ML20079L567

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Responds to Exercise Weaknesses 482/9119-01,482/9119-02, 482/9119-03 & 482/9119-04 Re Manual Transmission & Tracking of Critical Plant Data,Technical Support Ctr Mgt & Failure to Establish & Maintain Habitability in Emergency Facility
ML20079L567
Person / Time
Site: Wolf Creek Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation icon.png
Issue date: 10/30/1991
From: Withers B
WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
WM-91-0145, WM-91-145, NUDOCS 9111060389
Download: ML20079L567 (10)


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NUCLEAR OPEfWING CORPOfWION i

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Mi 91 -014 5 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cournission ATTN Document Control Desk Hail Station pl-137 Washington. D. C.

20555

Subject:

Docket No. 50 482:

Kenponse to Exercise Weaknesses 482/9119-01, 482/9119-02, 482/92 "#-03 and 482/9119-04 Gentlemen This letter provides Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Cor poration* of $4 to 1317 R/h at 10 miles are taken from the dose t

projection at 1053.

The dose projection was performed using a leak rate based on a total drop in pressure for thirty minutes i

far a worst case condition. The dose projection was not based on the actual condit4ons at the time.

1 The pressure drop was actually due to containment coolers as noted by the OEC and not due to a actual leak.

As stated ir,the inspection report only a two hour or less release duration was to be used.

Examples Rather than acting upon these results and making PARS for evacuation of personnel beyond 10 miles, the licensee chose to rely upon field monitoring data collected after 11:40 a.m.

tor l

dose assessment purposes.

This became more of a concern when considered with the fact that field monitoring teams only contacted the plume on one occasion, as discussed in paragraph 7.

As the scenario developed.

it was indicative of severe core damage and early containment f ailure and should hnve been trenced accordingly.

Response: The General Emergency was declared at 1025 by the DEM who had command and control at the EOF.

Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) were made at that time to evacuate downwind subrot.es out to 10 miles.

The County concurred with the PARS and implemented them at 1040.

The Emergency Planning tone (EPZ) for Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) is described in the P.adiological Emergency Response Plan and is an approximate 10 mile radius circle with its center at WCGS.

Responsibility for protective actions outside the EPZ abide with appropriate local and state agencies.

WCNOC cooperates with these agencies and provides support and assistance as appropriate.

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4 Attachment to WH 91 014$

Page 7 of 9 Dose projections were based on the worst case situation with no confirmation of a release in progress.

Honitoring teams were already in place downwind of the plant.

At 1103 the release started and at 1107 the Red Team reported 100 t

mR/hr 3/4 mile downwinC.

The TSC performed a dose calculation at 1113 based on the monitoring team's data.

This projection estimated a child thyroid dose rate of 0.061 R/h at 10 miles and a dose ut 0.122 R for a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> exposure at 10 miles.

The EOF perfoamed a similar dose projection at 1115 estimating a child thyroid dose rete of 0.753 R/h at 10 miles and a dose of 1.$07 R for a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> exposure at 10 miles.

At 1118 the Blue Team reported a reading of 10 mk/h 2 miles downwind.

The projection from the TSC at 1123 estimated a child thyroid dose rate of 0.035 R/h at 10 miles and a dose of 0.07 R for a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> exposure at 10 miles.

At 2130 the Blue Team reported a reading of 200 mR/hr 2 miles downwind.

The TSC projected the dose at 1133.

indicating a child thyroid dose rate of 0.701 R/h at 10 miles and-a dose of 1.403 R for a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> exposure at 10 miles.

The EOF projected the dose at 1135.

This projection estimated a child thyroid dose rate of 0.753 R/h at 10 miles and a dose of 1.507 R for a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> exposure at 10 miles.

k Honitoring team data was available at 3107 (instead of 1140 as stated in the report).

The monitoring teams contacted the plume

twice, approximately 3/4 of a mile downwind and at 2 miles-downwind.

Dose Assessment personnel in the TSC and EOF both performed dose

-calculations, compared. results for concurrence, and notified management of the results. The decision for making PARS was with the DEH in the EOF during the time period of 1044 to 1131.

PARS were conservative and timely.

TSC Hanagement used their best' judgement in assessing the plant conditions-and radiological consequences.

VCNOC's review indicates a conservative and anticipatory approach was used on important technical assessments based on the information that was available.

The role of the TSC when the EOF has command and control is to support the EOF.

This role was fulfilled throughout the exercise.

-The EOF used information supplied by.

the TSC to properly assess the-situation and make timely L

classifications and PARS.

At all times during the exercise.

protection of the public health and safety was the primary

-concern.

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Attachment to WM 91-0145 Page 8 of 9 Exercise Venknees_ '4d?/9119-03):

The failure of the licensee to establish and maintain habitability in the emergency response facilities was identified as an exercise weakness.

Responses Control Room 1

back of procedural guidance is the primary reason for this weakness.

Procedure EPP 01-1.0 ' Control Room Organization

  • will be revised to provide guidance to appropriate personnel in the i

following areast 1.)

Establish access control for the Control Room I

2.)

Performance of habitability surveys in the Control Room 3.)

Dosimetry in the Control Room 4.)

Control Room habitability operatious support Center (OSC)

A low background area was not available in the OSC to at:61yze air and swipe samples.

To provide a method for lowering background

readings, lead bricks have been placed in the OSC.

TSC and the EOF.

Procedures EPP 01-1.1 'WCGS Organization' and EPP 03-1.2

  • Emergency Operatt.ons Pacility Emergency Organization
  • will be revised to provide guidance to appropriate personnel for utilization of lead bricks when background is too high to accurately count samples.

Technical Support Cent 9r Lack of procedural guidance is the primary reason for this weakness.

Procedure EPP 01-4.1

' Technical Support Center Activation

  • will be revised to provide guidance to ensure the airlock door is closed.

The door seals will be replaced and signs will be placed on the door, identifying that it is to be closed during activation and operation of the *SC by December 10, 1991.

Procedure EPP 02-1.5 'Haintenance of Emergency Facilities and Equipment

  • will be revised to require a periodic inspection of seals on airlock doors in emergency facilities.

Procedure changes will be completed by December 16, 1991 and training for appropriate personnel will be completed by March 16, 1992.

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Attachineat to VM 91-014$

Page 9 of 9 Exercise Weakness (48?/9119-04):

Poor coordination and control of monitoring teams was identified as an exercise weakness.

Rosponse: The reason for this weakness has beon determined to be a lack of procedural guidance.

Procedure EPP 01-1.2 ' Emergency Operations Facility Emergency Organization' will be revised to provide additional guidance on the deployment, control, and coordination of monitoring teams, Guidance will also expand instructions 1 minimiting exposure to monitoring team members.

Procedures EPP I

01-8.2 *0ffsite Radiological Honitoring' and EPP 01-8.3

' Joint Radiological Honitoring Teams Formation and Operation' will be revised to include checklists that will require the monitoring teams to take self contained breathing apparatus with them when deployed.

Procedure changes will be completed by December 16, 1991 and

-training for appropriate personnel will be completed by March 16, 1992.

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