Text

Forwards Addl Info Re Fire Protection in Response to Concerns Raised During 830712-15 Bryon 1 Fire Protection Audit & Documented in .Pages Will Be Incorporated Into Future Amend to Fire Protection Rept
	ML20078C375
Person / Time
Site:	Byron, Braidwood, 05000000
Issue date:	09/20/1983
From:	Tramm T; COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	Harold Denton; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20078C379	List: ML20078C375; ML20078C391; ML20078C403;
References
	7337N, NUDOCS 8309270569
	Download: ML20078C375 (48)
	v • d • e

{{#Wiki_filter:, -~ s Comm:nwrith Edison -e '0 ) One First National Plaza. Chicago, litinois O Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago Illinois 60690 September 20, 1983 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Byron Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Braidwood Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Fire Protection NRC Docket Nos. 50-454 and 50-455 Reference (a): August 3, 1983, letter from B. J. Youngblood to D. L. Farrar.

Dear Mr. Denton:

This is to provide additional information regarding fire protection at Byron and Braidwood stations. Attachment A to this letter addresses the NRC concerns which were identified during the July audit at Byron Station and which were subsequently documented in reference (a). Where necessary, revised pages for the Fire Protection Report are provided. These pages will be incorporated into the Fire Protection Report in a future amendment. Although the July NRC audit included a visit to only Byron Station, most of the concerns identified to relate both Byron and Braidwood stations. Since these plants are for the most part i duplicates, our responses to the NRC concerns ganerally apply to I both plants. It is requested that immediate attention be given to the review of our responses to NRC concerns 8 and 10. These concerns involve possible hardware changes which might not be avaiable in time for the Byron 1 fuel load. Please address further questions regarding this matter to this office, i 8309270569 830920 l DR ADOCK 05000454 PDR l

H. R. Denton September 20, 1983 One signed original and fifteen copies of this letter and the attachment are provided for your review. Five copies of the four technical reports referenced in the response to Concern 1 are also provided. Very truly yours, T. R. Tra Nuclear Licensing Administrator 1m i 1 cc: Mr. Robert Barnes j 7337N

.=- .S 1 1-t i i i 4 I i 4 s ATTACHMENT A I j Responses to 18 NRC Concerns Raidsed During the July 12-15, 1983 5 Byron Fire Protection Audit i i f i 4 i I 1 f 7337N i f I i .i i 4 T' __.,.-.._.__m.-,_.-.. ._._,,_.._-.,_.,_.-,.-,._,-_..,______,_..,,,_,.,__,..._-,_--...__,_._.-.__.,,,,.....,,_.m,,-

O BTRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS Concern.No. 2 The following features of the fire protection program were observed to be incomplete: A) The installation of penetration seals in fire walls and fire rated floor / celling assemblies. B) The provisions of seismic supports for the Hydrogen supply piping routed through the Auxiliary Building. C) The installation of fire proofing for steel structural elements. D) The installation of fire hose nozzles, hose houses and hose house fire fighting equipment. E) The third repeater for the plant emergency communications network. F) The O.S. Y-type sectional control valve at the discharge outlet for the fire pumps to avoid the necessity of shutting off one fire pump in order to test the other. The applicant should verify that these features of the fire protection program will be completed by fuel load.

Response

A) All required penetration seals for fire walls and fire rated floor / ceiling assemblies will be installed by fuel lead. B) It is the applicants practice to seismically support all l piping in Category I structures, including Category Il piping. A review of the hydrogen piping reveals that it is in fact l seismically supported in the auxiliary building. l l C) All structural steel elements requiring fire proofing will be coated by fuel load. D) All fire hose nozzles, hose houses, and hose house fire fighting equipment will be installed and available for use prior to fuel load. E) The third radio repeater for the plant communications network has been installed. l F) The control valve in the discharge header of the fire pumps has been installed. l

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BYRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS Concern No. 3 To comply with Section C.6.a of BTP CMEB 9.5.1, electrical circuits associated with automatic fire suppression systems, including fire detection circuits, are required to be Class "A" supervised such that system activation is possible automatically under a single break or ground fault condition. Information was unavailable during the audit to completely verify this design feature in the plant. With the exception of the redundant fire detection systems in the cable spreading rooms, (where activation of either system initiates fire suppression system discharge), the applicant should verify that all circuits associated with automatic fire suppression systems are Class "A", including those circuits from the local fire alarm panels to the suppression system actuating mechanism.

Response

Contrary to the NRC's documentation of this concern, Section C.6.a of BTP CMEB 9.5.1 does not require Class "A" supervision for all .ci.rcuits. associated wi-th automatic fire suppression systems. Section C.6.a only specifies that " fire detection systems should comply with the requirements of Class "A" systems as defined in NFPA 72D." During the NRC's review of the fire protection program prior to the issuance of SER, CMEB requested CECO to identify what kind of supervision (Class A, B, or none) is provided for fire detection and suppression systems. CECO's response (dated January 19, 1982) to this request, stated that all fire detection circuits associated with automatic fire suppression systems protecting areas which contain equipment or cables which perform a safety function will be provided with Class A supervision or its equivalent in redundancy and supervision. It was also stated that all remaining fire detection circuits and fire suppression circuits will be Class B supervised. Based on this response, the staff concluded that the fire detection system meets the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5.1, Section C.6.a and is therefore acceptable. This conclusion is documented in the Byron SER. Since Section C.6.a of BTP CMEB 9.5.1 refers only to Class A supervision for fire detection circuits, and the Byron SER states that Byron is in compliance with the guidelines outlined in that section. Class A supervision for all circuits associated with automatic fire suppression systems is not required. [ii

BYRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS Concern No. 4 In the August 16, 1982 revision to the Fire Protection Report, the applicant committed to comply with Section C.S.d of BTP CMEB 9.5.1 and with Section C.7.b, with the exception that an automatic fire suppression system will not be installed in " offices" in the control room complex. We observed that the computer related storage area adjacent to the control room is not equipped with an-automatic fire suppression system which is not consistent with ' these commitments.

Response

The estimates of combustible material inventories and the result-ing fire loadings for the rooms in question have been revised. As a result, the fire loadings have been substantially reduced. The initial estimates were made over five years ago and were extremely conservative. They-reflected the uncertainty at that time regarding the expected use of these rooms. At this time, the expected use of these rooms is much more clearly defined. The new combustible material inventory is consistent with the expected use of the rooms, while still maintaining a degree of conservatism. The new fire loadings are sufficiently lower than the previous estimated values to preclude the need for an automatic suppres-sion system. Existing manual fire fighting equipment is " considered to be adequate for these areas. The fire protection report will be revised in a future amendment to reflect the new information. (Revised pages to the Fire Protection Report are attached.) s .c.

n/n TABLE 2.2-3 (Cont'd) FIRE LOAD DESIG9 FIRE AREA / ZONE NUMDER AND NAME Q E_P,ROTF Q Ot! FI HE,fjETif.CTION COMBUSTini. FIR,EJBtufft ) f 2.1-0 Note 1 fonization 1000 lb of paper 10,900 Control room detection 6400 th cable innulation 2.1-1 Note 1 Inn i zat Ion 1000 th of paper 42,300 Record storage eletection 100 th of papor room trannient 2.1-2 Note 1 ionization 2,000 lb of paper 87,000 Record utsi?ge detection and toilet room ,/ 3.1-1 Unit 1 Automatic total tonization 19,770 lb cable 146,000 cable tunnel flood ing carbon datoction insulation dioxide nyntam 3.1-2 Unit 2 Automatic total f on t rat ion 19,770 th cable 146,000 cable tunnel floodinq carbon .letection insulation dioxide nyntom 3.2-0 HVAC Note 1 Ionization 4600 lb cable 39,100 duct room sin t ec t. l on insulation 3.2A-1 Unit 1 Automatic total lonization 45 lb qankoting 64,000 Nonsegregated flood inq car bon elalection 16,467 th cabla bus duct area d io x lilo nyntom innulation 3.2A-2 Unit 2 Automatic total tonization 45 lb ganketing 64,000 Nonsegregated flooding carbon ele t ec t ion 36,467 lb cable bus duct area dioxide system insulation 3.2B-1 Lower Automatic total lonization 51 lb gaskets 27,800 cable spreading flooding carbon detection 640 lb ducting area, Zone B-1 dioxide system insulation 16,515 lb cable insulation i 3.2B-2 Lower Automatic total Ionization 12.5 lb gasketing, 26,600 f cable spreading flooding carbon detection 14.4 lb neoprene area, Zone B-2 dioxide system 16,515 lb cable insulation 3.2C-1 Lower Automatic. total Ionization 8898 lb cable 25,300 cable-spreading flooding carbon detection insulation area, Zone C-1 dioxide system 50 lb gasketing 3.2C-2 Lower Automatic total Ionization 8898 lb cable 25,300 cable spreading flooding carbon detection insulation area, Zone C-2 dioxide system 50 lb gasketing 3.2D-1 Lower Automatic total tonization 6 lb gasketing 96,700 cable spraading flood ing car bon detection 7500 lb cable room, Zone D-1 dioxide system insulation 3.2E-2 Lower Automatic total lonization 6 lb qanketing 142,000 cable spreading floodinq carbon detection 7500 th cable room, Zone D-2 dioxide nyntem innulation 3.2E-1 Division 11 Automatic total tonization 3670 th cable 208,000 cable riser flood ing ca r bon detection insulation d io x ida nyntom 3.2E-2 Division 21 Automatic total lonization 1670 lb cabic 208,000 cable riser flood ing car bnn detection innulation dioxide nyntom 2.7-19

BA control room for up to 6 hours during conditions which might (]) otherwise force them to leave. Any fire in the Control' Room would be quickly detected, by ionization detectors or the personnel in the room. The Control Room is continuously manned. Since all combustibles are either contained in cabinets or panels, or present in such small quantities, any postulated fire will be highly localized and would be quickly extinguished using available manual fire ~ fighting equipment. ~The analysis of the effect of a fire in this zone cables required ~ for safe shutdown is discussed in Subsection 2.4.2.4. 2.3.2.2 Record Storace Room (Fire 2cne 2.1-1) This area is shown on Figure 2.3-8 (Sheet 1). Electrical cable trays routed through this zon'e are shown on Figure 2.3-33. Fire Barrier Descriotion The floor slab at elevation 451 feet 0 inch, which is the ceiling of the Lower Cable Spreading Room, is a 9-inch clear cover of structural reinforced concrete over 3-inch fluted steel decking 3 formwork. It is supported by structural steel beams protected with a fire resistant covering and carries a 3-hour fire rating. All walls are 12-inch hollow concrete masonry units and carry a 3-hour fire rating. They extend up to within 1 inch of the ceiling above. This resulting space is packed with a 1-inch thick blanket of Thermafiber insulation. A 3-hour rated Label "A" fire door leads to the Control Room. i The ceiling slab at elevation 463 feet 5 inches, which is the floor,of the Upper Cable Spreading Room, is a 1 1/2-inch clear cover of-reinforced concrete over protected 1 1/2-inch fluted steel decking. It is supported by protected structural steel . beams and carries a 3-hour fire rating. A 1/2-inch x 1/2-inch x 3/4-inch thick aluminum egg crate suspended ceiling system is pr vided below the ceiling slab. L-1 ~ y Safety-Related Ecuiement There is no safety-related or reactor shutdown and cooling equipment in this area. Protection Criteria and Measures Combustibles in this room are subject to administrative controls. th !I*. 'J.'" .-~~-- ~ ca:.. f;;;; _2-2.3-12 m

B/B .e Combustible Materials The floor is covered with 208 ft2 of 1/8-inch thick vinyl-asbestos tile. In addition, 55 lineal feet of 4-inch vinyl cove base is provided at the interse,ction of the walls and the ficor. The following fire hazard characteristics of vinyl-asbestos tile and cove base were obtained from tests in accordance with ASTM Test E-84: Vinyl-Asbestos Tile and Cove Base Flame spread Less than 75 Fuel contribution 0 Smoke developed 415 This room will contain a desk, two tables, chairs, and file cabinets and/or bookcases. Most of this furniture will be of metal construction. Combustible materials equivalent to 1,000 lbs of paper (8,000 Btu /lb) are estimated to be present. In addition, a transient load of an additional 100 lbs of paper is considered. Fire Loadina With a floor area of 208 ft2, the fire loading is approximately 42,300 Btu /ft g. 2 Extinouishina and Detectino Cacabilities A portable fire extinguisher with a minimum 2A rating is located in the room and a manual hose station can be brought in from the Turbine Building to fight a fire in this area. Desion-Basis Fire The design-basis fire would result if all of the combustibles in this room burned. The fire loading of 42,300 Btu /ft' is equivalent to a fire of about 1/2 hour severity. The furniture and other materials in this area would be destroyed. This would not affect the ability to shut down and cool the reactor. 2.3.2.3 Storace and Toilet Room (Fire Zone 2.1-2) This zone is shown on Figure 2.3-8 (Sheet 3). 2.3-13 (

~ B/B Fire Barrier Descriotion The floor slab at-elevation 451 feet 0 inch, which is the ceiling of the Lower Cable Spreading Room, is a 9-inch clear cover of structural reinforced concrete over 3-inch fluted steel decking formwork. It is supported by structural steel beams protected with a fire resistant covering and carries a 3-hour fire rating. All walls of the storage area are 12-inch thick hollow concrete masonry units and carry a 3-hour fire rating they extend up to within 1 inch of the ceiling above. This resulting space is packed with a 1-inch thick-blanket of foil-backed Thermafiber insulation. A 3-hour rated Label "A" fire door leads to the Control Room. The ceiling slab at elevation 463 feet 5 inches, which is the floor.of.the Upper Cable Spreading Room, is a 2 1/2-inch clear cover of reinforced concrete over 3 hour protected 1 1/2-inch fluted steel decking. It is supported by unprotected structural steel beams and carries a 3 hour fire rating. An acoustical tile suspended ceiling system is provided below the ceiling slab in th,e storage area. Safety-Related Eauipment For details, see Subsection 2.3.2.2. Protection Criteria F.or details, see Subsection 2.3.2.2. Combustible Materials This room will be used to store chart paper for control room recorders. It is estimated that 2,000 lbs of paper will be stored here. A transient load is not considered. The storage area floor is covered with 184 ft2 of 1/8-inch thick vinyl-asbestos tile. In. addition, 59 lineal feet of 4-inch high vinyl cove base is provided at the intersection of the walls and the' floor. Fire Loadina s With a floor area of 184 fta the fire loading is 87,000 Btu /ft, Extinguishina and Detectino Caoabilities ~ For details, see Subsection 2.3.2.2. 3 Design-Basis Fire For details, gee Subsection 2.3.2.2, except that with a fire load of 87,000 Btu /ft, a 1-hour severity fire *could occur. 2.3-14

BYROM - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS a Concern No. 5 To comply with Section C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5.1, interior manual hose stations should be installed so as to be able to reach any location that contains, or could present a fire exposure hazard to safety related equipment with at least one effective hose stream. We observed that because of the present location of manual hose stations, it may not be possible to reach all areas of the computer room and cable riser area on elevation 451 feet. The applicant should conduct a hose stretch test to verify the adequacy of the existing design. Th3 also observed that because of congested conditions in certain plant areas, such as the cable spreading rooms, it may not be possible to utilize existing manual hose stations because of the inability to fully deploy the woven-jacketed fire hose. In such areas, to comply with Section C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5.1, it will be necessary to replace the woven-jacketed hose with a hard i rubber type.

Response

The applicant agrees that the computer room and cable riser area on elevation 451'-0" cannot be reached by presently located hose stations. In order to alleviate this concern, hose station no. 16 will be relocated.so that it is close enough to these rooms to reach them with an effective hose stream. The Fire Protection Report will be revised in a future amendment to include this change - (Revised Fire Protection Report pages are attached). The applicant also agrees that the use of the woven-jacket fire hose would present difficulties in the upper and lower cable spreading rooms. In these rooms, all of the existing woven-jacket fire hose will be replaced with a hard rubber type fire hose. No Fire Protection Report changes are required by this design change. i s 1 l l

B/B e reinforced concrete over 1 1/2-inch fluted steel decking. The underside of the decking, and the structural steel members that support this slab are protected with a fire-resistant covering. The slab and the supporting steel members carry a 3-hour fire rating. Safety-Related Eauioment Cables in this zone are in risers and are ESF Division 11 and contain instrumentation and control cables. Protection Criteria and Measures The Cable Spreading Room is separated from other portions of the floor by 3-hour fire walls. Entrance to this limited access-area is provided through a Label "A" fire door. Combustible Materials Tnere is contained in this riser area cable insulation which has a total weight of 3672 pounds. Fire Loadino With a floor area of 120 ft2, the fire loading is 260,100 Btu /ft2 Extincuishina and Detectina Caoabilities ~ Several portable CO2 extinguishers are located in adjacent This room is also within reach of manual hose station rooms. no. 16 in the turbine building. Design-Basis Fire The results of a fire in this zone are acceptable since only one ESF division will be lost. Sufficient redundancy exists in the engineered safety features fed from the other ESF division to achieve a reactor shut down and to maintain the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. The analysis of the effect of a fire in this zone on cables required for safe shutdown is discussed in Subsection 2.4.2.16. 2.3.3.23 Unit 2 Cable Riser Area (Fire Zone 3.4A-2) This area is shown on Figure 2.3-8 (Sheet 3). Electrical cable trays routed through this zone are shown on Figure 2.3-33. For details, see Subsection 2.3.3.22, except the cabling is ESF Division 12 cables and with a floor area of 150 ftz, the fire loading is 2r8,080 Btu /ft2, 2.3-48

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BYRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS ] Concern No. 6 1 In the August 16, 1982 revision to the Fire Protection Report, the applicant committed to seal fire barrier penetrations with material having a fire resistance rating comparable to the rat-ing of fire walls and floor / ceiling assemblies. Information was unavailable during the audit to verify that bus duct pene-trations of fire rated assemblies have been sealed internally with an appropriate fire rated material. The applicant should confirm that such penetrations are sealed to maintain the integrity of the barrier. In addition, we observed that fire dampers were installed in a " ganged" configuration in several large ventilation openings in fire barriers, such as the diesel generator room exhaust vents. This-arrangement does not appear to be consistent with the listing of the damper. The applicant should verify that the installation of the dampers in a ganged configuration will achieve a fire rating equivalent to that of the barriers in which they are installed.

Response

The bus ducts (which consist of aluminum conductors and housing with no combustibles inside) are provided with fire and smoke barriers between the bus and the housing at each point where the bus duct penetrates a fire rated assembly. Ganged fire dampers are multiple parallel fire dampers within a -singular fire damper sleeve. The larger fire dampers at Byron and Braidwood (greater than 48" x 48") are provided by the Ruskin Manufacturing Company. The maximum UL single section fire dampers are either 30" x 30" or 36" x 36". The larger fire dampers are UL listed in the Under-writers Laboratories Building Materials Directory as " Assemblies of Individual Doors". The maximum fire damper assembly is 60" x 60". This size is accomplished by being "Made up from individual doors not exceeding 30 inches in width and 30 inches in height". The fire damper design for larger sizes at Byron and Braidwood is consistent with UL fire damper listings.

BYRON - 1 i RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS j i 1 Concern No. 7 t In the August 16, 1982 revision to the Fire Protection Report, the applicant committed to comply with NFPA Standards 13 and 15 in the design and installation of fixed water extinguishing systems. We observed that manual discharge valves for the water deluge fire suppression systems protecting charcoal filters would be inaccessible during a fire because of their closeness to the filters and the limited access in~the area. This condition appears contrary to the commitment.

Response

The applicant takes exeption to this concern. The manaul dis-charge valves in question are for the water deluge system for the charcoal filters. The charcoal filters are enclosed by housing constructed of 1/4-inch steel plate, and are provided with high temperature alarms. The high temperature setpoint is below the ignition point of the charcoal, ensuring that the alarm would be actuated prior to development of a signifi-cant fire. The alarm is annunciated in the main control room. An operator would be quickly dispatched to the area to investigate the cause of the high temperature alarm. In all likelihood, the operator would reach the area before a fire could grow to a large enough size to render the area inaccessible. This is especially true when the shielding offered by the steel plate filter housing is considered. In the unlikely event that the area next to the fi er housings was not accessible due to heat radiated from the filter housing, the area could be wetted down and cooled using manual hose stations in the area to allow operator entry for a sufficient period of time to operate the water deluge system manual dis-charge valve. In summary,.the applicant believes that the high temperature alarms which annunciate in the control room will allow response to any potential fire in the charcoal filters rapidly enough that the area in which the manual discharge valve for the water deluge system is located would still be accessible. A fire severe enough to render the area totally inaccessible within the short period of time during which an operator would respond to the high temperature alarm is not credible. ,*e ~% y,-, y. 9,, e*. p r ,.pys.9---,,yv,. m -,- gy ,..ewr.rvry, y. -y-

BYRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS Concern No. 8 To comply with Section C.S.b of BTP CMEB 9.5.1 and Section III.G of Appendix R, structural steel forming a part of or supporting fire barriers should be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier. We observed that in the upper and lower cable penetration areas and in the Auxiliary Building General Floor area, on elevations 346 feet through 426 feet, the structural steel supporting the floors was unprotected. We are concerned that a fire could cause the collapse of such elements and effect components / cables of redundant shutdown divisions located within the same floor elevation or on vertically adjoining elevations. The applicant should provide protection for such structural steel commensurate with the fire exposure and the degree of separation between redundant shutdown divisions (see concern in item 18 below). We are also concerned that openings in non-fire rated barriers, such as equipment hatches, removable concrete slabs, and unprotec-ted stairway openings in the Auxiliary Building General Floor areas would subject redundant shutdown divisions, which are located on different elevations, to loss from a single fire. The applicant should provide fire protection commensurate with the hazard and in accordance with Section C.5.b of our fire protection guidelines or demonstrate that at least one shutdown division would remain free of damage from a vertically propagating fire.

Response

The applicant has reviewed all plant areas where redundant equipment is separated by non-rated or unprotected barriers. With one exception, the existing design or level of protection is considered to be adequate. A) Floor at elevation 426'-0" separating the upper and lower l cable penetration areas. The applicant agrees that this floor should be protected from a fire in the lower cable penetration area on elevation 414'-0". Consequently, the structural steel supporting this floor / ceiling assembly will be provided with fire proofing i to a 3-hour rating. Furthermore, all floor penetrations, with the exception of the equipment hatch at column-row 13-15/U-V, are provided with rated fire seals. The equipment hatch will be covered, but the cover will not have a fire rating. This is consid-ered to be acceptable because the combustible materials in these rooms are concentrated in the cable trays, the McC's and the electrical napels, most of which are not near the equipment hatch. The area near the hatch is open and free i

BYROM - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS Response (C'ont ' d) of combustible materials. Thus, the fire hazard posed to the hatch cover by combustible materials in the room is minimal. For this reason, a non-rated hatch cover is deemed to be acceptable. B) Elevation 346'-0". The ceiling at elevation 364'-0" is supported by concrete beams and columns. The fire loading in this zone is only 18,100 BTU /ft2, which is insufficient to cause the structural collapse of a concrete slab supported by concrete beams and columns. C) Elevation 364'-0". The ceiling at elevation 383 '-0" is supported by concrete beams and columns. A pipe tunnel running along column-rows Q-S between the pipe penetration areas is suspended from the ceiling by unprotected structural steel beams and hangers. The fire loading in this zone is 19,700 BTU /ft2 This is insufficient to cause the structural collapse of either the concrete ceiling slab, which is supported by concrete beams and columns, or the pipe tunnel suspended from the ceiling by unprotected structural steel. D) Elevation 383'-0". The ceiling at elevation 401'-0" is supported by concrete beams and columns. Two pipe tunnels are suspended from the ceiling by unprotected structural steel. The fire load in this zone is 20,800 BTU /ft2 This fire load is insufficient to cause the structural collapse of either the concrete ceiling slab supported by concrete beams and columns or the pipe tunnels which are suspended from the ceiling by unprotected structural steel. E) Elevation 401'-0". The structural steel support columns and main beams which support the ceiling at 426 '-0" and the structures above are protected by a fire-resistant covering to a rating of three hours except for the area between column-rows Q to V and 15 to.21. In this area the support steel is unprotected. The fire load for this zone is 30,100 BTU /ft2 The area with the unprotected support columns contains no significant concentrations of combus-tibles which present a hazard to the unprotected steel. The low fire loading and lack of identified concentrations of combustible materials results in no credible possibility of structural collapse of either the protected or unprotected steel structures in this zone. F) ' Elevation 426'-0". The ceiling of this zone at elevation 439'-0" (cable spreading room floor) and its support steel are three-hour rated. The ceiling at elevation 451'-0" between column-rows Q and V is supported by unprotected steel. However, the main columns and beams which support i

BYRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS Responses (Cont'd) the control facilities above are covered with a fire resis-tant material to a three hour rating. The fire load in this zone of 33,400 BTU /ft2 is considered insufficient to cause a structural collapse of main structural members. G) In veiw of the low fire loadings throughout the auxiliary . building general. areas, the presence of open stairways and equipment hatches in the floors at the various elevations is considered to be acceptable. A vertically propagating fire is not considered to be credible because of the lack of concentrations of combustible materials near the floor open-ings. Thus, the applicant, his consulting engineers, his insurers and his fire protection consultant all agree that fire protection commensurate with the hazards has been provided in the auxiliary building. Additional features are not required. The fire Protection Report will be revised in a future amendment to indicate correctly the protection provided for the floor / ceiling assembly at elevation 426'-0" between the upper and lower cable penetration areas. (Revised FPR pages are attached.) R e s R

1 B/B ~ Extinguishina and Detectino Canabilities ~0 Portable fire extinguishers are available in this room and adjacent zone. Two manual hose stations are positioned within reach of the room. Ionization detectors are provided, which annunciate and alarm in the Control Room. Desian-Basis Fire With a fire loading of 13,000 Btu /ft2, the design-basis fire is less than 1/2 hour in severity. If a fire should occur in this room the ventiltion system may be damaged. The loss of the roor would not prevent a safe shutdown of the reactor. The analysis of the effect of a fire in this zone on cables required for safe shutdown is discussed in Subsection 2.4.2.47. 2.3.11.42 Unit 2 Containment Chillers Room (Fire Zone 11.5-2) Th'is zone is shown on Figure 2.3-12 (Sheet 3) and in elevation en Figures 2.3-21 (Sheet 2) and 2.3-26 (Sheet 2). Electrical cable trays routed through this zone are shown on Figure 2.3-36. (h For details, see Subsection 2.3.11.41 except: Two 4-inch diameter drains are provided in the HVAC a. filter room and four in the reactor containment chiller pump room 2. b. There is about 25 pounds of gasketing present. c. There are 18 HEPA filters and 18 prefilter modules used. d. With a floor area of 3030 ft2, the fire loading becomes 7200 Btu /ft2 l 2.3.11.43 Division 11 Cable Penetration Area (Fire Zone 11.5A-1) This zone is shown on Figure 2.3-11. Fire Barrier Description .The floor at elevation 414 feet 0 inch, which is the ceiling of the Reactor Containment Chiller Pump Room, is a 5-inch to 33-inch clear cover of structural reinforced concrete over 3-inch flured steel decking formwork. It contains a nonrated penetration, and a large opening for equipment removal, is supported by ((("). unprotected steel beams and columns, and carries no fire rating. Six 4-inch diameter floor drains are provided. The perimeter 2.3-139

B/B walls of this zone are minimum 36-inch thick structural reinforced concrete. These walls carry a 3-hour fire rating except for the walls common to this zone, and to the Auxiliary Building ground floor, which are of 3-hour rated construction, but contain several nonrated penetrations and thus do not carry a fire rating. A stairway up to elevation 426 feet 0 inch is included in this zone and is enclosed by 12-inch thick hollow concrete masonry unit walls which carry a 3-hour fire rating. A door of Label "A" construction leads to this stairway. The ceiling at elevation 426 feet 0 inch is a 6-inch to 15-inch clear cover of. structural reinforced concrete on 3-inch fluted steel decking formwork. It is supported by steel beams and . columns which are protected to a 3-hour rating with a fire-resistant covering. Floor penetrations, with the exception of the equipment hatch at column-row 13-15/U-V, are provided with 3-hour rated fire seals. The equipment hatch is covered by a nonrated hatch cover. Due to the nonrated hatch cover, _the ceiling carries no fire rating.. Safety-Related Ecuioment The safety-related equipment in this zone is: a. portions of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation

System, b.

Motor Control Centers-131X2 and 131X4 (ESF Division 11), and c. cable and cable trays associa.ted with ESF Division 11. Protection Criteria and Measures Only Division 11 components are in this fire zone. Combustible Materials An estimated 35 pounds of gasketing is used in the ventilation ductworP An estimated 28,845 pounds of cable insulation is in this zone. Fire Loading With a floor area of 4,150 ft*, the fire loading is 59,100 Btu /ft2 Extincuishina and Detectina Canabilities Two manual hose stations are in this zone. Portable fire extinguishers are also available. Ionization detectors are provided whic'h annunciate and alarm in the Control Room. 2.3-140

B/B Combustible Materials ~h About 500 pounds of clothing may be stored here. The recire,ulation pumps hold 2 gallons of l'ubricating oil. The ductwork uses an estimated 824 pounds of gasketing and 4500 pounds of ductwork insulation. There is an estimated 69,670 pounds of cable insulation used. About 1000. pounds of paper is assumed to be kept in this area. A transient load ~ equivalent to one 55-gallon drum of oil is considered for this zone. Fire Loadina With a floor area of 19,910 ft2, the fire loading is 33,400 Btu /ft2 Extincuishina and Detectino Cacabilities Five manual hose stations are located within this zone. Portable fire extinguishers are also available. g.- Ionization detectors are provided which annunciate and alarm in the Control Room. Desion-Basis Fire The design-basis fire would occur if all the' combustibles in the zone burned. In this event the boron injection recirculation l pumps could be damaged. These pumps are provided to circulate the concetrated boric acid through the safety injection syster in l order to maintain a uniform temperature and boron concentration in the system. These pumps are not required for safe shu down since they are stopped upon initiation of the safety injection system to prevent pump damage. l The analysis of the effect of a fire in this zone on cables required for safe shutdown is discussed in Subsection 2.4.2.49. 2.3.11.46 Division 12 Cable Penetration Area (Fire Zone 11. 6-11 ( This zone is shown on Figure 2.3-10 (Sheet 1) and in elevation on Figure 2.3-26 (Sheet 1). i l Electrical cable trays routed through this zone are shown on ' Figure 2.3-35. 'Ch 2.3-143

B/B Fire Barrier Descriotion The floor at elevation 426 feet 0 inch, which is the ceiling of the Cable Penetration Area, Division 11, is a 5-inch to 15-inch clear cover of structural reinforced concrete on 3-inch fluted steel decking formwork. It is supported by steel beams and columns protected to a 3-hour rating by a fire-resistant cover.ing. The equipment hatch located at column-row 13-15/U-V is covered by a nonrated hatch cover. All other floor penetra-tions are sealed by 3-hour rated fire seals. Because of the nonrated hatch cover, this floor carries no fire rating. Five 4-inch diameter floor drains are provided. The perimeter walls of this zone are minimum 8-inch thick solid concrete masonry units or 36-inch thick structural reinforced concrete. These walls carry a 3-hour fire rating except for the . walls common to this zone and to the Auxiliary Building Mezzanine Floor. These walls are of 3-hour rated construction but contain one or more nonrated penetrations and thus do not carry a fire rating. A stairway is provided in this zone which is enclosed in a 3-hour rated masonry barrier from elevation 426 feet 0 inch down to elevation 414 feet 0 inch, and which is open up to elevation 439 feet 0 inch. Masonry walls extend up to within 1 . inch of the ceiling and and this remaining space is packed with a 1-inch thick blanket of Thermafiber insulation. Label "A" fire doors are provided for access to the Fuel Handling Building. The ceiling at elevation 451 feet 0 inch is a 5-inch clear cover of structural reinforced concrete over 3-inch fluted steel decking formwork, is supported by unprotected steel beams and columns, and does not carry a fire rating. Safety-Related Eouiement MCC 132X2 (ESF Div. 12), MCC 132X4(ESF Div. 12), and ESF Division 12 cables are present in this zone. Protection Criteria and Measures This zone is separated from the other ESF division by a 2-hour rated fire barrier. Combustible Materials ~ The ventilation ductwork uses an estimated 50 pounds of gasketing. There is an estimated 17,482 pounds of cable insulation in this Zone. A transient load is not considered as this is a controlled access area. Fire Loadino With a floor area of 4100 ft2, the fire loading is 36,300 Btu /ft2, 2.3-144

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BYRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTIO SITE AUDIT CONCERMS Concern No. 9 We observed several discrepancies in the description of fire protection features in the applicant's Fire Protection Report from what was observed in the plant. Such discrepancies include the description of fire proofing for structural steel, the extent of fire detection in safety related plant areas, the nature of fire doors and the lack of a fire hazard's analysis and fire pro-tection for the "Med-Chem" area on elevation 401 feet.

Response

The Fire Protection Report will be revised in a future amendment to correct the omission and discrepancies listed. (Revised FPR pages are attached.) s e -.. ~, -, ,-,-,,,,---,--7-,g, em---,+-r -wwn-, a.y-,--,r,e wa.. - r ,wn.-

m __-mm li ' H TAh!.M J.J it'a wit 'dl a FlHt: AREA /ZDNM NiTMDEH AND NAMM FIGUHE NUMns:H ! AFPI'Y-HVs.ATED FWill'M FNT RADinACTIVE FQfJIPMENT j 11.4C-0 H.adwante 2.3-13, 2 of J s vuuss e nhoeduwn p.eneln: None an.1 remote shut.aluwn 2.3-25, 2 of 2 div ' t, stiv li, elly 21, div 22 4 cuntaut auusu Lt.4C-4 Letdown 2.3-13, 1 of 2 Letdown heat enchanger Letdown heat excha ger 4 he.it eschawjur IA 2.3-22, 2 01 2 t ooie 11.4C-2 Letdown 2.3-13, 2 of 2 Letatown heat eschanger Letdown heat exchanger heat enchanger 2A ruum 11.4D-1 Letdown 2.3-13,1 of 2 sLetdown heat exchanger Letdown heat exchanger heat eschanger tous 2.3-22, 2 of 2 2 10 ruuna ll.4D-2 f.etdown 2.3-13, 2 of 2 Letdowre heat exchanger Letdown heat exchanger heat _enchanger i 215 ecom 11.5-0 Auxiliary 2.3-12, 1 of 4 Auxiliary building ventilation . Boron thermal liuitdang, elevation 2.3-12, 3 of 4 system; borun thermal regenerative regenerative heat 401 tt-0 kn. 2.3-22, 2 of.2 demineralizerus cation bed and exchanger 4

2. 3-25, 1 of '2 mixed bed demineratiects; recycle 2.3-25, 2 ut 2 cyag... at us g,resihmanesalizerut con-2.3-46, I ut 2 denuat e demines.il i zer, Isus ic acid i

2.3-26, 2 of 2 t.an k and transte. puis ps t borte acid fillesu, is '""""J'l""'" ""J I'"""la 2 11.5-1 Unit I con-2.3-12, 1 of 4 Nonu None tainment aut r agen d-2.3-26, 1 of 2 tson 'ujvipment tuum 11.5-J Unst 2 cun-J.3-12, 3 of 4 lion" None tainment refrigera-

2. 3-21, 2 o f 2 tion equipment sous 2.3-26, 1 of 2 ll.5A-0 H.n l i n-J.3-12, I ut 4 De vin t.u.

ll an.I IJ caleling Nonu loq i c.il Im.teuw ns Catal. ration Hi=>m 11.'sA-1 Diviulun !! J. 'l-11 Austil.isy I.ulldinq ventilattun None i. cunt.itnment elec-syntems.Itvluiun i t tL'if cabling 1 - trical penetaatsuna and pannen asea, elevation 414 ft-U in. II.5A-2 Divistun 21 2.3-11 Ae s i l l.n y 1.u l l.l e ng vent i l.it ion None cunt.sinnent eLee-ngntem .Ii w Iuinn J& t.:iV catiling i tr ic.s1 penet e at luun an.1 p.n.ein .nsea, elevat6un 414 (t-0 in. r I L1.6-0 Auslisasy J.3-10, 1 of 4 Ausitt.u g t.ulldenq ventilation 'None I building e l. v.at ion J.3-10, 3 ut 4 nyut em s.wpun.no cas.I t nq uue ge. 4Jb tt-U an. 2.)-22, 2 uf 2 tannus 4.seen t oi se. t e s.n s ec t e s:iit.s-J 2.3-25, 1 of 2 t enn p.m.p.. un.1 nut ye tanks, cable 2.1-25, 2 ut 2 aant panvina sitvintonn 11, 12, 21-and V 2.3-26, I ut 2 JJ azul volume cunt sul tanks J.]-26, 2 of 2 11.4,-! navaunun IJ J.J-10, 1 of 4 is 6 v i.i t un 13 c. sis t ing None l c lect t ie.s l Iwnet i.e-J..l-26, ! ut 2 NC 4 l> A ?, Mt C 48/X4 Lsona.asca l l 11.6-2 Davausuoi JJ 2.3-10, 3 of 4 ut vi seon 24 cat.fing None I electrar.at garietsa-2.3-JL, J ut 2 tre / s/p f, EW / 14X4 t sunu.a r er.a 2.3-22, 2 ut 2 II.LA-0 Latnerator y 2.3-10, 1 of 4 Diviutun il an.1 t/ cabling None HVAC equipment tsaim 2.3-25, I uf 2 L 2 2.2-12 i

11 / 11 TAlli,E 2.2-1 (('on t ' d) FIRE AREA /ZOt4E FIRE LOAD DESIGN NUMBER AND NAMM FIRE PROTECTION FI HH DITI'MCTION COMDUSTIDLE FIRE.(Btu /ft ) 11.5-2 Unit 2 Note 1 Ionization 874 lb cable 7,200 conta inmen t detection insulation, chillers room 18 IIEPA filters, 18 pcefilters, 25 lb gasketing, 32 gal lobe oil, 55 gal drum oil transient load 11.5A-0 Radio-Note 1 None 1000 lb plastic, 19,200 logical Instrument 250 lb rubber, Calibration Room 60 lb - rope, 10~1b cotton ll.5A-1 Note 1 Ionization 35 lb gasketing 59,100 ' Division 11 detection 28,845 lb cable Cable penetration insulation area ll.5A-2 Note 1 Ionization 35 lb gasketing 59,100 Division 21 detection 28,845 lb cable Cable penetration insulation t area 11.6-0 Aux iliary Note 1 Ionization 69,670 lb cable 33,400 building elevation detection insulation, 426 fect-0 inch 824 lb gasketing, 4500 lb ductwork insulation, 2 gal lube oil, 500 lb clothing, 55 gal oil drum transient load, 1000 lb paper 11.6-1 Note 1 lunizat inn 50 lb gasketing, 36,300 Division 12 detection 17,482 lb cable electrical insulation penetration area 11.6-2 Note 1 fonizallon 50 lb gasketing, 36,300 Division 22 detection 17,482 lb cable electrical insulation penetration area 11.6A-0 Note 1 None 6 lb lube oil, 29,600 Laboratory 47 liEPA filters, / HVAC equipment 18 prefilters, room 560 lb silencers, 97 lb gasketing, 2525 lb ducting Inuulation 3445 lb-cable insulation l 11.7-0 Manual charcoal The a nn mt at s 1241 prefilters, 35,200 l IIEPA filter deluge system lonlaat lon 1148 !! EPA filters, l rooms dotection 31,122 lb

charcoal, 435 lb lube oil 11.7-1 Unit 1 Manual charcoat Thermontats 240 lb charcoal, 2,300 purge room deluge system 40 lb lube oil,

~ 46 1b gasketing, 88 prefilters, 88 IIEPA filters i 11.7-2 Unit 2 Manual charcoal Thermostats 240 lb charcoal, 2,300 purge room deluge system 40 lb lube oil, 46 lb gasketing, 88 prefilters, 86 IIEPA filters 2

2 - 2 38

2.3.ll.42A Radiological Instrument Calibration Room (Fire Zone ll.5A-0) This zone is shown on Figure 2.3-12 (sheet 1). Fire Barrier Description The floor at elevation 401 feet 0 inch is a 33-inch clear cover of structural reinforced concrete over a 3-inch fluted steel decking formwork. It is supported by unprotected steel beams which carries no. fire rating. Two 4-inch diameter floor drains are provided in this area. The walls common to this zone and to the containment chiller pump room are 2'-11 5/8" thick solid concrete masonry which contains .non-rated penetrations. Masonry walls extend up to within 1-inch of the structural slab above and the remaining space is packed with a 1-inch thick blanket of the thermafiber insulation. The wall common to this zone and to the containment building buttress enclosure is 24-inch thick structural reinforced concrete and carries a 3-hour fire rating. The wall common to this zone and to the auxiliary building along colum row 'O' is 36-inch thick structural reinforced concrete and contains a non-rated metal personnel door. The ceiling slab at elevation 414 feet 0 inch is a 33-inch clear cover of structural reinforced concrete over a 3-inch fluted steel decking formwork. This slab contains two floor openings (l'-3" x l'-3" & l'-ll" x 2'-5") and is supported by unprotected steel , beams and columns which carries no fire rating. Safety-Related Ecuipment Safety-related cables run in conduit are routed through thin zone. No safety-related eugipment is located in this room. Protection Criteria and Measures , iThis room is separated from other plant areas by barriers of substantial construction. ~ Combustible Materials g Material stored in this room consists of radiation protection clothing and materials. The maximum estimated inventory is 1000 pounds of plastics, 250 pounds of rubber, 60 pounds of rope and 10 pounds of cotton. An additional transient load is not - considered. ~ ~ e

? Fire L'oading With a floor area of 1100 f t, the fire le' ding is 19,200 BTU /ft Extinguishing and Detecting Capability Automatic detection is not provided for this room. Two manual hose stations are within 50 feet of this room. Portable extinguishers are available. Design-Basic' Fire -With a fire loading of 19,200 BTU /ft, the design-basis fire is of less than 1/2 hour severity. It would not affect safe shutdown of the reactor. w F 6 O e l \\ v e t ---- w r --v

'v v

B/B e i the general area which could result from actuation of a deluce system. As shown in Figures 2.3-7 and 2.3-9, hose stations are ' located in each compartment of the upper and lower cable spreading areas. Hose stations are located adjacent to each doorway so that water availability will be guaranteed even if severe smoke conditions exist.~ In summary, the Byron /Braidwood cable spreading area fire protection system design ensures that a fire will not compromise plant safety. Use of automatic Halon or CO, systems instead of water deluge reduces the probability of a plant shutdown or equipment damage in the event of s spurious actuation. .ln the unlikely event that-water is-required, the area is well supplied with manual hose stations. Refer to the following subsections for a detailed discussion of each fire zone. 2.3.3.1 Unit 1 Electrical Cable Tunnel (Fire 2one 3.1-1) This zone is shown on Figure 2.3-12 (Sheet 1) and in elevation on Figure 2.3-25 (Sheet 1). Electrical cable trays routed through this zone are shown on Figure 2.3-36. Fire Barrier Descriotion The floor slab at elevation 415 feet-0 inch consists of a 5-inch to 21-inch clear cover of structural reinforced concrete over. 3-inch fluted steel decking formwork, which is supported by protected structural steel beams and hangers which carry a 3-hour rating. Three walls of the tunnel are structural reinforced concrete varying in thickness from 12 inches to 36 inches. These carry a 3-hour fire rating. The fourth wall is 12-inch thick hollow concrete masonry units, extends up to within 1 inch of the ceiling or steel beam, and carries a 1 3-hour fire rating. The space at the top of the wall is packed with a 1-inch thick blanket of Thermafiber insulation. l The ceiling at elevation 426 feet-0 inch, which is the floor of l an ESF switchgear room, consists of a 5-inch clear cover of structural reinforced concrete with a 3-inch concrete topping over 3-inch fluted steel decking formwork. It is supported by steel beams protected with a fire-resistant covering and carries a 3-hour fire rating. Access to the room is by hatches from elevation 426 feet-0 inch that are enclosed within a 3-hour rated barrier. ( Four 4-inch diameter floor drains (90 gpm capacity each) are provided. l 2.3-16 .e--- m w

BYROM - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS Concern No. 10 In our Safety Evaluation Report, we stated that an oil collection system for each reactor coolant pump was required in accordance with Section C.7.a of BTP CMEB 9.5.1. Based on observations of conditions in containment as they pertain to the fire hazard posed by the reactor coolant pumps, our conclusion regarding the need for an RCP oil collection system remains unchanged.

Response

Subsequent to our initial submittal on an oil collection system for RCP motors, we have reexamined the individual components of the oil system on the RCP motors and re-evaluated all potential ignition sources in the containment surrounding the motors. The reactor coolant pump motors have a lubrication system which contains only a few external components which could leak. If the lower motor bearing leaks, oil could leak onto the upper seal housing of the pump, which would be hot. To prevent this, an oil collection pan has been fitted below the motor to prevent leakage onto the pump. The oil lift pump is the only portion of the lubrication system which is pressurized above about 15 psig. The oil lift system is pressurized only for about three minutes when the pump is , started, greatly reducing the probability of a significant oil leak. The oil cooler is the only other major external component of the lubrication system. The cooler is never pressurized to a high level. l In order to have an oil fire inside containment, a heat source is required to ignite the oil. All hot piping in the containment is well insulated with metal reflective insulation. The insulation joints are covered. As a result, oil will not be able to reach the hot pipe surf ace. Ignition from electric sources is not probable. Components which could cause sparks, such as switches or motors with brushes, are sealed. The only known hot surfaces would be pipe support components very near to-the pipe. The pump orientation is such that the oil lift system and oil cooler are not above the reactor coolant piping or any other hot system. Oil dripping from the lift pump or cooler will not fall onto a hot system support and as a result no fire hazard exists. Oil falling on the floor will flow into the floor drain system and be disposed of. t

BYRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS 4 Response (Cont'd) The applicant feels that the only significant fire hazard associated with the reactor coolant pumps has been addressed with the drip pan under the lower motor bearing. Other portions of the lubrication system have been shown not to be potential fire hazards. 4 We continue to maintain our position that an oil collection system, other-than the ' drip pan under the lower motor bearing, is not needed and will not increase the safety of.the plant. s A l e e = i i l 4 i t J w -w-, ,, - ~ _., ..r,. , ~ ~., -., .,--.,_-,-e.-ww- .,,m,.,,,-- ,,,,-m,,.,-,---.,c..,...,----,,-,,-,., ,---,-w.7 ,,,,,_,%,,.,--w.--,,,---,m--,-

_ _. ~, BYRON - 1 l RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS e Concern No. 11 In the August 16, 1982 revision to the Fire Protection Report, the applicant committed to comply with NFPA Standard No. 20 rsgarding the installation of fire pumps. We observed that an unlisted controller has been installed for the electric motor driven fire pump which is not consistent with that commitment.

Response

i Due.to the location of the motor driven fire pump (in the River Screen House), it was necessary to drive the pump with a 4000V motor. Since Underwriters Laboratories (UL) labels are not supplied on motors cr starters rated over 600V, it was not possible to meet the specific committment in NFPA Standard No. 20 requiring that the controller for the electric motor driven fire 1 pump must be UL listed. However in an effort to meet the intent of the NFPA standard, it was required that the 4KV motor and controller should utilize components with approved documented reliability equal to UL or Factory Mutual labeled controllers. All fire pumps and controllers are subjected to a final field acceptance test. Based on these requirements M&M Protection Consultants have determined that the fire pumps and controllers are acceptable. A s e ,m-__,---------,,yy --,y- .,7 ,yy,- .,,.-~v. r ,,,,--r- ,,,,,,-----,7_yeep--,y

BYRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERMS Concern No. 12 In the August 16, 1982 revision to the Fire Protection Report, the applicant committed to comply with Section C.5.d(l), " Control of Combustibles" of BTP CMEB 9.5.1. In the diesel generator rooms and at the Auxiliary Fuel Pump Room, we observed that curbs were not provided at doorways into these areas and therefore, a potential existed for a diesel fuel fire to propagate through the doorway into adjoining areas. The applicant should provide. curbs at'these doorways to be consistent with their commitment.

Response

The applicant does not believe that curbs are required in either the diesel generator rooms or the auxiliary feedwater pump room as explained below: A) It is the applicant's position that curbs are not required for the diesel-generator rooms at Byron. The fuel oil supply and returning piping is embedded in the floor for much of its length. It is exposed for short lengths at the engine i mounted diesel fuel oil pump and at the day tank. This means the piping is embedded in the high traffic areas of the room, reducing the possibility of accidental breakage of the pipe. Furthermore, the day tank enclosure itself is provided with and integral curb which will contain a spill of the 500 gallons of fuel oil in the day tank. In the unlikely event of a pipe break in one of the fuel oil lines, five four-inch diameter floor drains are provided (90 gpm capacity each) which will prevent any accumulation of fuel oil on the floor. The 500 gallon fuel oil day tank could not drain' fast enough to cause a problem. .Due to the small volume of the day tank, the relatively large room area of over 2,300 ft2, and the number and capacity of floor drains prov,ided, the applicant considers the accumula-tion of enough fuel oil on the floor to leak under the door to be an incredible event. The applicant concludes that the existing design and arrange-ment provides adequate protection against breakage of fuel oil piping and accumulation of fuel oil. B) It is the applicant's position that curbs are not required for the diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump rooms at Byron. A four-inch diameter leak detection sump floor drain (90 gpm capacity) is provided in each of these rooms.

BYRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS Response (Cont'd) In the unlikely event of a pipe break in the diesel fuel oil lines, an alarm would be generated by the leak detec-tion floor drain sump. The auxiliary building leak detection sump alarms and indication are located on the liquid radwaste panel in the radwaste control room on elevation 383'-0". A simultaneous control room alarm is generated on the main control board annunciator panel. Thus, leakage would generate a " Liquid Rcdwaste Panel Trouble" alarm in the MCR. Upon. arriving at.the liquid radwaste panel, the operator would see a specific window on this panel's annunciator which would inform him of the precise location of the leak detection sump high level alarm (in this case the diesel-driven AFW pump cubicle). Because this room is provided with a leak detection sump and control room indication of leakage, and because the 90 gpm capacity of the drain is sufficient to prevent accumulation of fuel oil in the room, the applicant believes that the existing design and arrangement provides adequate protection against the break of a diesel fuel oil pipe and accumulation of fuel oil on the floor, and thus curbs are not warranted for these rooms. e e e G 9 _-,-._,m._-_,. -,,, _ _ _ ~.. -. _, _.. _ _. ~.. _.

BYROM - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS Concern No. 13 In the Fire Protection Report, the applicant committed to comply with NFPA Stnadard No. 13 in the design of automatic sprinkler systems. We observed that the ceiling level sprinklers over the lube oil drain tank were obstructed, which is contrary to that commitment.

Response

The applicant agrees with.the staff concern.. Additional sprinkler protection will be provided to the lube oil drain tanks on El. 364'-0" in the Turbine Building. The work will be completed by fuel load. Y S 1 t I l i

BYRON - 1 I RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS 3 Concern No. 14 To comply with Section C. 5.g(l) Of BTP CMEB 9.5.1, fixed self-contained lighting consisting of flourescent or sealed beam units with individual 8-hour minimum battery power supplies should be provided in all plant areas that need to be manned for safe shutdown and all routes to these areas. We observed that the Essential Safety Features Switchgear Room has not been provided with 8-hour battery powered emergency lighting as required. All other areas of the plant that are accessed for. safe shutdown have.been provided with emergency lighting off of individual battery units or the station batteries. The use of station batteries represents a deviation from our fire protection guidelines. To be considered acceptable, the applicant would have to demonstrate that a fire in an area containing emergency lighting off of the station batteries would not affect battery powered emergency lighting in all other plant areas.

Response

An excellent description of the lighting systems provided for the Byron /Braidwood stations is provided in Subsection 9.5.3 of the FSAR. Regarding the ESF switchgear rooms, the applicant agrees that these rooms should have been provided with 8-hour battery powered , emergency lights. A design change to add such lighting to both ESF switchgear rooms has been initiated. This change will be completed and the new lighting installed prior to fuel load. All of the AC and DC lighting circuits are provided with protec-tive devices (circuit breakers) to prevent a circuit failure in one circuit from affecting either other circuits or the lighting pouer supply. i s I l l

BYRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS i j Concern No. 15 The August 16, 1982 revision to the Fire Protection Report identi-fics equipment. located within the Control Room Refrigeration Equipment Rooms being.necessary for safe shutdown. We observed that components and cables from both shutdown division are vulnerable to damage from a fire in this room and therefore do not meet the guidelines of Section C.S.b of BTP CMEB 9.5.1.

Response

The FPR will be revised in a future amendment to-correctly indicate that this equipment is not essential to the safe shutdown of the unit. Note that this equipment is not included on the lists of equipment required for safe shutdown in Section 2.4 of the FPR. (Revised Fire Protection Report pages are attached.1 i e ~ l ( -,-r--

B/B i Combustible Materials The ventilation ductwork uses 123 pounds of gasketing. The refrigeration units have 260 pounds of lubricating oil associated 9 with them. Fire Loadino With a floor area of 1400 ft2, the fire loading is 4400 Btu /ft2, Extinauishina and Detection Capabilities One. manual hose station.is in this room. Portable fire extinguishers are also available. Ionization detectors are provided which annunciate and alarm in the Control Room. Desian-Basis Fire A partition separates the two redundant refrigeration trains, however, it is not a fire barrier. In the event of a fire, the galvanized ductwork, ductwork accessories, dampers, refrigeration equipment, and pumps may be damaged. However, this equipment is not required for safe shutdown of the plant. 2.3.11.31 Unit 1 Auxiliarv Feedwater Diesel-Driven Pumo Room (Fire Zone 11.4A-1) This zone is shown on Figure 2.3-13 (Sheet 1) and in elevation on Figures 2.3-22 (Sheet 2) and 2.3-25 (Sheet 1). Fire Barrier Descriotion The floor at elevation 383 feet 0 inch is an 18-inch thick i structural reinforced concrete slab and carries a 3-hour fire i rating. One 4-inch diameter leak detection sump drain is l provided. l The perimeter walls of this zone are 12-inch thick hollow l concrete masonry units or 42-inch thick structural reinforced concrete and carry a 3-hour fire rating. Masonry walls extend up to within 1 inch of the ceiling above, and this remaining space is packed with a 1-inch thick blanket of Thermafiber insulation. i All doors in these perimeter walls are Label "A" fire doors. The ceiling of this fire zone, at elevation 401 feet 0 inch, is a 24-inch thick structural reinforced concrete slab supported by concrete beams and columns and carries a 3-hour fire rating. \\ j 2.3-127 l f

BYROM - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS Concern No. 16 Labeled fire doors were not provided at the Auxiliary Fuel Pump Room and at the doorway in the fire wall at Column L-ll on elevation 401 feet, as committed to in the Fire Protection Report.

Response

Fire doors for the auxiliary feedwater pump room on elevation 383'-0" are Label "A" fire doors as currently indicated in the Fire Protection Report. A review of vendor shop drawings indicates that this is the case. The label in the field may have been inadvertently painted over or removed. The fire doors at column-row L-ll on elevation 401'-0" are " doors of label construction" and.not UL labeled doors as indicated in the Fire Protection Report. As described in agreement No. 4 of the fire protection site audit report, these doors provide an equivalent level of safety to labeled fire doors, and their use is therefore acceptable. The Fire Protection Report will be revised to correctly indicate the nature of these doors (revised Fire Protection Report pages are attached). \\

B/B For further details, see Subsection 2.3.11.36 except that: a. There is 9.6 pounds of gasket material. b. With a floor area of 170 ft2, the fire loading is negligible. c. The fire loading is minimal and the design-basis fire is minimal and will not affect the ability to shut down the reactor. 2.3.11.39 Letdown Heat Exchanaer 2B Room (Fire Zone 11.4D-2) This. zone is shown on Figure 2.3-13. For details, see, Subsection 2.3.11.38. 2.3.11.40 Auxiliarv Buildina Elevation 401 feet 0 inch (Fire Zone 11.5-0) This zone is shown on Figure 2.3-12 (Sheets 1 and 3) and in elevation on Figures 2.3-25 and 2.3-26. Electrical cable trays routed through this zone are shown on Figure 2.3-36. a Fire Barrier Descriotion The floor at elevation 401 feet 0 inch is a 12-inch to 48-inch structural reinforced concrete slab supported by concrete beams and columns. The portion of the floor over the RHR heat exchanger rooms carry a 3-hour fire rating. The remainder of the floor contains a number of openings for equipment removal, for an open stairway, and therefore, carries no fire rating. Several 4-inch diameter floor drains are provided. The perimeter walls of this zone are minimum 12-inch thick solid concrete masonry units or 30-inch thick structural reinforced concrete. The wall common to this zone and the Turbine Building ground floor and the Diesel-Generator Rooms carry a 3-hour fire rating. Fire doorc in these walls are either Label "A" doors ~ or " doors of label A construction." Three stairways and an elevator hoistway included in this zone are enclosed by 12-inch thick hollow concrete masonry unit walls, which contain Label "B" fire doors and carry a 2-hour fire rating. All masonry walls extend up to within 1 inch of the ceiling above, and the remaining space is packed with a 1-inch thick blanket of Thermafiber insulation. The ceiling slab at elevation 426 feet 0 inch is 36-inch thick structural reinforced concrete or a 5-inch to 41-inch clear cover 'of structural reinforced concrete over 3-inch fluted steel 2.3-135

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BYRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS Concern No. 17 We observed that, because of the absence of an automatic fire suppression system and the lack of a fire wall between redundant divisions, both RHR pumps and related cabling are vulnerable to a fire located in the containment spray pump area. To satisfy the guidelines in Section C.5.b of BTP CMEB 9.5.1, the unprotec-ted openings in the wall separating the Division 11 RHR pump room from the containment-spray pump area should be protected to prevent the passage of' smoke and heat.

Response

It is the applicanth position that the residual heat removal pump rooms are already adequately separated, and that upgrading one or both of the intervening pump cubicle walls to a rated fire barrier is not warranted. The reasons for this are as follows: The division 11 RHR pump cubicle is separated from the division 12 RHR pump cubicle by over 70 feet. The intervening rooms contain the division 11 and 12 containment spray pumps. The combustible loading in these rooms is conservatively estimated 2 to be 10,300 BTU /ft2 (division 11 CS pump room) and 36,200 BTU /ft (division 12 CS pump room). The majority of this material consists of cable insulation and jacket materials. Because these are controlled access areas, no transient combustibles are assumed. All of these rooms are provided with ionization type fire detectioni 'These combustible loadings are quite small, and the materials constitute a low fire hazard. Any fire which could occur in these CS pump rooms would not be of sufficient severity to propagate to the adjoining RHR pump rooms. The RHR pump cubicle walls, and door, while not fire rated, are of substantial construction, and could withstand a fire of the severity which might occur here without structural failure. In addition, the RHR pumps are not required for normal plant operation nor to maintain the plant in hot standby. They are only used to bring the plant to cold shutdown. Thus, as allowed by Appendix R, credit can be taken for making repairs in the 72 hour interval prior to the time when the pumps are required.

Thus, any cables which may have suffered fire damage due to a fire in the CS pump cubicles could be replaced or repaired during this time.

For these reasons, the applicant believes that upgrading the RHR pump cubicle walls to fire rated barriers is not required.

BYRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS Conenrn No. 18 We observed that, because of the absence of automatic fire suppres-sion systems, area-wide smoke detection systems and/or physical separation between redundant divisions, both trains of shutdown related cabling and components are vulnerable to damage from a single fire in the following plant areas: Non segregated bus duct area Aux. electrical equipment room Aux. building general area, Elevation 346 feet Aux. building general area, Elevation 364 feet Aux. building general area, Elevation 401 feet Aux. building general area, Elevation 426 feet Containment The fire protection for these areas is not in accordance with the guidelines in BTP CMEB 9.5.1 or Section III.G of Appendix R. Out-side containment, the applicant should completely protect one 4 shutdown division with a one-hour fire rated barrier wherever redundant divisions are located within 20 feet of one another or ' located more than 20 feet apart but the inervening space contains combustible material. In addition, complete area-wide fire detection and automatic fire suppression are required. Inside containment, the fire protection guidelines of Section C.7.a of BTP CMEB 9.5.1 apply. To facilitate our evaluation of any devi-ation from our guidelines and to evaluate the adequacy of the applicant's response to Item 8 (above), the applicant should provide color coded drawings showing the relative location of redundant shutdown related cables for all fire areas. NOTE Because no safe shutdown analysis was provided for Unit 2, our evaluation applies only to Unit 1.

Response

In order to facilitate the staff's continuing evaluation of fire . protection features in the plant areas listed above, a set of color-coded drawings showing redundant safe shutdown cable pairs for these areas will be completed and provided to the staff for their use, as requested by this concern. These drawings are expected to be available by September 30, 1983. _____m_.. ._m __ ~ y

BYRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS Response (Cont'd) A response to each area listed above follows: A) Non-segregated bue duct area (Fire Zone 3.2A-1) -- As described in Subsection 2.4.2.7 of the Fire Protection Report, all redundant safe shutdown cable pairs are separated by at least 20 feet. In addition, this area has area wide fire detection and a total flooding CO2 sup-pression system. It is the applicant's position that the existing design for this area is adequate, and additional features are not required. B) Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (Fire Zone 5.5-1) -- The applicant is in the process of designing a new panel to provide the operators with vital safe shutdown parameters independent of this zone. The new panel is redundant to equipment in this room, thus a fire in this room will not prevent safe shutdown of the unit. Details regarding-the new panel and the instrumentation to be provided on it are included in the revised response to FSAR question 10.57, and in revised Subsection 2.4.2.21 of the Fire Protection Report. Advance transmittals of these sections (which will be included in future amendments to the respective documents) were sent to the NRC on June 17, 1983 via a letter from Mr. T. R. Tramm (CECO) to Mr. H. R. Denton (NRC). C) Auxiliary Building General Area, Elevation 346'-0" (Fire Zone 11.2-0) -- As described in Subsection 2.4.2.33 of the Fire Protection Report, the applicant believes that the existing arrangement for this area is adequate. D) Auxiliary Building General Area, Elevation 364'-0" (Fire Zone 11.3-0) -- As described in Subsection 2.4.2.37 of the Fire Protection Report, the applicant believes that the existing arrangement for this area is adequate. l E) ' Auxiliary Building General Area, Elevation 401'-0" (Fire l Zone 11.5-0) -- As described in Subsection 2.4.2.46 of the j Fire ~ Protection Repott, the applicant believes that the l existing arrangement for this area is adequate. F) Auxiliary Building General Area, Elevation 426'-0" (Fire l Zone 11.6-0) -- Upon completion of the modification described l in Subsection 2.4.2.49 of the Fire Protection Report, the arrangement in this area will be adequate. G) Containment (Fire Zones 1.1-1, 1.2-1 and 1.3-1) -- As described in Subsections 2.4.2.1-3 of the Fire Protection Report, 'the applicant believes that the existing arrangement in these areas is adequate. l

BYROM - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCERNS o Response (Cont ' d) In summary, the applicanth position regarding the adequacy of the existing design for these areas remains unchanged. All of the areas listed outside of containment already have complete area-wide detection. Except for the non-segregated bus duct area, which is provided with an automatic total flooding CO2 suppression systems, no automatic area-wide suppression systems are provided, nor are they justified due to the low combustible loading and 'dhe widely dispersed nature of the identified combustible materials. Redundant safe shutdown divisions are already separated by 20 feet or more in all cases. This provides adequate separation. 'The additional installation of a one hour rated barrier around one safe shutdown division is not justified on the basis that the only identified combustible materials between the redundant cables consists of cable insulation and jacketing materials. Due to the fire resistant construction of cables used at Byron /Braidwood, propagation of a fire in one cable tray to nearby cable trays of the opposite division will not occur. Thus, the applicant concludes that changes to the existing arrangement are not warranted. I I l i

E BYRON - 1 RESPONSES TO FIRE PROTECTION SITE AUDIT CONCSRNS ~ Concern No. 1 In the August 16, 1982 revision to the Fire Protection Report, the applicant committed to seal fire barrier penetrations with material having a fire resistance rating comparable to the ratings of fire walls and floor / ceiling assemblies. This neces-sitates that sealant material be installed to an appropriate depth consistant with its UL listing. We observed that RTV silicon sealant material was installed in the plant in thicknesses greater than the depth of the concrete floor slab. This configu-ration does not appear to be consistent with the listing of the material. We are concerned that this sealant material will not be able to withstand anticipated fire exposures. The applicant should verify that penetration seals featuring silicon foam, as installed in the plant, are equivalent to the structural assembly.

Response

The sealant fire test reports for the different fire stop~ materials used in " electrical" openings in walls, floors, or ceilings address the amount of fire stop material required in order to meet the required fire ratings of these fire barriers. This information is transmitted to the installation contractor via drawings which give specific installation requirements for each opening requiring a fire stop. For openings where the thickness of the fire barrier is less than required thickness of the fire stop material, a detail has been shown on the installation drawings specifying how the required thickness is to be attained. The type of detail used for attaining a thickness of fire stop greater than the floor thickness is shown on drawing B1-E-0-5A (copy attached). The fire stop sealant test reports also address the installation of plugs in installed fire stops. For this testing an installed fire stop was drilled to make an opening and then resealed with the same fire stop material. The installation was subsequently exp.osed to fire tests. The applicable test reports for the fire stop materials used in " electrical" openings in floors, walls, and ceilings at Byron / Braidwood are listed below. These test reports are currently under review to verify that the fire stops meet all applicable require-ments. 1. CT Gypsum - Transco Test Report TR-109 2. High Density Silicone - Transco Test Reports TR-110+TR-121 3. Medium Density Sili. cone - Transco Test Report TR-lll i I

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1 i i 1 l l s By: G.J.Jarosz Date: 4-7-83 \\ l O Ouesm.yy, _ y i-I L. .J

Tec't Report #TR-109 Page 1 of 27 '(]) A) Synopsis: This report describes a three hour fire and subsequent h*ose stream f'loor test oi Transco #TCO-001/U.S. Gypsum Firecode CT Gypsun Cement used in a large electrical. opening. The fire test was perforced in accordance with the ASTM E-119 time / tem-perature curve for three hours and provisions for testing penetration seals set forth in the IEEE 634-78, ANI, NML, and ASTM E-814 (for a "F" rating) test standards. This penetration seal was tested along with 26 other openings in a large 17'-9" x 13'-10-1/2" concrete slab on March 9,1983, at Portland Cement Association's Fire Research Laboratory (Skokie, Illinois). -(:) The opening measured 109-1/2" x 32" x 12" deep and had two sub-strate surf aces which consisted of 1/4" thick. steel plate while the remaining two substrate surfaces were cast concrete. Three cable trays and two conduits penetrated the opening. Two of the trays (one ladder and one solid back) and one conduit were filled with PVC jacketed cable. The third tray and other conduit were filled with Hypalon jacketed cable. The tw] trays with PVC jacketed material were located 1/16"-1/8" from the t substrates at each end of the penetration in order to show'the sealing material's ability to seal narrow spaces. The third tray was located 17-3/8" from one end of the penetration. O 9

I Test Report #TR-109 Q Page 2 of 27 The opening was filled with 5" of Transco #TCO-001/U.S. Gypsum Firecode CT Gypsum Cement. Four inches of #TCO-009/U.S. Gypsum Thercafiber damming material was used to dam inside of the cable trays and conduits (only). No danning material was used ~ for the areas outside of the trays and conduits. Transco #TCO-001 cement is a water based, 20-35 lbs./cu.ft. material. It is normally mixed with an accelerator to. produce a rigid material which can be casily altered. The caterials, used for this test were mixed with varying amounts of water and accelerator (and in some batches no accelerator was used) in order to demonstrate the material's installtion versatility. During installation, the material's consistency ranged from a stiff material which had to be troweled in place to a soupy liquid which flowed and self-leveled. It should be noted that a small hairline crack developed at the center of the seal's surface (this crack was not visible from beneath the slab). The single surface crack was,the result of a slight' amount of linear shrinkage of the material (this is a normally occurring characteristic of this material). It should also be noted that the seal had been walked upon on several occasions prior to the actual fire test. Although no damage was visible, standing on the seal'is not recommended since it is a very thin, unsup-ported material.

Test Report #TP.-109 Page 3 of 27 Besides qualifying the seal to the test standards centioned, several other objectives were established in this test. These are: 1. The materials ability to seal both narrow and vide areas without support; 2. .The material's ability to provide the desired fire protective qualities even if surface cracks occur and when the material is installed using a variety of water and accelerator to dry. material ratios; 3. The use of caterial to seal both solid and ladder back cable trays; 4. The use of the material when installed next to either steel or concrete substrates; 5. The use of a dam:ning board divider (used in several sections) to separate larger field openings into sections which are equal to or smaller than the hnetrationtested; 6. The ability of the sealing material to be removed for additional cable installation; and, 7. That a symmetrical 5" thick seal can withstand the 3 hourfireand2hoseseparatestreamtests) B.) Test Slab: The test slab measured 17'-9" x 13'-10-1/2" x 12" thick. Twenty-seven openings which ranged from 1-1/2" diameter to 109-1/2" x 32" in size penetrated the test slab. The penetra-

e Test Report #TR-109 a Page 4 of 27 tions were arranged in the slab so that 18" wide (min.) concrete columns separated each row of penetrations.- These columns were placed in the direction which would allow for the least amount of deflection from heat during the fire test. The slab's steel reinforcement design and actual slab fabrication were co=pleted by Portland Cement Association's personnel. After the slab was cast, the concrete was allowed to cure for several days af ter which the slab was subjected to additional heat curing on a furnace. ~ (h The slab's superstructure and specimen fabricatica and seal installation was performed by Transco employees. The slab's superstructure consisted of steel angle braces mounted to the slab which supported the pipes, cable trays, cables, etc., for the test. r j C.) Specimen Configuration: The test penetration measured 109-1/2" x 32" x 12" deep. Two l l sides of the penetration were lined with 1/4" thick steel plate j '(set at a right angle in the plan view of the penetration). The remaining two substrate surf aces were cast concrete. t l The opening was penetrated by three cable trays and two ( conduits. Each cable tray was mounted so that it extended 36" above the slab's unexposed surface and 12" below its exposed

Test Report #TR-109 Page 5 of 27 -{()) surf ace., The conduit sleeves were 12" long and counted flush inside of the penetration. The*cabic trays and conduits were filled with cable based on ~ The loadings were calcu-loadings which exceeded 100% fills., lated so that a 100% fill was equivalent to 40% of the actual sectional areas of the cable trays or conduits. Some of the loadings were increased so that 100% visual loadings were also chic' ecd. Cabic loadings were as follows: 1.) 24" x 6" solid back cable tray filled with Hypalon jacketed cable: ~ 7 4 pr. #20..................... 0.4185...... 2.9295 5 1 pr.

16..................... 0.1046...... 0.523

~ 5 8 pr. #16..................... 0.6792...... 3.396 9 12 pr.

16..................... 0.916...... 8.2448 10 2/C
14.....................

0.1839...... 1.8398 3 3/C

14..................... 0.2058...... 0.6176 3 3/C
14.................... 0.2715...... 0.81464 8 7/C
14..................... 0.3717...... 2.9741 4 9/C
14..................... 0. 4 9 3 8...... 1. 9 6 4 12/C
14..................... 0.7013...... 2.8052 4 7/C
10..................... 0.5242...... 2.0969 2 9/C
10..................... 0.7697...... 1.5395 3 2/C
10..................... 0.2846...... 0.8538 1 3/C, 500MCM.................. 5.2563...... 5.2563 5 3/C, 1/0.....................

1.6695...... 8.3475 Total loading = 44.1986 sq. in. O (115.10% fill of tray)

Test Report #TR-109 (]) Page 6 of 27

one 12/C #14 ccble was added to this tray as part of the repair to this scal.

? 2.) 4" diameter conduit filled with Ilypalon jacketed cable: 2 12 p r. # 2 0..................... 0. 916 0...... 1. 8 3 2 2 12 p r. # 14..................... 0. 7013.'..... 1. 4 02 6 1 3/C, 4/0...................... 2.6822...... 2.6822 100% fill Total loading = 5.9168 sq. in. (117.7% fill of conduit) 3.) 30" x 4" ladder back cable tray filled with PVC jacketed cable: 134 2/C

14....................

0.1372.... 18.3848 35 12/C

14..................... 0.5329..... 18.6190

- []) 26 1/C, 500MCM.................. 0.7013...... 18.2359 Total loading = 55.2397 sq. in. (115% fill of tray)

three 2/C #14 cables were added to this tray as part of the repair to this seal.

4.) 30" x 4" solid back cable tray filled with PVC jacketed cable: 134 2/C

14..................... 0.i372..... 18.3348 35 12C
14..................... 0.5329..... 18.6190 26 1/C
14..................... 0.7013......18.2359 i

Total loading = 55.2397 sq. in. (115% fill of tray) O

Test Report #TR-109 ~ Page 7 of 27 5.) 6" disceter conduit filled with PVC ja' keted cable: c .O' '30 2/c

14..................... 0.1372...... 4.1160 8 12/C F14..................... 0.5329...... 4.2632

7. 1/C, 500McM.........:........

0.7013...... 4.9091 Total loading = 13.2863 sq. in. (117.4% fill of conduit) All cables used in the test extended 36" above the slab's unexposed surface and 12" below its exposed surface. Cables were held to the trays with both compression clamps and metal plates located approximately 12" from the top of each tray. In addition, a threaded rod das used across the bottom of each tray to prevent the cables from being pulled forward during the seal installation. This was done to simulate field conditions where continuous cables make

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it impossible in some cases to move the cables apart for seal installation. The conduits were welded directly to the steel substrate. This was performed to show the sealing material's at111ty to fill a space which gets increasingly smaller (following tle curvature of the conduit to where it is welded to the substrate). The cables used in these conduits were held to a bar which was located approximately 30" above the slab. I The top ends of all cables used inside of cable trays were covered ith silicone adhesive while conduit cable ends were taped. This w I was completed in accordance with IEEE-634-78 requirements. l i

Test Report !TR-109 Page 8 of 27 o D.) Seal Installation: The opening around the cable trays and conduits was 'first formed with plywood and supported from the floor'below (any other s=ooth, ~ removable form can be used in field installations or an approved noncombustible material can be used if damming is to re=ain as a permanent part of the installation). Four inches of #TCO-009 damming material was then installed between the cables to hold the liquid #TCO-001 cement material in place until set (and remained in place as part of the permanent seal between the cables only). The iTCO-001 cement was then installed 5" deep over the forming materials. The cement material was mixed both in a. dispensing machine and by hand in plastic buckets to demonstrate both conditions. Varying amounts of water were used in both cases to produce a material consistency which ranged from a flowable, soupy liquid to a thick material which had to be placed by trowel. Varying amounts of liquid and dry accelerator were also used from ' batch to batch (and in some cases, no accelerator was used). This wide range of installation techniques was used to d'econstrate the material's fire protective properties when batches as described are installed and when set percentages of water and accelerator to dry material might be altered by the installer to suit field conditions. O

Test Report #TR-lO9 Page 9 of 27 After the cement had been placed, its surf ace was trowelled smooth. O An additional light coating of #TCO-001 cement (approximately 1/4" thick) was sprayed onto all PVC jacketed cable to a. height of 12" above the already installed 5" thick seal. The Hypalon jacketed cables were not sprayed with any additional caterial. After the mate' rials had hardened, a wooden rod was used to bore a small hole through the cecent in front of the cable tray holding the Hypalon jacketed cables while a second hole was made in front of the ladder back tray filled with PVC jacketed cable. One 12/C #14 Hypalon cable was then added to the Hypalon cable tray and three 12/C #14 PVC cables were added to the ladder back tray through the holes. The spaces around the cables were then filled with O aaitie= 1 ce=e== a ae==1 8 teri 1 te i=et te rie1a ce aitie=- ^ where a finished seal might be altered for the addition of cables. It should be noted that prior to the installation for the cement material, a section of 1" thick Johns-Manville Ceraboard (81b. density) was set perpendicularly in front of the solid back cable tray filled with PVC jacketed cable. This section of board material consisted of three separate sections of the board which were butted up against each other across the width of the penetration. The section of board was as high as the cement seal surrounding it. This board was installed to demonstrate field conditions where pena-trations larger than the penetration qualified in this test can be divided using the board material into sections the same size or smaller to ccet the size limitations of this test. --.y

^ Test Report #TR-109 Page 10 of 27 ' O E.) Thermocouples: Thermocouples were mounted to the test specimen to gather temperature data throughout tlie test at five minute intervals for the first two hours and at ten minute intervals for the re=aining hour (in accordance with lEEE 634-78). Temperatures were recorded for the seal surface (in eight different locations), concrete and steel substrate / seal interfaces, at tray / seal and conduit / seal interfaces, on seal surfaces of conduits, and at cabla/ seal interfaces. In each cable tray and conduit, thermocoupes were mounted to typical instrument, control, and power type esbles. Where the cables were covered with a sprayed coating (in the cable trays and conduit which were filled with PVC jacketed cable), the thermo couples were attached directly to the cables at the surrounding seal surface (beneath the coating). ~ All seal surface thermocouples were embedded approximately 1/4-1/2" deep into the seal's surface. Where thercocouples were used to measure cable, substrate, tray, or conduit temperatures, the thermocouples were also embedded 1/4-1/2" deep into the interface surfaces. The thermocouples used in this test along with final temperature readings at the conclusion of the test are as follows ,(temperature data for the entire test can be found in Section H of this report): e O

a Test Report #TR-109 Page 11 of 27 -( ) T/C# Print # Description Final Temperature (*F) 9 9c Seal surface 137 10 10e Seal surface 150 11 11c Seal surface 141 12 12c Steei substrate / seal interface 423 13 13e Concrete substrate / seal interface 193 14 14c Instrument cable 416 - Cable tray filled 15 15e . Control cable 441 with Hypalon I 16 16e Power cable '464 jacketed cable 17 17e Cable tray 326 _ 18 18e Seal surface 471 19 19e Instrument cable 424' - Conduit filled with 20 20c Control cable 391 Hypalon jacketed cable 21 21c Power cable 326 22 22c Seal / conduit interface 471 23 53a Instrument. cable 368.9 24 54a control cable 426.9 -Ladder back tray filled 25 55a Power cable 809.2 with PVC jacketed cable 26 56a Cable trr.- 201.5_ 27 27c Instrument cable. 271 -Solid back tray filled 28 28e control cable 364 with PVC jacketed cable -e-- w, ~w

Test Report ~ /*TR-109 ~ Page 12 of 27 T/C# ?rintf Description Final Temperature (*F) 29 29c Power cable 627 188 __ 30 30c Cable tray 31 31c Instrument cable 391 32 52a control cable ~546.3 -- Conduit filled with PVC 33 49a Power cable 578.6 jacketed cable 34 50a' Seal surface 213.7 ~ 35 Sla seal / conduit interface 704.3,_ 163 163c Scal surface 141 164 164c Seal surface 390 165 165c Seal surface 325 166 166c Seal surface 470 167 167c Seal surface 423 209 98b Repair surface 16 5. 3' -- Hypalon jacketed cable 210 99b Repair cable 370.4_ '211 100b Repair surface 150.2-PVC jacketed cable 212

90b, Repair cable 178.9 F.)

Purnace: The furnace used for this test measures approximately 14' x 18' at its support points." It is approximately 7' tall making it possible to work on the spe'cimen's exposed surface and view it prior to the fire test. The furnace at=osphere is controlled by six self-igniting burners which burn natural gas and operate in unison. The burners are automatically controlled by a computer 1.ocated inside of the control room. As the furnace atmosphere temperatures are monitored in the control room, (h manual adjustments can be made to account for varying amounts of fuel contri-bution throughout the test. p

~ ' Test Report #TR-109 Page 13 of 27 The furnace atmosphere tempera'tures are monitored by 16 thermocouples located 12" below the test slab. These temperatures are individually printed on a continuous chart and also averaged on a computer print-out. / The furnace draft is manually operated and averaged approximately .08" of water pressure throughout the test. Since manual adjustments are made, to the burners in order to follow the ASTM E-119 time / temperature curve, brie'f periods of positive pressure are introduced inside of the furnace. This is evidenced by visible puffs of smoke generated through any openings in the test specimen (i.e., through a fire damper, unsealed (]h pipe insulation, etc.). G.) Test Record: The fire test was conducted for three hours in accordance with the ASTM E-119 time / temperature curve. Throughout the test, an'even blanket ( of flame covered the plan area of the furnace. All combustible materials located on the exposed surface of the slab quickly ignited and continued to char throughout the test. During the first 2 hours of the test, very little smoke was generated from the cables used in this specimen. Water began to evaporate through the hairline ' crack (noted prior to the test) at the center of the seal. This was evidenced by moisture highlighting the crack. O l I t

r Test Report #TR-109 -() Page 14 of 27 ~ During the test, the west side of the penetration's substrate (concrete with the 1/4" thick steel plate liner) was level. This portion of the slab was supported by the edge of the furnace and remained level. Although no deflection of the slab was noted here, slab expansion did occur as. evidenced by 1/16"-1/8" wide cracks at the corners of the slab. The opposite side of the penetration (cast concrete with no steel liner) was not supported by the edge of the furnace and as a result was exposed to more heat than the concrete substrate with the steel liner. This lack of support and exposure to greater heat caused the concrete to expand and visibly deflect downward into the furnace. '(:) The downward deflection of the concrete resulted in a combined shear / twisting action on penetration seal during the fire test. The most severe downward deflection of the concrete occurred near the damming board divider.- During the fire test it was observed that the seal twisted and sloped here to follow the slab's deflection. At this point of the severest slab deflection, several small cracks and a s=all r bulge occurred on the seal surface. This was a result of strain release of the twisted seal. During the fire test, higher surface te peratuers were obtained in this area. After the fire test, it was noted that some of the seal's exposed surface had fallen from this area also. Outside of the area of the seal affected by the deflection of the slab, seal surface temperatures remained relatively cool and no loss of caterial was observed after the conclusion of the test. m

S Test Report !TR-109 Page 15 of 27 Within the last hour of the test, the PVC jacketed cables began to swell near the seal surf ace causing cracking in their coatings. This swelling was not observed on the Hypalon jacketed ' cables. A light density smoke - generated from the PVC cables for the duration of the test. Two hose stream tests were conducted o~n the concrete slab and pene-tration seal. k'ater did not penetrate any portion of the seal during either test. The first hose stream test consisted of spraying the exposed surfat -f the 17'-9" x 13'-10-1/2" slab with water delivered from a 1-1/2" hose equipped with a fog nozzle set at a discharge angle bf 15' at 75 p.s.i. from 10' for 6 minutes and 18 seconds. The second hose stream test was identical to the first except that.the nozzle was set at a discharge angle of 30*. H.) Temperature Data: The following sheets identify both furnace atmosphere and unexposed surface temperatures obtained through the fire test. e ..,-..--m-. _.p.,.,

Page 16 of 27 1 P AlibCO *CP5056) 0 3 / 0 9,* B.!- F UF il AC E 6 T !105~ HEF.E T E!!F EF; A T UPE (SEC. F) h TEST T !!1E, F UPlirtC E ASTil E119 VAF:l AT 1011 FPO!: Hr:!1in T ElIP. T EllP. ASTil TEllP. F F F, 0:00 196 68~ 123 0:05 995 1000 -5 0:10 1271 1300 -29 0:15 1503 1399 104 0:20 1527 1462 65 5: 25 1547 1510 37. 0:30 1557 1550 7 0:35 1608 1504 24 0: 40 1626 1613 13 0: 45 1633 1630 0 0:50 1655 1661 -6 0:55 1704 1681 23 1:00 1714 1700 14 1:05 1724 1718 6 1:10 1729 1735 -C '1:15 1748 1750 -2 1:20 1771 1765 6 1:25 1776 1779- -3 1:30 1779 1792 -13 1:35 1818 1804 14 1:40 1823 1815 8 3:45 1830 1826 4 1836 1835' 1 1:50 1:55 1844 1043-1 2:00 1854 1850 4 2:10 1873 1862 11 2:20 1880 1875 5 2:30 1880 1888 -8 2:40 1895 1900 -5 2:50 1916 1912 4 3:00 1930 1925 5

= .u6 1 F; fit ti C D rCF5056) - 03,'09'83 Page 17 of 27 a U!!E * :P O L EIa SUF F f10 E THE;:11G' 0UF L E T E!:F E F.fs T Ur:E S (l'EG F) 1EST 1111E, TeC'f40. Hr: 11i n 9 10 11 12 13 14 I 0:00 75 75 J6 76 76* 76 0:05 72 72 74 75 73 74 0:10 73 73 74 83 73 77 0:15 73 74 74 97 74 90 0:20 74 74 74 113 74 109 75 75 136 75 135 0:25 75 0:30 76 77 76 153 78 168 0:35 78 79 78 164 82 192 0:40 30 81 82 176 87 203 0:45 83 84 92 188 93 208 0:50 67 88 105. 198 99 211' 0:55 - 92 , 93 121 207 105 214 1:00 99 99 135 220 112 217 1:05 106 108 146 235 119 222 . e 1:10 112 115 151 249 126 229 1:15 118 123 153 263 133 236 1:20 122 130 153 283 139 238 1:25 127 136 152 300 144 251 1:30, 129 139 152 314 150 251 1.:35 129 141 149 325 154 272 ~. - .e ,I 1:40 129 142 146 337 157 279 1:45 130 142 145 346 160 287 [ 1:50 129 143 144 353 163 293 I ' ~ 308 1:55 129 143 144 359 166 t 2:00 130 144 143 367 169 321 2:10 132 145 143 378 175 334 2:20 132 ,145 142 389 180 347 2:30 132 *~ 147 142 399 184 367 2:40 135' - 149 142 408 187 ~ 336 2:50 135 149' 141 415 '189 402-3:00 137 150 141 423 193 416 O v =

TF:F1!{5 CO (C R5056) - 03/09/E3 Page 18 of 27 U'!E:JOSED SU TACE T HEP:10C OUPL E T E!1F E P A T UF.E S < DEC F > 1EST T !!:E, T'C 110. Hr-: lii n 15' 16 17 18 19 20 l 0:00 76 75 ,75 77 76* 75 0:05 75 73 75 78 76 73 0:10 82 73 82 92 83 77 0:15 105 75 94 114 97 86 0:20 130 78 106 136 113 93 0:25 '160 34 120 162 136 114 0:30 181 92 144 182 153 141 ~ i 0:35 20'6' 102 156 194 164 154 f l 0:40, 226 114 162 206 176 159 0: 45 241 12C 167 219 188 166 0:50. 251 143 179 233 198 171 0:55 261 160 192 24S 20S 176 1:00 271 176 '204 265 220 183 1:05 282 186 216 2S4 235 , 198 ~ ~ 1:10 2.40 191 232 298 249 211 ~ 1:15 298 197 244 315 263 222' 1:20 306 204 253 336 283 236 0 1:25 314 2i2 264 - 356 30e 248 1:30 321 220 - 272 372 '3 1 5 - 260 1:35 328 225 278 383 326 271 336 230 280 393 338 280 ' 1': 4 0 1:45 344 235 283 402 346 289

1:50 350 _ -

241 - 287 409 354 298 6 1:55 ~ 356--::.- 248 - 293 _ :415 360 307 2:00 363 254 292 421 .-. 3 6 7

315 2: 10 378_.

269 295 433 379 334 I ~ 2:20 395 291 307 452 389 348 2:30 4 0 7. 320 321 451 399 359 l 2:40 420 352 314 458 408 370 2:50 429 397 316 464 415 382 3:00 441 464 326 471 424 391 G O I

P5 e 19 of 27 9 .' iRANSQO I N C. i () TRA':SCO (CE5055' - 03/09/83 USEXTOSE SU?.?IsCE TEET':OCOUPLE TEMFEEATUP.ES (DEG.F) -= TEST TIME T/C DO 2 HP.: MIN I 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 0:00 75 76 70.1 71.8 73.8 71.5 75 0:0: 75 78 70.4 72.4 78.4 72.3 73 0:10 82 91' 71.5 75.4 95.4 95.4 74 0:15 94 114 74.0 82.3 123.3 73 5 78 0;20 105 136 78.7 94.2 165.5: 76.4 83 0:25 119 162 86.2 110.2 210.3 80.7 90 0: 30 144. 182 97.2 126.1 241.5 86 7 98 0: 35 156-194 115.1 147 9 270.4 93 9 108 0:40 161 206 159 1 173.4 307 9 102.4 123 0:45 167 218 192.0 199 2 335.4 112.9 142 0: 50 179 233 197.8 206.3 353 1 126.1 149 0: 55 192 248 198.1 210.2 365.2 133 9 153 1:00 203 265 197.0 215.4 379.9 141.9 156 1:05 216 284 195.7 221.0 379.1 146.8 158 1:10 231 298 194.9 227.7 415.8 153.7 160 1:15 243 315 193.9 233.6 436.0 157.4 163 ,()I1:20 253 336. 193.7 241.5 463.5 159.7 167 1:25 264 355 193.9 248.6 485.7 162.3 171 1: 30 272 371 194.2 257.0 501.2 164.1 176 .1: 35 ,278 383 195.1 264.5 514 4 167.2 179 1:40 j280 393 199.6 270.5 536.1 166.1 184 1: 45 l283 402 204.8 277.3 560.9 166.1 190 1:50 287 409 209 9 284.6'. 584.3 167.7 196 1: 55 292 414 215.4 292.5 607.2 168.3 200 . 2:00 292 ~421 220.4 298.1 632.1 169.9 206 2:10 295 433 229 3 312.0 680.2 172.9 215 2:20 307 442 236.8 325.6 692.8 177.9 225 2: 30 321 450 266.9 340.5 712.5 183.8 231 2:40 314 458 309.3 364.1 737.8 190.3 243 2: 50 316 463 339.5 393.0. 784.6 195.6 250 3: 00 326 471 368.9 426.9 809.2 201.5 271 O

Page 20 of 27 i'R A N S C O I N C. TRA!:SCO (CR5056) - C3/09/83 l'UEZ2CCE3 2'JEFACE THEEF.CCO'yFLE TE!:PEEATURES (DEO F) TEST TIT:E, T/C ho.,_ ER: MIN 28 29_ 30 31 32 33 34. 35 0:00 75 75 69 75 7h.1 71.5 71.6 73 2 0:05 74 74 67 73 72.6 71.8 72.2 77.1 0:10 78 80 68 .77 75.1 74.4 74.8 94.6 0:15 85 .90 71 86 82.6 80.8 82.1 124.8 0:20 94 103 74 98 96.8 92.3 97.1 163 0 0:25 107 120 78 114 120 9 111.5 119 0 217.1 0: 30 122 140 83 141 180.3 144.9 171.1 236.1 0: 35 l 139 165 89 154 299.8 170.3 190.8 250.1 0:40 154 198 95 159 210.8 179 0 194.1 259.S 0: 45 164 220 101 166 210.6 179.4 195 5 272.8 0:50 171 238 111 171 208.9 179.6 195.6 291.2 0:55 178 248 122 176 206.9 183.8 198.1 311.9 1:00 184 257 131 183 205 7 190.7 213.3 333.7 1:05 191 268 137 198 214.9 200.5 224.1 355.2 1:10 196 281 142 211 244.7 209.8 229 9 380.8 1:15 200 294 145-222 273.9 218.8 223.0 407.1 . :20 206 305 147 235 231 5 227.4 213.8 435.8

25 212 316 150 248 264.0 227.7 214.2 458.3 1: 30 217 325 152 260 303.0 225.9 214.2 481.1 1: 35 220 335 153 271 308.3 226.9 214.3 504.0 lie 0 -

223 34.7 154' 279 29I.3 224.3 181.2 522.1 1: 45 232 374 156 289 285.4 236.5 175 7 539.6 1:50 243 411 158 297 295 1 254.4 176.2 555 1 1:55 154 430 160 306 304.2 274.4 179.6 572.7 2:00 269 448 162 315 323 3 294.9 181.4 509.0 2:10 286 482 167 333 361.6 348.0 187.1 620.9 2:20 299 517 169 347 387.2 406.3 192.9 640.5 2: 30 308 538 173 358 401.1 424.8 195.6 653.2 2:40 327 566 178 -369 438.9 475.3 200 9 667.0 2:50 3h3 594 182 382 507.2 552.9 207.3 690.6 3: 00 364 627 188 391 546.3 578.6 213 7 704.3 ~ O

T.R A N S C O 1 N C. P:ge 21 of 27 TEl.!!SCO (CE5056) - 03/09/83 (]) U!!EXPOTEP 5'Jh? ACE THEE*.;OCOU?LE TEI4?EEATUEES (EEC-F) TEST T7!'S T/C EO ERiF.1D - 14 3 164 165 16'6 167 0:00 77 75 75 76 76 0:05 74 73 75 78 75 0:10 74 77 82' 91 83 114 97 0:15 74 86 93 ~ 136 113 97 105 0:20 75 0625 76 114 119 162 136 0: 30 79 141 144 182. 153 0: 35 86 153 155 194 164 0:40 97 159 161 205 176 0: 45 109 166. 166 218 188 0: 50 122 171 179 232 198 0 ~: 55 132 176. 192 248 ' 207 1:00 138 183 203 264 220 1:05 142 198 215 283 234 1:10 145 211 231 298 249 1:15 146 222 243 315 263 147 235 252 336 283 3.', 147 ,248 264 355 300 1 1: 30 148 260 271 371 314 1:35 147 270 277 382 325 1:4&.- 145 279 280 392 337 1: 45 143 289 282 401 346 1:50 142 297 286 408 353 1: 55 143 306 292 414 359 142 314 291 420 ~366 2:00 142 333 294 432 378 2:10 142 347 306 441 389 2:20 143 358 321 450 398 I 2: 30 l 2:40 142 369 313 457 408 141 382 315 463 414 i 2:50 141 390 325 470 423 3: 00

'T. R A N S C O I N C. Page 22 of 27 TRAUFCC (CP.5056) - 03/09/E3 (]) UNEXPOSED SUEFACE THEF.MGCOUPLE TEMPEE.L.TURES (DEG F) TEST, TIME _ mg 77 HR: MIN pna 7,n 7,, 7,7 0:00 72.6 73.1 70.4 70.9 0:05 72.9 75.4 70.7 74.4 0:10 73.8 82.2 72.1 79 3 , 0:15 l 75.7 93.4 73.9 83.8 0;20 79 0 - 109.6 76.5 89 0 0:25 83.7 129 9 79.2-93.8 0: 30 89.8 152.0 82.3 99 0 0: 35 97.6 172.5 85.6 104.6 0:40 107.4 192.2 90.4 113.7 0: 45 117.6 208.9 103.1. 135.5 223.8 124.9 161.8 0: 50 128.2 0: 55 138.6 236.1 141.7 175.0 1:00 143 9 244.4 151.4 180.5 1:05 147.2 253.4 156.8 183 0 1:10 149 5 261.5 159 3 183.2 1 15 152.0 269 9 160.9 182.8 1 'O 153.9 277.9 159 3 181.9 1 ~ 153 5 284.8 157.8 179.6 1: 30 156.0 291.7 156.1 177.5 1: 35 153.5 294.5 154.6 175 1 1:4&.- 155.0 300.1 153e5 173.8 1: 45 156.7 304.6 152.4 172.7 1:50 157.2 310.3 150.3: 170.5 1: 55 157.6 315.1 149.8 169 2 2:00 158.6 320.3-148.9 168.7 2:30 161.0 328.8 149 0' 169 1' 2:20 162.0 338.4 149.0 171.4 2: 30 162.5 347.2 148.2 170.6 2:40 162.7 353 9 ' 148.4. 172.5 2: 50 164.1 362.2 149 2 174.8 3: 00 165.3 370.4 150.2 178.9 ~ e O

.~ Test P.eport 4TR-109 O Page 23 of 27 I.) Post Test Observations: Af ter the hose stream tests were concluded, the exposed surface of the seal was available for viewing. It was noted that cost of the sealing material was intact. Several cracks appea' red across the bottom of the seal which were. caused by the intense heat of the fire test. Material had fallen from the seal's exposed surface near the darzing board divider.,Approximately 2 to 2-1/2" of material had fallen frc: the seal which was affected by the greatest amount of surrounding slai deflection. It was in this area where higher seal surface tenperatures were experienced during the fire test. The seal's.une.;oted surface remained completely intact throughout the fire and hose stream tests. The only visible change noted was the swelling on the PVC materials and several small cracks in the area of the slab deflection. As the seal was iemoved for slab destruction it was observed that the PVC jacketed cables completely charred through the seal. The Hypalon jacketed cables charred approximately 1-2" into the seal's exposed surface. O _e... ~

TRA,NSCO '~. T.0 TEST,Erun 6 n n~~ D nn N,-. .eo 4 to l Yi= 39.,

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2 _....,.,.p. ~.t.,..- s&"c.. y@., - ;* M[..,e ' ' e.? - N. TCO-001 cernent seal n 3-c.. . f .r.,.. 3:.. .is- ,, =, .t..~. r .t..~.....m..,? .,. z :.

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TR'NSCO TEST R ;rvR,i.,. R -Iv.:: i O pitt.ptii..w-.:( o b i. :. s. i - i: PVC cables and trayNr. r =,., 17.._ y.c. = . *d,; i.,. n' C.... '. i. i. i !. ;. j.

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l E1 [Illlli; :: : tH um !! ! Hvid ?O l SECTION B B l TRAY WITH HYP_ALON JACKETED CABLES l 1 t l i

6 TRANSCO TEST REPORT TR-lO9 O 9 3 sections of l~ thick ceramic fiber damming board used to divide penetration seal - y~.:....

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l } -m. l ' 2 (.... '..$p. [ii2.~}U,l' .,0.,[,'.Yj..;h:%.1:- jl,,.,..) slab SECTION E-E DAMMING BOARD DIVIDER O .HYPALON cables PVC cables - p -u cables coated 12" i ap' )e H above seal i 5, thick di TCO OOI . j k. .". i I conduit seal 3 conduit l

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>t \\ \\ l { N Ib b TlEN / XX'OT(h$'vX'fy, l ) j M:-:idi? ; iY '!! 5.5!bSE :!isi!! M ~ 5: :i i'!!!!I fi$iii@!:!' ' $ $ N $; I$8:!$ 0 $ 3

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), 175ENt 93 4"of TCO- 'U F9HL 009 damming THI; r material a SECTION C-C SECTION D-D HyPALOS._ CABLE CONDUlT PVQ__ C ABL E _C_ONDUIT

TRA1NSCO s TEST REPORT TR-103 o x F

3 r,:o e t-c r we e v.e.:nc,wa -

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'a % !:;iid.;p cracks'near.. (',cij; ,9 gi;:,. r -- slab cracks iii test end. '.4h -N Lk:-N * ~ ~

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O PLAN VIEW TEST RECORD 1 e i i _ _. _ _ _ _ _. _ _}}

ML20078C375

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ML20078C375

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