ML20079Q395
| ML20079Q395 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1984 |
| From: | Gerrets T LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| 130, W3K84-0130, W3K84-130, NUDOCS 8402010148 | |
| Download: ML20079Q395 (2) | |
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I OUISIANA 342 ouAnoNOs s1mt POWER & LIGHT P O BOX 6000
- NEW OALEANS. LOUISIANA 70174. (5041 366-2345 se UilOTIES SYSTEM January 20, 1984 W3Ro4-0130 Q-3-A35.07 Mr. John T. Collins
['O JAN 2 69 Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 j
Arlington, Texas 76012 pi 1
REFERENCE:
LP&L letter W3K83-2004 dated December 21, 1983
Dear Mr. Collins:
SUBJECT:
Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Potentially Reportable Deficiency No. 130
" Loss of Annulus Vacuum Control, Potential For" Amended Final Report This amended response to the Final Report of PRD No. 130 is being submitted in anticipation that the referenced response may generate some confusion as to our reasoning on the issue of non-reportability.
EVALUATION There is an interlock designed into SBVS that will prevent the SBVS fans (E-17 SA/SB) from sta:-ting if the filter train inlet or outlet isolation valves are closed. During preoperational testing on train A, this interlock was tested by closing the train inlet valve (2HV-P!60A) and de-energizing the breaker to its motor operator. When operating the system in this configuration, it was discovered that filter train outlet valve (2HV-B158A) and either the exhaust (2HV-B162A) or recirculating (2HV-B-164A) valves would open as required.
However because of the closed position of the inlet valve and the failure of the fan to start because of the interlock, these valves would immediately attempt to reshut. The valve inertia at the end of the opening cycle was resulting in high amperage in the actuating motor when attempting to immediately reverse direction to the closed position. The configuration of the system for test purposes where this condition was noted, is an abnormal lineup that would not be permitted in normal operation without declering that train inoperable. The Londition would in no way affect the ability of the system to perform as designed when in the normal lineup, nor would it have any effect on the redundant SBVS train when in the abnormal lineup discussed. The fact that these valves tripped while in the abnormal configuration would not therefore have affected the SBVS's ability to respond on an SIAS.
8402010148 840120 m
PDRADOCK05000g f { Q /iD S
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-Mr. John T,' Collins January 20, 1984
'W3K84-0130 Page 2 Altho':gh the breaker sizes have been changed as a result of the problem identified by this test, the original' breaker sizes were adequate, though marginal, and would not have adversely affected safety if left uncorrected.
This PRD is therefore considered not reportable.
Very_truly yours, T. F. Cerrets Quality Assurance Manager TFC:CNH:SSTG cc: Director Office of Inspection &. Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 (15 copies)
Director Office of-Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
~ Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. E. L. Blake Shaw, Pittman, Potts, & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Mr. W.'M. Stevenson Monroe & Lemann 1424 Whitney Building New Orleans, Lo21siana 70130 e
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