ML20078R592
| ML20078R592 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/11/1983 |
| From: | Blake E METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-SP, NUDOCS 8311150217 | |
| Download: ML20078R592 (1) | |
Text
-
00CNETED USilRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMI$$JOj@l14 $11I44
,.--,,e
,1
,d.
6 In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289-SP
)
(Management)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Station, Unit 1)
)
NOTICE TO COMMISSION, APPEAL BOARD LICENSING BOARD AND PARTIES In Licensee's October 27, 1983 Response to Commission Order of October 7, 1983, Licensee noted at page 6 that a
" specific written report" would shortly be provided concerning allegations by employees at TMI-2.
Enclosed are copies of that report provided to the Commission in response to Chairman Palladino's letter of October 7, 1983.
Respectfully submitted, Y
Ernest L. Blake, Jr.,
Counsel for Licensee DATED:
November 11, 1983 cc:
Attached Service List O
DR DR m5 e
GENERAL
%(.p,3 PUBLIC William G.Kuhns UTILITIES chairman CORPORATION 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054 (201)263-6500 November 1, 1983 01 airman Nunzio J. Palladino U. S. Nuclear Regulatory renunissicn Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Chairman Palladino:
In your letter of October 7,1983, which discussed 'DiI-2 cleanup activities, you requested my "...prcuopt attenticn to the findings concerning administrative and management ' controls over Bechtel's cleanup activities and
[
the procedures which govern these activities..." contained in the NRC's Office of Investigations report dated September 1, 1983.
I Although we agree with OI that there are no "immediate health and safety concerns for the public and occupational work force...", we have taken the allegations that led to that report very seriously.
In addition to me, Mr. Dieckamp (Chairman and Chief-Executive Officer of GPU Nuclear Corp ration) and the other directors and senior officers of GPUN were made aware immediately of the initial allegaticns by Mr. King. We have been actively involved in being sure those allegations were objectively and thoroughly investigated. We also assured ourselves that any deficiencies identified during the investigaticos were being acBressed effectively. In additicn, we have reviewed the OI findings to ensure our ccinplete understanding of all the issues.
~
Jiuram Ceniral Power & Lcht Company /H&lropohtan Edison Company / Pennsylvana Electnc Company
Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Page 2 Sme of the specific actions taken at the initiative of senior manage-ment, or with their concurrence, are:
1.
Upon Mr. King's expressim of criticism in late February,1983, inunediate efforts were made to be sure we had as thorough an understanding as possible of Mr. King's safety concerns. Two technical professicnals from outside the Capany (Mr. William Lowe and Dr. Roger Griebe) were asked to do an independent investigation of Mr. King's safety concerns. Copies of their report and the Ccapany's respcuse were provided to the Commissicn. The TMI-2 Safety Advisory Board, representatives of which met with you in late August, was encouraged to interview Mr. King and one of their mamhers did so on March 10, 1983.
2.
After Mr. Parks' release at Mards 23, 1983 of his affidavit containing a series of allegations of improper control of safety-related activities, the Company, m March 25, arranged for Edwin H. Stier, Esq., an experienced investigator, to conduct a complete and professional investigation of the allegations expressed by both King and Parks. His charter was subsequently enlarged to encompass all of the allegations made by King, Parks, Gischel and Wenger.
3.
In April, 1983, the GPUN Board of Directors met separately at TMI with eads of six mambers of TMI-2 middle management, as well as the Director and Deputy Director, to explore first hand the nature of organizational problems, attitudes and staff concerns.
Mr. Gischel was included among those who met with the Board of Directors.
1 l
l
..--.~. -... -., -, -. _,., _. -
Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Page 3
- o. 'Ihm Board members reviewed the Iowe/Griebe report and GPW's response.
5.
'Ibe Board was kept advised by GPW manarfunant of the progress of this matter and met with Mr. Stier three times (April, June and September) to receive progress reports on the 'results of his investigaticms.
f
'Ihese efforts did not reveal a lack of safety in the performance of work, nor a lack of -itaant cn the part of individual mainhars of management to conduct 'IMI-2 activities safely and in accordance with all regulatory requirements. Ibwever, they did reveal that there was a lack of sufficient tmderstanding of how the organization was intended to function and that some work on the polar crane had not been dcne in conformance with all the appropriate administrative controls.
f
'Ihe Board also determined that when the potential for some ncn-conforming work was brought to the attention of the Director, 'IMI-2 in mid-February, he initiated a complete review of the polar crane refurbishment work by the QA Department. The work cn the polar crane that was not done in conformance with applicable procedures was identified as a result of that review; appropriate corrective actions were initiated; and the misunderstandings concerning the applicability of GPUN administrative controls were clarified. We think it is important to realize, and we do not believe it is reflected in the OI report, that management had initiated actions to f
correct these problems prior to the public allegations and was doing so by l
means of strong management support of the Quality Assurance organization and trogram.
~
We believe that the problems identified relative to the 'IMI-2 organization and cleanup activities resulted from two general aspects of the j
situation at 'IMI-2.
w,----,---------,
---,--.--,-,-ec,-,..w----w-
---g---.--,---m--.---n.-,----w wn-n,_m,m-w-,,-----.r---my,,,
wm-g e,,,,w
,~,-r
Chairrian Nunzio J. Palladino Page 4 1.
In early 1982, the decision was made to restructure the 'IMI-2 organizaticn so as to fully integrate the GPUN and Bechtel cczaponents.
This decision was made to reflect additional insight we had gained as to the need to have the orcanizaticnal structure facilitate closer working relationships with less separation of the work into "Ccsupany" work and
" contractor" work. 'Ihese plans, and the incentives for proceeding in this manner, are discussed with the NRC staff as well as with se1ior Bechtel management and the GPtM Board of Directors. By the end of sunumer, the details were worked out and the NRC approvals needed for the first phase of the restructuring had been obtained. The new 4
organizaticn was of ficially put into place cn Septenber 1.
The restructuring was a major change for the organizaticn. It resulted in a number of the in,ter-relationships between key members of 'IMI-2 management being changed.
During the sunener and latter part of 1982, while the organization was having to make the transiticn to the new orgmization, the cleanup work still needed to continue.
In fact, sczne very important efforts were acccanplished such as the first look inside the reactor vessel and the refurbishment of the polar crane. What was evident as we investigated the various allegaticns was that more progress needed to be made in maturing the new organization and ensuring that everyone understood the j
roles and respcnsibilities of the various umpnts of the new organization.
(I would note that we believe this effort would have been
(
helped in early and mid 1983, if we had received NRC's approval of the l
change in the technical specifications necessary to implement the second phase of the new organization. The request for the change submitted in I
i November 1982 was not approved until September 1983. )
i o
01 airman Nunzio J. Palladino Page 5.
2.
'Ihe second aspect of the circumstances at 'IMI-2 that contributed to the identified prcblems es the stage of developnent of a new administrative controls system. In 1981, work was initiated on a complete revisicn of the administrative centrols systems in use by GPUN. This was a massive effort but necessary to standardize controls in use at GPLN's three nuclear facilities and to reflect the completely restructured organizaticn put into place with the establishment of GPLN. This effort was well along by mid 1982. However, the decisicn to integrate Bechtel and GPLE components of the 'IMI-2 organization also resulted in a decisicn to have a single set of adminstrative procedures for all site work. Previously, Bechtel was in the process of developing separate procedures for their work cn site, as well as off site. Both of these decisicns caused additicnal revisicns to the new procedures about to be put into place. Transiticn to the new procedures system tock place cn January 3,1983 with the issuance of 45 new or revised administrative centrols procedures.
'Ib us, the relevance of all of this is that the performance of the organizaticn, and the significance of any deficiencies, needs to be judged in the ccntext of the need to ecntinue to perform work important to ptblic health and safety while implementing a new organizaticn and the related new system for administrative ccntrol of the work. We think it is imprtant to keep in mind the many, many tasks, including the majority associated with the refurbishment of the polar crane, which did conform with the appropriate controls.
It is i
also important to note that ncne of the investigaticns have identified any work as being tnsafe or technically inadequate.
l While the 'IMI-2 program efforts were folicwed closely during 1982 by GPUN senior management, the involvement of senior management was increased during 1983'. Some of the more significant efforts during the latter part of 1982 and to date in 1983 directed toward improving the performance of the l
l
'IMI-2 organizaticn are described below.
l l
.-,_m.,,
01 airman Nunzio J. Palladino Page 6 In the last quarter of 1982, prior to initiation of the new procedure system, indoctrinaticn training was ccmducted for some 274 employees who were effected by the new procedures. Since then, an additional 111 esiployees have received such crainirg. The establishment of formal training of staff perscnnel in the specific content of procedures and other administrative requirements, as reconnended in the OI report, is in progress. We expect to complete the first cycle of the new training effort during the first quarter of 1984.
W e new administrative controls system was initially put into effect at the beginning of 1983. While not all of the approximately 200 procedures were yet prepared or revised that would eventually be needed, a sufficient number were cxanplete to permit transiticn to the new system. We remaining cnes have continued to be worked upon chring the year. Recently, as a result of progress not being at the desired rate, the Board of Directors agreed that a higher priority had to be given to the ccanpleticn of the new procedure system even at the expense of slipping of cleanup work.
%e review by QA of the polar crane refurbishment work previously described corrected the misunderstanding that had led to some of the polar crane work not being conducted in accordance with the applicable administrative ccntrols. In additicn, the Quality Assurance Department reviewed the work, the related documentaticn and verified that appropriate steps were taken for all ncn-cczopliances. At the request of the Director, Division of Nuclear Peactor Regulation, the 'IMI-2 organizaticn created the documentaticn that would have been developed had the ncn-complying modificaticos been accomplished in full conformance with the applicable administrative controls.
_m---.
~,, -
Chairman Nunzio J. Palladino Page 7
'Ihrough the sumer of 1983, the Cmpany went through the process of selecting a ecnsultant to assist in an organizational developnent program using techniques that have proven to be of benefit cn other large projects. 'Ihe field work necessary to design a program has been completed and the implementation of that effort will mmmence fonully t.he second week of November.
In addition to the activities described above, a nunber of other specific acticris occurred during 1983 that contributed to improved cmpliance with administrative controls. 'Ihese are set forth in the attached letter from the President of GPUN to me.
We believe the actions described in this letter and the attachment are respcnsive to both the four specific concerns in your Octcber 1983 letter and your request that the OI report be reviewed in detail and that identified deficiences be corrected.
I must emphasize that we disagree with a nunber of the judgments expressed in the report. We were particularly distressed 1,y diat we felt was a failure to reflect in any meaningful way the extent to which the organizaticn was dealirs with the prcblems or any understandirg of the extent 1
to which the problems were associated with a transitionary period for the l
organization. And, certainly, the report provides no credit to the organization for dealing safely and effectively with unprecedented technimi prt:blenis during the same time period it had to cope with the cmplications of the transition. We will be forwarding, in the near future, to the NRC Staff our detailed ccments cn the OI lieport.
/
Chairman NLnzio J. Palladino Page 8 I have attached a copy of Mr. Stier's letter of September 23, 1983, in which he provides initial consnents cm tlw OI hport.
We also expect to have Mr. Stier's report on his investigation available about mid-November and we will be providing the report to the ceweni saion.
We remain dedicated to a safe and expeditious cleanup of 'IMI-2 and are confident that the total organizaticn shares this commitment. We look forward to continuing to work effectively with the NRC and the other organizaticns involved with the TMI-2 cleantp to achieve that goal.
Sincerely,
}
William G. Kuhns
/rac cc: Commissioner James K. Asselstine Conunissioner Frederick Bernthal Commissioner Victor Gilinsky Consissioner 'Ihomas M. Rcberts Advisory Panel for the Decontamination of TMI-2 Service Distribution List (see attached)
GPU Nuclear NQQIQf 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany. New Jersey 07054 201 263-6500 TELEX 136-482 Writer's Direct Dial Numoer:
(201)-263-6290 October 31, 1983 Mr. W. G. Kuhns Chairman f. Chief Executive Officer General Public Utilities Corporation 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054
Dear Mr. Kuhns:
Subject:
Correction of Deficiencies at TMI-2 In response to your request, the following are examples of actions taken by GPU Nuclear to correct deficiencies in the performance of TMI-2 activities and to improve the effectiveness of the organization:
1.
The Company policy for strict procedural compliance is discussed with all personnel prior to being granted unescorted access to TMI-2 as part of the required general employee training.
(This is also the case for TMI-l and Oyster Creek. ) That policy is reviewed annually with each individual (Company or contractor employee) who maintains authorization for unescorted access to TMI-2.
This policy is set forth in appropriate administrative procedures as well.
2.
In January 1983, it was identified that the use by Recovery l
Progrwns of work packages for reactor building work, which were generated in accordance with Bechtel constructior. procedures, were not consistent with the new administrative procedures and l
effective steps were taken immediately to correct that situation.
3.
The QA Department issued a Quality Deficiency Report following the review of the polar crane work that required the TMI-2 manage-ment to document that they understood the actions necessary to prevent recurrence of the deviations from administrative controls and commit to complying with the applicable administrative procedures.
The action necessary to close out the QDR was agreed to on April 8, 1983.
4.
On March 12, 1983, a management committee which included Mr. Clark and me, an outside member of the TMI-2 General' Office Review Goard, and other senior management personnel, reviewed the readiness of l
GPU Nuclear is a part of the General Public Utilities System
GPU NUCLEAR Mr. W. G. Kuhns October 31, 1983 the organization to proceed with the testing of the polar crane.
During that review, presentations were made by all elements of the TMI-2 organization including the QA Department. The nature of the procedural non-compliances were reviewed as well as the current understanding of the various elements of the organization as to the need to comply with GPUN administrative procedures.
The discussions and follow-up items were such as to reinforce the requirement for procedural compliance.
5.
In May 1983, the Director of TMI-2 issued a memorandum to the TMI-2 management and professional personnel emphasizing that the informal interactions with the NRC that occurred to keep the on-site TMI-2 Program Office aware of plans and activities were not to be taken as official NRC positions nor used to argue against viewpoints and judgments being expressed by those involved with internal reviews of documents requiring subsequent NRC approval.
6.
In July 1983, a revised Quality Classification List was issued.
This provided needed guidance on the current safety classification of equipment and removes much of the uncertainty that was the source of a number of technical disagreements among members of the staff.
7.
On August 2, 1983, the Chairman and the President of GPUN met with about 140 of the TMI management group to discuss a number of issues.
Prominent among the items covered by Mr. Dieckamp was the need for people to understand and support the way the organization was intended to function. Other subjects emphasized by him included the need to meret all the Company and Regulatory requirements and the need to ensure that dissenting viewpoints within the organization were fully aired and properly resolved.
8.
In its July monthly report, the QA Department expressed concert. that there were not consistent compliance with administrative controls on work that was not important to safety (NITS). Although the issue had been discussed with TMI-2 management and was be,ing addressed, I met with the Director of TMI-2 and the Vice President of Nuclear Assurance to review the issue. As a result of that meeting, the QA Department performed a review, in September of compliance with administrator requirements for not important to safety work.
Although the review indicated there was not a significant problem, the President subse-quently issued a written directive to the Quality Assurance Department to routinely include NITS work in their monitoring, surveillanca and audit programs.
9.
In April 1983, a letter from me to all employees (initially distributed in October 1981 and posted on bulletin boards at that time), was posted
-,wo,- - = -,,
gw.-
.rw-,
,w.
w w--
. -, ---.--.w-,.---w.-
w -, s wyw--.--e v.myr-
_ g
,r---
GPU NUCLEAR 3-October 31, 1983 Mr. W. G. Kuhns on TMI-2 bulletin boards. That letter was reissued individually to all management employees at TMI in October 1983 and will be distributed to the balance of GPUN employees in November.
I would like to assure you that the members of management of GPUN, including the 8echtel employees on the staff at TMI-2, understand that we are account-able for compliance with Company and Regulatory requirements that apply to our activities.
Very truly yours, 9
3 4%
R. C.
Inold President h
cc:
Mr. H. M. Dieckamp m
,3-~
-m.
..w
,m3%.s,
=w.-
m._,
?r'"'-t--'-'-"r--~
T-
- Y-'WM-i
-'--r#N'tw
--'--*Tw"mW-yN"P-Y'"YT v
v--'w='r-'W'*w'w*'--'
KIRSTEN, FRIEDMAN & CHERIN A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION COUNSELLORS AT LAW 17 ACADEMY STREET ocMAmo E. f.NEmeN*
NEWARK. N. J. 07102 MAmoto re CoMAN sAcn s.nl4% TEN' (20s)623 3600 sOSEPM MARRISON (19301976) rMeLup LCwes PALCv' or coUNSCL EoWIN M. sTIER oENNis c. uNnCN S*Ptember 23, 1983 MILTON LOWENsTEIN CowAmo s. Levy orCOUNSEL MANGA#ET C. 2ALESAs GERAAo n. FRECM' STEvCN PAsTERNAn' JOHN n. EN##GMT
- mtaseta se J. & se v. Samt Mr. Robert C. Arnold, President CPU Nuclear Corporation 100 Interpace Parkway Parsippany, New Jersey 07054
Subject:
Allegations by TMI-2 Employees
Dear Mr. Arnold:
You have requested my cosaments on a report issued by the NRC, Office of Investigatiuns (01), entitled "Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 Allegations Regarding Safety Related Modifications, Quality Assurance Procedures and Use of Polar Crane." The following comments are based upon the evidence we have gathered in the course of our investigation which included substantially the same subject matter covered by the OL report.
We have reached a stage in our investigation where I have suf ficient information to respond to your request for comment. Our investigation began on March 28, 1983 and has continued, full-time, through the present.
During the course of the investigation we will have reviewed in excess of 1,000 documents and have obtained sworn, transcribed, question-and-answer statements from approximately 80 witnesses. We have now concluded the fact gathering phase c' our work and are preparing our final report.
In that report, we intend co cover the full range of issues raised by 1.awrence King, Richard Parks and Edwin Cischel, the THI-2 employees whose public allegations precipitated the investigation by the NRC as well as our own.
Although we have not yet completed writing the final report, we have reached conclusions I
concerning the validity and implications of the allegations that have been made. These conclusions have been reached by an analytical process c
I independent of CPU Nuclear Corporation (GPUN) management.
l The NRC investigation dercribed in the 01 report is far narrower in scope than the investigation that we have conducted. OI focused heavily on one set of issues relating to compliance with administrative procedures.
It is l
unclear why they did not address issues, such as whether activities at TMI-2 m-g
-i.myre-r ist w
w--e-,,-.m.
,se
~
-i-wy
,-*.ww,eyw c--
e-y-.-p
.yy----,
gpg g
yy9-,gy.---wer-g.--.m- - -. - _
wv-yy,yyy-.-ng
-=-+v
Mr. Robert C. Arnold, President September 23, 1983 Page 2 have in any way endangered public health or safety. They did not evaluate.the affectiveness of the safety review system, and the extent of management's concern for the protection of public safety.
In my view, it is not possible to assess the seriousness of procedural errors unless these related safety issues are analyzed as,well.
From the limited scope and depth of the OI report, very sweeping conclusions have been drawn by the investigators which were probably not intended to be as categorical as the language of the report suggests.
In his i
cover memorandum to NRC Chairman Palladino, Mr. Hayes, Director of the Office of Investigations, states without qualification "the allegations were not only substantiated, but we found them to be illustrative rather than exhaustive."
Presumanly this statement intended to cover only a narrow category of allegations.
L It is clear from our investigation (and should have been evident to OI) that many of the allegations made by Parks, King and Gischel are contradicted by the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
For example, all three allege l
that TML-2 management intentionally withheld information from the Site Operations Department about the polar crane load test Safety Evaluation Report (SER) to minimize the time available for them to review and criticize the SER. The testimony and documentation clearly demonstrate that Site Operations had received the necessary information and had the opportunity to comment suf ficiently in advance of their review of the final revision of the SER.
Parks suggests that a critical document had not been reviewed or approved by Site Operations or the NRC.
In fact the document had been reviesed and approved by both and bears the signatures of Site Operations and NRC personnel. Numerous other examples have been found where witnesses who allegedly possessed evidence supporting the allegations have contradicted them.
The obvious danger in overgeneralizing about the validity of the allegations is the confusion it engenders.
As important as administrative l
procedural compliance may be, it would be unfortunate if one were to infer solely from the verification of an allegation of procedural noncompliance, that a related safety allegation might also be true. We have found that the allegations must be very carefully sorted and separately investigated and analyzed to account for the half-truths and distortions inherent in many of them.
1 Even within the narrow framework of procedural compliance, the 01 report l
provides no means of assessing the significance of its findings.
A procedural violation may be serious or inconsequential depending upon its cause and its public health and safety consequences.
In measuring the significance of a l
KIRSTEN, FRIEDMAN & CHERIN
..g Mr. Robert C. Arnold, President September 23, 1983 Page 3 procedural violation some reasonable criteria must be applied beyond word for word compliance.
For example, the OI report does not apply the following criteria:
Has the physical safety of ti.e general public or site personnel been jeopardized to any degree?
Has the work activity beer subjected to the scrutiny of the safety review groups which constitute the checks and balances system designed by GPUN management to identify and correct potential safety problema?
Has the GPUN Quality Assurance Department (QA) identified and resolved procedural deficiencies in the ordinary course of its work?
Additionally, during the time period covered in the 01 report, TMI-2 was undergoing a fundamental restructuring of its management. The objectives and the ef fectiveness of that reorganization must be examined in depth and understood in order to judge whether procedural noncompliance was endemic to TMI-2 or transitory. The 01 report makes only passing reference to the fact tha t the reorganization has been taking place.
It does not analyze the actions taken by the Director of TMI-2 to resolve the very problems that the report describes.
Without discussing each issue considered in the 01 report, I will offer some comments based upon the above criteria.
Our investigation has found no evidence that any work performed on the polar crane created a safety hazard for the public or for site personnel.
Noue of the information contained in the 01 report or in any other source leads to a contrary conclusi,n.
As our i
investigation report will describe, the engineering judgments made in the course of refurbishing the polar crane, and, in connection with other activities which were the subject of allegations, met reasonable standards and were based upon appropriate consideration for public health and safety. For example, it was alleged that, in addition to procedural violations relating to the proposed load testing of the polar crane, calculations were not performed to determine the consequences of dropping the test load. We have confirmed that, in fact, such calculations had been done.
Similarly, we have investigated many other safety allegations that have been found to be without merit.
The 01 report fails to consider the extent to which alleged procedurally deficient activities were nevertheless subjected to the GPUN safety review system. This deficiency may leave an uninformed reader with the mistaken XIRSTEN, FRIEDMAN & CHERIN
Mr. Robert C. Arnold, President September 23, 1983 Page 4 impression that a procedure may have been intentionally violated to circumvent the safety review system. One example is the 01 report's discussion of the polar crane No Load Test. The OI report. concludes that the test violated site test procedures because it was not reviewed by the Test Working Group (TWG).
Seven other specific violations of the te=t procedures are set forth in the re port, including such findings as " failure to include the RBPC (Reactor Building Polar Crane) No Load Test in the Master Test Index."
What the OI report neglects to mention is that prior to the No Load Test being conducted, it was categorized as "Laportant to Safety" thereby subjecting it to the highest level of safety review. The test procedure was reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee, QA, NRC and the Site Operations Department, where it was approved by King. The performance of the test was witnessed by representatives of Quality Control. The chairman of TWC was satisfied with the test plan prior to its performance, and reviewed the test results, determining that they were satisfactory.
- Finally, notwithstanding its prior approval of the test, QA subsequently issued a quality deficiency report noting "the administrative program controls for testing were not followed." However, QA went on to find, "the test results were technically adequate." Unless the reader of the OI report has all of the information concerning the performance of the No Load Test including the details of the review process to which it was subjected, the procedural violation may take on exaggerated proportions.
In addition to procedural violations that had been identified, investigated and resolved by QA, 01 investigators assert several other violations based upon their interpretation of CPUN procedures. Varying interpretations of procedures are understandable.
Site administrative procedures are highly complex and of ten ambiguious. Their construction must be tempered with logic and recognition of their intended function.
Procedural l
uncertainties should not be resolved simply on a literal interpretation of the procedures themselves. The 01 report does not identify such ambiguities nor does it fully explain the reasoning process which led to the CPUN interpretation which the report criticizes.
An illustration of this problem is the discussion in the OI report of the use of the GPUN maintenance procedure to authorize the refurbishment of the polar crane. The conclusion of the 01 report is that it "was the incorrect l
procedure to use..." This conclusion is significant.
It calls into question the procedural validity of all of the refurbishment work on the polar crane.
MIRSTEN, FRIEDMAN & CHERIN
{.
Mr. Robert C. Arnold, President September 23, 1983 Page 5 Our investigation has carefully traced the process by which the refurbishment work was initiated.
By reviewing the maintenance procedure with the individual who wrote its relevant provisions, we have determined the basis for its use for the refurbishment of the polar crane.
He identified specific language in the procedure which authorizes its use for such purposes.
However, even if the 01 investigators are ultimately correct in their interpretation' of the maintenance procedure, the absence of a clear articulation of CPUN's rationale suggests that the procedure might have been used in bad faith.
In fact, there was a reasonable, logical basis for the procedural approach taken by GPUN, but the reader of the 01 report has no way of knowing that.
It is hidsly significant that the procedural deficiencies that constitute the primary subject matter of the OI report occurred at a time when TMI-2 was undergoing a major reorganization.
Its objectives included the establishment of uniform, practical procedures and measures to assure procedural compliance.
Shortly af ter the reorganization became effective, a new procedural system was initiated. Training has taken place and the ef fort is ongoing.
+
When the issue of procedural compliance was raised internally, the new TMI-2 Director took immediate action to investigate the matter and assure that future activities complied stric tly with site procedures. Through his effort, uncertainty about the applicability of Bechtel administrative procedures to recovery work has been resolved.
To evaluate the response of TMI-2 management to procedural deficiencies, it is necessary to understand that completion of the reorganization has taken many months. Reorganization has progressed slowly, with apparent inconsistencies between the organizational structure and Technical Specificatio'ns. The 01 report comments upon this.
However, it does not consider that new Technical Specifications intended to complete the reorganization process have been awaiting NRC approval for 10 months.
I In analyzing the issue of misclassification of activities, the OI report j
makes no reference to the Quality Classification List (QCL). The QCL should identify the proper safety classification for all plant systems.
It was correctly alleged by King that misclassification of activities had resulted in large measure from an outdated QCL.
Neither this nor any other underlying cause for misclassification was explored by the OI report. The impression created is that the safety classification system was intentionally circumvented.
I
.I KIRSTEN, FRIEDMAN & CHERIN
- - ~,
m Mr. Robert C. Arnold, President September 23, 1983 Page 6 On the basis of numerous interviews, we have identified fundamental differences in engineering judgment which have existed for some time in different parts of the TMI-2 organization. Certain groups tend to rely totally on the literal contents of the QCL.
If a system is listed as "Important to Safety," any related activity is so classified despite the absence of any safety implications. Other groups in determining safety classification emphasize the safety implications of the activity to be performed. These differences in approach have caused disagreements in determining safety classifications. What may appear on the surface to be an intentional misclassification may, in fact, be legitimate differences of opinion by responsible engineers.
The TMI-2 Director has attempted to solve this problem by updating the QCL so that obsolete systema are reclassified "Not Important to Safety" and new recovery systems are properly classified according to their current functions. The OI report makes no assessment of che potential impact of this effort on the safety classification process.
Therefore, the conclusions reached in the 01 report concerning the response of nanagement to procedural deficiencies are based upon events which occurred during the most difficult period of the reorganization. The report fails to take into account either the objectives or accomplishments of the new TML-2 management.
A further finding of the 01 report deserves some comment since it suggests an improper relationship exists between CPUN and NRC representatives at the site. The OI report, however, does not consider the stated objectives of the NRC in establishing a unique regulatory relationship with TMI-2 af ter the accident. Our investigation has found that practices exist whereby NRC l
person nel attend -CPUN meetings, CPUN transmits draf t documents to the NRC for information purposes and the NRC staff informally communicates its concerns to i
CPUN. However, this communication is apparently based upon an expressed NRC policy to " oversee day-to-day licensee activities."
i The OI report states that the investigation of allegations of harassment and intimidation of TMI-2 employees and the so-called 9aystery man" remain open and will be the subject of future reports.
Our investigation has been concluded in those areas and will be documented in our final report.
In previous communications to you we have indicated that the sworn statements of witnesses identified by Parks have refuted his " mystery man" allegations.
Additionally, a recent Babcock and Wilcox analysis of system responses indicates that there could have been no " mystery man" at the time of the accident as suggested in the Parks affidavit.
KIRSTEN, FRIEDMAN & CHERIN
_ _.. ~ _
~
Mr. Robert C. Arnold, President September 23, 1983 Page 7 4
Our investigation of the harassment and intimidation allegations was extens ive. However, it did not encompass allegations that Parks had been subjected to harassment by Bechtel which was the subject matter of litigation between Parks and Bechtel. With respect to King, Gischel and Joyce Wanger, King's secretary, we have determined that none of them had been subjected to i
harassment as they alleged.
King's employment was terminated based on a conflict of interest. While employed as the Site Operations Director, he was an owner of and operated a consulting firm which recruited GPUN employees.
Our investigation traced the origin of the information which led to King's termination as well as the internal GPUN investigation of that information.
The judgment to terminate King's employment was based upon factors independent of any safety or management concerns raised by him.
Gischel claimed that as a result of expressing concerns about the testing of the polar crane, CPUN pressured him to take a neuro-psychological e xamination. Our investigation has determined that the decision to urge Gischel to take the examination was made independent of and without the knowledge of CPUN management by a psychological counselling service under contract to CPUN from which Giachel, voluntarily sought help.
Approximately a isonth af ter Gischel had expressed his concerns about testing the polar crane to management, a psychologist from that service requested CPUN to assist it in convincing Gischel to be examined. The psychologist felt that the test was necessary to diagnose fully the after-effects of a stroke which Gischel had suffered. Failure to take the test would leave a serious question about Gischel's ability to perform in his employment. There was no connection between efforts to convince him to be examined and his expressed views on the testing of the polar crane.
Joyce Wenger's allegations of fabricated evidence to justify her termination have been thoroughly examined and found to be without basis.
All l
of the individuals involved in the incidents which led to her ermination have been interviewed and refute.her claima.
l l
Unfortunately, the allegations which have been made, and the work being performed at TMI-2, are so complex and highly technical that it is difficult l
co summarize them in a way which is not over generalized. The 01 report seems to suffer from a quite natural desire on the part of the investigators to cut througi a great deal of detail and reach the heart of the matter.
In attempting to do so, however, balance and perspective have been jeopardized.
i Sincerely, Edwin H. Stier l
ERS:lhw 3
XIRSTEN, FRIEDMAN & CHERIN
- -. ~ _. -,
~-
SERVICE LIST Dr.. Thomas Murley MILLIS 8!28Y. SITE MauACER RES30#4L &OMINISTRAIES. SEggDN !
U.S. SEP&87 MENT OF EMERSY U.S.. NUCLEAR RESULATOsv COMMISSION P.O.
32I 84 631 P&st avt.
M100LETOWN. P& $7057-43t1 ElpS OF PSUSSIA. Ph. 19446 Davt3 J. MCSOFF J0M2 F.
WOLF. ESS.. CMA!anam.
O! VISION OF TMSEE Mitg ISLAND PROSSAMS ASMINISTRATIVE JUSSE ME=23 3189 SNEPwERO ST.
U.S. SEP&aTRENT OF EMEagY CNEYY CNASE. MO.
38918 WASMINSTOM. DC. 2054$
- 08. OSCA8 E. P&t!S WILLIAM LOCMSTET ASMIMESTeaf1VE JUSSE 194 OAVEY LASOEATORY A70MIC SAFETY  LICENSIPs PENMSYLVANIA STATE UntyERSITy SOA30 P&MEL UNIVERSITY P& bee PA 16802 U.S. MUCLEAS RESULATORY CORMISSION
- ASNIMSTON. 8.C. 20S55 BANDY MYERS. 80!T08!AL
- 08. fee 9ERICE J. SMON 812 MAaEET 57.
ADMIM1STEATIVE JUSSE Mast!Stues. PA 17tes ATOMIC SAFETY ANS LICIMSING U.S. MUCLEAR RESULATORY CDRMISSION 10 SERT S. 30tS'UM 50 ABS P&mEL EAS31MSTom. 8.C.
19555 SABCDCE & WILCOE NUCLEAR POWER SEMERAft0M O!V15!0N SAa!M W.
CasTgt SUITT 228 ASSISTANT ATToeNEY SENGeAL 79te WOOOMONT ave.
SeS EzECUTtvt NOUSE BEtn8304. MS.
20814 P.O. SGI 2337*
CARRIStutS. PA 17128 JUDITM A.
DORSET SUITE 1632 St. JUS!fM M.
J0MMSBUS E%WIBOMMENTAL COALITION ON PM ADELPWIA. P& 19137 WUCLEAR POWER 435 GaLANDS AVE.
L!NGA M. LITTLE STATE COLLESE. PA 16451 S000 MERMITAsE 08.
{
SALEISM. NC 27612 880e85 F. 790W8810SE. ESS.
J SMAm. PITTMaw. POTTS AMO*
MAEVIN 1. LEWIS 6504 taADP080 TEttACE j
ffowaa20sE tsee M.
57.. Mu.
PHILADELPM1A. PA 19149 EAON!hSTON. 0C 24836 JANE LEE ATOMIC SAP 17Y Ame LICENSIMS 90480 Pa#EL 183 'ALLET E8'33' ITTIES.
P' 17 U.S. NUCLEAR RESULA70tY COMMISSION WA&MIMSTON. SC 20535 J.S. LIBERMAN. ESOUltE ATOMIC SAFETY AAS L3CEMstpS APPEAL P&MEL BERLACE. ISRAELS. L3 BE RM AN U.S. McCLEAe REsuLATOsv COMMIS$10m 26 BROA0WAY EASMIMSTON. DC 19555 MEh YOSE. MY 19904 SECRETA 9V WALTER W.
COMEN. CONSUMER ADVOCATE U.S. NUCLEAR RESULATOET COMMISSION SEPatTMENT OP JUSf!CE ATTMs CM1EF. 00CIETING & SERVICI SE AMCy STsAWaEney SeU&ste tafM FLOOR MAGE!SSUSS. PA 17127 EASMINSTON. OC 28555 EDWat0 9. SWaaTZ BOAa0 0F SUPERVISOES MS. LASST MOCMEMBONER LOMOOMetatY TOMMSWIP DAUPMEN COUMfY COMMISSIONGR SFO et SEYERS CMutCM 20.
P.O.
00E 1295 M100LET0mm. PA 17857 East 158Uts. PA 17104=1275 20sttT L. EMUPP. ESOUltE J0MN E. MIMMICN. CMA!RPERSOM.
ASSISTANT SOLICITOR DAUPMIM COUMfY 50Aa0 OP COMMISSIONERS EMUPP AMO AMOREWS OLUPMIM COUNTY COURTMOUSE P.O.
BOX P FRONT AND MAttET STREETS es?
M.
Ft0MT ST.
Matt!$5URS. PA 17101 WABt135URS. PA 17108 OAUPMIM COUNTY OFFICE OF EMEtsENCY JONM LEVIN. ESOU!tt PSEPAGEOMESS PEMMSYLVANIA PusLIC UTILITIES COMM.
COURT NOUSE. BOOM T.
P.O. 802 3265 Fa0NT & nattET STREETS MAnt155URG. PA 17120 Kast1SSUES. Pa trist NONORA3LE MARK COMEN
'U.S.
EMWtt0NMENTAL PROTECTION ASEMCT
$12 E=E MAIN CAPITOL SUILO1ME RES!OM !!! 0FFICE MasatStUts. Pa 17120 ATTMs EIS C00tOIMAfot CURTtS SUILDINC (SIZTM FLoct!
LTM & WALMUT STEEETS PWILADELPNIA. PA 19996 TMOMAS M.
SERUSKY O!SECTCt 3
tutEAU OF 840! aft 0M PROTECTION SEP&ETMENT OF ENW13UMMENTAL RESOURCES P.O. SOE 2063 NASSISSUSE. P& 47120 Dawl0 utSS OPFICE OF IMv!IONMENTAL PLANNIMS DEPaaTM847 07 IMvItonMENTAL RESOURCES P.O. BOI 2963
- A48158Ues. PA 17123
-. ~.. _. _ _.,..,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR FIGULATORY COMMISSION Befe e the Com'ission m
In the Matter of
)
)
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289 SP
)
(Management)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
SERVICE LIST Nunzio J.
Palladino, Chairman Administrative Judge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission John H.
Buck Washington, D.C.
20555 Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeaj Board Victor Gilinsky, Commissioner U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissi U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Administrative Judge Thomas M.
Roberts, Commissioner Christine N. Kohl U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety & Licensing Appea)
D.C.
20555 Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss)
James K.
Asselstine, Commissioner Washingron, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Administrative Judge Ivan W.
Smith, Chairman Frederick Bernthal, Commissioner Atomic Safety & Licensing Board-U.S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss)
Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Gary J. Edles, Chairman Sheldon J. Wolfe Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555
.. Mr. Henry D.
Hukill.
Administrative Judge Gustave A.
Linenberger, Jr.
Vice President Atomic Safety & Licensing Board,
GPU Nuclear Corporation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 480 Washington, D.C.
20555 Middletown, PA 17057 Administrative Judge Mr. and Mrs. Norman Aamcdt R.D.
5 Gary L.
Milho11in Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Coatesville, PA 19320 1815 Jefferson Street Madison, Wisconsin 53711 Ms. Louise Bradford TMI ALERT Docketing and Service Section (3) 1011 Green Street Office of the Secretary Harrisburg, PA 17102 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Joanne Doroshow, Esquire The Christic Institute Atomic Safety & Licensing Board 1324 North Capitol. Street Panel Washington, D.C.
20002 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Ms. Gail Phelps ANGRY /TMI PIRC Atomic Safety & Licensing Appeal 1037 Maclay Street Board Panel Harrisburg, PA 17103 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.
Harmon & Weiss Jack R.
Goldberg, Esq. (4) 1725 Eye Street, N.W.,
Suite 506 Office of tne Executive Legal Washington, D.C.
20006 Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Michael F. McBride, Esq.
Washington, D.C.
20555 LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Douglas R.
Blazey, Esq.
Suite 1100 Chief Counsel Washington, D.C.
20036 Department of Environmental Resources Michael W.
Maupin, Esq.
514 Executive House Hunton & Williams P.O. Box 2357 707 East Main Street Harrisburg, PA 17120 P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, VA 23212 John A.
Levin, Esq.
Assistant Counsel David E.
Cole, Esq.
Pennsylvania Public Utility Smith & Smith, P.C.
Commission 2931 Front Street i
P.O. Box 3265 Harrisburg, PA 17110 Harrisburg, PA 17120 l
,, -. -.,,.. - -