ML20079G723
| ML20079G723 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 01/12/1984 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20079G719 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8401230045 | |
| Download: ML20079G723 (2) | |
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SAFETY EVALUATI0t; BY THE OFFICE N NL*d_EAP. F.EAC70R KEGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO.6'S TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY AND CLEVELAND Ei.ECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-346 1.
Introduction
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By letter dated July 10, 1981, Toledo Edison -Company proposed an amendment to Appendix A of Facility l0perating License No.!NPr-3. The subject change involves Section 3.7.10 of the Technical Speci fications for ' Davis-Besse. The licensee has proposed to amend Section 3.7.10. " Fire Barrier Penetrations" (including cable penetration seals, fire doors and fire dampers) to specify:
With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration or verify the OPERASILITY of the fire detectors on at _least one side of the nonfunctional fire carrier and establisn an nourly fire waren patrol. xestore tne non-functional fire Darrier eenetration(s) to functional status witnin seven days or, ist lieu of any other report reouired by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Soecial Report to the Cormiission oursuant to Soecification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlininc tne action taken, tne cause of tne nonfunctional cenetration and clans and senecule for res torino tne fire carrier oenetration(s ) to functional status.
2.
Discussion Cable penetration seals,' fire doors and dampers. are required to be operable to maintain the integrity of fire barriers to prevent the spread of fire and to minimize the overall potential for fires affecting safety related areas and equipment.
Fire barriers separating safety related areas are important fire protection features in nuclear plants. Due to structural or sheilding requirements, many walls have a fire ratit g in excess of three hours. Other concrete walls have at least a two, or three nour rating. All openings through walls for doors, ducts cr cable penetrations must have a door, damper, or penetration seal rating which is consistent with the required wall rating.
To prevent the potential spread of fire and limit its damage, fire doors, fire dampers and penetration seals are required by Technical Specification 3.7.10 to be OPERABLE.
In the event that one or more fire barrier per.etrations are inoperable or nonfunctional, within one hour, the licensee proposes, as compensatory action, to establish either a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or as an alternative verify the operabiiity of fire detectors on at least one side of the nonfunctional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire wat:h patrol.
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Evaluation
,co We find that these compensating measures for inoperable fire barrier penetration (s) provide reasonable assurance for the timely detection of a fire such that corre-tive action can be taken to prevent the possible spread of a fh e beyond the fire barrier. In addition, the established time limits or reporting requirements will provide reasonable assurance that the licensee will restore nonfunctional fire barrier penetrations to operable status.
These actions are also consistent with previously analyzed requirements specified in the present Standard Technical Specifications. We, therefore, find that the licensee's proposed changes to Section 3.7.10 of the Techincal Specifications acceptable. Technical Specification 6.9.2 is also mooified to include the added reportng requirement proposed by the licensee.
4 Environmental Consideration We have determinad that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or. total amounts nor an increase in power level and will' not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendmcat involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4),
that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
5 Concl usion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the commen defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated : January 12, 1984 Tha following NRC personnel have contributed to this Safety Evaluation:
C. B. Rams ty J. B. Ulie p
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