ML20077J876

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Forwards Change of Address
ML20077J876
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/28/1967
From: Blatz E, Blatz H
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
Shared Package
ML20077J880 List:
References
FOIA-94-153 NUDOCS 8111160321
Download: ML20077J876 (1)
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THE CITY OF NEW YORK OFFICE OF RADIATION CONTROL M-sg 0

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s ssa FOURTH AVENUE f r L. Ltassectoes 2 9660 Ncw vomx is. N. Y.

August 18, 1959 i}L'.

U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Vashington 25, D. C.

Centlemen Your press release of August II, reporting the proposed issuance of a disposal license to the Military Sea Transpartation Service of the Navy, gives no infomation about the identities and quantities of the vaste radio-icotopes which would be du= ped at sea.

To be able to estimate the possible health hazard connected with the vaste disposal operations it see=s necessary to have an inventory of the materials which are du= ped.,

A proposal has been made for the' Metropolitan Regional Douncil to request a hearing in order to bring out this infomation. {The Council is an organization of representatives of cities in New York, New Jersey and Connecticut.) Perhaps you can supply the needed in-fo ration without a for=al hearing.

In case this cannot be done be-fore the 15 day time limit expires vill you please consider this letter a request for an extension of time.

Very truly yours, I

%V Hanson Blatz Director CC: Mr. Oliver Townsend, Director New York State Office of Ato::tio Development

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I COPY August 28, 1959 Mr. Hanson Bistz Director Office of Radiation Control The City of New York 386 Fourth Avenue

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Dear Hr. Blatz:

Enclosed is the informtion on the proposed license to Hilitary Sea Transportation Service to dispose cf radioactive traste in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in 1000 fathoms of water which Mr. Iester Rogers of this division dis-cussed with you by telephone on August 26th.

As Mr. Rogers indicated to you, the license requires that

.the Cornission be notified at least 20 days prior to any disposal operation as to the date of disposal, the total amount of radioactivit to be disposed of and the mst hazardous radioisotope in each container. This information will be available to any interested person upon request to the Cocnission.

I hope that this is the information that you desire. please feel free to contact us if you have further questions on this matter.

Sinedrely yours, H. L. Price, Director Division of Licensing and Regulat. ion

Enclosures:

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i Mr. Harold Price Director Division of Regulation O'

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Dear Mr. Price:

Because of the proximity of Buchanan, N.Y. to New York City and D particularly n,ince it is very close to both tiie Croton Water Supply System and the new Chelsea Hudson River pumping station, there has been considerable interest nere in the proposal by the Consolidated Edison Company to construct a large power reactor at Indian Point. The Mayor's Technical Advisory Conamittee has recoammended to Mayor Lindsay that an independent technical review by qualified experts be cartfed out for the City of New York. Such a review would be limited in scope with the principal purpose being to identify any possible safety aspects that may have been overlooked in the Cotweission's revtew.

The Mayor agreed that such an independent review would be desirable and authorized this Of fice to proceed with the necessary arrangerments. A sisall group of Belgian scientists wi*h appropriate qualifications has agreed to conduct the type of review desired by our Advisory Conumittee. The Consolidated Edison Company has been inost cooperative in supplying the necessary documents.

It is our understanding that a public hearing is generally conducted in connection with any reactor construction permit application and that one hmonth'snoticeisusuallygivenbeforethehearingisneld.

It is expected that such a hearing alght be scheduled for the near future, although we have not seen a notice to that effect.

My reason in writing. is that we have received word from our consultants that they will not be able to finish their review unt11 about the first of September.

In case it in the intention of toe A.E.C. to schedule a hearing before that date, it is presumed tnat questiont, might still be ratted suaserjuently to the hearing and receive consideration by the A.E.C.

It is rot expected that the City would request chat t ie aoplication for tre construction perrnit be denied. but furtner investigatton of certain aspects may be requested.

If thin procedure mig 5t present a problem, it would be helpful to New York City if the hearing not be held until altar rece.rt of the report from our con nu l t an t s.

I believe tn at we could obtai.i a closer eatimate o-that date withhe a few weeks.

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July 15. 1966 Ycur consideration of this matter woult be a*prec14*.ad.

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Dear Mr. Price:

I Because of the proximity of Buchanan, N.Y. to New York City and 4

particularly since it is very close to both toe Croton Water Supply Systems and j

the new Chelsea lludson Atver puesping station, there has been considerable interest l

here in the proposal by the Consolidated Edison Company to construct a large power reactor at Indian Point. The Mayor's Technical Advisory Cormittee has reconnended to Mayor Lindsay that an independent technical review by qualified experts be carried out for the City of New York. Such a review would be limited in scope with the principal purpose being to identify any possible safety aspects that may have been overlooxed in the Consission's review.

The Mayor agreed that such an independent review would be desirable l

and authorized this Of fica to proceed with the necessary arrangements. A small group of Belgian scientists with appropriate qualifications has agreed to conduct j

the type of review desired by our Advisory Coassittee. The Consolidated Edison Company has been most cooperative in supply 1ig the necessary documents.

It is our understanding that a public hearing is generally conducted in connection with any reactor construction per: nit application and that one month's notice is usually given before the hearing is neld.

It is expected that such a hearing might se scheduled for the r. ear future, although we have not seen

e. notice to that effect.

My reason in writing is c.iat tve have received word f rom our consultants tnat twy wt al r.ot be dole to f.nisn their revtew until about the Lirst ot Septemer.

In case si is tac antention of tac A.E.C. to schedule a acarir.g oefore that date, &L is presurned trat questions c:ignt stati be retsed subsequently to the hearing and receive consideration oy L.te A.E.C.

It is not, expected that tre City would request th.at c.ie appilce. tion for tee construction permit be denied, but furt.ser anvwsttsation of certatn aspects may be requested.

If this procedure stynt present. problers, it would be helpful to New York City if tne aearanb not ne neld until af ter receipt of toe report f roci our consultants.

I believe ende we could obtain a closer esttaate of that date witnan. few o ews.

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Mr. H:rald Price. Director July 15. 1966 Yeve consideration of this matter would 5e apsreciated.

Sineerely yours,

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TMt CITY CP NtU YCRK DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH e

0FFICE OF RADIATION CONTROL 319 seDAsaAv MW * *. 4.Y. 10807 July 20, 19 M Tet. see 7750

'V e-Mr. herold Price, Director Division of Licensing U.S. Atomic seergy Commission Washington, D.C.

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.M tr I have learned iedirectly that my letter of July 15, 1966, addressed'to you may have been considered a formal regnest for a deley la the public hearing '

referred to.

a This was eartainly not intended, since we knew neither the sehVM date of the hearing nor the date when our review will be completed.

It ses an emploratory letter to learn whether it would be desirable to eseediases the 'eme detes and 1f so to learn of the feasibility of doing so.

Sincerely yours i 1 p.

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Hanson Blatz Director 1

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cc: Dr. Harald H. Eossi Dr. Jones 8. Kelley Mr. Olivar Townsend l

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Mr. John T. Conway Eneeutive Director h

Joint Committee en Atomic Laergy Copyress of the tatited States

Dear Mr. Conway:

P.nclosed for the information of the Jelat Contaittee are two 1stters i

recently received from Mr. liensesi 21sta, Director, % e City of i

New York Departaset of Health, Office of Radiaties Centrol. Deee i

letters refer to the proposed nuclear power plant of the Consolidated Edison Campany of New York, Indian rc, int-2.

51moorely yours.

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ilarold L. Price birector of F.egulatlen Lactosures Ltts fu lislats dtd 7/15/66 f 7/20/66 I

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l Mr. Essees niets 1;1 rector Deparesset of Beattb office of mediettee Centrol 323 troedeep metTurk,riew York 14J47

Dear fer. 5 tete:

thank you for veur letters of July 15 and July 23. 1964, esacertise the app 1& settee of One Comestidoted Ed& ass Ceapeep to constrwet the ledise Pelas 11 reester.

The public heartea e the app 11estsee hoe been askeduled for Augeot 31, IM6. I understand that Er. neuerd shaper of oier Generet Coussel's Office hoe discoseed tato date with pens and that pens f&ed it to to gente est&stessary.

If yee have further gusettees to thte setter,1 esagnet yeo eastest ra. Edmos G. Lees. Assisteet p1 rector.

Divistes of toester Liesentes, de vtLL be the vosolesory staff's ektet ettenes ta the proceedtes.

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Sleserely yours, a...A s i

Boreld b Price Directer ef Regelet1&a es: Mr. Otteer Theessed j

Moe Tork State Atoete & Spees Roseleposes deshority ase part messee par e rk, See vert 10007 4

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..- es THE CITY Cf' NEO YCRK

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November 24, 1967 Y.r. Ibrold Price, Director 0; vision of Licensing & Regulation U.S. Atomic Energy Cosaission Washington, D.C.

Daar Mr. Price:

g Enclosed is a copy of Co==ents on the Preliminary Safety Analysis.% port of the Indian Point Nuclear Cenerating Unit No. 3" pre-pared by consultants retained by the City of New York. This project has been conducted with both the cooperation of the New York City Xsyor's Cowicil on Science & Technology, Dr. John R. Dunning, Chairman, and the New York State Office of Atomic and Space Development, Mr. Oliver Townsend, Director.

We should appreciate it if you would obtain a response from the Consolidated Edison Company to the questions raised by our consultants.

For your information, we have informally supplied representatives of the Consolidated T21 son Company with a copy of the report to allow them as t

much time as possible for study.

i Very truly yours, i

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Hanson Blats E3/hp Director I.r.clo sure cci ::. John R. Dunning, Chairman Mayor's Council on Science & Technology g g,t.,,

cc: Mr. Oliver Townsend, Director Date N.Y.S. Office of Atomic and Space Development ilma_ //

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COXME:4TS ON THE PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT OF INDI AN P0lJ4T NUCLEAR GENERATING UNIT No.3 t

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/crw perfomoc for,tne Of fice of Radiation Control of the City of' Near York by

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71 2 'OAD (1) Oho pN.: cat docu= cat Cives our co::sonts on the cafety of the proposed power

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poder ste. tion t.s requested by Dr'H. BIATZ, Dirooter of the Office of Radiation Control of the City of New York, in his letter of June 14, 1967 to Mr. J. 00D;5 (ii)'The doc 5:ents ex::ined are tu following :

- Prcli=in.2ry Safety Analysis Report (P.S.A.R.)

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Voluca I - Descriptic. of Sito End Environment Volusc II - farts A and 3 - Plant Design Description and Safety Ar.alysis.

(iii) In the cour:o of this analysic, the soventy Geneml Design Criteria *as picsently cct fortn, havo bcen given attentiori.

i It cny bc : ic, in ccncral and within the scopo of the present analysis, that cost of tho general design critoria seca to have been given full

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by the designcr.

Oho purpose of tho prccent analysis is not to'demonstrats

..%t the 70 criteria aro fully net but to draw the attention on spooitic topios concurring to public health and sofoty.

(iv) We feel that the plant cs decoribed can'bo built and opented without adverse consequences for the catc*y of tho.public but wo think that the followin; points era of special importanco from the safety point of view and should be borno in mind by the desicncr and the opcmtor e) Cent:.in.cnt into;rity and tightness are essential for public safety and choald bc naintained and &dequatcly tested (co:: cent 5 4).

f b) Sccendary coolant accidental relcano in the contr.incent building following a icss of coolsnt accident is not con:1dored as credible. However, in view of the consequences of cuch an event, pMtcotton of feed water and v.por lines c:ainst missile impact t.hould be ascortainod (occment 5.4).

c) Tho ed iq'u:27.pt the coolins cap:. city of the faaa and sp s y after a* loss o.' coolant scoident should bo investigated (co== ant 5.)).

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i d) An enalycit.. f th.ocn cquence of a dci:.y in the safety injection A metho' ' to reduoo ute.ntic.,cho 1d be perf-.ned (com:ent 2 5.2).

d this delsy to minimun it prof., od under consent 6.

c) '.'ho post...lc cen:cquenec otolectrical fires sunt be analysod and ade'quatel ii=itcd (co=cnt 10.1).

f) ?o lo:: of power may cata11 falce indications fMe vital instrumentation (co= cat 10.2).

c) C:.Nful analysis of the sonitoring and alarm Icycl of the gaseous wasto

- disposal should be performed (com. cats 2.4.2, 2.4.) and 2.4.4) 1 h) Ohc probics of for= tion.nd decay of methyliodido should be further invecti;sted (cc= cat 8.)).

1) Doron continuous monitoring in the primary coolant is to be advised (co=cnt 9.1.,4 ).
1. :".SION C:GNC2S AS CO:?A3D TO D.DiAN P007 UNIT No 2 1: ;cncr.1, the dcsica of the Indian Point Unit No 3 in very similar, and in many N:p:, cts identical to the desica of Indian Point Unit No 2.
  • swcyor sc:a =.jor chansce, have bcca incorporated; thoso are listed in PSAR t:.hl: 2.1 c.r.d co=cated in the prc cat report for as =uch as they affoot nuclear
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Thcco ch:.n:c cro s i

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n incrce.co in.ucler.r power level from 2758 rat to 3025 rat as commented in

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2. the supprc ::1cn of cht.rco:.1 filters in the main intomal ventilation system,
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}. the Nduccd heat removal capacity of the 'intomal ventilation and of the ccn*..ir..:.nt cpr:.y systes, t.a co=onted in 5 5 2 s

4. the ni.uccd thick cas of the conoroto choll of the containment building, as ec=cntcd in 5 51 3
5. the hichcr see.;pted fuel bur..-up c. M,cco :".1 dcys/catrio son of u mnium

(?".13 *.e blo ).1) c: cos?: red to 27,000 El days /=otric ton for I.P.2 ; this inerc:. c would bo justified if the coro dcsign limitations appearing in ?SAR -

p:.;o ).74 AN adequ:.tcly =ct.

),

2. VAS O DIS?OSAL A;;.?J7;.;"2.7 RE:2AC 2.1 SOL O.;AST. DIS?OSAL Sol.J ut.. prcpsmtion and stors,,o to not seca to ondanger %e publio.

Fin.1 dispossi $ s to bo schieved off-sito (PSAR pago 11.2).

2.2 LICUID UASE DIS?CS.*.L IT.C2R NCal AL CONDITIONS Liquid w.sto dispec.1 into t$oliucson river can be adequstely monitored sad the yc.rly avom;c 1cv.1 of conta=instion in t.ho condonser disoharge c.nal wil' be c.inte.ined b~clow tho maximum pomissible concentation for drinking we.tcr (?f.*.R pt.;c 11.3).

Eowver, in order to, justify that ststc= cat, tho c.pplicant. should explain how hc intends to =oditor the rolcsso of the various isotopcs, including tritium,

~

quoted in ?SAR, pr.so 11 3.

2.) ACO::~2.TAL R2IZASI C7 L~CUID F.K~6A:227S r

l Accidente.1 rclesso of,1.iquid offluents is improbable ; spillsCe and leakage in buildincs would flow by gravity to drain and su=p tr.nks. Piping extomal

, to buildin;s will mn below grado in concrote trenches (PSAR page 12.19).

Even if the =sximum allowablo activity included in the primarycoolant was discht.r;;cd into tho Hudson river, the peak concentration st the Chelsea

. rer.crvoir vovid' rc= sin below,the.ui=um pcmissible concentration (PSA3 pscs 12.20).*

d.

2.4 CACCUS WACE D'S?OSAL,1:013 NOVAL C0;OI7 CNS l

2.4.1 All is:dous efflucnte of potential rt.diosotivity,.with the exception of 'inc contain=:nt vcat c.nd, purge, arc trcsted in the cascous.isto j

processins syates. The rolcsso of offluents from the wiste gas tanks

\\

is continuously conitored beforo dischside *.o tho.p; Ant vont and, if an unexpected,incresso in radiosctivity is sensod, a discharge vAlvo will be closed c.utosstically (?SAR 11 5).

I

/

I 4

2.4.0 L,wevcF, othon ;ischr;cs to the ple.nt vent are possible, which Cro i

not conit red by the detcetor runtioned above. 7acce are

.ac v..it s..d pur;o cacc., of tha contain= cat buil61n; ; theco are conitored beford vc24 ting and purgins (PMR p gc 11.14 and 11.15) 3 i

~~

- the condenser t.ir removal cases, which are conitorod.nd diverted to the cont:.in=ent buildin; in the event of high activity (?fAR pase 11.16) {

I

. - the W:: reics:cd by the relfict valvos in caso of high pmssum in

  • t.nkscontainin;potentiallyhi;hactivitylevelwastos(PMRpage119)f I

thc c ; :c would attain the plant vent'unmonitored ;

- in the ph:nvent a last,cas conitorin; system is installed; ocasisting of four G.7.. tubca. H1;h activity alam in provided (?MR page 11.16).

i i A first rc: ark chould be cado abcrat the uso of C.M. cou:iters as provided for it. the "Ccatain=ent Cas 2fflucat-3:.dio G:.: X:nitors", "?lant Vent Cas Detector",

"Conden cr Air ?.csov:.100: Monitor" (?;A2 pc;cs 11.15 cnd 11.16) :.no the "Aren Mediati:n Monitorin; Oyste " ?fA3 pr.co 11.19). 7hoso counters have an 1:porte.nt der.d-tic; ao tM t special circuit have to be used allowins and the datomination of the nu:b:r of pul.c fo. low countin; rates, c.nd the censun of the averngo curr:.t for high countin; ratcc in ortior to avvid that high activities or doses could cntail itiso ccacurc=ents.

~ '. ~

s.

Further sj; cit.1 attention chould be dovoted to Iodino detection and one"

ny.condcr if tho' "Oontainment Air Particulato Monitor" quoted in $ 11.2.21.a

(?G3 ;:.;cs 11.1;. c.nd 11.15) are provided with a special filscrin; paper j

(*. care;n:.tcd whh. cilver calt or lor.ded with.ctivo charcoal) in otticr to fix th Oc:ccus icdir.c. or'if the iodino contanination is co.puted usin; & thcontical i

r.;io b:t ::cn that ;as and the colid fi':: ion pnducts conte.mination.

C.c h:., es a =:.t'or of fact, to tahc into cccount that.n c:tiinary filtcrire

.;er r tt. ins on'y'thet icdir.c aircady adsorbed on du
r.particlos, but is not cffi cient far.: the caccous for.s of iodino is concernod.

l

?in:.117, in view of tho variety of cas co= positions which could ba.

dtu:.ted throu;h.the plar.; vent, a c:.reful analysi:. chould be er.do of thd alar =

icvi.1. ?c::isir. tic cc.usptie.. on ;t.s cc position, includin; substantial==ounta cf iodinc-131, should P postuinted. ?wo :. lcm lovola aro cu;;osted a 4

6

./..

l

__J 5,

- kaJ fir:t shoc*d De located slightly &bovo Dorsal ruading, so $4 se U r.. o.*t.. expected incNaco of tho sctivity rcicascd ;

- the accond should be located at. carefully detom.inated levol and

~l 1

chould imposo a well pl nificd sction.

l 4

1 2.4.) 7:e diluents are is ued fro:.a the plaat vent located above the occtr.in=cnt,'

, baildir.;. For the purpoco of calcul: ting the ste,omphorio dilutior. factorj l

.she effluents am secured to be rolcased ner.r ground level and diluted

}

i in the s:.ke of the contai[: cat buildin.

  • 1thou;h a s::.11c-dil tion factor is possible, if the gasos tre A,0cc.od ;

to be relce. sed :.t a height such that they am not tm;, pod in th( s;.p I

of the ccatain= cat buildir.;, tho dilution factor retained (1.6) 10*U i

ci/cu.=/ci/:co - PS*d pr.;c 115) is considond sufficiently prudent wh.::. used :.: a ycerly averaced dilution factor l

1

' 4.4 7;c Jfcet of dry A..? min-out doposition on the pollution of surface d.

s::.hr rc:crvcire, and of r.cadows should be cvsluated foi continuous relcese, in cMer.o c tablish tho alarm icyc1 centionod in 5 2.4.) stors 2.4 5 it is suc;cated C.t ;; cous wanto cisposal in Indian Point Units :to 1, 2 :.r..i ) to coordit.:.ted in a ny to cinimizo ;,ublic exposure to tho'so cfflucnts. It ehsuld further be c certtined that the stomso cape. city 1: edeque.tc to =cct i.hc present reco==cadation..

' t.*.6 Takin; 1..to soccur.t.r.c specit.1 ch-rcctor of the site (valley) where thr,oe 4.uclar ;cw;r pl nts will bo in operation, it nicht be advisable to cup ri:..at ti.h :s:c traced cascous rolcasos in order to ascertain the edcpbddi*.unun5'4.otor.

1.5 AO r.L* ?~'~*.C C7 7/.LIC',CTIV2.GAE2S 251*

. cc;ricas:1 relcar.o of re.dioactivo gar.c occurs in thoevent of loss of coola:t :.oct nt consecutivo to a co:plete covemnce of e ut.r coolant pi.o.

7ac folic in componc.i. ~ ec.... ibute to tho protectiori of the public :

, 7;c c;ett.it. er.; huildin, designed and tested to be tight to ler.h:. c mtc of ics: +" i 0,1 % of its voluso por day at the

./.

l

?.

t de *;a accident pmscuro cf 47 psic withcut the hMp cf the "En;1hecred c2fc;uanic" iisted below. Bocent expericnce indiostes,

~

~

, m t cuch a low leeks;c rato is not easy to achiavo e.d r.Aintain.,

C;ccial t.ttet. tion chould to devotcd to 'poriodical tcstin; w'Eose sco,,c snd ple.nnin; chould be ca n fully definod. Acconiing to the

?S*.3, the contain=cnt would recist the accident design pressure and sc=perature, to;other with the design earthquake or desi;pa wind, with a suffioicnt safety margin (PS,*sR page 5 9) 3 continuou:1y pr:::u'rized double containment at all liner seams

.r.c penetrati's.s ;

cce.1 wM,er cn t.hc contain=cnt isoir. tion valvos ;

.lcty in',cetion of borated water in the core at high, medium and low pro :urcs ;

contsin=cnt cooling by ventilation through roughing and absolute filters ;

centsincent sprcy containing codiu= thiosulphato for halogen rc=ove.l.

?

Miccile protcetion of vital co=ponents will be provided. Tce periodical testin; of tho "canir. cured safo;uanis" is described (PEAR Chaptor 6).

2 5 2 rae c "cn;ineered arc;ur.nis" when encr;i:cd by tho crid are r*-*t.

Xini=us esfe;ur.rds can be energi cd by two out of three Diesels.

?cwcr supply t/ one of those two cer.ns is c::catial in case of t.he loss j

of coolant sceident. Indeed, if the sie:ultaneous occurrence of t.he followin; cycats should tr.ko placo :

- r.:ajoi W,turc in the priss:/ coolant pipin;,

- persistan'. poucr unsvailnbility from the crid,

- po; cist: nt f.tilum of sli the three dicacis, 2 coro' would ur.dcuttcC.y melt ; core sc :in; through t,he react.o.- vs: sol c.r.d throuch the conc m te containment buildin; baso cat is' to be

.d.

7t.o con:oqucntial rolcsse of fission products could be

.,atastrophic ; vays to prevent such t.n occurrence are alludos 1,0 ur4cr p int 6.

If, due to a delaycd power supply, tho sfcty injection is delayed,

5. tcr pourin; on the hot coro.nd subscqucnt ct.cmical roactions mi;,ht provoko a charp prc :urc. tret.. cat exccedin; the rc istance cap:.bi',it,y of the contain cnt building. ' it is roco==cnded that t.n analysis of the eennequences of,a delay in'ths safety injection intervention be made, N

7.

2 5.) If the "encinecNd safecu:N=" powered by two diocci senors. tora sporr.t'e e3 cr.tici..abd, i.hc N:ultins docos from dinct rc.distion cnd fissica product

  • inh istion n=:in at an acceptable icycl. dven como ::1Nnotica.

l of the "ensinccred cafe u N=" can be tolcrated -(?fA3 paso 12 59).

{

';'hc effect of rain out on td,o pollution of. water rosorvoirs has boca I

found tolcr ole. It is our norr.a1 proceduro to investisn'to the doses i

to r, child's thyroid duo both to iodine inhalstion sad pasturo-cow-milk f

.procc : cad to.compara them to the Dritich. Medical Roccarch Council Neo: :.nd. tion as quoted in ICa? recor.:sendations, publication 6, page 15 i

2 5 4 No c cr cacy plannin is doseridcd to cope wish the out of plar.t site consequcnoc of a esJor sooident.

i 2 5 5.Nrster co:sonts on the cents' n=ent buildins are provided in 5 5 ; on i

dic:c1';cnert. tors, in 5 6 ; on ensinocred safeguaMa ir, $ 'f,and*on acciden!

j t

analysis in 5 8.

r l

. ms==. rar c=cu

).1 ~.n vie : of possibic Nel c.n failu.c, the vont11ntio.. of the spent fuc1 storsse I

pit (?2.*.R pr. c 12-16) should to enNN11y desicncd, as difficultics are l

u:ually cnccu.tured in the lo:stion of tho vcatilation ducts. Air and water 1

nenitorin; s';ould bc conciccmd (PTA3 fig. '9-4).

l J.2 m :.dir.tica ds o of 2 =r/ hour :. tho surfc.co of the ufuelins cent.1 duri:q r.fu: lins.(?ff,3 p.11-13), could po::tbly trac been co=puted for conditions whe. c no ccr.tc.=ir.stion is present in the Wfuc* ins water. If this :,s tho a

c:.sc, :.r.d in view of the very largo smcant of radic.ctivity which is t.cocpted in the pri=:.r/ ws,tcr durir.; reactor operction (of the oMer of 200.o1/=} of

.......; for 1 % ale.d failure), what could de sho u'am cga u.re to

'# I fi::.-

sr.. cts in the cource of refueling, after the primary water has boca cleaned ?

  • ht it, the duration of thic cler.ning opcrr. tion ?

}.) It wo' 14 to rceo : ended, for Nrther caintent.nce pie. nins purposes.to perio<.ic:*1y ressure the dose rato in cubielos of the auxiliary r.ucicar

. /.

i l

~.

I G.

buildin, whcNts pcr onr.cl should acccs: when repair is r.ccessary to mdio-active hert-exche.;crs, pu=ps, valvec, pipes, etc. (Fr.13 p.11-12).

1

___.\\

i

).,4 In scoidental ccaditior.s, it is ad.itted that the perse.r.o1 "plar. nod" whole i

. body expo:um ba limited to 25 rem (PTAR p. 2-37 ar.d 2-54). InselsiW we would restrict this 'doce to 12 rcs ; the IC3? publioation 9, $ 66, lir.its this, dead to 10 rc=.

In the ca=a circu stances a thy n!d dose of }00 rea is tolcrr.ted (?C3 p. 2-3). AccoMins to the Eurt.tos roca---w'etions, this deso should be restricted to 15 re=, e.d in the Ic3? publication 9, $ 66 to 60 rom.

i 3 5 753 p.

5-31 states that contain=ent is completely closed during operation.

This i= plies that pursin is not tolemted. However personr.o1 assess is i

pc;=itted. Ua'. provisions or steps are fonsoon,to oodo with porsennel l

PMtoction against internal centshination ?

4. O:02AC") ?C.23 3*72:3 4.1 The inems:c in pcuer icvel from 2758 F.it for Ir.disa Point Unit No 2 to 3025 :*. t for Indi:-n' Point Xo ) resulta =sinly from acoptin: a reduction of i

i the nucicar hot cy. r.nci (or "cnthalpy riso*) factor from 1.75 to 158.

A c *lcr Nduction appears in the axial nuclear power distribution factor fro: 176 to 172 (?M3 p. 3-5).

i

?arther c'..r.nges such a

.n incresco in inict w. tor te=parcture (PsiR p. 2-13) in 'ustificd by the calculation proccdure describcd in PTA3 p. }-41 to p. 3-58.

j 1

Ctice che.r.cc neult fn= better thcomtical invcetigt. tion.

t i

b 4.2 ':'hc reduction in the nuclear' factors is,justificd by theoretical e.& lysis a 4.

cxpcriccnt: (PfA3 p. 3-22 to p. 3-C4). These fac. ors will be verificd by cxperi.-- *

? distribution tr.slysis perfor=cd c. the first core (?tA3 p.)-5 e.G

. subscquent intcry:Is (?f.13 p. 3-26).

4.) ;-: wever, the:c fr.ctor do net tako it.t's secour.; the local powcr peaking due to

  • enen tr.ncients after control clusters' movencats (as indicated by

?f.A3 p. 3-:.9 e.: p. 3-26).

./.

,y.,

_ _ = _

9.

7 v

i 7t.c sce.curements of these factors by the in-cen instmmentatien till not show -

, this tre.nsient cffect (?SAR p. 3-26).

{

$cnec the rate of withdrawal of the control clustcra might have to be limited t

in co:c circu= tances, and the rate of power increase night have to be limited accordin;1y. 7nis,could be implied by PSAR p. 2-8 ; however, PSAR does not deceribe the way by which this rate of rod withdrawal could be limited to t

copo with this lon;-term transient effect. In sono earlier destgr.s a small I

on-ling co. puter would prohibit rod whithdrawal when a transient power peaking is possibio ; this auto =atio feature ispt included an the pnsent design

(?tA3 p. 7-4).

4-3 view of -thl reduction of the nuclear factors a careful investigation chould bo =ade of this tre.nsient power posking.

~- - -

'x 6

4.4 %cnon induced spatial instabilitics cro possible ; they can be detooted by j

the nucic:.; instruncntation and corrected by pro;or control stre.to;y (?:A3

p. 3-12). P.oweve,r, bofora cuch instebilitios can be corrected an increase in t.ucicar fr.otors will appear, and this fact should to taken late account in co choice of tho design va'uo of theco nucicar tsotors.

4.5 2 oW.cr to obte.in the total hot ch:nnel factor, the nucicar tot channel

' factor is =ultiplicd by lthe "casincerind" hot channel sub-factors. One of

~

theco is the " flow =ir'n;" hot ch nnel sub-factor. This sub-fsetor has hct.n deternine'd to bc 0,92 (?tA3 p. 3-49) in the c&sc of the C:A fuci elc= cat

-(?SA3 p. 3-59, Ecf 15). This =ub-tsetor should be ca inverso fonction of tho powcr 6:nsity rr. dial pc kin; factor in Co fuci elca.st. Sinco powcr penking is.hr;cr in s* cia cic cnt than in s I.?.) fuci cic ent, we would scest to c- --ine it'this sub-factor has not bcon chosen too s=all, loadin; to sa overe.;ti= tion of the power ospability of the I.P.),phnt.

/

3 i

1. ?2AC7C3 0 h3CC i.* 7:o *.ic.r.:ss of'the concrcto containment buildin; has been nduced by'about cno fcs; :: :os; nd to Indian Point No 2. (?SAR p. 2-19). No explan:. tion has ten ;iven by applicant fcr this Nduction. Is this caused by tha

~

,j,

E u,

~

Nduction of the m2.ioactivity Nicsscd into the containrcnt due to the feet that th. PNacnt snelysis of the loss of coolent nooident oKoludes ooro Golt down, th:nks to ce prc cnce of the safoty injcotion acou uhters ? It is 7

noted that the I.P. 2 contain= cat was stated to resist the impact of most proscnt day ainrafts, whilo auch a statencat does not appear in the I.P.)

Nport.,'

5 2 Accordins to tho appliesnt (? A3 p. 5-9), the containment building is more th n capable of Just$1ning the pec u m and tc=poraturo load resulting from the loss of ooc.rmt cocident as, describcd in PSAR $ 12.).

It should be faitful to invc

.;c the conditions in which a higher lead

, to the contair. cat is possible, such c:. a

- delsycd cotion of the safety injcotion and heat removal pu=ps;

- delaycd notion and failure of the ventilation cooling and/ or the spray pu=p.

5.) Oo insu m htc;ritf of the contain=cnt following a loss-of-coolent scoident i:ith no activo quenchin system (~safoty injootion), the following suct bo

ut in opcstion (?SA3 p. 2-51)

at I.?.2

~ '

at I.P.)

) f n units + 1 cpmy pu O

) ft.n units + 1 spray,' pump or 4 fan units or 5 ten units or i =pmy pu=p

  • or 2 spmy pumps The units powsNd by 2 diccols are (?SA3 p. 2-20)

= i.:. a u 2.P.3 4 ft.n unit

) fan uni.s 1 pray pu=p' 1 spmy pu=p.

i 7..: fen cool.7 ur.it: of,I.?.) aro pro h bly idcationi to the unita of I.P.2

(?fA3

. a-19). 7.w differer.co in nu=ber of fen units nocdcd to linit the ccr.

..n..r.t pm::uro is not exphir.cd ; it =ay be duo to a difference in.

cr.su. ptice.:, wheroby at 1.?.2 non a foty in'cotion was cc=u=cd, while at I.?.) tho cr.foty in'ootion water could hva been accu: sed to spill in tha reacter c:.vity hence prevent the core from =oiting.th:ve h the contain= ant

./.

  • 1.

b::c :st'.

h'cycrthcicss, it should h noted that,one of tho,five fr.n units sust. W assu 53 oui, of order, cad that the opcration of the last two f.n units implies switchins of the units on t.he opcsting two dicsc1 genomtors.

._._1 The capacity of the camy pu:p soo s to have bcon doorcacco.from I.P.2 to

!.?.) Indcod, tho'hcst rc= oval capacity of eno I.P.2 spray pu p is equivalent to four fan units, while at I.?.) one sprr.y pump is equiv&1ont to 2,5 tsa units (7f.'s3 p. 2-51).

Itissu;; cst.edt.cinvesticatothenecessityof~1norc&singthecoolidscapsoity l

i of tho it.n and spmy.

5.4 If seconde.ry coolant water would be reicased in W oc.ntain= cat building followin;.. loss of coo bnt nooident, the consequencos of the sooidcst would i

ho dm:tically incret. sed :

- the pe.h pressum would be much higher ;

I

- tho =ccor.ds n systcm would provido csa losk=:= psth throuc.h valve scels, p;ckin;, etc. designed for standa211 industrial watertightness and not provided by seal water injoetion (PSA3 table 6.'f) ;

- a rce.ctivity accident could be initiated in the damaged core when the cu=p water is used for safety injection.

7ac desiy. is such that ruptura of the second n system as a consequct.oo sf

& lo:s of 'coole.t acoiscnt is not considered orodit,le (PSAR p.12.C9).

  • owcycr it is ::.id in PSA3 p. 2-38 that "the stcan scnorator secondary shall d

will provido.ddition:d patcotion fNa missiles ori;1r. sting in tbe rcaotor cc p:.r':::.cnt".

Cno say then ask tho question,a bow would the shell sustain the nissilo is;, sot and protoot feed water sad vapor linos ?

l l

t 5 5.?criccical l.e:.h::e Tests l

i

, Ccntait. ::.'

  • .tecrity and ti;htness cro est.catial for publie antcty 4t4 health.

j 7o..persticnal inte r,sted Icak :.nd resistance test at the sooidcat, pressure

614 h parfor
ed vi'.h all the penetrations in their finsi status.

t late,reud ic:.k testa at reduced pro::uro should be pcriodioally run t.o scocrtab the ti;htnosa of the containment,.

./.

l t

f

12, i

I

)

Tcatsofit.dividualso=poncnts(airlooks,penetratians, valves)shouldalse bc perforIc0 on a periodical basis.

~

It is reco=.cnded that tho requirements, schedule and actions to be taken be elearly defined.

1 S. D Z::::, CCC:MOC3S As ststcd in 5 2 5 2 dicsc1 senerator availability is essential. Fna what aan he l

inferred fron ?O*a p'. 2-40 and p. 8-6, the.' diesel generstors am nor. ally at 4

  • ten needed, any engine has to be eranked with an independant M r standstill.

a supply, b Nucht up to speed ar.dthe proper field has to be put en the generator.

Ihs say consideration been given during des 1gn to the cor. cept of'having the

[

cr.crator$. pc5E Y.catly switched on the' live busbar, nn at r.o load as a synchrcsous roter, a fly *"acci, a clutoh and a reliable starting devise allowing
. quick sad safe start-up of the engine in case of loss of nomal dupply to the tus ? What n asons have led to shoose the present design ?

i P

'. 2: 0 0 C O C A ? l0;*A: Q S 71 fA77.Y 2:.~2C':':C 71.1 :uch esacern hr.s alrer.dy been raised with the possibility of pressure vessci or pr*:4:7 pipin; mpture due to rapid cooling by the s&fety in;cetion. Tse accu =ulators in particular would intaduce a *svge c=ount of cold w. tor within a small time intenal (2300 to 3000 ft>

I PfA3p.6-13)g Although the cafoty injeetion pu=p produce a osall flow, they could high pressum while coolir.g done the vessel and pipes, in ct.se of s=all pipe break.

Ouarral'oleevo's an sus:cated on the safety injection inlet into the

,rinary coolant pipes (?fAR fig. 4.2).

7.:. 2 :t 1. co..ceivable that d. moircul. tion,u=p. (., residual seat

./.

+

c.

)

.linit the containment presoun.

Con.iderin,s

- tMt tb<r servioo tetor system pressure at locations inside the

[

containment is i.clow the design loss-of-ooolant nooident

_ eontain=cnt pucsum (47 psis) (PSAR p. 9-)6) ;

f

= tMt pu=orous procautions have been designed to provent dinot

  • esatsota betwoon re.dionettve materials and the outside world 3

- tMt an auxiliary coolant system is available for cooling various

^ potentially re.diosotive equipments and fluids ar4 is spoeially

' desi:; nod to introduos a double barrier between the egvan'a and tho.-iver water 3 and still being aware

.- that a continuous cheok of piping sad oosponents ihtecrity of the contain=ont water cooling system is inhorcr.tly achieved throu;h nor=al opcration of some of the five units (PSAR p. 6-M) ;

1

- tMt provision exists for monitoring and isolating a fauity watcr line (PEAR

  • fig. 9-7) :

it is as%cd why the auxiliary cooling system is not used for the contain= cat ventilation cooling.

3y ask's; the ducstion, it is realiscd that such an arts 7 cement would acas to overe.ise the auailiary cooling heat aink ospability and to i

hi;her contain=ent heat sink tes;smtures.

7 2.2 2:phsis is put on the fact that senice cooling water prosaure is below the loss-of-cooiar.t-acoident oontain=ent pressure (PSAR p. 9-36").

1s More any special rosson Icading to ruch a status, dish at first thoucht sec=a to be'oont a ry to safety conditions in case of accident ?

7.2.) *f so o imorstive of Justifical reasons impose the uw of servico

{

v....'s.* cce.t.n=cnt air cooling, what will be the sensitivity o'

~

j

~

.ivcr water Mdioactive "conitoring at the outict of the coolers, Q.e

.c.
',bility of isolatins a faulty.coolinC oircuit by romote valve-o;cretion and ssnual seal water injection (them is none accettin; to j

~

.f.*,l,*t fig. 9-7), the timo and man power necessitated for oormative action, at a t'se c.en ;hnt conditions call for attention and action

. in many other fields ?

./

- - ~

4.

t t

7 2.4 If portinent reasons impose the use of servios water to eool the

,,contain:. cat' air heat exchangers, water camplins and monitoring at the t

outlet of the five coolers should be subject to eareful design and,

~*

operatian.

7aa pnson't status of the design.(PEAR fig. 9 7) shows sepaste s.=plin linos -cach of tNa with an isolating valve - diceharging

.into a co==on bescor wMeh leads se a singie line of magasien

=enit.or_ ins equipccat.

' Such a 1sy-out does not appear to be entirely foolppot when one considors that the ca.:ple linos of any four ooolers ni$t be subjoot to couv..c.-flow fnm the ca=pling line of the fifth cooler. Such an over.t nicht, occur if the comasf sa=pling discharge header offers exccasive resistanco to flow and when, at the same time,'the disahar.e lino of the fifth cooler is inadvertanly closed or asefdentally plu;;cd domstronn of its sa=plig point.

C ci-valves on cach as=pling line would eliminate or consitoweight i

the possible faulty situation described benabove.

'.orcover, indiviwal monitoring of cash sa.;ple line would definitely expcditodetojtiont.rdcorreotiveactionincaseofnecessity.

k*a assuco tht duri.as normal operation, the 5 sasoling valves an in fully open position whatever the number of coolers in action.

7 2 5 A:.stous so charvosi filter is provided on the main containment ver.tilation (?SAR p. 6-44), chaMoal filter dousing is represented on

? A3 fig. 6-2.

A s=s11 sepaste intemal roeirculation system utilisir.s charcoal filtwrs is pavided for nuoval of iodine as nccossary prior to nutine necess to the containment. Does this filter needdeu1$3whocitsventilationisstopped7 ts it used la aseidental-c..ditiona ?

7.) CC.".Ar;; 0 ::%'.Y 7 317.a charecil tilters in the oor.tainment ventilation syst.on have boon si.ppresscd as studier on sodium thiosulphate containacnt sprey indicata

.i.

16e 1

e their crest offcotivcacss in removins iodine (PSAR p. 2-)).

Ir4eed

{

filtor dousing and handlins intaduce problons.

Howsycr exporimental vorification of the analyttoal studies are still

~

to be perfomod, and the probicas to be solved am 11stod. Among these the rapid oxydation and datoriointion of the 21osulphate in prescnee ofakrwillcertainlyorcateadifficulty,w*dishleadsto ucation the thioauiphase effieteney in the restreulation phase (if needed).

Also, spid dmining of %e thiosulphate injeetion tank (PSAR fig. 64).

. st the bo81nning of the operatim of the two symy pumps should be cxa=ined.

7.).2 In.dvertent opamiion of the spray system is r. eentinuous concem for

{

the opomtor, 2,nd our experience indicates that manual blocking is

)

1 often considered if not malised.' The possibility to install two doubic-valvo in series, one operated by the ocatainnont isolation signal and the other oporstod by the safety injection signal, should be i

examinod.

l 7.).) In 733 fic. 6-2 the indications "inside missile barrier" and "outside I

missilo barrier" should be interchanged (PSAR p. 6-40) 7 4 ISC ATICN %'m C:llAL WA'l2l3 SYO'J.:4

~

7.t.1 In the containment spmy syston (PSAR fig. 6 e), the sinsle barrice I

betwocn.the, containment sad the atmosphoro, if the refuciing water I

storace ank is e=ptiod in the course of spraying, would'be the cheek Also, if one pb is not put into operation,1='mo coulh

}

valvo.

.ppcar at the packinco of the manual valvos and check valve.

i It is succestod that positive closure be ir. stalled by manual seal l

water injcotion, as provided on the safety injootion lines (see PdA3 fi. ~.,.'.t'.oush not mentioned in PSAR table 6-7).

i 7.:..e 7so exeoss letdown heat exchancer eooling user incomins and outgoing linca should be pmvided caoh with two automatio stop valves ar4 seal water injootion, as indicated in FSAM table 6-7, 'but not en PSAR fig. 9 4).

h

.h i

i I

I

- + -

c.* '.

17, 4

7.4.) 351 water injection should be provided into the lino,lesding fna the Naotor. coolant dmin tank and pressuriser relief tank u 2e want hosdcr, as, indicated in PSAR table 6-7, but not en P:AR fig. 11-1. The

~~[

ease applies f$r the line leading to the gas analyser.

7.4.4 If an scoidental insecaso of pressure in the eentainment building was aseenanied with the npture of the nismcen supply line to the pressuriser j

rolief tank, or of any the line loading to this tank (PS1R fig. 44),

nitrogen would flow into the containment, inoroasing the pnssun g

unncocc arily. If the nitrogen reserve is substantial, aut3catie l

isolation valves and seal water injection are succosted en this line.

7 4 5 It is shom on POAR fig. 9-4 that the primary pump oeoling is intermpted on a si nal of high pressun in the sentainment bu1141nd. Are the prican pump stopped by the same signal (they are not designed to an -

in a vapor atmosphere) ? Will cooling be suffielent during 'eeast

~

down t 7 4.6 ?!AR table 6-7 pW: cats the line fna the naidual heat eschar @rs to the safety injection pu=p as a class 4 penetration (defined in PTAR

p. 6-5,).

This line should be sategorised in elaas ) and pntested as indicated in'PSAR fig. 6-1 and not as in PSAR table 6-7 7 4 7 It is'su:;osted that the sentainment sump roei n ulation line be prevised with casual er even automatie se,a1 mter injeetten (PSAR table 6-7 and f10 6-1).

7 4.8 :s is su;:osted for safety reasons, to investisate what a n the auxiliary steam lir.e entering the sentainment building and the retuming auxilian condensate line, mentioned La P8AR table 6-7.

i.

A00~~'.7 A: A.YSIG g

?

3.1 "n PfA3 p.12-9, it is stated that in oase of_ loss of power to the stasian aux 111 aries, the steam generator safety valves would tempe nrity lift.

./.

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lo.

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  • tc.e v *us s.hGeld f.;l to elese, partially er && tally chad eux111 ry fud water pu=ps be adequately drivea ? ht would be the -araar^a=

of such an event ?

5.2 In PT,'.:1 p.12-12 ears is taken to dt=sastrate that turbine bursting through the cylinders is'ne's to be espected ris a consequence of everspeed. hover, a..a would suc;es.t that suon a burstia,1, due to s.- ::f, less of tubrienties er caerIsical failure be as.uned, and remeter enfety or at least populaties safety sacertained. Indeed, we believe Mat total failure of activity oculpr.cnts is more prehable than the failure of a statie equipment as envisaged in the less-of.eeelant seelder.t.

d

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3.} In he er.:.4.:1: et the loss.ef.eeelar.t see dent, it is assumed that 0.2 W st the iodine pr.::.ent in the fuel gap ap; ars sa the fons of ast41 todide 3

.hu u cc.id to te based en tra fset trat the sec,y1 deeecpecaties rate is et ichst 'J,0 sucs lar.,er ther. the rate if sedine doesy ;Paa?. p.12@).

1: wcycr, cas i.ould er.ly bs the case if 1.he CH e and I~ rodisals (or a cer y

j n.d:ce.u : cr.c.sted by dee - stian, - t - a $ 1.

If ce rue:pesttien rate is samen into aseeunt tr.e theory saeu14 he na j

falless

  • et I te W rmr of iet.ar.e & tar.s pruscr.t WM e meSQL 1e41se),

l X

be the t.ht.Ler af uthyl 1e4144 asics les prweest, A

ine 7. die &st*v. ( eay car. star.t of ied:.r.e.

k' W r.te of u 4 1 1edido deeecpe.;t1&a r

tu rr te of ucy; tod14e forw.ttes fres Ledase (1.f State La

..fficient me*..J1 rm41cala asaltable).

k 'M

'll%.

r 1-X) = A :.

+

L:.4 v

a I

r* A

  • t '

..c*.co ite proper".ica of rath 1 esa sp;r m tally L.*

b; rste of fors;.t ar, y

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La 1 r;e && S&;&nd to it.e rt".4 of *deoey* k e k' 1A vse af thz grt&t *t. pef %.t.c4 of 36 thy

  • Ledade mL tae pe M"tten SMe%

eisc. ;; 14 set.or lesa} a: orted by L:.e sedium *h'r -*P ^te (P&&R p. 12.b ;

.arthcr 37estipitea is s i. eated.

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19,

9..%*.:.~;' CC:7.74

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9 1 ??AC'.*1YI'l"t f447:' IC.'N r.*.T. GIN shut-dem ar.J eentrol roda groups assestated with ehesteal shia assauan.a

'Maetivity shut-down r.srcin of at least 1T st the time of a remeter trip.

Sabe.:tuer.t beren additten ta*ses care of Xeaan doeny and moderater eeeling (PSAR p. 2-45).

i The fo'.lowin, sec..ents are presented en the sub, leet e

~

j 91.1 :n orcer to.. insure w 15 shut-down marsia, she eer. trol rede lower l

position sust be lis1*.cd. This leiser lasertion limit la saleuhted

]

4 by Os red insertion limit mentter arJ two alares alert the opentar to ta*4e corrective ction it, tae ev. ant a eentrol group 9;-i-?^: er r.:a41.cs its lower 11.1% s?aDI p. 7-$).

t

  • n scriter desip this same calculater produced a sicpal which a

a::1.tict.* *y ;rshibited *.he control red lasertier. (eseept ny serms) 3 1

why has tr.is awtac.atie insert aa he sopressed (PfAR fig. 7.2) ?

51.2 ~.orsa

".4141er. s.he%.4 ha realised through reliable equipment.

tut :1:. h e. e;.~t.r's atsstude 1. treet.f a a.usmed unnostahi.

11ty of th cr.Ar:1r.; ysses after shutadens ?

=

9 13 : 4 it

.I..*.e:s..&tts".e4 WS.he

  • I aser.iteSe cf sht-deman re.ctivity e Lar;s cr.s ;;. to ca;,e wiu ce maata.as physteal heres dilutter. Fr.te.

~

9.*.* 7 e.%3 4..ac.attutsa t?At centit senes heres semiterlag is set re4.ttse.

.s.w is ta a a4ss rve. :a inters:stant aneelee desse tven the pris.a.ry

\\

-; a *a.

.si,:lr.1sprovmat over ladian Pelas 2 lays la the separstaem

  • f I
11r.; 11&es.

L e su:.:. L eiteve c t s rer.

a*'

maatteriac La

--a v-l 5

,'t a t.4%.a1 eage r*.s.se. Lt.ers &as been a ease at leest as as &&serEl j

i e.

W..

N M

I M

h m n 4t v:ty sar,:1n of a at teams ears w

<;ss.r samh.aues 1 e :.e4r. ;, t e-t af aefvise for seven1 dage as a -

t"""

af A f:re hv*.c4 damages a.e aar is.ste%eestaties wirig.

./..

9 2 :.~%T:1C:2 f,C'.T.C3

  • a so:a desi.ns, esatrol red withdrawal is prohibited en a low eeunting vote es one coun o channel. In ordor to avoid a sudden rapid shaage of neutres power level with red withdrawal, this addittamal preteetism is suggested

(?fAR p. 7.4).

s.) rcAc;;a ces:/ :: Av=ucs :=::'::rx.,az The reactor coolant sverr.;e sc penture is use. idely for plaat seatsel 3 the averace te=perature of each of the four primary toeps is averaged to obtain sto reester coolant averece temperature.

La there as sute:Atle ac1 Lien tshes when the averese temperswre measurement

. is ene loop.41ttera sanctly free the Gree others, sadteattag em tastrumental

~

fatium 7 "v ct if Q's au;&aatte ctif.n exists, *et us assume that it falls and

  • Jr.at la*.ar an 4. 4*.sw 431ft escars at ene thermerestataate of the amarm.54 av6r ;sd t @ Jrat.M'J.

As a result there will be a drift 13 tas true rosater real.r.

arcs;e to: pen *Are cile the ap;nrest average tesperature ts..aas.s es pr:;n.:st The drift =1 ht be at auch a rate uas the montres fl u ar.1 pri=.ary-pnasare re=sia withia Geir operettaa limita ky the regulattag proce.:.

A:com :; te 7f.A2 f12 71 u overpe.ser.evertengers*mre trip eentre* Lee la est.e.c417 each of the four evende %=perst.rma aat. temperstasro 41tteresses 3

.4.11. u* e ein.it trip La tism te avoid 3 5 & or emessa M

  • t=-

t 1

  • .l 4 e C.N a & atais a fa* A4 reaeter teslaat avermGe toeperthre is.r.ieettssLa,M*19.s::At me.1d he the effect et the destg> treasiest ?

2:.~ T Jaa*.~7.~2:t 103 iCP M 10.1 C.* COA

  • 7U.~4
  • t la

.4*--=

  • M L:At &A ac.alysta he s*.de es *'1re haenres nebteh m 4%s affect 3

- t.e m.paly of pe=4r sa sa:er oostamaste ;

. L.e aste:rsty of eestem'. aan taetasnamt vital electrieal er paen.natie a.*&teaa ;

. the 44bisah111tT of the centrt1=feem ed1b rWs 2e e aA4 ten $e

.e

31e

    • e 10.2 ?O.03 C., '."'.* 70 V7.'A. b:;37.t'.l;*.:;;7.*.7*02

?awar supply to vital instns:entatten has to be seat re11ahle.

104.1 Yau: 1suru caution tr 11 eaters or recorders should set be af the positionin servoccche.nism type ur.less a,apoetal ladseatiam esums the operator of any less of motive power. Otherwise a less et pouer u111 cau:.e she it. diester to fall as is, addah will sadiente a salas novant attun'en la case of distkrtance.

10.2.2 s case of ler.a of pen.or sr. the Laetnment erstes, each Santeater ehould 41r.p;&y as ir.41cetica of asserder.

~

7t.e er.::e applica in case of failure of atpaitanties laap. N rsata.au of a.*use st4 ult, met tr/.ues falso andaaniens er shou 14 he

.,..:.11.4 : c;.eatal car.aiderr u en should be gives to teses em remotely I

sp<r;.tc4 squips&st la this rsspc4t.

le.) %14411e prosecuan af vaul penner awlies

.sh* ?mr
ssera*. ors. viul tr%nsferuners, meter esasers and eahtaa a&esad to off 4tivsly PMtested acair.st staalles generated by the en11aes (knarsting 17 overa>*ed. every nneuru...) af near ty ega pensus.

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i ADDENDVN CC):r.EXTS C3 TRI P;E:.:Y:3 ART SATITT AKAI.Y318 REPORT Or i

133IAX 70137 3*JC*.ZAR G3& RATING UNIT No.)

~.

w 7.

U".;3 IIID sdEAELS l

7 1 J.TATT ;M LCT:G%

7 1.4 :s is. gested tant the accidental opentag of the preseu-riser dischs.rge valves he studied, sisce the safety injection is set provoked is this saae g the same applies to a rupture is the top of the pressuriser.

  • O Y

e octeu r 1947 e

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