ML20079F259
| ML20079F259 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 12/18/1981 |
| From: | Ottinger R HOUSE OF REP., ENERGY & COMMERCE |
| To: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20079F261 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-83-130 NUDOCS 8203150319 | |
| Download: ML20079F259 (7) | |
Text
~#/ t"4%""'
L"X C % "
U.S. HOUS2 0F REPRESENTATIVES h
=,,=,;,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY CoNsrRVATioN AND R
.;'g.lllf '"'
- 2. T.
~Y,,,,dh 3CYA coMMITTtt oN ENERGY AND COMMERCE WASHINGTON. D.C.
2m3 T. -l, '.:; * ;,.
)
w December 18, 1981
..me Tho Bonorable Nunzio Palladino Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wcshington, D.C.
20555 DeGr Mr. Chairman:
Last month Chairman Dingell and I communicated to you our vary serious concerns regarding the disclosure of errors in the docign and construction of a number of commercial power reactors.
In our letter, we were particularly concerned about the discovery of such errors at Diablo Canyon Unit I following the issuance by the Comm1ssion of a low power license.
As a consequence, we noted the need f or a quality ' assurance audit of unquestionable competence and independence of the seismic design of the Unit I, rocctor.
You were requested to supply the Cormittee with the criteria which would be used by the Cormission in determining the independence of the required audit.
Since our letter of November 13, the Subcormittee has discovered additional information which raises serious questions regarding the independence and integrity of the audit conducted by Robert L. Cloud Associates (RLCA), under contract to Pacific Gas l
cnd Electric Company (PG&E).
Specifically, the Subcormitt'ee has learned that there were two drafts of Dr. Cloud's report, the l
first being designated the October draft and the second referred l
to as the November draft.
The October draft was submitted to the utility for review and comments about a month prior to being cupplied to the Commission.
The November draft, which incorporated many of the utility's comments, was then released to I
the Cormission and the public.
The Subcommittee has also learned that, following the submission of the first draf t and prior to the issuance of the second draft, representatives of the utility and its contractor misled Commission officials as to the status of the
~
Cloud report, asserting it was not complete and would be distributed only when it was complete.
These statements were issued amidst assurances to the Coraission of its independence.
\\
In view of the contractor's apparent association with the utility involving the submission of 'a draf t of its report fo'r review, the incorporation of the utility's comments into the publicly released report, the joint misrepresentations to NRC l
staff concerning the status of the report, the manner in which the existence of twb reports was discovered, and the inability of the 12/24...To EDO to Prepare Response for Sicnature.of Chairman and Co i
n m n,.
en --
Jan 12..Cpys to:
bdA/56.2/9%_ XA Copy Has Been Sent to PDR 5
7 m n.,
g,.ci.a
(
2 utility and the contractor to locate a'll the copies of the October draf t and associated " inserts" containing the utility's com.;ents, the integrity of a trustworthy safety reanalysis has been violated.
This dramatically underscores the need for. criteria for datermining the independence of any future audit.
The copies o~f the October draft containing the utility's ccaments, and the differences in the October draft and the i
November draft raise a number of disturbing questions.
As the Commission has not yet responded to our letter of November 13, I ask that you include responses to the following questions in your l
reply.
Throughout the corre'ctions and comments on the October draf t, the utility repeatedly deleted the term " qualify" and replaced it with " analyze" or " evaluate".
This substitution is significant bacause it addresses the issue of responsibility.
One of the PG&E cmployees who reviewed the October draft, Mr. J. J. McCracken, explained the difference in a handwritten comment that, "PGEE can have analysis done by a supplier or consultant, but ultimate responsibility for qualification must rest with the licenses -
PG&E.
Stating otherwise will red flag the NRC."
(1)
In view of these changes, please supply the Subcommittee with an explanation of PG&E's responsibility for qualifying equipment and work.
(A)
In the case of Diablo Canyon, was any of this responsibility delegated or transferred to, or performed by Westinghouse or any other equipment manufacturer?
(B)
If such delegation is found, were HRC requirements violated?
(2)
Does Dr. Cloud's use of the " wrong" terms indicate a finding by Dr. Cloud that such responsibility was in fact performed by Westinghouse or any other equipment supplier?
(A)
If not, does the use of the " wrong" term indicate a failure on the part of Dr. Cloud to understand who-
.was responsible for portions of the equipment qualification program?
^^ ^-
3 If Dr. Cloud did not understand who had (B) responsibility for portions of the equipment f his -
, qualification program,.what is the validity o -
report?
Please describe the basis for recognizing (i) Dr.
(C)
Cloud and (ii) Robert L. Cloud Associates as quali*fied to conduct such audits.
Is there any evidence which would indicate that the (D) responsible employees of the utility or its contractors were confused about which party was responsible for qualifying the equipment?
Was Dr. Cloud's audit confined to a review of documents provided by the licensee or did Dr. Cloud (E) have access to the records an6 employees of any contractor _and equipment supplier?
If access were provided, how extensively was it -
(F) utilized?
the supporting As indicated in the October draft,'
documentation and data relied upon by Robert L. Cloud L
(3) associates in reaching its conclusions were to be However, the attached as appendices to the report.
November draft states that such documentation is l
available only for " authorized examination at the office l
j of Robert L. Cloud Associates."
What is the basis for this change?
(A)
Who is responsible for this change?
(B)
Who. determines what constitutes an " authorized (C) examination"?
What is the criteria used to determine what l
(D) constitutes an " authorized examination"?
l l
Did the utility provide all the parties to the a notice regarding (E) licensing proceeding with (i) the availability of the report (ii) a copy of the report, and (iii) a' copy of the supporting l
documentation?
I 1
4 (F)
Is a copy of (i) the report and (ii) the supporting documentation available in the NRC's public document room and Ragion V office.
If not, why not?
(d)
Does the Commission staff have a copy of (i) the October draft, (ii) the November draft, (iii) the supporting documentation?
If not, why not?
(4)
Please supply the names of all persons employed by Robert L. Cloud Associates,.either directly or by contract, who contributed to or participated in the preparation of (i) the October draf t and (ii) the November draft.
(A)
How many professionals are employed by Robert L.
Cloud Associates on (i) a full time or (ii) part-time basis?
(B)
How many independent contractors are employed by~*
~ Robert L. Cloud Associates?
(C),.What procedures have been established to determine if any of Robert L. Cloud Associates' employees or independent contractors (i) were employed by, (ii) had any contractual relationship with, or (iii) had any financial relationship with the utility, Westinghouse or any other company doing work on the Diablo. Canyon reactor?
(D)
What procedures
- Will be utilized to assure that the contractor and its employees who perform the required NRC audit are free from any real or apparent conflict of interest through prior association with the utility, Westinghouse, or any
~
~
subcontractor or equipment supplier?
(5)
One of the copies of the October draf t distributed to the utility is missing.
(A)
What attempts have been made to l'ocate the missing copy which was designated as Copy 27 (B)
'To whom was this copy.sent?
(C)
What is the function performed by the person who received Copy 27
7 5
(D)
What is~the relationship between the function performed by the recipient of Copy 2 and the scope of the November draft?
(E) -What attempts have been made to identify the recipients of the other four internally distributed documents supplied to the utility?
(F)
What efforts have been made to determine the extent of the internal distribution of the October. draft?
p I
(G)
What attempts have been made to determine the extent of (i) any additional written comments by l
utility employees regarding the October draft and I
I (ii) any verbal, telephone or other undocumented communications between Robert L. Cloud Associates I
and the utility regarding the October draft?
l (B)
What attempts have been made to produce the inserts mentioned in the October draf t on (1) pages 55 and
~
56, copy f5 (" replace with attached text"), (ii) page 51, Copy f5
(" insert here"), (iii) page 33, Copy f3 (" insert B")?
I (I)
In each of the incidents cited in subparagraph (B),
the text of the November draf t is substantively different from the October draft.
In regard to changes made on pages 55 and 56, there were additibnal conclusions.
f (1)
What actions have been undertaken to determine if such additions reflect the independent judgment of the author of the report?
(2)
What actions have been undertaken to determine if' adequate documentation exists to support such additions?
(3)
In view of the fact that there were additional conclusions inserted into the November text, what efforts have been undertaken to' determine if supplemental informhtion had been provided-l to form the basis for the changes?
l As many of the adopted changes have the.effect of (6) making the report less critical of the utility, what assurance can the Commission provide the
. subcommittee that the changes do not reflect a lack l
l
- ~ - -
,A.
- w-mw wm
---~~--a-s-~-wwe
=-w e--
-v e-
-~--5
~ ce e
--=
r~er~w-
--+-v
=-w-~
O
6 of objectivity in the analysis and report of Robert L. Cloud Associates?
(7)
On December 4, 1981 Pacific Gas and Electric Company submitted a proposed audit program, which includes the qualifications of those firms which Pacific Gas & Electric proposes to conduct the program.
(A)
Given past behaviour on the part of Robert L.
Cloud Assoicates in regard to the submission to the utility of the October draft, and in view of its apparent complicity with the licensee in making false statements to the Commission regarding the existence of the draft, under what circumstance would Robert L.
Cloud Associates be considered by the Commission to be an acceptable contractor, as proposed by the utility?
(B)
In view of the questions surrounding the adequacy and indepen6ence of the Cloud report, and the questions raised concerning the Diablo quality assurance program as a whole, what actions will the Commission take to determine the safety of the plant as constructed?
4 (1)
What assurance can the Commission give to the Subcommittee that the proposed reanalysis program will systematically l
evaluate each major step f rom design l
through construction of this plant?
(2)
How is Unit 2 affected by (i) the revelations of' construction errors, and, (ii) the safety reanalysis proposals?
\\
(C)
What is the purpose and scope of the Teledyne review?
(D)
If the proposed review by Robert L. Cloud Associates is found to be independent, what additional assurances regarding the design and l
construction of ' the plant will be obtained as a result of the Teledyne review?
l l
f l
t 7
(8)
What actions will be taken by the Commission in regard to the false statements made to NRC staff.on November 3, 1981, and associated events, to prevent recurrence?
Thank you for your prompt terponse to these questions.
Sincerely, tA4$4 A
Richard L.
Ottinger Chairman RLO:mb e
e I
e I
e 9
8 e
e e
O e
e 9
e6 a
e.
i
,-_.--e
- 5 %:.t h
- "." # 7. T
- 'll;".MT,::.".i-
~~."O.,'t.;.'.'.T U.h. $ouse of Represen1atibts Cemmtttee on Energp amb Commerce
. m.
.a,::,=,,,,,::f,,,,,,,,,.
=,--., gy s E.'.""miT UiOld Room 2125. E.syburn Teras: Offue iiinanist Pa es) 4. bases u
.Ast A b sLT.
l':"nllr,.'.,
- ".'::,00;; :.'."a utarbington, D.C.
20515 lllll%'..".lm".."' "'
':::.W':: '
7 *","";.'
".,2l'.".,,.,TCll". u..
- lll".'.' *i""4,,'"4 November, 13, 1981 L
."'" C.'"l^
u.
- %'."l" u".
~
n
,.m.
c.r Honorable Nanzio J. Palladino Chairman U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In his April 9, 1981 testimony before the House Interior and Insular Affairs Subco=mittee on Inergy and Invironment, Mr. Malcolm Furbush, a i
Senior Vice President and General Counsel for the Pacific Cas and Electric Company stated that the Diablo Canyon Unit I nuclear power reactor was I'the thoroughly stt; died nuclear poverplant... in the history of the world."
most In view of this record, the recent seristin disclosures of increasingly serious safety-related seismic des _ign_9nd. construction error at this reactor raise fundamental questions about the utility',s quality assurance Moreover, the fact that the first error, relating to the supports l
f program.
for the. piping in the reactor's cooling system, was discovered just one day af ter the Commission issued a low-power test license, raises serious cuestions about the adequacy of the Coc=ission's review and licensing I
The subsequent discovery of additional safety-related errors, practices.
described as potentially more significant than the initial error, elevate the problen. from an isolated incident to a pattern of behavior on the part of the licensee which is far below the standard which is expected by the i
As a result, the public or which should be accepted by the Commission.
issue raised by these discoveries is transfomed from a simple matter concerning the licensee's quality assurance program to a major and fundamental matter concerning the Commission's ability and villingness to l
effectively regulate the nuclear industry in a manner which adequately l
protects the public's health and safety.
The belated disclosures of purportedly minor errors, each of them a surprise to the licensing agency, shows that the NRC can and does license a on a ques,tionable reliance on the good-faith l
plant based, to a great extent, Although ti e uit,imate seriousness of the recently h
efforts of the applicant.
discovered errors and the implication of such errors on the overall safety of the reactor are yet to be determined, the seriousness of the errors is These are to the fundamental issues raised by their discovery.
irrelevant the question of the utility's ability and resolve,to administer a quality control program which ensures that the reactor vill' tre designed, constructed and operated in conformity with applicable regulations.
More ir.pertantly, questions are rais d as to the Coc=isrion's ability to detect deficiencies g, y jQ nLY* 9 Yb
/ (if g.,q....y pu
~
~ ~ ~ '
^
Ecn. Fussio J. Palladins~
Ecysmber 13, 1981 Pdge 2
)
in the utility's program and to respond to such deficiencies in a manner which dissuades repetition and which generates public confidence in the regret to say that, on the basis of the evidence We regulator's vigor.
l presented to date, the response to both the first and the second issue a.s disheartening.
4 For a number of reasons, the significance of the Diablo Canyon situation is greater than the incident itself.
First, this is the first real test of the Commission's regulatory performance since your appointment as Chairman and Mr. Roberts' as Commissioner.
We regret to say that we derive little comfort from the Commission's acquiescence to the utility's offer to voluntarily delay exercising the authority granted to it by its license and to contract for the performance of an audit of other seismic The Commission's continued reliance upon the utility's good safety systems.
intentions to' conduct this audit seems doubly misplaced since the issue raised concerns the adequacy of the utility's resolve and capacity to The failure of monitor itself and those under its direction and control.
both the NRC and the utility to discover the errors over a period of at 1 east four years eviscerates the credibility of any reanalysis either the As has l
agency or the utility now performs or contracts to have performed.
been pointed out "it is like asking the people who made the mistake and the l
people who didn't find it before to tell us what else might have gone Any real' or apparent conflict-of-interest publicly perceived vill vrong."1 undermine the attempt to restore pubMe confidence in the safety of the plant and the ability of the utility and the Com=ission to provide for the public safety.
A second f actor which magnified the significance of the events at Diablo Canyon concerns the public controversy and demonstrations which have
=
The disclosure of these errors
-surrounded *"tTse' licensing of this reactor.
has not only resuscitated the protest, but also vindicated the position of those who have argued that the reactor is unsafe and vested these opponents
- Moreover, with a degretof credibility that was previously unattainable.
the credibility of'the protestors has been gained at the expense of the Commission which appears incapable of discovering that the wrong blueprints were used in constructing-a portion of the plant, and greets such discoveries with apparent nonchalance.
7 The f ailure of the Commission to either revoke, suspend, or minimally,
. add restrictive amendments, to the e'risting low power test license in spite
/ of disclosures of errors of apparently increasing significance strains the f aith of all but those most devoted to a belief in the Com=ission's
, f" comitment to a vigorous and independent regulatory regime.
The Commission's position in this instance. is undermined by the Commission staff's public concession that the di'sclosures were of sufficient magnitude The Co==ission's to have prevented the issuance of the license originally.
failure to initiate formal action against the existing license becomes 28, 1981.
- 1. "Questicus at Diablo Canyon," San Jose _Mercurv News, Oct.
son. Uun:iT y.7smpfcrc.a2 Novc=ber 13, 1981
?.oge 3 indef ensible when it is admitted that tht license should not have been issued in the..first_ place.
The third and perhaps most significant factor regarding the Con =ission's performance regarding Diablo Canyon concerns provisions in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's authorization bill which vests the Com=ission with.the authority to issue temporary operating licenses in advance of completion of any hearing required by sections 189 and 192 of the Provisions in the recently passed House version of the Atomic Energy Act.
bill allow a temporary operating license be issued when all the non-hearing provisions of the Act are ' met - when the reactor is in compliance with all the rules and regulations of the Commission.
The Com=ission's failure to insist that an existing licensee comply with these requirements raises serious questions as to wheth : the Commission is coepetent to administer this new authority in a responsible manner with the degree of protection intended by its sponsors. Moreover, in view of its past performance, the deference given the utility in this instance by allowing it to continue to possess a license which should not have been issued in the first instance and by relying upon informal and extra-legal agreenents challenge the presumption that the exercise of exclusive federal authority in this area is adequate to protect public health and safety.
I The final factor raised by the Diablo Canyon situation regards the l
Com=ission's overall concern for qua,Lity assurance. A spokesman for PG&E is l
quoted in the Wall Street Journal as acknowledging that "we had a breakdown in our quality assurance." Diablo Canyon bovever, is not the only reactor to have experienced such problems recently.
Similar situations have occurred at WNPPS Unit 2, Midland 162, Marble Hill, Zimmer and So. Texas Clearly, there has been a major breakdown in the Co==ission's i
Project 167.
l overall system of quality control, as is evidenced by reactors in different parts of the country facing similar problems. The entire program needs to be reviewed and strengthened.
In regard to the specific problem at the Diablo Canyon power reactor, we are advised that at a November 9, 1981, briefing, both NRC staff and Com=issioners recognized the need for an independent audit and a complete reverification of all seismic-related activities performed by subcontractors In view of this Co==ittee's concern raised and the quality control program.
by the Diablo disc.losures, you are requested to supply the following information:
Please provide, prior to the issuance of the 50.54(f) letter, the 1.
definition of the terms (i) " independent," (ii)'" competent," (iii)
" integrity," and (iv) " complete."
Please provide the criteria to be used in assuring that the l
2.
i preposed audit vill be " independent."
Mg 4
4
_...~..--,.,_...._n
.n
2cn. runzio 8. >1aXB
.a novemb2r 12,1981 Pago 4 3.
In view of the licensee's past. performance, and that of its subcontractors, what procedures vill be utilized to ensure that there are no cor.Ilicts-of-interests in the perf ormance of-any-required audits?
4.
What plans does the KRC have to ensure that.a similar situation vill not arise at other plants now under construction? What, if any, additional quality control procedures does the NRC propose to institute in its incpection program?
Sincerely, John D. Dingell, Chairm n Richard L. Ottinger, Chairman Coc:mittee on Energy & Commerce Subcomittee on Energy Conservation
& Power l
A.
l*
l
(*
g 1
i e
9 aS w
.c
--.,m
_