ML20077J107

Testimony of Wf Wegst Re UCLA Reactor Safety.Bldg Fire Could Not Damage Core.Sufficient Energy or Oxygen Could Not Reach Graphite to Cause Rapid Oxidation to Ignite Large Quantity of Energy.Prof Qualifications Encl

ML20077J107
Person / Time
Site:	05000142
Issue date:	08/12/1983
From:	Wegst W CALIFORNIA, UNIV. OF, LOS ANGELES, CA
To:
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ML20077J103	List: ML20077J107 ML20077J110
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NUDOCS 8308150221
Download: ML20077J107 (11)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA '

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-142 THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY ) (Proposed Renewal of Facility OF CALIFORNIA ) License Number R-71)

)

(UCLA Research Reactor) )

)

TESTIMONY OF DR. WALTER F. WEGST CONCERNING THE SAFETY OF THE UCLA RESEARCH REACTOR Q.l. Please state your name and occupation.

A.l. My name is Walter F. Wegst. I am employed by the University of California as Director of the Office of Research and Occupational Safety for the Los Angelns campus (UCLA).

Q.2. Please describe your current responsibilities and experience relevant to the testimony you are providing. ,

A.2. I am responsible for providing for the safety of the campus from all health and safety hazards, including the possibility of fire. The Campus Fire Marshall, who is a Deputy State Fire Marshall, and the Campus Radiation Safe'ty l Officer are both under my supervision. My office is responsible for coordinating with the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) to the extent that the assistance of the LAFD is needed on the UCLA campus. My educational background is in engineering and physics. I have twenty-three years of 1 l

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l ,, experience in the safety field and regularly consult on safety questions. I have had numerous consultations with experts in the field of fire control. My experience also includes three years on the staff of the University of Michigan's water-moderated, graphite-reflected research reactor. I am a member of the UCLA Reactor Use Committee which oversees the activitier; of the UCLA reactor. A statement of my professional qualifications is attached.

Q.3. What in your opinion is the likelihood that a building fire could damage the core of the UCLA reactor? i

A.3. In my opinion, thereh.snocrediblewayafireeither within Boelter, Hall, the Nuclear Energy Laboratory (NEL),

or the reactor room (the high bay) could damage the core of the reactor. There is simply no way that aufficient 1

energy (ignition source) or . oxygen could reach the graphite to cause it to oxidize rapidly enough to liberate a'large quantity of energy. .

Q.4 What is the basis of your opinion?

A.4. Fundamentally, three elements are required before a fire can occur. These three elements, ignition source, fuel and oxygen make up the so called " fire triangle" and all must be continuously present for a fire to be self-sustaining. For example, a fire can be extinguished C'

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.. by: water which cools the fuel and hence removes the ignition source (heat); carbon dioxide which removes l l

the oxygen; a " firebreak" which removes the fuel. This concept is very basic, but is is very important to answering the question as to whether any external fire can adversely affect the reactor core. In considering the question whether a fire external to the reactor could reach the core and damage the fuel, three possible scenarios can be distinguished. First, there could be a' major fire in the buildings (Boelter Hall and the Mathematical Sciences Addition) which surround the NEL. Second, there could be a fire in the NEL but outside of the reactor high bay room.

Third, there could be a fire inside the reactor high bay, but outside of the biological shielding for the reactor. '

Q.5. Would you explain the factors you considered for each of these scenarios?

A.5. A major building fire can be described as one that spreads beyond the room or place of origin. Concerning the suggested scenario that a majob building fire in Boelter Hall or the Mathematical Sciences Addition (MSA) could result in damage to the reactor core, the following 6

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I facts need to be considered:

(1) There has never been a' major building fire at UCLA.

(2) The LAFD respense time is 2-5 minutes to any l place on the campus. l (3) The Reactor Building is a separate structure-from Boelter Hall and MSA, which surround it i

on the top and three sides. All three buildings are constructed of non-combustible poured reinforced concrete.

(4) The entire NEL outside of the reactor high bay room an'd excluding the west exterior exposure is equipped with a fire sprinkler system.

(5) The roof of the Reactor Building is 6 inches of concrete and is separated from the building above by 26 feet of open space (hence no fuel immediately in contact with the . roof') . Six inches of concrete will hold back any fire for many hours.

Because of these considerations a major building fire in Boelter Hall or MSA is extremely unlikely to occur.

If a' fire did occur, the LAFD would be on the scene very quickly. In any event, the structure of the Reactor Building will provide more than adequate

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_y protection against the intrusion of any fire into the NEL. Any fire that did penetrate into the outer perimeter spaces of the NEL would be extinguished by the water sprinkler system.

Q.6. What about a fire starting within the NEL itself?

A.6. The NEL consists of the 2-story Reactor Building and adjacent portions of Boelter Hall and MSA. A fire starting within the NEL but outside of the reactor room would immediately trigger the sprinkler system and hence would be quickly suppressed. Further, whenever any campus sprinkler. system is activated, a signal is ,

automatically sent to the 24-hour campus central dispatch center which relays the alarm by direct line to the IAFD. In addition,the following factors must be considered:

(1) The high bay itself has 14 inch concrete walls, equipped with double fire doors (three hour rating each door) on all openings except the west, exterior side.

l (2) The fuel loading ~in the NEL is relatively light.

There are paper supplies and wood furniture in the various laboratories, but there are no large quantities of combustible or flammable liquids.

The amount of available conbustible materiai is .

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insufficient to generate a fire that could breach the reactor room walls. Although there are small holes for pipes and conduits that do penetrate i

the reactor room walls, there is no force that l

would drive a potential fire through these holes.

Q.7. What about a fire within the reactor high bay room.

A.7. In addition to the factors already mentioned the following must be considered:

(1) The amount of combustible material in the high bay area is so small (no combustible or fla==ahle liquids) that this area offactively acts as a fire-l break between any external fire and the reactor itself.

(2) The reactor is surrounded by 5-6 feet of concrete.J{t; i

with a few penetrations for experimental equipment.  !

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The north and south walls of this shield are ,,

monolithic pours of concrete (no cracks). The ~I ~

east and west walls are slabs of concrete stacked so that there are no cracks that pass entirely t

through the shield (for radiation shielding) .

Concerning all three of the fire scenarios, because of the factors I mentioned there is no credible way that any_ fire could ever reach the biological shield of the reactor or get into the reactor core. There are other l points that can be made which greatly suppo;;t this general conclusion.

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Q.8. What other points do you wish to make? -

A. 8. One important point is that the few small cracks in 4-t the shield, or even an open beam port in the shield  !

I would not provide a path for an external fire to reach the core. The convection currents set up by a fire outside the shield would, if anything, tend to draw air out of the shield toward the fire.

Also, any flame front that impinged on the shield would be rapidly cooled (hence removing the ignition part of the fire triangle) by passage through 5 or 6 foot long cracks or small holes in the concrete.

Q.9. What about the combustibility of graphite? ,

i A.9. Graphite is considered a non-combustible material; it  !

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does not support combustion under any ordinary conditions. !

For example, consider the graphite electrodes used in

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the common (all movie theaters) electric are light.

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i When the electric current is flowing, the tips of the 1 I

• graphite electrodes are at 5000-6000 degrees [. When the current is turned off, the electrodes do not continue to burn. Graphite crucibles are used in high temperature (several thousand degrees Farenheit) metallurgical work and they do not burn. Graphite electrodes are used for certain types of electric welding and electric arc l

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., . - 8-9 cutting, and they do not burn. In fact, powered graphite a

is recommended as the appropriate extinguishing agent for metal fires, inciuding uranium metal fires (see National Fire Codes, Vol. 803, 1981). Fire, as commonly pictured, is the rapid oxidation of gaseous material usually derived from the vaporization of solid or liquid materials. Note that solids and liquids do not burn. The energy from the exothermic oxidation of the gas must be sufficient to continuously vaporize the fuel source. It is essentially impossible to vaporize graphite (boiling point is approximately 8700 degrees F.) and the so called " burning" of graphite is actually a surface reaction more analogous to the rusting of iron than to burning in the sense of a self-sustaining, propagating fire. If a mass of graphite is heated to a sufficiently high temperature (appro::imately 1200 degrees F., or bright red heat) and air is forcefully directed on to the surface, the energy liberated is sufficient to cause the temperature of the graphite to l rise (R.E. Nightingale, Nuclear Graphite, 1962). If the forced draft of air is removed, or if the entire mass is not preheated, the reaction rate is too slow to cause the temperature to rise. I emphasize that a forced draft is required, not convection currents generated by

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a fire, and that high temperature preheating is necessary. A flame front directed onto a block of graphite will not ignite the graphite. This experiment has in fact been tried at the NEL with an oxy-acetylene torch and a small 0.5 inch diameter rod of dense graphite. The graphite could not be made to burn.

Q.10. Could you summar'ize your conclusions regarding fire scenarios that could damage the reactor core?

A.10. There is no credible fire scenario that could result in damage of the reactor core. For each of the three postulated fire scenarios one of the essential elements of a fire (fuel, oxygen and ignition) will be missing or the magnitude of the fire will be far too small to restilt in any damage to the reactor core.

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Se CURRICUL1JM VITAE -

1 Name: Walter F. Vegst, Jr. .

i 510 Fairview i Sierra Madre, CA 91024 i

Born: Philadelphia, PA, December 26, 1934

Title:

Director, Research and Occupational Safety University of California, Los Angeles I i

405 Hilgard Ave. 1 Los Angeles, CA 90024 Education:- B.S.E., Electrical Engineering, University of Michigan 1956

)' M.S.E..' Nuclear Engineering, University of Michigan 1957 Ph.D., Environmental Health, University of Michigan 1963 i .

Professional Experience: -

1979 to present: Director, Research and Occupational Safety, UCLA 1968 to 1979: Manager of Safety California Institute of Technology l 1971 to 1973: Manager of Safety and Security, California Institute of Technology '

1963 to 1968: Institute Health Physicist, California Institute of Technology'and Radiation Safety Officer, Jet Propulsion

. Laboratory 1959 to 1960: Supervisor, Phoenix Memorial Laboratory, University of Michigan -

l 1957 to 1959: Reactor and Laboratory Health Physicist, Phoenix Memorlal Laboratory, University of Michigan

Consulting Experience

' Atomics International Division of Rockwell International City, of Hope National Medical Center i

Nuclear Products Inc.

Teledyne-Waterpik l

Casady Engineering Kirschner Associates Inc.

Technical Advisory Service for Attorneys Bio-Science Laboratories Genentech, Inc.

Scathern California Edison Inc.

l lrthe areas of interest include management of comprehensive safety programs such

! a, required at a large reseacch institution (academic, medical, or industrial),

.i-.v m.1 cr.sul:i y it. various areas of operational Health Physics.

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o Professional Certifications: '

American Board of Health Physics, 1966 -

Board of Safety Professionals, 1971 ~

California State, Professional Safety Engineer,1975 Registered Professional Engineer #212 -

I Professional Society Memberships:

American Industrial Hygiene Association .

Society of the Sigma Xi American Association Advancement of Science Campus Safety Association

, Health Physics Society I Professional Society Activities:

1974 - president, Southern California Chapter, Health Physics Society 1969 - Treasurer, National Health Physics Society, Midyear 4

Symposium 1979 - Registration Chairman, National Health Physics Society, Midyear Symposium .

1977 - to present, Member Program Committee, National Health Physics Society 1974-77 Member Education and Training Committee, National Health Physics Society 1973-78 Hember Panel of Examiners, American Board of Health Physics .

1975 - to present, Coordinator, National Association of Campus Radiation Safety Officers 1970-72 Member Program Committee, Western Industrial Health Conference Publientions and Papers:

" Initial Calibration of the Ford Nuclear Reactor", }2fPP 110-1, June, 1958

" Atmospheric Concentrations of Gaseous Effluents from the Ford I;uclear Reactor", }c!PP 110-4, May,1962

" Safety Analysis Report for Alpha Sources Used on Surveyor Spacccraft". Health Physics Vol. 21, pp. 301-308, 1971 -

" Computer Program for Maintaining Radioactive Source Inventories",

}  !!nith Physics Vol. g, pp.44-448, 1970.

"Public Relation Constraints on Health Physics Communications",

presented at the 1969 Midyear Symposiugt of the Health Physics Society "th" .a ent of P.adtation Emergencies", presented at 1977 Southern CH r-M C& ater, t Health Phystes Society Sy pesium on E_ergency M c . 8 2.

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