ML20079N410
| ML20079N410 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 02/15/1983 |
| From: | Kemper J PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-83 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8303030671 | |
| Download: ML20079N410 (2) | |
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 23O1 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA, PA.19101 JOHN S. KEMPER
.. ".!'"" Z-FEB 151983 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Subject:
Significant Deficiency Report No. 67 Rockwell International Hydrogen Recombiners Equipment Failures as a Result of Qualification Testing Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 Attachments:
a)
Letter Rockwell International to USNRC Region IV, 10/21/82 (#82ESG-7725) b)
Letter Rockwell International' to USNRC Region IV, 11/3/82
(#82ESG-7948) c)
Letter Rockwell International to USNRC Region IV, 11/3/82 (#82ESG-8085)
File:
QUAL 2-10-2 (SDR #67)
Dear Mr. Haynes:
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By means of the attached letters, we have been advised by Rocl-well.,
International of component failures occurring cs.a result'of qualification h
testing. These failures have been previously reported to the USNRC under ti e provisions of 10CFR Part 21 by Rockwell International. The components that failed are;
- 1) 7TT Barton Pressure Transducers, 2)
Square-D Disconnbet Switch, and 3) Timetrol SCR Power Controller. The details of the 0 11ures are described in attachments a), b), and c) respectively.. Hydrogen'recombiners similar to those tested have been supplied by,Rockwell International for use at the Limerick Generating Station.
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We consider the deficiencies described *ini he attache 9nts as significant t
per 10CFR50.55(e) and are hereby notifying ~y' ti As required.
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4 We believe that the Rockwell Internationdl reports sEbniitted undeE the '
provisions of 10CFR, Part 21 provide the information reghired for QOCFR50.55(e)
. reporting. Therefore,weanticipatethatthislet.terwill_h5ourjnlyreport
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to you on these matters.
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8303030671 830215 I(M-PDR ADOCK 05000352 s
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i Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement. Region I United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-Page 2 4
We will of course as;ure that-the reported problems associated with Limerick hydrogen recombiners are corrected in accordance with instructions received from the vendor.
Sincerely,
$d$f Copy to: Director of Inspection and Enforcement United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 S. K. Chaudhary, US NRC Resident Inspector f '
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October 21, 1982 In reply refer to 82ESG7725 US Nuclear seguletory Comission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Arlington, Texas 76012 Attention:
Mr. John Collins, Administrator, Region IV Gentlemen:
Subject:
Report of Deviation / Defect (10CFR21)
Energy Systems Group is currently undertaking a program to establish 1El;E-323 qualification status of the post-LOCA Hydrogen Recombiners delivered by us.
This program is designed to umbrella equipment delivered in the pest as well as current designs, and therefore specifies environmental conditions severe enough to satisfy any expected customer specifications.
As a result of this qualification effort to date, it has been deter-mined that the ITT Barton pressure transducers, 4-20 ma, AP or absol--
lute pressure, Part Number D4R-29998 will not withstand our test parameter for radiation of 1 x 10 rads (and may not opgrate satis-factorily after radiation exposures in excess of 1 x 10 rads TID due to gradual drifting in readings resulting in ultimate total failure).
These pressure transducers are installed in several delivered Recom-biners and are used to measure Recombiner inlet gas flow, total flow, ar.d inlet gas pressure. A total failure of the AP units would result in Recombir.er shutdown, and the loss of-its intended safety function.
Plants to which this report applies are given in Table I, along with the radiation environcent indicated by their specifications.
TABLE I No. of Date Spe-ified Radiation Facility Recombiners Shipped Requirement (TID) 5 Limerick 1 & 2 4
06-77 6 x 10 rads 0
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La Salle Co. 1 & 2 2
08-78 1.7 x 10 rads 5
Nine Mile Point 2 2
02-79 1.7 x 10 rads t
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Mr. J. Collins Page 2 US Nuclear Regulatory Coinnission October 21, 1982 Region IV 62ESG7725 Arlington, Texas These transducers should be replaced with nuclear rated.trans'ducers.
For an operating plant (LaSalle only from the Table I list) it is possible to operate the Recombiners with a relatively simple, temporary wiring modi-fication 'in the control cabinet which will allow operation of the recom-biner and perforrance of its safety function in the manual flow cor, trol mode. An Engineering Field Bulletin will be issued to provide instruc-tions for the tenporary fix by October 29, 1982.
In the meantime, a pre-liminary draft of the field bulletin change is described in our letter of October 21, 1982 to the La Salle plant operator notifying them of this potential problem with the transducers. The pennanent modification (re-placement of the transducers) can then be made during plant shutdown when access to the recombiner skid is possible.
These 1TT Bartor, transducers were also installed in the E. I. Hatch and Termi Recombiners.
Although there were no radiation requirements for these plants, the Utilities are boing notified of the transducer opera-tional limits so that they can evaluate the impact to them and take any action deemed appropriate.
Since Hatch is an operating plant, they are also receiving the teraporary wiring instructions for operating in the norral flow control mode as noted above for La Salle.
If you have any further questions or r.eed vore inforvation, please call me at (213) 700-3926.
Very truly yours,
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D. C. Empey Director Quality Assurance (4
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Energy Systems oroup 890o De soso Averve Caroga PsA Cohaorrma 913od Rockwell Tom m33345 3ooo International TWX' 9144941237 Teies.161o17 November 3, 1982 In reply refer to 82ESG7948 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Arlington, Texas 76012 Attention:
Mr. John Collins, Administrator Region IV
References:
- 1) ESG Letter 82ESG7725, D.,C. Empey to John Collins
" Report of Deviation / Defect (10CFR21)" dated October 21, 1982
- 2) ESG Letter 82ESG8085, D. C. Empey to John Collins,
" Report of Possible Defect (10CFR21)" dated November 3, 1982 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Report of Possible Defect (10CFR21)
Energy Systems Group is currently undertaking a program to establish IEEE-323 qualification of our post-LOCA Hydrogen Recombiner designs.
This program is structured to umbrella equipment delivered in the i
past as well as current and future production, and therefore speci-fies environmental conditions severe enough to satisfy any expected customer specifications.
As a result of this qualification effo'rt to date, it has been deter-l mined that the below noted component may not operate properly follow-l ing the radiation exposure given in the ESG qualification program.
I COMPONENT DESCRIPTION J
Square D disconnect switch, three-pole nonfusible unit, 30A,15.hp l
at 480 VAC or 20 hp at 600 VAC, P/N 9422-RC-1.
Test Results
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During the IEEE 323 Environmental Qualification testing and following the Irradiation and Associated Baseline functional Test the disconne:t j
switches failed wher. they were mechanically operated due to a plastic i-P
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Tscel.wcli ihiH nc'ipni' Mr. John Collins, Administrator Page 2 I,
Region IV November 3, 1982 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 82ESG7948 7
component breaking.
It was concluded that the applied dose of 1.1 x 10 rads degraded the plastic sufficiently to initiate the failure. The switch is the main disconnect switch for the recombiner skid 480 VAC, 3-phase, power bus for the inlet gas, recirculating gas and water valve motor cir-cuits; its failure would ' prevent operation of the recombiner.
Corrective Action /Coments Failure analysis of the component shows that the switch could fail open during a seismic event thus disrupting the 480 VAC power to the recc.mbiner skid.
ESG has not determined whet radiation doses less than 1.1 x 10ger or not the switch would fail with rads, but we believe that since there is a reasonable chance of failure, the switch should be eliminated from the circuit. This modification is consistent with current design which does not use a switch for this function.
An Engineering Field Bulletin has been issued with instructions to by-pass the switch.
Affected Plants NRC Licensed Date Specified Radiation Customer Name Facility / Activity
08-76 Not specified 5
Philadelphia Limerick 1 & 2 NPS 4
06-30-77 6 x 10 Electric Co.
'06-14-77 Not specified l
Company f
5 Comonwealth LaSalle County 1 & 2 2
08-29-78 1.7 x 10 i
Edison Co.
5 I
Niagara Mohawk Nine Mile Pt 2 NPS 2
02-23-79 1.7 x 10 l
Power Corp.
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Mr. John Collins, Administrator Page 3
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Region IV November 3,1982 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 82E5G7948 j
Notifications Each listed plant operator has been notified of the results of our IEEE-323 qualification testing along with the above mentioned bulletin on by-passing of the disconnect switch. Additional components which failed to furttion properly following the qualification program are given in the References.
If you require further infornation or clarification, please call me at (213) 700-3926.
Very truly yours.
D. C. Empey Director Quality Assurance cc:
(3)
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement ll.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Washington, DC 20555 i
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Energy Systems Group o
8900 oe Soto Avenue Canoga Park. Cahfortna 91304 Rockwell Telephone:(213) 3411000 International
_i TWX: 910 4941237 Telex:181017 November 3, 1982 In reply refer to 82ESG8085 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission t
Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Arlington, Texas 76012 Attention:
Mr. John Collins, Administrator Region IV
References:
- 1) ESG Letter 82ESG7725, D. C. Empey to John Collins,
" Report of Deviation / Defect (10CFR21)" dated October 21, 1982.
2)
E5G Letter 82ESG7948, D. C. Empey to John Collins,
" Report of Possible Defect (10CFR21)" dated November 3, 1982 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Report of Possible Defect (10CFR21)
Energy Systems Group is currently undertaking a program to establish IEEE-323 qualification of our post-LOCA Hydrogen Recombiner designs.
This program is structured to umbrella equipment delivered in the past as well as' current and future production, and therefore speci-fies environmental conditions severe enough to satisfy any expected l
customer specifications.
As a result of this qualification effort to date, it has been deter-mined that the below noted component may not operate properly follow-ing the radiation exposure given in the ESG qualification program.
COMPONENT DESCRIPTION Timetrol SCR Power Controller - Three-phase,1066Z series, Part No.
2053C-125K.
Test Results During IEEE 323 Environmental Qualification Testing and after the unit 6
was irradiated with 1.62 x 10 rads, the SCR failed functional testing r t f
a 4
t Mr. John Collins, Administrator Page 2-Region IV-November 3, 1982 U.S. Nuclear-Regulatory' Commission 82ESG8085 b
and the SCR Power Controller was removed from the Qualification Program.
In hydrogen recombiner operation, loss of electrical power control to the heaters would result in a loss of safety function.
Corrective etion/ Comments
- We are recommending that the Timetrol unit be replaced with a Halmar unit (per our design on current production recombiners). None of the affected BWR plants are operating and this replacement can be done prior. to startup.
Although three of the affected PWR plants are operating (Zion, North Anna, and Beaver Valley) the environment at the power / control cabinet should be such that replacement of the power controller can be done at any time. Al-though this expected low radiation environment could be interpreted as making replacement optional, Zion and TMI did include an overall radiation require-ment in their specifications to us and we cannot unilaterally determine that these radiation environments will not be seen by the power / control cabinets.
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Affected Plants NRC Licensed Date Specified Radiation i
Customer Name Facility / Activity Qty Shipped Dose Rads TID Detroit Edison Fermi 2 NPS 2
08-76 Not Specified 5
Philadelphia Limerick 1 & 2 NPS 6
06-30-77 6 x 10 Electric Co.
Duquesne Light Beaver Valley 1 & 2 2
07-02-74 Not Specified Co.
North Anna, 1, 2, 3, 3
10-75 Not Specified
& Power Co.
and 4 NPS Northeast Millstone 3 NPS 2
02-77 Not Specified.
Utilities 1
5 Jersey Central Three Mile Island 2
03-77 2 x 10 Power & Light 2 NPS Co.
4 Commonwealth Zion 1 and 2 NPS 2
10-05-73
< 10 Edison Co.
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Mr. John Collins, Administrator Region IV Page 3 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 3, 1982 82ESG8085 Notifications Each listed plant operator has been notified of the results of our IEEE 323 qualification testing along with our recommendation for replacement of these units.
Additional components which failed to function properly fol-lowing the qualification environments given in our program are reported in the References.
If you require further information or clarification, please call me at (213) 700-3926.
Very truly yours,
(
D. C. Empey Director Quality Assurance cc:
(3)
Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 l
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