ML20078F797
| ML20078F797 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1995 |
| From: | AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OLA-3-I-019, OLA-3-I-19, NUDOCS 9502020259 | |
| Download: ML20078F797 (7) | |
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Contgcar June 8, 1989 gg Contractcr wdE I-(f- 6 L'r, Other wanes sqos 6g 6 X' .u r
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Dennis: Reporter I promised you in the earlier letter that I would discuss a little of
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what is going on at Georgia Power. You have read several accounts that I have sent you related to the IRS investigutions, FBI investigations, political campa gn contributions, etc. There is, to my knowledge, no progress in these areas and I am told that these investigations will L.-
going on for years. There is a lot of speculation as to whether R ,
Addison will be able to weather the storm - after all, he was the CEO at Gulf Power when many of these allegations occurred. The situatton in t h ..
company - - throughout Southern Company - - is horrible.
I will get more specific about my situation in a moment. Itut, I must admit that I am grateful to have worked at Georgia Power when Mr. %11er was President. He was a no nonsense guy, hard working, competent, inquisitive, honorable, and he worked for the company. !!e ! t v. d ,
breathed, and exited for Georgia Power. The man could lead. He ash. d questions. He asked for input. When people dis. agreed with htm, thut was
,- S fine. It seemed it was only an opportunity for him to ask more q um.; t i o n s
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4 and he would admit when be learned something. Even though he was President, he was not afraid to learn something or hear a new iA He
.was not afraid to say he didn't know. He wasn't afrail to sa) h. .i t J n ' '
understand something. He wasn't afraid to ask for advice. II.- didn't m:r!
people challenging him - - not personally but on an issue.
Mr. Miller had integrity. He gave us guidance and direction and his message to us was clear. He also held you accountable for your performance. As one lower level supervisor in building serviced s, a i d to me in lamenting Mr. Miller's retirement, "We are really going to miss him. You may not always agree with the dirertion he gives you, but you always know where you are going." She was right.
Mr. Miller also focused his attention on where the company should be headed and what was required to get there. He really took an emut:onal interest in the 15,000 employees we had and he wanted them to p e r i o r n..
And, if they performed, he took care of them whether he lik f d them or not. It was not essential that Mr. Miller like you because he judged each employee on performance and what they were doing for Georgin Power.
Mr. Miller could make a decision. Sometimes he would make a snap Judgement based upon his technical knowledge, his experience, hi, managerial ability, or just his hunch. But, when a decision was made, that was the end. Everybody jumped. He also protected the .mmpany.
There were several examples where the System wanted Georgia Power to
('l change what they were doing although what we were doing was turning out the profits. But, the bureaucrats at southern, who wanted to inereuse
(~) their power, demanded that all opernting companies abide by Ihe same set of rules. Mr. Miller said no t. hat he was in charge of operating Georgin Power and, although some people at Southern got bent out of shape, Nr.
Miller's decision ruled the day.
9502020259 950111
$DR ADOCK 0500 4 Exhibit g { , page I of l
ace 4
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A lot of people remember Mr. Miller as a tough, authoritarian figure.
I remember him as a great leader, someone to be admired, a role model, a n, a loving and caring man who dedicated his life to Georgia Power and it3 employees.
Yet, Mr. Miller was a strong man. Several senior executives were glan to see him retire because he ruled firmly and would not let some of them put into effect their lunacy. I am convinced that several executives wanted their day in the sun and made suggestions just to make themselves look good. But, their suggestions died because they did not have the courage to bring them to Mr. Miller for approval. ,
What resulted was a small group of executives who wanted so desparately to be in charge that they looked for every. opportunity to enhance their position - - not the company's position - - th"ir personal position. Some of them would have sold their mother and the company outright if they could have positioned themselves better.
There was one exception. George Head. George was a technically competent, hard headed, hard driving manager who did an exception ud. . m had a weakness in that he did not have as broad a perspective as d ; d .is .
Miller and George found it hard to listen and learn, lir f. I t he hn"w his business sufficiently well to do his job and listening, learning, taking advice, or changing was difficult for him. George could not adapt. 1 gg don't mean he just didn't want to, he couldn't.
(j After Mr Miller left (actually b e ff o r e Nr. Miller i. f t , Geore hat.
assigned to report to Grady Baker. The organization at the t ino- was Mr.
Scherer was Chairman of the Doord nnd CEO, and Grady H a fi e r a m t i I no .
Grad 3 had p l ao n. !
Harris were the two Senior Executive Vice Presidents Ps.t.,4 ai.
his career such that when Nr. Miller retired, h" would lem om.
Elmer was brought over from Alabama Power to head External Affairs and t h.
word was that he could become Chairman and CEO of Georgia Power. Grady even told everyone that would listen to him that he had picked E l m.a r to L CEO at Georgia because he (Grady) did not want the job - - he wanted to !".
President and C00.
Mr. Addison became President of Southern and said Georgia Power did not need both a President and a Chairman of the Board. He said that when Mr. Scherer retired, we would have a President and a CEO and u.s Chairman.
That crushed Grady. He had worked to become President all ~ these y.z a rs au now would not get the job. Then a horse race began to see wheth.r Flmer would become President or whether Bill Dahlberg, President of Southern Company Services and an ex-Senior Vice President of Georgia Pow"r who u s. " .
to work for Grady, would become President of Georgia Pnwer. Friction developed between Grady and Elmer. Grady was obviously pushing. Bill.
Bill won because, in part I think, Elmer got involved heavily in this campaign contributions fiasco.
Back to George. George and Grady did not get along. Grady is a
( Jekyll and Hyde. There are days when his thought And, process i s. Lrillant.
you never know which There are days when he acts like an idiot.
I could go into a lot of examples whrs e person you are dealing with.
George and Grady disagreed but there is not need. I would point out that l for years Southern had been trying t o tell Georgia how to do its busines- l Exhibit b .oaae 2 of 7
. 3 1
l Mr. Miller would not let that happen and Mr. Miller and George INad were on the same side. After Mr. Miller left, Grady tried to get on Mr.
Addison's good side by agreeing to everything Southern Services wanted tu do. George disagreed but Southern is gradually taking over.
Now, however, we are left with another poor situation. Elmer liarris, is named President of Alabama, Bill Dahlberg at Georgia, and Allen Franklin at Southern Company Services. Each one of them is runnind for Addison's job. It appears that it is not so important that each one of them does his present job properly as it is that each stays on good terms with Mr. Addison. Southern is now run by a management council of all the CEOs. It is run by consensus. There are not disagreements. As n matter of fact, each CEO makes it his business to agree with what they think Mr.
Addison wants to do. A rumor can start that Mr. Addison wants something done and all the CEOs break their necks to agree to it even if Mr. Addiso knows nothing about it. We are in a heavily political arena here and right means little.
Into this situation enter one R. Patrick Mcdonald. This almusphere :
made for him; he excels in it. He is either 61 or 62, knows he is not going further in the Company, has retirement from the Navy, makes good money, and recognizes a vacuum in the leadership of the Company. lie does g- what he wants to do, regardless of what any one else says, explains it without sticking to the truth, and, in general, is enjoying life. lie get
(' along very well with Mr. Farley partly because he lies to Farley and l partly because Mr. Farley hates Georgia Power Company. Pat can g. t away with anything by badnouthing Georgia Power. Farley is Executive Vice President of Southern for Nuclear and reports to Mr. Addison.
When the decision was made to bring Pat into Georgia Power ho is Executive Vice President of Georgia Power and Alabama Power) and tu mov.
our nuclear operations group to Birmingham, I decided after my experience with him to not go. I went to Grady and told him that I didn't want to e and I recommended that we establish a contract administration group to protect Georgia Power - - not to manage SONOPCO - - but to advise GPC's senior management on how our performance was. Grady agreed to that and said he would talk to Dahlberg. I specifically remember him saying that 1 whoever got the job as General Manager of his group would have a tough time trying to deal with Mr. Farley and Mr. Mcdonald. (Incidentally, everyone in senior management at Georgia Power that I have talked to:
George Head, Grady, Elmer, Dwight Evans, and I have been t'old Dahlberg hates Pat Mcdonald. They think he is bordering on crazy, and he doesn't tell the truth).
Grady took his proposal to Dahl. berg and at some point Grady and Georg-Head talked to Dahlberg. They decided we did need such a group and it would be reporting to George Head. Dahlberg asked George who would head -
the group and George told his me. He said I was the only one in the Company left with nuclear experience, except George.
I was given the job on December 27. A copy of Dahlieerg's memo announcing the promotion is enclosed. Prior to the memo going out, Geort. l asked me how I would structure the group. A copy of my memo to Ueuree on that subject is also enclosed.
Exhibit I9,page 3 of 7
m Early in January, Pat Mcdonald came over to Georgia Power and told m.
to do something. I told him I would be glad to but that I needed to !
inform George Head since I now worked for him. Pat went livid. lie aske, '
what I was talking about and I went and got a copy of the memo for him.
Ile got very made and said he opposed the creution of such a group. lie said when the time came for such a group, he would set up the group, decide what it would do, and he would pick the head of it. !!e said hi would not have any of this. I reported this to George.
From January until the end of April when George retired, I worked :.
well as I could to do the Job assigned te me by the President. !
Unfortunately, Pat Mcdonald would not cooperate and would not let his people in Birmingham cooperate. I will not go into details except to say that Pat has refused to let his people in Birmingham even talk'to me.
During this period, I told George we needed help from Dahlberg. I must have requested a meeting with Dahlberg 50 times. George asked for many, many meetings. He had maybe 4 or 5. Each time, Dahlberg would sa: l he se;pported us, wanted us to do our job, and was behind us, i: n i , he li nothimg. Pat still would not cooperate. Finally, George asked me to ca.
Mcdonald and set up a meeting between Mcdonald, lle a d , and me. NcDonald would not set up the meeting.
Dahlberg asked him tu O Then George announced he was retiring.
reconsider and remain with GPC but George refused. One of t he reanons George refused was that he felt we did not have a leader at Georgia Power and that Bill would not make a decision and would not stand up for Georg:
Power.
Throughout all of this, I have continued to remind people that l'a t Mcdonald reported to Dill Dahlberg and, by NitC regulations, ha.I b. Iter.
told Grady, George, Dwight Evans (EVP of External Affair. onei a c."..!
friend of Dahlberg's), Chuck Whitney (Asst to Dahlberg), Fred Williumr of Bulk Power), and the attorneys that I thought we had a prolelem. I to'.
them that, in my opinion, Pat Mcdonald worked only for Joe Parley, now E
of The Southern Company, and if that were true we were in violation o f in license and the NRC could shut our plants down. Several people shared m3 concern but would not agree or disagree. George }!ead agreed. Fred Williams said all we had to do was show the NRC the organization chart.
said Fred that won't cut it.
I talked to the lawyers. They were concerned and even went so far at to tell Hairston that i f he were ever asked who he reported to he was to say McDonaldiwho reports to Dahlberg. For the license on Unit 2 at i Vogtle, the people were coached.as to how to answer that question.
Finally, George has decided to retire and he went to Dahlbere and sa4 there was one matter he wanted to get settled before he retired and that was our relationship with SONOPCO. Dahlberg responded that he knew thes.
was a problem and be was going to meet with Farley and see if they co u l .! l
( straighten it out. . When George told me that, I said something like if 1 Mcdonald report to Dahlberg why in the hell can't Bill just tell him whnt to do and why does Bill have to go and straighten it out with Joe Parley" George said, "Well, I guess we have just got the answer as t o who M.: Dona :
really reports to." George also said that Dahlberg said it w.is . wastr er +4-. fnr nnhibers in talk to Mcdonald. l PyhNt k nuo ha 7 '
g v
When we learned that Grady and Dahlberg were going to meet with Farley, I told George that they shouldn't go talk to Farley without talking to him and me first about what problems we were having. He agre.
and tried to set up a meeting with Dahlberg. Dahlberg wouldn't meet witi us.
- About this time, I was going up to George Head's office on the 24th floor and the Executive Vice President for External Affairs saw me and h-starting talking. His name is Dwight Evans and he is pretty close to Dahlberg. Dwight said that if he were me he would start looking for another job in the company because he had heard that Mcdonald and Par te:,
were out to get me fired or out of the job I was in.
I reported this to George and he said we had to talk to Dahlb.eg and Grady before they met with Farley. He tried bu.t failed. He then suggested that I might go to Grady and tell h8u whnt we had heard and wh '
our concerns were and try to get a meeting with Grady and Dahlberg. I went to see Grady and asked for a meeting. He said it was not necessary I said something like Grady, the rumor is going around that Mcdonald and Farley are after my job. Won't you at least talk to Georg,. and me' flo jumped up from his chair, threw his arms up high, laughed and continuine '
to laugh said, " Hobby, what can I say?" And, he then walked out of tho room.
I told George. He got mad and said he was lenving the compao), want to get away from those people, and he basically apologized that ihe Company did not have a backbone and would not stand up for what was rich He said we did not have anyone in senior management at GPC " worth a shit' and that Mcdonald would win because no one at GPC would dare tackle ,
Farley.
About the same time, I got a call from Fred Williams, VP of Dulk Power. He is the guy that really deals with most with the joint owners.
He said he had been asked by Dahlberg and Grady to go to Birmingham to u if we could work out the problems between SONOPCO, GPC, and the joint owners. He asked me to write down the major problems I had in denling with Mcdonald. He said he would not show it to Mcdonald but he would gi' it to Grady and Dahlberg for their meeting with Farley.
I wrote the memo (which is enclosed) and before giving it to Fred I showed it George Head. George agreed with the memo and felt so.strongly about what I had said, he said he wanted to sign the memo with,me. I has the original meno at home with my and George's signature. I took the men to' Fred Williams. He read it. He told me to destroy the memo because wt did not want something like that in our files. He said the joint owners had been fussing about Mcdonald and who Mcdonald reported to and he said that my meno showed that Mcdonald reported to Farley and we rould not has this meno in our files because it would prove Oglethorpe's argument.
g sJ I told Fred that this was a regulatory concern. I told him that the -
- way he reacted indicated that we did have a problem and that we ought t e, fix the problem before we got into trouble with the NRC. I told him we ought to concentrate on fixing the probles not worrying about some memo.
I further said if he did not have a problem, then . me no to!gige xfiibit gg m.. ant,page r .
S (3
C/ It only meant something if Mcdonald did not actually report to Dahlberg but to Farley. I told him I thought we were going to net in trouble wirl the NRC. He said there was not a problem that if the NRC ever asked abom the issue we would just show them an organization chart. Then he said, you must destroy this memo. He also said he was going to keep a copy .i f the memo but he would not keep it and he would not let Grady and Dahlber, see it. It was because of that that I went to see George and later to w.
Grady.
I talked to George and we agreed that I would not destroy the memo.
do not have a copy at the office. I do elsewhere.
In my conversation with Fred Williams, I asked him why Dahlberg just didn't tell Pat Mcdonald what to do and the whole issue would be behind us. He said Bill did not have the clout to do that. lie said McDonuld wa very close to Farley and if Bill gave Pat Mcdonald an order and Farley da not agree with it, the matter could wind up be fore Fd Addison. I asked well, doesn't Dahlberg have enough clout with Addison to win the argument. Fred said that wasn't the issue. He said Addison did not h a i.
enough clout to tell Farley what to do. He said the Southern Boarel war divided and that Addison did not have enough votes to do something if Farley disagreed and that Farley did not have enough votes if Addison disagreed. He said the Southern Board is et a stalemate an.1 we have to make do the best we can. And, the one thing Dahlberg could not afford t.
7-ss t 4 do was raise an issue between Dahlberg and Farley that woulu require
\~ Addison to make a decision because, if push came to shove, Addison was ni guaranteed that the Board would support him over Farley. Therefore, av major disagreements were to be brought to Addison.
Bottom line: Dahlberg wants to replace Addison. D a hl te r e is not going to make something an issue that will require Addison to decide between Dahlberg and Farley. No one is in control at Southern it ts shared responsibility. Farley can do what he likes. Farley lets McDonal do what he likes. And, nobody can stop him.
I shared what Fred told me with Paul Rice and Paul said that was pretty much the truth. He said Addison is working to gain a majority of th~e Board's support but he does not have it now.
After George retired, Kerry Adams, who knows nothing about nuclear, was named to replace him. Grady told him he was not sure who I would eventually wind up reporting to, but that I was to hire no' new people.
I believe that the outcome will be that my job will be greatly reduce including a reduction in pay and I will be asked to report to Fred Williams. Or, I could be asked to resign. I don't know. But, I do know this, I have tried to do a good job and have been prohibited from doing m job by Pat Mcdonald. I got excellent support from George Head. I have received no support - - except lip service -- from Grady or Dahlberg.
Everybody is protecting their own position in the company.
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\._ I don't know what will happen. It is my opinion that apc and Alabam:.
Power Company are in violation of our NRC licenses. Mcdonald reports to Joe Farley, I don't care w ' hat the organization chart says. I have pointe out over and over to management that I wa con <.crued that we were Exhibit Il,page_(c._ of 7
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violating Federal law.
show them an organization But, the answer is time and time again, chart." "h'e ' l l Maybe you and I can talk about this on Sunday.
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