ML20078Q321
| ML20078Q321 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/1995 |
| From: | Alexion T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20078Q325 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9502210207 | |
| Download: ML20078Q321 (11) | |
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- 4 UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. semeMeM s,,e*
e HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD OF SAN ANTONIO CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY CITY OF AUSTIN. TEXAS DOCKET NO. 50-498 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 69 License No. NPF-76 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Houston Lighting & Power Company *
(HL&P) acting on behalf of itself and for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio (CPS), Central Power and Light Company (CPL),
and City of Austin, Texas (COA) (the licensees), dated November 7, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; i
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; 1
C.
There is reasonable assurance:
(i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
- Houston Lighting & Power Company is authorized to act for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company and City of Austin, Texas and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.
9502210207 950209 PDR ADOCK 05000498 P
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.: 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-76 is hereby amended to read as follows:
2.
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 69, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
i 3.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (07l00 f
Thomas W. Alexion, Project Manager Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
February 9, 1995
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 30806 4 001
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HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY CITY PUBLIC SERVICE BOARD OF SAN ANTONIO CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY CITY OF AUSTIN. TEXAS DOCKET NO. 50-499 SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 58 License No. NPF-80 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Houston Lighting & Power Company
- i (HL&P) acting on behalf of itself and for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio (CPS), Central Power and Light Company (CPL),
and City of Austin, Texas (C0A) (the licensees), dated November 7, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the At6mic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; j
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of j
the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance:
(1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have i
been satisfied.
1 1
- Houston Lighting & Power Company is authorized to act for the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Central Power and Light Company and City of Austin, Texas and has exclusive responsibility and control over the physical construction, operation and maintenance of the facility.
1
. 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-80 is hereby amended to read as follows:
2.
Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 58, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
The license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance to be implemented within 30 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WW'
'h Thomas W. Alexion, Proje Manager Project Directorate IV-I Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
February 9, 1995 i
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 69 AND 58 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-76 AND NPF-80 DOCKET NOS. 50-498 AND 50-499
\\
Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness, REMOVE INSERT i
3/4 9-4 3/4 9-4 B 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-1 B 3/4 9-2 B 3/4 9-2 B 3/4 9-3 B 3/4 9-3 B 3/4 9-4 i
l
REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.3 The reactor shall be suberitical for at least 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br />.
l APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel.
ACTION:
With the reactor subcritical for less than 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br />, suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel.
LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 4.9.3 The reactor shall be determined to have been subcritical for at least 42 hours4.861111e-4 days <br />0.0117 hours <br />6.944444e-5 weeks <br />1.5981e-5 months <br /> by verification of the date and time of subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel.
SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 9-3
REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following status:
The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four a.
bolts.
b.
1)
A minimum of one door in the containment Auxiliary Airlock (AAL) is closed.
M 2)
A minimum of one door in the containment Personnel Airlock (PAL) is closed.
E The water level is 223 feet above the reactor vessel flange.
The Reactor has been subcritical for 295 hours0.00341 days <br />0.0819 hours <br />4.877645e-4 weeks <br />1.122475e-4 months <br />.
E An Individual is available to close a PAL door when directed (after the initiation of a fuel handling accident inside containment) within; a.
30 minutes, if the reactor has been subcritical <165 hours.
E b.
As soon as possible but within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, if the reactor has been subcritical 2165 hours0.0251 days <br />0.601 hours <br />0.00358 weeks <br />8.237825e-4 months <br />.
c.
Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:
1)
Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or 2)
Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge and exhaust isolation valve.
APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.
ACTION:
With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.4 Each of the above required containment building penetrations shall be determined to be either in its required condition or capable of being closed l
by an OPERABLE automatic containment purge and exhaust isolation valve within 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building by:
a.
Verifying the penetrations are in their required condition, or
[
b.
Testing the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.3.2.
SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 3/4 9-4 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 69 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 58
3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 21.1&J BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that:
(1) the reactor will remain suberitical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for K includes a 1% Ak/k conservative allowance for uncertainties. Similarly, th7 boron concentration value of 2800 ppm or greater includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm boron. The locking closed of the required valves during refueling operations precludes the possibility of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portion of the RCS. This action prevents flow to the RCS of unborated water by closing flow paths from sources of unborated water.
3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.
3/4,9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses for the rapid refueling design.
3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The containment personnel airlock, which is part of the containment pressure boundary, provides a means for personnel access during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 operation.
During periods of shutdown, when containment closure is not required, the door interlock mechanism may be disabled, allowing both doors of the containment personnel airlock to remain open for extended periods when frequent containment entry is necessary. Both containment personnel airlock doors may be open during CORE ALTERATIONS provided one airlock door is OPERABLE, there is 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange, and an individual is available outside the containment personnel airlock to close a door following a fuel handling accident inside containment.
SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 9-1 Unit 1 - Amendment No. W 54,69 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 4b43,58
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS (Continued)
Operability of a containment personnel airlock door requires that the door is capable of being closed, i.e., that the door is unblocked and no cables or hoses run through the personnel airlock. Containment personnel airlock door closure is required to take place within 30 minutes of initiation of a fuel handling accident inside containment if the reactor has been subcritical for less than 165 hours0.00191 days <br />0.0458 hours <br />2.728175e-4 weeks <br />6.27825e-5 months <br />. Fuel movement is not permitted with personnel airlock doors open, if the reactor has not been subcritical for 295 hours0.00341 days <br />0.0819 hours <br />4.877645e-4 weeks <br />1.122475e-4 months <br />.
If the reactor has been subcritical for 165 hours0.00191 days <br />0.0458 hours <br />2.728175e-4 weeks <br />6.27825e-5 months <br /> or more, containment personnel airlock door closure is to occur as soon as practicable, but is assumed to occur within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to be consistent with the accident analysis.
These requirements assure that the associated doses are limited to within acceptable levels. The requirement to have 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange is consistent with the fuel handling accident analysis assumptions, Regulatory Guide 1.25, and Technical Specification 3.9.10, Water level - Refueling Cavity.
3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.
3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine and auxiliary hoist ensure that:
(1) the refueling machine and auxiliary hoist will be used for movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies, (2) the refueling machine has sufficient load capacity to lift a drive rod or fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and reactor vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting Operations.
3 /4. 9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - FUEL HANDLING BUILDING The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool, unless handled by the single-failure-proof main hoist of the FHB 15-ton crane, ensures that in the event this load is dropped:
(1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a
. ingle fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage r acks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.
SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 9-2 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 69 Unit 2 - Amendment Nn. 58
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION The requirement that at least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop be in operation ensures that:
(1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor vessel below 140*F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.
The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability.
With the reactor vessel head removed ar.d at least 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.
3 /4. 9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM TM OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment purge and exhaus. penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels in the purge exhaust. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.
3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REFUELING CAVITY AND STORAGE POOLS The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.
The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.
3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING EXHAUST AIR SYSTEM The limitations on the Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Air System ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1980 will be used as a procedural guide for sureillance testing.
SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 9-3 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 69 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 58
REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL POOL MINIMUM BORON CONCENTRATION The restrictions on the boron concentration of the spent fuel pool ensures that the rack K is maintained less than or equal to 0.95 in the event that one or more Yi!el assemblies are improperly loaded in the spent fuel pool storage racks (with respect to Specification 5.6).
Since the presence of boron is ensured, the rack K((ng of fuel assemblies.
will be maintained less than or equal to 0.95 intheeventofimproperloaI This boron concentration is more than adequate to ensure the K limit of 0.95, specified in Specification 5.6.1.1.a will not be I((olated under the following scenarios:
(1) in Region 1, any misloading of Category 1, 2, 3, and 4 assemblies; or (2) in Region 2, the misloading of one Category 1 assembly into the center of a fully loaded checkerboard area also containing Category 1 assemblies; or, (3) the misloading of a Category I assembly in a Region I rack adjacent to a Category 1 assembly in a Region 2 rack.
This boron concentration limit is the value necessary to ensure that the 0.95 K,,,
limit for rack criticality will not be violated in the event of a Category 1 assembly dropped in the gap between the pool wall and a Region 2 4
rack module.
SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & 2 B 3/4 9-4 Unit 1 - Amendment No. 43,69 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 32,58
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