cort.Nny P.O Box 236 Horrocks Bridy, NJ 03038 6fB 935 6010 v.ce President -
UJClPM August 4, 1983 Mr. Thomas T.
Martin, Director Division of Engineering and Technical Programs U.
S.
Nuclea r Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Dear Mr. Martin:
NRC INSPECTION 50-311/83-14 SALEM GENERATING STATION NO. 2 UNIT APRIL 17 THRU 20, 1983 The following is our response to the notice of violation identi-fied as a result of the inspection conducted on April 17 - 22, 1983.
This response was delayed in the interest of completeness as discussed with Mr.
J.
R.
White of your staff.
ITEMS OF VIOLATION:
Item A 10CFR 20.103(a)(3) requires that licensees use suitable measurements of concentrations of radioactive material in air for detecting and evaluating airborne radioactivity for purposes of determining compliance with the requirements of 10CFR 20.103.
10CFR 20.103(a)(1) provides quarterly limits for intake of airborne radioactivity.
Con t ra '.
to the above:
On April 16, 1983, during three separate drilling and cleaning operations of a nozzle dam stud located inside the No. 22 steam generator, no measurements of the concentrations of radioactive materials present therein were made for purposes of determining compliance with 10CFR 20.103.
Personnel entered the steam generator immediately before and af ter the drilling to clean the area being drilled with an air gun.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement IV).
Mr. Thomas T.
Martin, Director U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8/4/83 Reply to Item A Elevated contamination levels in the No. 22 Steam Generator (SG) were the result of a Westinghouse Bolt Removal project.
The loose debris from this and other work became airborne when the nearby No. 22 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) was test run.
This RCP will draw 20,000 cubic foot of air per minute for cooling pur-poses.
The RCP is located adjacent to the SG, and with the sudden change of air flow, the contamination from the SG and SG tent area was drawn out by the RCP motor toward the RCP area.
The personnel that were in the vicinity of the RCP were exposed to unexpected radioactive airborne concentrations which were higher than normal.
It should be noted that an air sample from the waterbox was taken immediately prior to the drilling operation.
Addition-ally, numerous samples had been taken previously in the SG tent, bowl, and platform areas during this outage and during previous outages revealing elevated airborne radionuclide concentrations in the SG waterbox.
As a result of these observations, all SG
" bowl" work is performed in multiple sets of protective clothing with airline-full face respiratory protective equipment.
Since the SG " jumps" are of very short duration and the turn-around time is very large on determining activity levels from air samples when compared to jump times (several minutes, typically two minutes), the practicality of taking individual samples for 3
/ each " jump" is limited.
~
~~
The requirements of 10CFR 20.103(a)(b) state that suitable measurements of airborne concentrations of radioactivity must be made for determining compliance with the requirements of 10CFR 20.103(a)(1).. It should be noted that measurements by them-selves do not ensure compliance with the exposure limits, but rather the preventive action taken prior to the work dictates whether compliance is achieved.-
In other words, when airborne concentrations increase, various levels of respiratory protec-tive equipment can be utilized to prevent exceedance of the regulatory limits.
If the concentration levels exceed those levels for which the highest rated respiratory protective devices can protect against for a given exposure duration, then the activity must be terminated and the individuals must be removed to an area of lower airborne contamination.
Since the drilling operation workers were already employing air-supplied full-face respiratory protection (with a protection factor of 2000) and their " stay" time was restricted below 10 minutes (usually 6 minutes), the expected variations in airborne concentrations in the SG would not jeopardize our ability to limit the amount of radioactivity inhaled below the quarterly
- a Mr. Thomas T.
Martin, Director U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8/4/83 limits (520 MPC-hours).
This conclusion is borne out by the whole body counts done on these " jumpers. "
The air concentration which would require us to suspend operations is several orders of magnitude greater than any observed air concentration at Salem station including the SG bowl (waterbox).
The quantity of removable contamination to achieve such elevated concentrations is very high (on the order of tens of curies).
Since the total potential source term for high airborno activity in the steam generator is finite and the waterbox had been hydrolazed prior to this evolution, it appears that our air sampling measurements were adequate to ensure compliance with 10CFR 20.103.
However, we are investigating potential improvements in our means to detect changes in conditions within the SG bowl which might warrant suspension of work activities.
As a result of our review of the events occurring on April 16, 1983, several areas of improvement in our containment air sampling program during outages have been identified.
Although at least 17 air samples were taken during the period of interest, it appears that we can enhance our knowledge of changing conditions within containment.
This improvement requires prompt recognition of conditions changing respiratory requirements for various operations in containment.
The specific acticns taken by PSE&G in regards to this matter are discussed below.
Actions to Prevent Recurrence:
1.
The Radiation Protection Department will revise the procedure governing surveys (RPI 4.001) to ensure samples are taken from the containment building at least once per hour during routine containment outage conditions where the potential for high airborne radioa'ctivity exists.
This procedure will be revised by September 30, 1983.
2.
Direct-indicating air monitoring devices will be evaluated for use to monitor changing airborne concentrations near sources of high contamination during the outages.
For example, recording air monitor devices can be employed for the SG platform area in the future.
Additionally, we are investigating other means to verify that the respiratory protection provided to workers within the SG bowl is suitable to maintain compliance with 10CFR 20.
The improvements that will be adopted will conform to ALARA requirements as well as to proper sampling practices ( e. g.,
the ability to differentiate between respirable contamination and gross large-particle contamination).
These actions will be completed by the next refueling outage on Unit No.
2.
l
Mr. Thomas T.
Martin, Director U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8/4/83 3.
The ALARA program at Salem Generating Station (SGS) is being strengthened to provide better pre-job ALARA review for all jobs requiring a Radiation Exposure Permit.
The enhanced pre-job ALARA review will include the incorporation of specific air sampling requirements for jobs having the potential for changing airborne concentrations.
Improvements and procedural modifications are scheduled for implementation by January 19, 1984.
Item B 10CFR 20.103 states in paragraph (b), in part, "The licensce shall, as a precautionary procedure, use process or other engineering controls, to the extent practicable, to limit con-centrations of radioactive materials in air to levels below those which delimit an airborne radioactivity area as defined in 20.203(d)(1)(ii)
Contrary to the above:
On April 16, 1983, an installed airborne radioactivity removal system was not used to limit airborne radio-activity concentrations inside the No. 22 Steam Gen-erator or in the vicinity thereof.
Airborne radio-activity concentrations measured in the work vicinity ranged from 52 to 168 times the value specified in 20.203(d)(1)(ii).
This is a Severity Level IV viola-tion (Supplement IV).
Reply to Item B At 1650 on April 15,'a Radiation Protection (R.P.) Supervisor requested that No. 22 Iodine Removal Unit (IRU) be placed in service for a test.
As a result of a miscommunication between the Radiation Protection and Operations Departments, the IRU was never placed in service.
However, the R.P.
Department recorded the Public Address (PA) announcement by Operations in the shift log (the announcement was incorrect), as verification that the IRU was operating when SG work began approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> later.
It is difficult to determine whether or not the IRU would have prevented the personnel contamination to those in the RCP area in this particular event.
Personnel in the SG tent area were protected, however, by their respiratory squipment.
Based on our evaluation of events, the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) motor test run may have rendered any available air removal units
c.
Mr. Thomas T.
Martin, Director U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8/4/83 inadequate.
Nevertheless, it is believed that proper engineering controls were not exercised.
The most significant cause of the contamination spread appears to be the operation of the nearby RCP.
The RCP motor test run should thus not be allowed to take place concurrently with any high contamination job within containment.
Actions to Prevent Recurrence:
1.
A form has boon develop 3d to document requests to the Operations Department to place in service any system that the Radiation Protection Department feels will aid in maintaining exposures ALARA.
This should assure the communications are complete.
2.
Improved communications and a strengthened ALARA program should promote the scheduling of plant evolutions to avoid any adverso impact on maintenance work in progress.
The attachments to this letter contain more detailed material than our summary previously provided to the NRC inspectors.
The attachments provide clarification regarding the interpretation of which MPC-hours were used from the various methods available.
Sincerely,
/4G.7 x~e A6p' Attachments CC:
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. Donald C.
Fischer Licensing Project Manager Mr. Leif Norrholm Senior Resident Inspector
ATTACHMENT 1 DDSE CALCULATION RESULTS and CALCULATIONAL METHOD 50 Year
- 5 0 Y e ar *
- Count Time /Date Whole Body Dose Lung Dose Name (mrem)
(mr em)
A 13:49, 4/17 4.4 344
.,6 16:17, 4/17 2.9 241 C
16:07, 4/17 1.8 207 p
17:07, 4/17 1.8 175 E
15:05, 4/17 0.7 53 F
9:37, 4/18 0.7 12 C-12:33, 4/17 2.1
.121 l+ -
15:18, 4/17 0.7 22
[
1 7_: 0 4, 4/16 0.4 34 3~
16:09, 4/17 0.5 20 K
10:03, 4/17 0.7 17 Based on the assumption that particles inhaled are soluble.
Based on the assumption that particles inhaled are insoluble.
The bioassays performed in the week following the exposures supported the assumption that the airborne activity was in the form of insoluble par ticulate s.
With insoluble par ticulates, the lung will receive most of the dose,and therefore become the organ of concern.
To be conservative, calculations were performed with the assumption that 100 percent of the
. radioactive particulates were in an insoluble form.
In addition, another calculation was performed in order to ascertain an estimate of the dose which.would be delivered if the particulates were (or became) soluble.
In this situation, the radionuclides would be distributed throughout the body and make the whole body the " organ of concern".
The following page defines the equation used for these calculations.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 the names of individuals and their social security numbers have been removed to avoid an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
f
ATTACHMD:T 1 Cont' d h
doses The equation below taken from ANSI-N343, was used to calculate t e
' resulting from this event.
51.2 g(t)f2 exp (At) E (1-e xp(-18 250 A) )
D Am 50 year _ dose based on, a single in-vivo measurement
=
D, (dis /uci-day) conversion factor; (g-rad /Mev) x 51.2.
=
time of measurement radioactivity in total body at
~q(t)
=
in organ of reference of the radioactivity in total body fraction
- f2
=
~
lide effective absorbed energy per disintegration of a radionuc
=
E (Table 4, ANSI-N343 )
X d
0.693/T-eff (days-1), ICRP-2 values used for soluble, and 120 day for insoluble (ICRP-10 assumption) biological halflife used m
. mass of or,gan of reference
=
18250 =
days per 50 years intake and in-vivo measurement (days) time between t
' =
4
'O 4
6 9
e e
- 'T'Tw-*w%y
- ~'
Twrr w-p
ATTACHMENT 2
., MPC - HOUR ASSIGliMENTS FOR INDIVIDUALS INTEiciALLY CONTAMINATED ON APRIL 16, 1983 Individuals MPC - hrs based on MPC-brs, based Name Stay-time and Air saniples on whole Body Countg
[A 24.3 43.0-6 1.0 29.5 -
C.
38.2 25.5 -
E 11.5 22.9 D
0.6 21.7 -
F 2.3 17.9 Cr 21.7 14.5 -
H 4.6 10.4 -
l s
A.
<0.1
- 6. 5 -
7
~
12.3
- 2. 6 -
K 1.2 2.2 -
MPC - HOUR ASSIGNMENT METHODS' Methods of assigning MPC - hrs to the dose records of internally contaminato individuals are described below:
A. - S tay-Time. Method : c 3
. This methodeis included.in the Radiation Protection Procedure Number RP; 11.011.
The formula used is as follow ~s:
Time spent
- airborne activity **
MPC - hour s ="
Protection. factor for respiratory equipment The ' time spent in the area is obtained frcm the appropriate REP Sign-In Sheet.
- After GeLi analysis 'a ' "per cent MPC" number is included on the comput-printout.
This number is calculated by dividing MPC values into eac respective radionuclide activity and summing to give a total "percen MPC".
The percent MPC number is used whenever possible in the above-formula.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 the names of individuals and their social security numbers have been removed to avoid an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.
~
~
ATTACHMENT 2 B.
Whole Body Count Method N343.
The This method is based on assumptions given in ICRP2 and ANSI
-formula used and the assumptions made are given below.
uCi in the lung MPC - hours =
-[uCi/cc per MPC) x 1.25E6 6c7Fr x 0.125 This calculation is repeated for each radionuclide with the results summed to give an MPC-hour assignment.
1.25E6 is the standard working breathing rate.
0.125 is based on the assumption that 12.5 percent of the radioactive particles inhaled are left in the lungs after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The uCi number is obtained from whole body count data on the lung bur d en, approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the initial exposure.
C.
Whole Body Count Printout The formula described in Section B above is included in the Whole Body Counter computer program and, as a result, an MPC-hour value is given on
" time since exposur$
the Whole Body Count Report (printout).
However, a value is not in cor pora ted into the computer formula.
The Radiation Protection staf f has determined that since the "12.5 percent assumption" should only be used after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the only MPC-hour value for the Whol Body Counter computer printout, which can be considered accurate, is th@
. computer number calculated from the lung activity 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after exposure. -
NOTE-Q Standard practice at Salem is to assign MPC-hou'rs based on the' stay-tim @
~
- Method.- In this case the 11 ~ individuals with'-ipternal exposures 'above.
the procedural action level for further bioassay analysis ' ere assigned' w
MPC hours based on -the (manually calculated) Whole-Body Count Method versus the stay-time method to improve accuracy.
t I
T' WIT'rfi.*22,4 3
Initial 1ssicned Name SSN Co.
WBC P D C-- P r E. -
Ba s e 6___oW__t a y W mira I.
Catalytic 4/17
,3.65 l
2.
Catalytic 4/18 0.20 3-Catalytic 4/17 2.76
- 1 PSE&G 4/17 2.76 O,
P.ydro Nuclear Ser.
4/16 21.7*
5 Rad Services Inc.
4/18 33.76 b
Catalytic 4/17 0.20
'7 Catalytic 4/17 0.20 w>
B
.E o HAP 4/17 4.30 9
%E5 HAP 4/17
< O.1 O
U.,=.
m "5 >
Westinghouse 4/16 3.67 10 m
//
5 "."
Westinghouse 4/17 4.27 cX
/ 2.
c." 3 Catalyt.ic 4/17
< 0.1
.c u u
/3 8E Catalytic 4/17 0.20 oeu lf R*5 Catalytic 4/17-3.09
.- 2
"}5 Catalytic 4/17 4.75 15
/6
$85 Catalytic 4/17
< 0.1
/7 OD3 Catalytic 4/17 1.30 0 0
/E 56%.
Hydro Nuclear Ser.
4/17 1.89 g
17
- ESMj Catalytic 4/17 4.70 es :e 26 E m l 'E.
Rad Services Inc.
4/18
< 0.1 m->a.
l'S@- _
Rad Services Inc. -
4/17 3.99 7-(
Oo m;
m i.L':8 ' c m.~Catalytic...
~.. /17
~
< 0. l~.
5 z.2. _ -
4 7'31?
.c,.i Ej 5 1.~
R,ad' Services Inc. ~. 54/18
< 0. 1
.O a;-
29 PSE&G 4/17
-1.20 25
, Catalytic 4/17 1.44
~
- 2. 6 Catalytic 4/16 1.41 27.
Catalytic 4/17 5.67 28 Catalytic 4/18 1.40 17 Catalytic 4/17 1.24 3o PSE&G 4/18
< 0.1 31 PSE&G 4/37 0.24 31 Catalytic 4/17 1.50 33 Westin9 ouse 4/16 1.54 h
Based on Whole Body Count Data and Rrarcin@m coliven in Attachment 2, Part_B RcV-1
~
~ ~ s 3n2z w
!!ame SE!;
Co.
WBC MPC-ErE-(Ba sed on 5 3. W sun) 31 Rad Services Inc.
4/18 1.55
~
~
35 pSE&G 4/18
.0.58 3L Combustion Eng.
4/17 4.10 3'?
Catalytic 4/17 0.42 38 Catalytic 4/17 3.90 31 Catalytic 4/17 0.74 40 Catalytic 4/17 0.68 4I Catalytic 4/17 4.1 41 Catalytic 4/16 8.5 CJ l
43 j
Combustion Eng.
4/17 0.20 C O 44 Catalytic 4/17 1.10 mc L. o I
Catalytic 4/18 7.74
'/ 5 S '",,
mga 4G nee Catalytic 4/18 0.40 m
't 7 "Do Catalytic 4/17 1.11 s
as.- m
~ 0.1 M
15 5 c Westinghouse 4/15 49 S
Kenper Ins.
4/18
<0.1 rs a
PSE6G 4/18 1.20 50 d % $,
5.
EEc Rad Services Inc.
4/18
< 0.1 ome 52 o s. o Catalytic 4/16 3.76 1
a-5}
r$
Cooperheat 4/18 0.36 aam 51
'g.a o D Rad Services Inc.
4/18
<0.1 aam 55 8
- o.R Catalytic 4/17
<0.1 C M GI S.
50
.@ % 3 "
Rad Services Inc.
4/18 4.95
- t. s g,-
57 8.3 s.:@ j Rad S~ervices Inc.-
4/17 - ~
3.59 E.3 c 8 1 7
5 c3 ED Catalytic 4/16' 4.63 St
~ ' " - "
5'(
i Catalytic 4/17
<0.1 6
Catalytic 4/17 0.95
~
6/
Westinghouse 4/17 0.70 C
Hydro Nuclear Ser.
4/18 25.5*
6Z Catalytic 4/17 0.20 63 Catalytic 4/17 1.13 64 Cooper Heat 4/17 4.59 6-Rad Services Inc.
4/16 14.5*
45 Catalytic 4/18
<0.1
<0.1 66 Catalytic 4/16 Based on r;ho3e Ecdy Count Data and geV 1 TC forno3a given.in Attachment 2.
Part n
liTisdvwd3 3 I
2nitial Assi ne:
h;arne SE!:
Co._
WBC MPC-P.r!.
( Ba s ed on S t a;. M Tbe).
-67 Rad Services Inc.
4/18 2.65
' 0.1 6B Catalytic 4/17 bi Catalytic 4/16 1.39 7
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