ML20078R880
| ML20078R880 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/11/1983 |
| From: | Aamodt M, Aamodt N AAMODTS |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8311150335 | |
| Download: ML20078R880 (34) | |
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AAM - 11/11/83 i
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Ugo BEFORE THE COMMISSIONERS:
Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman p
Victor Gilinsky I 4 M f,y p Thomas M. Roberts OF 00go Sg 4 s Q,;;-
James K. Asselstine Frederick M. Bernthal In the Matter of METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, et al.
Docket 50-289 SP
-(Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1)
AAMODT REPLY TO COMM]iNTS OF PARTIES CONCERNING RESOLUTION OF MANAGEMENT ISSUES; ADDITIONAL BASES TO SUPPORT AAMODT MOTION TO DJiNY LICENSE INCLUDING DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INDICTMENTS Table of Contents bee Introduction 1
Summary 2
Discussion 3
l Other Parties' Positions for Postponement l
to Accomodate a Prolonged NRC Secret Investigation of Hartman Matter 3
Impact of Recent D0J Indictments on an Expeditious Hearing on the Hartman Matter 4
Denial of License as Alternative to an Expeditious Hearing of Hartman 8
Further Consideration of Conservation l
of Agency Resources
................. 12 l
Licensee's Arguments for the Commission's Lifting of the Suspension of the Licensee to Operate Unit 1
................... 14 Public Health and Safety
............. 16 Correction and Addendum to October 27, 1983 Comments
....................... 17 Conclusioh
............................. 17 1
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8311150335 831111 PDR ADOCK 05000289 9h a
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Table of Contents, contd. - Letter of Richard W. Starostecki, Director, Division of Project.and Resident Programs to H. D. Hukill, Director, TMI-1, October 28, 1983, subject:
Inspec tion Reports 50-289/83-25 and 26 - DOJ Indictments, November 7, 1983 0 - Pages 5, 8, 9, (Sections thereof), Licensee 's Response.to Commission Order of October 7, 1983 pendix A - Report, Philadelphia Inauirer, November 8,1983 AgDisputes Delayed Indictment" by Jim Detjen and Susan FitzGerald, Inquirer Staff Writers
- Attachments 1 - 7, in support of Aamodt Motion for denial of license were provided in Aamodt Comments of October 27, 1983.
The additional bases, not available at the time of the motion, are provided 'in Atta'chments 8-10.
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1 Introduction The Commission's October 7, 1983 order stayed the Appeal Board's Order (ALAB-738) that an immediate hearing of the Hartman allegations be provided.
The Commission stated its intent to review the Appeal Board's decision and requested parties to the management phase of the Restart Proceeding to submit comments.
The commente were to address the resolution of the issue of TMI-1 plant and corporate management integrity in view of the number of open matters and taking into account the Commission's interest in conserving agency resources.
The following parties to the management phase of the Restart Proceeding responded:
the Licensee, the NRC Staff, Three Mile Island Alert (TMIA) and the Aamodte.
Another party to the Restart Proceeding, Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS),
not having participated in the hearing of management issues, responded and motioned to be~a party to subsequent litigation.
s The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, previously active on management issues, did not respond.
After the parties filed their responses, the Department of Justice acted to indict Metropolitan Edison Company on eleven
. counts of criminal conduct.
The indictment was based on the allegations of Harold Wayne Hartman, Jr. in May of 1979 i
concerning falsification of leak rate data at the Unit 2 reactor.
from October of 1978 until the accident.
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- Summary We stand by our position in our. response of October 27, 1983 that the NRC must provide an expeditious administrative hearing of the single most important open matter concerning management competency / integrity, the Hartman allegations.
This hearing should not be postponed to provide for a prolonged, secret NRC investigation by the Office of Investigations expected to last until March 30, 1984.
The need for such extensive investigation has not been explained.
We know that NRC had nearly completed its investigation by March of 1980 before referral to the Department of Justice, and at that time, had verified that leak rates were falsified at Unit 2 as alleged by Hartman.
Two other investigations (Licensee's and DOJ's) have verified the Hartman allegations.
Concerning
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corporate involvement, DOJ has indicted the Metropolitan Edison Company.
The development of additional evidence, pertinent to the Reatart Proceeding can be most expeditiously and appropriately accomplished through parallel administrative and criminal proceedings.
Rather than await the conclusion of the D0J trial for criminal aspects, the administrative proceeding should be convened promptly to address those aspects which are uniquely within the jurisdiction of the Commission.
Protection of the public's health and safety, the unique responsibility of the Commission, requires prompt resolutica of the competency / integrity issue and pre-empts D0J's responsibility for criminal prosecution.
There is, however, no good reason for either agency to await the other.
. Discussion Other Parties'. Positions for Postponement to Accomodate a krolonged NRC becret Investigation of Hartman hatter Three parties. (the NRC Staff, TMIA and UCS) supported the (previously-touted) Staff position that the Hartman hearing should await the conclusion of NRC's investigation or until after March 30, 1984.
We fully addressed the absurdity of such a postponement in our comments of October 27, 1983.
Three additional arguments provided by TMIA and UCS are without merit and/or have been mooted by the D0J action.
TMIA's belief that better evidence could be obtained after the statute of limitations for criminal action had run, or after March 30, 1984, assumed inaction by DOJ and has been mooted by D0J's action.
TMIA's need for postponement,because of insufficient resources to participate in the Steam Generator Repair hearing as well, has been met by UCS's offer of superior resources.
(See UCS Motion of October 24, 1983)
UCd's support of an extended OI investigation, as a path to discovery of information to prepare for the subsequent hearing, is without merit.
It assumes that OI will adequately develop the needed information.
It does not provide for I
discovery by the parties during the OI investigation.
It does
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not take into account the NRC's inadequate performance in its l
investigation of the cheating on tests at Unit 1.
We have fully discussed our misgivings (in our October 27 response) concerning DI!s investigation to develop the remaining i
evidence (the identity of individuals and management involved in the leak rate falsification).
New information, provided by I
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the Philadelphia Inouirer, indicates that the ingdaqu2cies of NRC investigations may be planned.
(See Appendix A)
The NRC Staff has had sufficient time in the intervening four and one-half years to fully investigate the Hartman matter.
The NRC's failure to do so has not been adequately explained.
We find the explanations offered so far (misunderstandings between NRC and DOJ or deference to DOJ) inadequate.
NRC has experienced legal counsel who must have been aware of the legal bases, now cited in the Commission's Order of September 21, 1983 (Docket 50-320, at 5-11).
In addition, three decision of the court, handed down in 1980 upheld f
NRC's pursuit of matter in common with DOJ.
(United States v.
McGovern, 87 F.R.D. 582, 584, 590 -- cited in Commission's September 21, 1983 Order, at 10)
The three parties, ( NRC Staff, TMIA and UCS) have provided no meritorius reasons to cause the Commission to overturn the Appeal Board's August 31, 1983 decision which directed a prompt hearing of the Hartman matter.
Impact of Recent DOJ Indictments on an Expeditious Hearing on the Hartman hatter l
We have considered two legal bases and a practical matter to determine whether NRC should postpone its administrative l
hearing of the Hartman matter while LOJ proceeds to trial on the criminal aspects.
We.have concluded that XhC should not await the conclusion of the D0J proceeding.
We have considered 1
l the possible affects on the DOJ proceeding and the public's I
interest.
One bar to parallel proceedings could be an improper I
influence on the grand jury.
The Commission has, however,
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already cenciderad cnd rajactcd thic crguncnt wh n forw2rdcd by the forty-seven individuals subpoenaed by OI.
The Commission's decision is as follows (September 21, 1983 Order,at 7-8):
Movant argues, however, that both policy interests relied on by the Supreme Court in IaSalle apply here.
Movant maintatas that a resumption by the NRC of its investigation would hamper the role of the grand jury as a principal tool of criminal accusation, and that it would improperly broadsn the Governmgnt's opportunities for criminal discovery.
The Commission disagrees.
The NRC's pursuit of its own civil investigation for civil enforcement purposes will not hamper the role of the grand jury.
Nor will the NRC's civil investigation broaden the Government's opportunities for criminal discovery, because the grand jury's subpeona powers are as great, if not greater than, those of the NRC.
The court in SEC v. Dresser Industries, suura, In directly addressed these same arguments.
Dresser, the court upheld parallel civil and criminal investigations by the Securities &
Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice, respectively, into the rame matter.
The Dresser court stated that the reasoning of laSalle could not be extended to an agency with a wide-ranging mandate to make investigations as necessary to protect the public from violations of the security laws.9 i
8Movant provides no support for these arguments beyond his assertion that the NRC has already provided the Justice Department with the information l
it developed during its earlier investigation into this matter.
There is no bar to the NRC sharing l
information with the Justice Department, and doing t
l so does not of itself amount to an improper influence on' the grand jury.
See SEC v. Dresser, supra at 1383-87.
For the NRC to brief the Department of Justice on the information in its possession is "in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act. 42 U.S.C. 2271." CLI-80-22, 22NRC 724, 728 (1980).
See also United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1970) (redecting argument that use of civil discovery to compel answers to interrogatories that could be used to build government's case in a parallel criminal proceeding required reversal of criminal convictions).
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... - 9 'lhe court stated that "the langunga of the securities laws and the nature of the SEC's civil enforcement responsibilities require that the SEC retain full powers os investigation and civil enforcement action, even after Justice has begun begun a criminal investigation into the same alleged violations."
628 F.2d at 1379.
~~ Another potential bar to parallel proceedings is also addressed in the above citations, i.
e., whether the criminal investigation would be hampered.
As can be seen (above), the Commission clearly stated that "NRC's pursuit of its own civil investigation for civil enforcement purposes will not hamper the role of the grand jury."
The Commission recognized (Order, at 10) that there is a "large and very real public interest in the expeditious and comprehensive resolution of the matters of the Three Mile Island f
accident.
Such was the decision of the court (United States v.
McGovern, 87 F.R.D. 590) over three years ago.
Since no significant safety-related matters, such as the Hartman matter, can be resolved by an NRC investigation even after the record of a hearing has closed, the NRC. is obliged, according to the above rulbag,to provide an immediate hearing.
The LOJ trial cannot do that for NRC.
Even if D0J should fail to prove its charges of criminal conduct, there is no assurance from that court concerning the adequacy of management or the competency and integrity of the operators of the plant.
Sequential hearing of the Hartman matter would prolong the resolution of restart of Unit 1 beyond the public's capacity to endure.
The Commissioners are well aware of sentiment of the public as expressed by Dauphin County Commissioner John hinnich when he appeared before the Commission recently.
According to Commissioner Minnich, the public wants the TMI matter "off their backs".
As a practical matter, any positive advantages to be gained from secrecy would be minimal in view of the " oldness" of the Hartman matter and the number of preceding investigations.
The.only deprivation of information about which we have any surety is to the parties and public.
The potential witnesses, the operators and management, are in working and social contact.
If the need arises, a hearing can be conducted in camera.
The Department of Justice may prefer to proceed with their trial and conclude it before the NRC opens a hearing, however the Atomic Energy Act has clearly mandated the NRC to protect the public health and safety.
The NRC must not, as a matter of discretion, abandon its mandate by deferring to DOJ.
The NRC may seek to conserve its own resources by depending on the development of information by D0J.
However, such a relinquishing of responsibility to another agency will increase the seeming and actual impotence of NRC.
Nor can DOJ develop the information needed by NRC.
Their mandates are vastly different.
The resultant delay in the administrative proceeding in the hope of obtaining useful information from D0J will be more costly; it will additionly require, at a minimum, monitoring the DOJ proceeding and storage of this information in a useful form.
This acitvity could be rendered less useful than if there were parallel proceeding since information can grow cold.
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In terms of the personal rights of potential witnesses, subsequent investigations will increase schedule conflicts.
. Closely scheduled appearances of witnesses in both courts l
will case scheduling of out-of-town witnesses.
It would also tend to produce better evidence by reducing time in which testimony could be altered to fit that given by another witness.
Denial of Idcense as Alternative to an Expeditious Hearing i
of Hartman In our October 27, 1983 comments we motioned the Commission to deny the license at Unit 1 prior to a hearing of the Hartman matter.
We provided seven attachments concerning matters which have been verified, off the record of the Restart Proceeding, and which question the capability and Lategrity of the Licensee.
Since the Commission must provide the public with reasonable assurance that the Licensee can operate Unit 1 without undue risk to health and safety and since the Commission cannot do that four and one-half years after the TMI-2 accident and after three years of litigation, we moved that the Commission's obligation to the public interest was to resolve by denial of the license the enduring question concerning the restart of Unit 1.
After our comments were served, the NRC Region I provided their reports (#50-289/83-25 and 26) that between August 24 and October 3, as well as in June 1983, there were numerous serious violations of procedures.
An inadvertent release of KR-85 on August 29, 1903 was alleged to have been caused by "a procedure of questionable quality".
(See Letter, at 2, our Attachment 8)
The release was not declared, reported or 4
documented in. accordance. with NRC.: regulations.. >(IRF50-289/83-26, at 21-17)
'where, in June 1983, procedures were violated on three
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ocparato occonions in tho transfer of solidified radioactive waste, the report stated, "Although you identified these items and took immediate corrective actions, it appears that they could have been reasonably precluded by corrective actions implemented for previous violations in this area in the past."
The Covering Letter to the Inspection Reports, cited above, is provided as additional evidence in support of our motion to deny the license (See Attachment 8).
Repeated failures of Licenaea to correct identified deficiencies have been evident j
the close of the main portion of the Restart Proceeding.
At that time we found slapdash remedies, adopted for identified deficiencies in the augmented training ordered by the Commission, which needed to be changed again after the focus of the Reopened Proceeding.
Then,aftedcompromiseoftheRadiationWorkerFermit tests was discussed and procedures initiated to secure the tests and answer sheets, only a few months later in May 1982, the tests and answer sheets were left lying on open shelves in the training department on two separate occasions.
This failure of licensee to keep its promises was noted by Judge Milhollin in his report of the Seopened Proceeding.
Judge Eilhollin's strong indictment of licensee's trustworthiness is added as corroborative evidence in Attachment 8.
The eleven counts of criminal behavior cited in the DOJ indictment of November 7,1983 are provided as Attachment 9 and speak for themselves.
_ _. - _. Attachment 10 provideo portions of tho Liccnoco's October 27, 1983 comments which demonstrate the uncontrite attitude of a management which has engaged in criminal acts.
Licensee knowingly attempts to misrepresent the Hartman allegations as "yet unproven" and unrelated to the restart of Unit 1.
We now know for sure that Dieckamp's heated denial, before the Commission on Fay 24, 1982 of Licensee's own verifi-cation of the Hartman allegations,was an attempt to coverup.
Licensee 's comments, concerning the significance.of the issue of management integrity, are most damning.
Licensee considers the expansion of the'. issue by discovery of related matters in the GPU v. B&W court trial documents to be a ruse by the Staff to delay the Commission's decision concerning restart.
Idcensee states (at pages 8, 9 --included in Attach-ment 10):
It (management integrity issue) has crept into the proceeding in filings by the Staff which fail to define the term and which give no indication as to how past deficiencies, assuming they exist, bear on the qualific-ations of present management to operate TMI-1 safely.
The' term " management integrity" has become a peg for a potential continued delay in reaching the decision on restart which the Commission originally stated it expected l
to reach more than three years ago.
Instead of the Licensee placing the blame for' delay on i
i itself as well -- for not bringing forward the evidence concerning verification of the Hartman allegations and the other matters revealed in the GPU v. B&W court trial, Licensee has the audacity to accuse the Staff and,in addition, the Commission of a lack of " decent respect" towards individuals within the TMI organization, service customers and investors for their actions of irresponsibility toward the public health and safety.
11-These three attachmenta and tho coven provided with our October 27, 1983 comments are more than sufficient evidence of the lack of the Licensee's integrity and competency.
- Clearly, the Commission has sufficient evidence to deny the license to operate Unit 1.
For the Commission to fail to do so is not understandable.
For the Commission'to fail to do so and to postpone the Hartman hearing is unconscionable.
The evidence included in our attachments is not exhaustive of the open matters of alleged lack of competency and integrity.
Other evidence exists on and off the record, some more complete than others.
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not included in any One matter of significance party's comments, but of considerable interest to us for sometime, is the qualifications of the personnel employed at Unit 1.
Recently, the NRC Staff released information held in secret since February 1, 1983 which reveals unresolved allegations concerning collusion between TMI management an j
an employment agency in falsifying pre-employment screening records.
Several books written by former employees provide evidence which parallels that in recently identified open issues and entirely new matters.
We have not had sufficient time to complete our reviews of this material in order to identify significant information.
Failure of the NRC Staff to adequately heed these individuals, who tried initially to give their " stories" to the authorities, has been a gross error.
The supposed incredibility of these first-hand witnesses, l
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- such co Harry C. Willir_ms, Jr., a formar guard, has blindcd the NRC, so far, to the criminal nature of the Licensee.
To consider all evidence that can be revealed would, however, be a waste of agency resources.
That is, unless the Commission is so inured as to find the evidence presented in our ten attachments insufficient to compel a decision to deny restart of Unit 1.
The verified information, available to the Commission, can only lead a responsible agency to the expeditious conclusion of the i
Restart Proceeding.
The evidence is duplicative and undeniable
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that procedural non-compliance, falsification of records, compromise of tests and other cheating including denial of knowledge and withholding of information were and m commonplace in the operation at TMI and accepted by the management.
The only acceptable alternative to an expeditious hearing l
of the issue of management integrity is the denial of the license.
latter This/ path would be the most resourceful in terms of conservation of agency resources and the fairest.
Further Consideration of Conservation of Agency Resources As discussed in our comments of October 27, 1983, the expeditious hearing of the Hartman matter will result in the t
greatest conservation of agency resources aside from an immediate decision to deny the license.
The.Hartman matter, unresolved, j
remains the most significant information that licensee bears the burden to disprove before the Commission can lift the suspension of the license.
The added information of the D0J indictments would cause any reasonable mind to conclude that licensee cannot meet that burden.
We would view with great suspicion any decision by the Commission other than an expeditious 4
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hocring of the Hartman matter or a denial of the license.
There can be no argument made for conservation of agency resources, the alleged purpose of the Commission in staying the Hartman hearing, by the choice of any other course of actis All other matters raised since our motion concerning the Hartman matter provoked the Staff's attention on April 18, 1983, can be considered in the framework of the Hartman hearing.
Individual consideration of these matters unf airly diminishes their significance and would be a waste of agency resources.
We find, however, that the matter of misleading information provided after the Unit 2 accident must be reconsidered in a separate hearing.
Although this matter is on appeal, to await the inevitable ruling of the Appeal Board for a reopening --
due to the cavalier dismissal of full litigation of the matter by the ASLB -- would be further waste of resources.
The appeal of management issues should await the conclusion of the reopened hearings.
Any decision on the appeals of t
management competency / integrity issues will be pendant on the I
resolution of the Hartman matter and related-matters.
We addressed the futility of resolving the Steam Generator Repair issue prior to Ideensee's disproof of the Hartman allegations.
All technical issues, including these repairs, are pendant on the resolution of the trustworthiness of the Licensee.
The DOJ indictment emphasizes the soundness of our position.
Too much time as well as agency and intervenor resources have already been wasted in an extended litigation with a licensee that has demonstrated a proclivity for false witness.
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We proposed that OI participato as a party in the
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Hartman hearing and take the responsibility for development of evidence.
This would result in a full and orderly development of information without unnecessary recall of witnesses or waste of agency resourcea in going a second round of discovery, subsequent to a secret investigation.
The Appeal'. Board ordered participation of all interested parties solely.for the full development of information.
We addreseed the futility of resolving the Steam Generator Repair issue prior to Licensee's disproof of the Eartman allegations.
El technical issues, including the repairs are pendant on the resolution of the trustworthiness of the Licensee.
The DOJ indictment emphasizes the soundness of our position.
Too much time as well as agency and intervenor resourceshavealreadybeenwastedinanextendedlItigation with a Licensee with an identified proclivity for false witness.
i ii Licensee's Argumerts for the Commission's Lifting of the Suspension of the License to Operate Unit 1 We must agree with Licensee that the Commission's extended schedule for the resolution of management / integrity issues is an invitation for Licensee to demand a lift of the license suspension. '1he otitrage'ous schedule of investigations well into 1984 and a commission decision as late as mid-1985 (inview of the Commission's August 9,1979 Order for an expeditious hearing).
makes the Licensee's demand appear not unreasonable.
he are inclined to question whether NRC has set the stage for Licensee's response.
The severe financial burden imposed on Licensee by the delay cannot be denied or ignored.
Licensee has signaled its diminishing capability to finance the cleanup
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- of Unit 2 by a sizeable cut in the numbers of workers.
The Gommission%s concern for public health and safety due to the continued delay in the cleanup of Unit 2 could be factored into the Commission's decision on Unit 1 restart.
We would find t such a course, if chosen by the Commission, to be illegal as well as short-sighted.
Fortunately, it need not be considered further because the IOJ indictments have cut-short any thance a decision for restart may have had.
Nevertheless, Licensee's arguments for the lifting of the license suspension are flawed.
In fact, they provide an additional basis for denial of their operating license.
Licensee misrepresented the evidence to date concerning the open matters presented in Licensee's Response as Attachments 1-11.
Licensee's selfaserving op.'nions, which it seeks to have accepted as evidence, are incorrect.
Where Licensee cannot overcome the. facts of the matter, Licensee repeats a familiar excuse for its failure,1.
e.," reorganization!'.
Licensee cited no legal basis for its position that the deeds of any individuals who may have been involved in the Hartman matter should not be imputed to the Licensee.
Even if there were such a legal basis, in this particular instance it would not apply.
Clearly, individuals within the company would have no inclination to keep the plant in operation in violation of technical specifications nor would they 'thet had the authority to act in that manner without the dire-t' <a '
- f. approval of the management.
The TMI-1 corporate management (Kuhns, Dieckamp, Arnold, long) and the plant manager (Ross), all with poseible links to the falsification of leak rates, recein.
_ Although the ranponsibility for th9 "faloifiesticus" es alleged by Idcensee is totally incredible, Licensee's argument does not make the Hartman matter go away.
If Unit 2 were
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operated in violation of technical specification without the knowledge of plant and corporate management, that fact, in itself, l
l would demonstrate such a level of incompetence as to demand i
revocation of the operating license.
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Idesnsee objects to the issue of " management integrity",
not finding the Commission's orders for the license suspension as requiring a litigation of this specific issue.
Licensee overlooks the Commission's specific direction of the ASIB to identify any other issu;s that needed resolution and the fact that the cheating of Idcensee's operators on NRC licensing exams identified the issue to the ASLB.
Public Health and Safety We are concerned that the Commission has entered a new standard, the conservation of agency resources, into the schedule for the conduct of the Restart Proceeding.
We believe that the Commission's primary responsibility for the public health and safety in the TMI area may be affected.
The NRC's failure to consider the Hartman matter as first order of business in the Restart Proceeding has already failed the public interest for an expeditious resolution of the issue of GPU management.
The maintenance and functional testing of Unit 1 and the hazardous cleanup of Unit 2 have been allowed to remain in irresponsible hands.
The Commission has been aware for sometime of procedural violations in refurbishment of the polar crane at Unit 2, a situation which held serious potential as a threat to public health and safety.
The Commission now has the Region I inspaction reports of significant violation of regulations at Unit i during the period of June to October,1983.
The potential for future threats or bajury to'public health and safety must be recognized while the TMI plants continue under the present management.
The actions of GPU at TMI must also evoke some action by Commission concerning this corporation's management of other nuclear facilities, namely Oyster Creek and Peach Bottom, and the proposed licensing of Limerick.
Correction and Addendum to October 27. 1983 Comments I
Where we referred to lost radiation records at pages 4, 9, and 11, correction should be made from "inplant" to
" survey" records.
Reference 19 on page 22 should.. include NUREG-0600, at II-3-97 of which the referenced portion is as follows:
As noted earlier, the investigators have identified problems with the surveys conducted by the licensee, i.e.,
the periods from 1700 to 2400 on March 28 and 0340 to 0910 on March 29 when an inadequate assessment of radiological conditions was made.
In addition, it annears that oritinal radiation survev records have been discarded Ctef. 194), leaving the only record of survey results being those radioed in and recorded by personnel in the ECS (Ref. 169, 174).
(emphasis added)
However, our conclusion on the necessity of a separate hearing of this matter remains the same as in our October 27 comments.
The recent information of alleged. criminal conduct of.*TMI management and the substance of the charges provide new force to our deduction that the records were intentionally lost.
Conclusion The Commission must act immediately to deny the license at Unit 1 or to provide an expeditious hearing of the Hartman matter.
The Commission's responsibility for public health and safety requires a denial of the license in view of the evidence available.
This action of the Commission would also satisfy the real and present public interest in an immediate resolution.
of the restart question.
In the event that the Commission fails to act to deny the license, the Hartman and related management competency / integrity matters must be heard immediately.
The j
Commission's choice of either of these two courses will result, in addition, in consirvation of agency resources over and above any other course of action presented thus far.
Respe,ctfull submitted, I
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November 11, 1983 Marj6cie M. Aamodt
Ietter of Richard W. Starostecki, Director, Division of Project and Resident Programs to H. D. Hukill, Director, TMI-1, October 28, 1983,
Subject:
Inspection Reports 50-289/83-25 and 26.
Page 141, Special Master's Report, April 27, 1982
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- UNITE 3 STATES p at NUCLEAR REOULATGRY COMMIS$10N REGION I e
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OCT 2 81583 Docket No. 50-289 GPU Nuclear Corporation ATTN: Mr. H. D. Hukill Director TMI-1 P. O. Box 480 Middletown, Pennsylvania 17057 Gentlemen:
Subject:
Inspection Reports 50-289/83-25 and 50-289/83-26 This refers to the routine safety insnactinne conducted by Messrs. F. Young and
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T. Moslak of this office on August 29 through October 3,1983, and on August 24 through September 7,1983, respectively, of activities' authorized by NRC License No. DPR-50 and to the di'scussions of their findings held by Mr. Young with your-self and by Mr. Moslak with Mr. R. Toole of your staff at the conclusion of the respective inspections.
Areas examined during these inspections are described in the NRC Region I Inspec-tion Reports which are enclosed with this letter. Within these areas, the inspec-tions consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, independent measurements, and observations by the in-spectors.
Apparent violations of NRC requirements are described in the inspection reports.
Due to the numerous instances of nonadherenca tn nrneadures and instances nf inada-auste orocedure reviews, we are considering these occurrences for appropriate en-forcement action and will be addressing these matters through separate correspon-dence at a later time. However, as a part of our review of these matters, we want to discuss with you the circumstances surrounding these related apparent violations.
Therefore, we have scheduled an enforcement conference with you on November 8,1983, at 9:30 a.m.
In particular, we are concerned about the three acoare.nt_ orocedure violatinne ra-garding the transfer of a "Hittman" lingr containints_olidifigd._radiac_tlyeaaste from the spent resin tank in June,1983. These apparent violations collectively ~
represent an apparent breakdown in the proper implementation of your radiological control program.
Althouah you identified these items and took immediata enrrar--
tive actions it_ appears that they could have been reasonably precluded by cor-rective actions implemented for previous violations in this area in the cast.
Further, we are concerned _a.kout thel wo apper.pnt orocedure vio_lations ragarding_im-proper valve positions for nonautomatic co.ntainment isolation valves.
These were identified during hot functional testing in September,1983, when containment in-tegrity was required.
In one instance, there appears to be a lack of timely re-
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DCT 2 81983 GPU Nuclear Corporation 2
1 view to resolve a discrepancy that caused a containment isolation valve to be par-In another instance, two independent verifications of valve position tially open.
failed to identify a valve in the " stuck" open position. This resulted in a reduc-tion in redundancy with respect to containment isolation Technical Specification re-
, quirements.-
Also,,we are concerned about the_thtee_ apparent violations _during_ho_t_func.tiona.1 in which valves were_inadvertantly left anan ne were misoperated that re-testint As a re-s51ted Tn safety camnonents#ina inonerable fouhort periods of time-sult, in one instanca:.a_small amount of a radioactiva tracar nas (Krypton-85) was
- 29. 1983.
The other two in-inadvertent 1v released froA yo_ur_ facility on August (1) hydrogen concentration exceeding tiichnical Specification stances resulted in:
limits in the waste gas system; and, (2) an inoperable condenser offgas system plant effluent monitor.
Additionally, we also wish to address the other_ apparent==argency and admini=+rm-tive procedure violations identified during hot functional testing. Although these apparent violations are of lesser significance than those noted above, they repre-sent an apparent lack of attention to detail on the Dart of your olant staf.f_and, in particular. first line sunarvienes.
A orocedura Other aDDarent violations deal with the adequacy of orocedure reviews.
of auestinnabla nuality may have been resDQDsible for the inadvertent relaata Af
-Kr-85 on Aucust. 2_9. 1983.
In other instances. inconsistent or conflictino operat-ing/ emergency procedures resul.ted. Here again, it appears that more attention to detail was warranted by the various individuals or groups in the preparation and The satisfactory performance of individuals implementing review of procedures.
procedures and the functioning of systems important-to-safety are directly depen-dent on the quality of the procedures used.
At the enforcement conference, you and your staff should be prepared to discuss the circumstances surrounding these matters, your immediate and 1cng term correc-tive actions, your views on the significance of the events and your findings rela-tive to the underlying reasons for these occurrences.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosures will-be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office, by tele-phone, within ten days of the date of this letter and submit written application to withhold information contained therein within thirty days of the date of this Such application must be consistent with the requirements of 2.790(b)(1).
letter.
The telephone notification of your intent to request withholding, or any request for an extension of the 10 day period which you believe necessary, should be made to the Supervisor, Files, Mail and Records, USNRC Region I, at (215) 337-5223.
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OCT 2 81983 GPU Nuclear Corporation 3
Your cooperation with us in this matter is appreciated.
Sincerely,
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Rhhard W. S arostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident Programs
Enclosures:
NRC Region I Inspection Reports 50-289/83-25 and 50-289/83-26 cc w/encis:
P. R. Clark, Vice President, GPUN R. J. Toole, Operations and Maintenance Director, THI-1 C. W. Smyth, Supervisor, TMI-1 Licensing E. G. Wallace, Manager', PWR Licensing 3 J. B. Liberman, Esquire G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Public Document' Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (N.IC)
NRC Resident Inspector Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Ms. Mary V. Southard, Co-Chairman, Citizens for a Safe Environment (Without Report)
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e can, produce true un standing. One would expect more careful atment of a subject specially require the Commission.
250. In response to the ch ng incident e Licensee has adopted new procedures for testing. The new proce s require that examinations be secured, that examinees be told ther the nation is open or closed book, that examinations octored, that seating ts be made for major examinations, and e orth. Lic. Ex. 73; long, f f. Tr. 24.
5 at 25-26. If these new pr edures are followed the administration of testing a
-1 sho rove.
One should keep in mind, however, the fact that the Licensee adopted new training procedures once before. After the accident at TMI-2, the Licensee assured the Licensing Board that its new training program would overcome the deficiencies in training which had r:isted before the accident.
P.I.D. 11 182-199, 205. Also, in 1979, Mr. Miller, as a result of the incident with VV and 0, recommended steps to " review and upgrade the requalification program and procedures," and he said that "with the advent of I
l the OARP which began at about this time.... I was confident that my recommendations would be carried out."
Miller, ff. Tr. 24,358 at 6.
According to U, however, the pattern of loose quiz administration continued af ter the accident, and throughout the OARP.
See 170, above. Y said the pattern of cooperation on weekly quizzes continued until August of 1981, when the cheating by 0 and W was discovered.
See 171, above. GG testified that l
the casual attitude toward taking the quizzes still existed during the Category T make-ups.
Tr. 25,695-696(GG). Thus, poor test administration followed the Licensee's post-TMI-2 assurances. The Licensee's latest
~
assurances must be viewed with that record in mind.
(emphasis added)
My overall conclusions _on_ the Licenseehrafn- -ing and testing
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251.
program _are nsd o ows. First, the administration of the~ testing program was 141-
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a DOJ Indictments, November 7, 1983 I
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To be Provided
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.i Appendix A Report, Philadelphia Inouire.r, November 8, 1983
" Disputes Delayed Indictment" by Jim Detjen and Susan FitzGerald, Inquirer Staff Writera
l Disputes
- d layed.
e indibtment By Jim;Detjen and Susan FitzGerald wm san wrum..
a 41t was on May 22,1979 -less than two months after the worst commer-ciel nuclear accident in history -
that Harold Wayne Hartman Jr. first told his story to authorities.
"That leak rate had to be fudged every timeh justeboutevery time that we got-it?we had'to do some.
thing to make.11 right'," he 1old inves,.
11gators for the Nuclear Regulatoryn Commission :(NRC).* 1
~ Hartman was employed as a coni trol-room operator at Three Mile Is'.
land at the time of the March'2fr*
1979, accident, which released large amounts of radioactivity into the air.
and caused more than 140.000 people to flee the area temporarily.
His contention-that he and other control room operators had for months falsified data concerning-a leaky valve to avoid having to shut
'the reactor down for repairs-inter.
ested investigators from the NRC's Office ofinspection"and Enforce-ment, who were charged with inves-tigating the accident.' c',
In the end, it would be 4% years between the day Hartman first made his allegations and yesterday's feder-al grand jury indictments against the company for which he once worked.
The path to the 11<ount indict-ment against Metropolitan Edison Co.has been tr.arked by finger-point '
ing and' feuding between the NRC and the Department of Justice. Com-mission officials charge that the Jus-tice Department allowed its investi-gation to come to a virtual standstill for 15 months and that federalinves-tigators failed to follow up crucial leads. Justice Department officials argue that top NRC officials may have intentionally worked to delay the investigation.
Between the 1979 accident and yes-terday's indictment, many Nhc in-vestigators took detailed staten'ents (See TMI on 13-A)
XRC and Justice Dept. feuds from Hartm. but h agency did M,
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not mention Hartmans allegations a ses of e arc 19 ccident.
U DN "W O And the Justice Department two
- 1. Harold Hartmem a former control room operator. ak years ago allowed a grand jury term l is9es that in the three months befcre the Three Miie asiend to expiro with no indictments, de.
acodont. safety vehes were seekng in oncess of acceptable
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rows approved by the Nucteer Reguietary Commesert tors thought they had a strong case
- 2. The safety walves are connected ta the pressuruer. a i yj ga h
j of perjury against a control-room op.
' l 40-foot-tan steel tar
- inside the reactor txaldng that regu-erator at TMI.
- istes pressure in the, reactor's cooling system.
The intlictment's handed up yester. ]
'3. Too much inakage'in ihe' safety velves could tend to i
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day came from the same federal of-
, the loss of water needed to cool the reactor's core. If the care overheats it could lead to an accident smiar to the fice in Scranton that brought no in-j:
, l eto the environment.
ore that orarred in 1979, demo which radcactmry leakad i
dictments two years ago. But the'U.S.
n.
attorney,Lthe prosecutors and.the l.;
7 grand jury were different.
lg-4l Hartman anegas that control room dperatorE improper- '
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Hartman's allegations of falsified, ! ly added water and hydrogen to the makeup tenk.Ohch.'
leak rates first surfaced on May 22, contams weeer used h4he cooing eyeesm, wehout record..
p 4
1979, when.the commission's Office og the infanmaan h pient logo He says this practme.mede 7
of Inspection and Enforcement inter-
- n appear that the seek rate was i.e. therr it actueuy woe,,
viewed him.as part of its investiga-
.thereby aHowng the teactor to contius operswL *[,.,
tion of the accident.in'the next four' years he wculd tell his story to many others: investigators with the NRC and the Justice Department-consul.
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. M.o 7e' tants hired by the Metropolitan Edi.
Hartman began working at Three Island records. He described bait 2 son Co.Jand journalists.
auxth.lsland in January 1974 es an.asa" lemon"and a'"$9 Rambler."He MII* '
Hartman contends that Unit 2 con.
ary operator at the Unit I reac-also explained how he personally tor. In September 1976, he was trans. added hydrogen to. the reactor's trol room operators, including him-self. routinely falsified leak. rat 4 tests ferred to Unit 2, which was ainder. makeup tank-withoct recordingit on devices known as ccde safety construction at the time,and promot:o-- to make it appear.that the leak ed to the job of control room opera-rate was less than the technical re-valves inside the mammoth reactor building at Unit 2. He charges,that tor, a position that enabled him to i
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operators.. including. himself. im. - directly participate in;the startup,of, quiremen'ts.
..Why did you do it?" he was asked U i 2.
properly added water and hydrogen by the television interviewer.
rf ce i ly years impressed his bosses. Month.
Hartman: We had to get it done.,1 ut eco ding th in tion t
ly appraisal reports from Metropoli... was told to o it. Get a good one.
make it a ar that the lant was tan Edison Co. rated his performance The interviewer:"And you knew it leaking le than it actual y was' lie maintains that this falsification as "high" to "excelle'it." One report was a,, violation of the NRC regula-in 1976 stated that Hartman had a 1
of leak rate tests began at least three months before the accident and con- " tremendous attitude" and "a desire, Hartman: "Uh-huh."
tinued until the time of the accident. to learn and help others at all times."
After the television interview, the Hartman quit his job at Three Mile commission bega'n its first full inves-Insestigators now contend that if the.
Island on March 30, 1979, two days tigation of Hartman's allegations.
records had not been falsified. Unit 2 after the accident.
Hartman was interviewed during a would have been shut down for re.
pairs on the night of the accident.
In a May 22. 1979, interview with commission probe shortly after the llartman said that he himself had the NRC. he said that the manage-accident and during a 1980 investiga-obtained excessive leak rates 50 to ment of Metropolitan Edison hed put tion by the NRC's Special Inquiry 100 times. He and other operators the reactor into commetetal opera-Group. but his allegations were not threw away unsatisfactory test re.
tion before it was ready and that the mentioned in the report of either sults, and the tests were continued plant was "a wreck."
investigation.
until they obtained one that met "It was dirty, there were oil leaks.
In this full study, irivestigators 1cchnical specifications, he said.
there were water leaks, there were from three sections of the agency lie has also charged that his super-stcom leaks." he told investigators. were assigned to the case. On April 2.
visor and foreman at Metropolitan "It was a nightmare to operate the 1980.the commission turned the mat.
Edison had been well aware of the plant.
. Management recognized ter over to the Justice Department routine falsification of tests and, in the problem but they didn't do any. for criminal investigation, and later fact. had encouraged him to cheat. thing abou it.'
that month suspended its own inses-When he told his superiors about the On March 24. 1980 Hartman ap.
tigation at the request of Justice offi-excessne leak rates. he said they peared on WOR TV in New York City cials.
ignored his concerns and told him and for the first time publicly de-Tim Martin.one of the NRC inves-simply. "Get a good leak rate."
scribed f alstheation of Three Mile tigators. sgi at a commission 1neet-
w delayed TMIindictment came available after the settlement ing is that there was no substantive
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in January of a lawsuit between the investigation conducted (by the Jus-(
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parent company and Babcock & Wil-tice Departmentl between November cox Co.,the manufacturer of the Unit 1981 and February 1983, and appar-2 reactor.
ently no information has been devel-Joseph Gray,an NRC attorney,said oped,,beyond what was developed in SAFETY the commission's legal staff had 1980.
ruled that General Public Utilities But in a letter dated May 17Jensen, VALVE ~'
Corp. had improperly withheld the who is now associate attorney gener.
report. "Any party in a proceeding al, said,"it is not correct" to say that PRESSUmZER{
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has an obligation to report promptly.the. investigation was "at a total "w"
any new information that could af. standstill":for that,p4r10d.
i He ackn' owl' edged'that the degiert-W q
'fect the outcome of a proceeding "he i d
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j said. "Since GPU is involved in a ment's investigation "unfortunately g
REACTOI.
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- proceeding involving the restart of has encountered urfavoidable de-CORE S
Unit 1, they should have turned over lays" but said that because of rules p
x the report."
q,-
N _4 of federal ' criminal procedure, "we,
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In May 1980, after the commission, : are not at libertyJo fully explain to
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. Department, a grand jury, was,conggggjensamindicatedAbatiha NRChad e
vened in Harrisburg to consider %also coptributed to its own investiga-allegations of falsified leak ratelt tive.,giolays.. In ; October. 4981.;De cords. Hartman was called as one of Its first witnesses. The grand Jury?'fwrole,af.riminaldiy4 ton' lawyer,ad.
idsed)ames_Cummings; director 1of
.under,former U.S. Attorney CarlonM the commission's Office of Inspector O'Malley, expired after 18 months,vand ' Auditor,- that-the commission without handing up anyindictments.V-should feel free to proceed with in-ing May 24 that thestaff had conclud-A source close to these prn-ti-T terviews-of any individuals. begin-for 11 refe th ma said that in August 1981,federalprise ning in November.1981.;,
ec w
g n the case rM _
- As far as we know, the NRC has ptlitan Edison-employe'es had fa'si-mended seeking a perjury indicti declined to interview Ihe TMI Unit 2 fled leak rates.
. ment against one TMI control-room employees and has not pursued its "I can tell you for a fact that re operator becauseof conflictsin testi r in
, cords were falsified," he said.."We., mony.he offered to the grand jury?pinquiry'4 to.the. matter,""Jensen wrote -
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wcre abre to reach our conclusions ' The source said that the. operator 4 W
h through technical analysis."
. had testified that he had'never falsi-M. OneNRC' o"fficial,who askN! not to As a result of the WOR-TV broad. fled leak-rate data, such-as Hartman - be identified, said Cummings knew that the commission'could pursue 1ts had described, but that the grand cast, Metropolitan Edison hired a F investigation, but that it was unwill-son, to conduct its own inquiry into " (ud had evidence to prove that he Minneapolis law firm, Faegre & Ben-ing to proceed Another commission source said Cummings " felt'hin mis-
"It was a good soll'd case," said the i
the Hartman allegations. In Septem.
sion was to make the' commission ber 1980, the firm submitted its re-source. But D. Lowell Jensen, head of look as good as he could under 'all
(
port to the company.
the Justice Department's criminal di-circumstances. He felt it was going to vision, thought otherwise. He de-all blow over soon, He said be wasn't That inquiry found that some of clined to approve the proposed perju J there to hang someone."
Hartman's charges were, in essence; E
correct. It found that it had been Because of questions about Cum-te had le weakn s
t difficult for operators to obtain mings' performance, the commission i
" good" leak rates, and that " bad.
Jensen has declined several re-established a separate Office of in-rates had been thrown out. But the quests to be interviewed about this vestigations in April 1982 to remove report said no conclusions could be ; natter, from Cummings* jurisdiction the in-drawn as to whether water had been An exchange ofletters that became vestigation of possible criminal vio-added to modify the leak rat, or public last spring shows there had. la'tions of licensees.
whether anyone other than Hartman been delays in the Nuclear Regula-But controversy about his perfor-added hydrogen with the intent to tory Commission an( ostice Depart-mance persisted, and on Sept. 28 the influence test results.
ment investigations of Hartman's NRC announced that Cummings had Officials from General Public 111111 charges because of misunderstand-been removed from his position for ties Corp., parent company of Metro, ings and squabbling between the undisclosed reasons. Congressional polNan Edison, did not turn over the agencies.
aides believe his dismissal may have report to the commission until May in 'an April 11 letter to Attorney been connected with his handling of
- nearly three years after the study General William French Smith. NRC allegations involving the Zimmer nu-was completed. Jack Goldberg. an Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino asked clear plant in Moscow, Ohio.
NRC attorney, said the commission's the Justice Department wher, the The NRC's investigation of falst-staff became awareof the report only grand jury probe would be complet-fied leak rates had not 3ct bec't com-after reviewing documents that be.
ed. lie noted that "our understand-plcted.
I l
Thic is to cortify that AAMODT REPLY TO COMMENTS OF PARTIES CONCERNING RESOLUTION OF MANAGEMENT ISSUES; ADDITIONAL BASES TO SUPPORT AAMODT MOTION TO DHiY LICENSE INCLUDING DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INDICTMENTS was served on following Service List on by Express Mail to the Commissioners, ASLB, ASLAB, Docketing & Service, Staff and to all others by deposit in U. S. Mail, First Class on November 12, 1983 (due to legal holiday on November.11, 1983).
c OLiu Ml
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4 9. v. I -
I Marjorie M. Aamodt Michael McBride Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby G MacRae U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1333 New Hampshire Ave., N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20036 Commissioner Victor Gilinsky Douglas Blazev, Chief Counseel&-
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Department'of Environmental Resources Washington, D. C.
20555 Executive House Harrisburg, PA 17120 Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ellyn Weiss, Esq.
Washington, D. C.
20555 Harmon G Weiss 1725 Eye St., N. W.,
Suite 506 Commissioner James K. Asscl stine Washington, D. C. 20006 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiscion f
Washington, D. C. 20555 TMIA 315 Peffer Street Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Harrisburg, PA 17102 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Administrative Judge Gary L. Milhollin 1815 Jefferson Street Atomic Safety G Licensing Board Panel Madison, Wisconsin 53711 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comsission Washington, D. C. 20555 Jane Lee 183 Valley Road Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Appeal Etters, PA 17319 Panel, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Edward J. Markey, Chairman Subcommittee on Oversights &
George F. Trowbridge, Esq.
Investigations Shaw, Pittman, Potts G Trowbridg House Committee on Interior 1800 M St., N. W.
205 Cannon House Office Building Washington, D. C. 20036 Washington, D. C. 20515 Docketing & Service Branch Att:
Richard D. Udell U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Jack Goldberg, Office of Executive Legal Director, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.
C. 20555