ML20079R685
| ML20079R685 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 01/26/1994 |
| From: | Calvo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20078M603 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-94-167 NUDOCS 9402030340 | |
| Download: ML20079R685 (5) | |
Text
.
[km Rf C J
o UNITED STATES g
l' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
h WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
\\
,/
January 26, 1994 MENRANDUMFOR:
NRR Division Directors THRU:
Steven A. Varga, Director Division of Reactor Projects - I/II FROM:
Jos6 Calvo, Assistant Director for Region I Reactors Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
SUBJECT:
REQUESTS FOR ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION AND OTHER EVENTS DUE TO SEVERE GRID / WEATHER CONDITIONS As you know from your own experience over the last week, we have experienced I
severe cold weather and electric utilities in Region I have experienced an unprecedented demand for power together with an extremely low reserve power i
capacity.
Some utilities reduced grid voltage and/or instituted rolling blackouts.
Federal, state and local governments, as wr -
as many private sector businesses, closed on Wednesday, Thursday and f m ay to help conserve power (Pennsylvania issued an emergency energy declaration).
On Wednesday, January 19th, Region I was contacted by Steven Miltenberger, VP and Chief Nuclear Officer at PSE&G, to discuss the status of the Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland (PJM) grid and the need to keep the grid's nuclear plants online, since many fossil plants were having trouble with natural gas transmission lines, frozen coal piles and thickening fuel oil supplies. Of specific interest to the PJM grid plants was the possibility of temporarily postponing Tech Spec required surveillances that had the potential to increase the risk of possible plant downpower or scram, or postponing some Tech Spec required tests /surveillances to speed up a plant's restart from a
" uncomplicated" scram. The utilities were considering invoking 10 CFR 50.54(x) to accomplish this.
Region I conferred with NRR c.d it was determined that enforcement discretion was the appropriate route for the utilities to take.
The following enforcement discretion actions were discussed over the last week:
Salem 1: Recently, Salem I was heating up for restart from its eleventh refueling outage.
In Mode 3, after steam pressure reaches 350 psig, the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump has to be tested in accordance with the Tech Specs.
If the pump fails the test, the Tech Specs allow 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to correct the problem or cool the plant back to Mode 4.
During the performance of the test during the week of January 10th, the pump failed because of flow oscillations. The plant was o oled down and the governor replaced. The unit went back to Mode 3 and the test performed again on January 17th, at which time it again failed. During trouble shooting, the licensee determined that sufficient time was not available to complete repairs,and perform the required surveillance test O
before the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> time limit expired. On January 19th, the licensee requested enforcement discretion to allow an additional 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to
{
GN
\\
Qanyw w
l P
j
! complete trouble shooting and performance of the surveillance test.
i Approval was given on January 19th to extend the allowed outage by 72
)
hours starting at 3:00 am on January 20th. The repairs and the surveillance tests were completed on January 20th and the unit went critical on January 24th.
TMI-1: GPU Nuclear reviewed all of the Tech Spec required surveillances that were due within the next week at TMI-1 and found one potential increased risk surveillance, control rod movement verification (it had the potenital for a plant down power or scram). The surveillance interval -s 14 Jays, with the next surveillance due on January 23rd (14 days + 25M. 9n January 20th, the licensee called Region I and requested edarcement discretion so that they could postpone the surveillance for a maximum of 5 days, January 28th. Other B&W plant Tech Specs have varying surveillance intervals (e.g., the BWOG STS requires testing every 92 days, Oconee requires monthly testing). The staff discussed the circumstances and safety basis with the licensee, 1
and verbally granted the N0ED on January 20th.
Limerick I and 2: On January 20th the licensee requested enforcement discretion to postpone performance of the Main Stop and Combined Intermediate Valve weekly exercise tests, which were determined to be
~
potential increased risk surveillances. At the time, Unit I was at 73%
power coasting down in preparation for the upcoming refueling outage and Unit 2 was at 100% power. The testing, which had been scheduled for January 21st, would be postponed until January 28th, unless it could be i
performed sooner. The staff issued a verbal approval to the licensee's i
request on January 20th. The licensee performed the tests on January 22nd, and thus, although the N0ED was granted, it was not needed.
5 Peach Bottom 2: On January 20th the licensee requested enforcement discretion to delay the weekly functional testing on two of four steam line radiation monitors. While performing the surveillance, the risk of reactor scram is increased since the test would have caused one-half reactor scram and one-half group one isolation. The test was to be performed on January 20th.
It was requested to be postponed until January 22nd when the weather was predicted to moderate. The staff issued verbal approval to the licensee's request on January 20th.
Susauehanna 2:
Early in the morning of January 20th, Unit 2 scrammed from 100% power as a result of a turbine / generator trip on unexpected high stator cooling water temperature. Grid voltage was reduced by 5%
following the trip. With the conditions causing the trip cleared, the i
reactor recirculation pumps were restarted and Unit 2 changed from Mode 3 to Mode 2 within a few hours of the trip. The startup check list disclosed that the voltage reading on one of the SRV acoustic monitors was reading low.
The licensee declared the acoustic monitor inoperable i
on January 21st and requested enforcement discretion to allow continued operation and to be able to change from Mode 2 to Mode 1 with an inoperable SRV acoustic monitor. The licensee determined that the SRV i
9 i
.m m
3
>.I was fully seated and that there are multiple other means of detecting a weeping or stuck-open SRV. The enforcement discretion was verbally l
granted on January 21st by NRR with Region I concurrence. The licensee j
has submitted an emergency Tech Spec change.
j t
Ovster Creek: On January 21st, GPU Nuclear requested enforcement i
discretion from performhg a Tech Spec required surveillance, APRM j
weekly tests. The licensee.sieted that they. reviewed the Oyster Creek i
Tech Specs, together with the schedules for performing surveillances, and this surveillance was the only potential increased risk surveillance-l that would be required to be performed during the projected severe weather period.- The surveillance interval plus 25% would expire Monday, l
January 24th. The staff listened to the licensee's request and i
justification and indicated that it would grant the NOED if the licensee would formally request it on Sunday, January 23rd. Due to a break in the weather and power demands, Oyster Creek did not need the NOED and none was granted.
j i
In addition to the enforcement discretion actions, the following plant events l
had a significant impact on the PJM grid Calvert Cliffs 2:
Unit 2 tripped on January 12th and during routine j
post-trip containment inspection on January 13th, the licensee identified a pressure boundary leak from the reactor vessel closure head j
leak detector instrument line. An Unusual Event was declared and the unit was cooled down to Mode 5 to conduct repairs.
Repairs were complete and restart commenced on January 19th, with full power reached l
on January 20th.
l i
Susouchanna 1: On Friday, January 21st, Susquehanna Unit I was in Mode 2, coming out of a refueling outage that began September 25, 1993.
l On Monday, January 24th, the unit was on the grid at 38% power.
l The following event, although it occurred after 'the severe weather broke and the PJM grid problems abated, demonstrates what can happen during potential increased risk surveillances.
1 Calvert Cliffs 1: On Monday, January 24th, the licensee was performing the Tech Spec required'RPS matrix relay surveillance test.
This test required two of the eight reactor trip breakers to be.open. During the test, the #12120 Vac vital bus deenergized when its associated inverter deenergized (blown power input fuse to the inverter; blown fuse was not caused by the surveillance, but unfortunately occurred during the surveillance), which caused two more trip breakers to open, resulting in a reactor trip. The unit its currently in hot standby.
J t
4-Close coordination of the Region and NRR projects and technical staff during this period of severe weather contributed to necessary electrical power being provided by the Region I nuclear plants, while still assuring continued safe t
operation.
a.
r - '. : e t vi, -
t.,..:. 4... n a.,.. 4 ; ; v,...,,,,,, v Jos6 Calvo, Assistant Director for Region I Reactors Division of Reactor Projects - I/II cc:
T. Murley F. Miraglia J. Roe W. Russell T. T. Martin W. Lanning Regional Directors, DRP i
DISTRIBUTION Central File DRPE R/F ADRI R/F i
i l
onicE ADP.I:DRPE,
JCalvo O'I
"*E DATE
}/74/94 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
[P:\\CALVO.NOT]
.