ML20076M632

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Amend 178 to License DPR-69,revising Heatup & Cooldown Curves & low-temp Overpressure Protection Controls
ML20076M632
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/01/1994
From: Marsh L
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20076M633 List:
References
NUDOCS 9411080161
Download: ML20076M632 (35)
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Text

{{#Wiki_filter:, 7 ~ w uoy 9 '. 'Id UNITED STATES y '[ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [ t WASHINGTON, D.C.' 20066 0001 .....l + BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY-DOCKET NO.'50-318' CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT NO.'2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSEJ ~ Amendment No.~178:- . License No. DPR-69 ~ -1. The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission)' has found that:- 'A.. The application ' .mendment by Baltimore Cas tand Electric Company. (the licensee) dated May 27, 1994, complies with the standards and. requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,- as. amended'-(the Act) and the Commission's rules and rsgulations set forth in 10 CFR. Chapter.I; B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions.of the Act, and the rules ~and regulations of the Commission; C. There. is reasonable ~ assurance (1) that the activities authorized. by this amendment can be conducted'without endangering' the health and safety of the public,:and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations;- -D.. The issuance of this amendment.will not be' inimical to the. common defense and security orL to the health-and safety of the public; and E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part:- 51 of the Commission's: regulations and all-applicable requirements have been satisfied. 2. Accordingly, the license is amended.by changes to the Technical, Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph _2.C.2. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-69-is hereby- ' amended to read as follows: 1 a 7'u -] } 9411000161 941101 PDR ADOCK 05000318 P PDR

.c 2. Technical Soecifications t .The' Technical Specifications containod in A)pendices A and B, as revised through Amendment.No.178, are here sy incorporated in the license. ' The licensee shall operate the' facility in accordance with .the Technical Specifications. 3. This license amendment is. effective as of the date of its issuance to t>e-implemented within 30 days.- FOR~THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4 f .[O Ledyard B/ Marsh, Director Project Directorate I-1 Division of Reactor Projects-- I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical ~~ Specifications Date of Issuance: November 1, 1994 i i t 1 a I

.s-ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS AMENDMENT NO.178' FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR DOCKET NO. 50-318-Revise Appendix A as follows: Egmove Paaes Insert Paaes V V XI XI 3/4'l-10 3/4 1 3/4 1-13 3/4 1-13 3/4 3-14 3/4 3-14 3/4 4-2 3/4 4-2 3/4 4-4 3/4-4-4 3/4 4-7 3/4 4-7 3/4 4-28 3/4 4-28. 3/4 4-30 3/4 4 ' 3/4 4-31 3/4 4-31 3/4 4-33 3/4 4-33 3/4 4-34 3/4 4-34 3/4 4-36 3/4 4-36 3/4 4-37.through 4-42 3/4 4-37 through 43* 3/4 5-4 3/4 5-4 3/4 5-7 3/4 5-7 B3/4 4-1 B3/4 4-1 B3/4 4-7 through 4-11 B3/4 4-7 through 4-11 B3/4 4-12* B3/4 5-2 B3/4 5-2 B3/4 5-3 B3/4 5-3

  • Rollover pages - vertical line at amendment number indicating rollover page with no technical specification change.

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~ i r ^ TABLE OF CONTENTS. .l LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR'0PERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS j SECTION _P_A_QE i 3/4.4.9s PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS Reactor-Coolant System....'.. .1. 3/4 4-28f Pressurizer...................... . Overpressure Protection Systems.......... - 3/4 4-321 3/4 4-33" - 3/4.4.10-STRUCTURAL-INTEGRITY E ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 Components...-...... 3/4:4-37 .l ,3/4.4.1'1 CORE BARREL MOVEMENT 3/4 4-39! l '- 3/4.4.12 LETDOWN LINE EXCESS FLOW

3/4 4-41~

l.. 3/4.4.13 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS 3/4 4-42 .l-P 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS 3/4 5-1 I

3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - MODES 1, 2 AND 3 (> 1750 PSIA) 3/4 5-3 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - MODES 3 (< 1750 PSIA) AND 4... 3/4 5 l 3/4 5.4 REFUELING WATER TANK .3/4 5-8 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT-INTEGRITY............... 3/4 6-1 Containment Leakage..._......- 3/4 6 l Containment Air Locks............... 3/4 6-5 Internal Pressure.................. 3/4 6 Air Temperature.................. 3/4 6 Containment Structural Integrity 3/4 6-9 1 Containment Purge System 3/4 6-11 -3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS Containment Spray System 3/4 6-12 Containment Cooling System 3/4 6-14 3/4.6.3 IODINE REMOVAL SYNEM'............... 3/4 6-16 l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 V Amendment No. 178 I ~.

LS 4 TABLE.0F CONTENTS BASES. SECTION. . PAG { A -3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY..........-..:............ B'3/414-5 3/4.4.8 LSPECIFICACTIVITY...-................ B 3/4 4-6 3.4.4.9 PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS............ ~B 3/4 4-7i 3/4.4.10: STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY B:3/4 4-11" l1 3/4.4.11.: CORE BARREL MOVEMENT: B 3/4 4 l 3/4.4.12 LETDOWN LINE EXCESS ~ FLOW B 3/4-4-12' ll1 3/4.4.13. REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS...-.:..... '.... -B 3/4 4-12 ll 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE C0OLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) L3/4.5.1 SAFETY INJECTION! TANKS 'B 3/4 5-1 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS lB.3/4 5-1 3/4.5.4 REFUELINGWATERTANK(RWT) B 3/4 5-3 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT.-............... B 3/4 6-1: l 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION-AND COOLING SYSTEMS B 3/4 6-3 3/4.6.3 IODINE REMOVAL-SYSTEM.................. B 3/4 6-3L ~3/4.6.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES B 3/4 6........... 3/4.6.5 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL............... B 3/4 6-4 -3/4.6.6 PENETRATION ROOM EXHAUST AIR FILTRATION SYSTEM B 3/4 6-4 r ~ b .: ? e i 5 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 XI Amendment'No. 178 I u:-

E 3/4.11 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2~ ' B0 RATION SYSTEMS Flow Paths - Shutdown ~ ' ) - LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION T 3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths and one associated heat tracing' circuit shall be OPERABLE . ~

a. LA flow path from the' boric acid storage tank _via either a boric -

acid pump or a gravity feed connection and charging pump to the. _ 1 Reactor Coolant System-if only.the boric acid storage tank in Specification 3.1.2.7a. is 0PERABLE..or Lb..The flow path from the refueling water tank;vja either a charging ~ . pump or a high pressure safety injection. pump to the Reactor-Coolant System if only the refueling water tank in. Specification 3.1.2.7b is OPERABLE. j 1 APPLICABILITY:. MODES 5 and 6. ACTION:,With none of. the above flow paths 0PERABLE, suspend all operations-involving CORE ALTERATIONS or-positive reactivity changes. until at least. ] one injection path is restored to.0PERABLE status. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.1: At least one of the~ above. required flow paths'shall be demonstrated OPERABLE: a. At least once per 7' days by verifying that _the temperature of 'the heat traced )ortion of. the flow path is above the' temperature - limit line slown on Figure 3.1.2-1 when a flow path from the-concentrated boric acid tanks is used. b. At least once per 31 days' by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked.: sealed, or otherwise secured i_n position,.is in its correct position. At 301 F and less, the required OPERABLE HPSI pump shall be in pull-to-lock and will not start automatically. At 301 F and less,' HPSIL pump use will be conducted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.9.3. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-10 Amendment No. 178 m e a >nw-- -,n u- -n ~- * --- .m-o

3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS Charoino Pump - Shutdown LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.g.3 At least one charging pump or one high pressure safety injection pump in the boron injection flow path required OPERABLE pursuant to Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from. an OPERABLE emergency bus. APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6. ACTION: With no charging pump or high pressure safety injection pump OPERABLE. suspend all_ operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or. positive reactivity changes until at least one of the required pumps is restored to OPERABLE status. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.3 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required-by Specification 4.0.5. .l 'l At 301 F and less, the required CPERABLE HPSI pump shall be in pull-to-lock and will not start automatically. At 301 F and less, HPSI pump use will be conducted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.9.3. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 1-13 Amendment No. 178

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) TABLE NOTATION Containment isolation of non-essential-penetrations is also initiated by SIAS (functional units 1.a and 1.c). When the RCS temperature is: (a) Greater than'325 F, the required 0PERABLE HPSI pumps must be able l to start automatically upon receipt of a SIAS signal, (b) Between 325 F. and 301*F, a transition region exists where the l OPERABLE HPSI pump will be placed in pull-to-lock on a cooldown and restored to automatic status on a heatup. .(c) At 301 F and less. the required OPERABLE HPSI pump shall:be in l pull-to-lock and will not start automatically. - The provisions of Specification 3.0.4.are not applicable. Must be OPERABLE only in MODE 6 when the valves are required OPERABLE and they are open. (a). Trip function may be bypassed in this M0DE when pressurizer pressure is < 1800' psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is > 1800 psia. (c) - Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE below 785 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above 785 psia. P CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 3-14 Amendment No. 178

3/4.4 REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1 COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION H0T STANDBY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.1.2 a. The reactor coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE: 1. Reactor Coolant Loop #21 and at least one associated reactor coolant pump. 2. Reactor Coolant Loop #22 and at least one associated reactor coolant pump. b. At least gne of the above Reactor Coolant Loops shall be in operation APPLICABILITY: M0DE 3". ACTION: a. With less than the above required reactor coolant loops OPERABLE, restore the required loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in NOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours. ~ b. With no reactor coolant loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and initiate corrective action to return the required loop to operation within one hour. i 1 All reactor coolant pumps may be de-energized for up to I hour (up to 2 hours for low flow test) provided (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolet System boron concentration, 'and (2)fcore outlet temperature: u maintained at least 10 F below saturati5n temperature. A reactor coolant pump shall not be' started with the RCS temperature less than or equal to 301 F unless (1) the pressurizer water level is l less than or equal to 170 inches, and (2) the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than or equal to 30 F - above the RCS temperature, and (3) the pressurizer pressure is less than or equal to 320 psia. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-2 Amendm2nt No. 178 j

,j 16 L3/4.4 REACTOR C00LANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.1' -COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION l ShutdownL i . LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 13.4.1.'3'. a. - At least.two of the coolant:. loops listed below shall be .GPERABLE-1. Reactor Coolant Loop #21 and its associated steam generator and at-least one associated reactor coolant

pump, i

2. Reactor. coolant Loop #22 and.its associated steam. . generator and at least one associated reactor coolant

pump, 3.

Shutdown Cooling Loop #21*, 4. Shutdown. Cooling Loop #22*. t b. At least 9,ne of the above coolant loops shall. be in operation.- t \\ APPLICABILITY: MODES 4***' and 5***'. j ACTION: l a. With less than 'the:above required coolant loops OPERA 8LE,.- initiate corrective ~ action to return the required coolant loops' to 0PERABLE status within one hour or be in COLD SNUTDOWN within 24 hours. i 1 The normal or emergency power source may be inoperable in MODE 5. All reactor coolant pumps and shutdown cooling pumps may be de-j energized for up' to I hour provided-(1)ino operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron. i concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least I 10 F below saturation temperature. A reactor coolant pump-shall not be started with the RCS. temperature less than or equal to 301 F unless '(1) the pressurizer water level;is l-l 1ess than or equal to 170 inches, and'(2)-the secondary. water - temperature of each steam generator is less than or equal to 30*F above the RCS temperature, and (3) the pressurizer pressure is less than or equal to 320-psia. 8 See Special Test Exception 3.10.5. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-4 Amendment No. 178

3/4.4 REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.3, RELIEF VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.3.Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3*. ACTION: a. If one or both PORV(s) has excessive seat leakage, within I hour close the associated block valve (s) and maintain power to the block valve (s). b. With one PORV ino)erable due to causes other than excessive PORY seat leakage, wit 11n 1 hour either restore the PORY to 0PERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore the PORV to 0PERABLE status within the following 5 days or be in NOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours and at or below 301 F within the following 24 hours. -l c. With both PORVs inoperable' due to causes other than excessive PORV seat leakage, within I hour either restore the PORVs to~ OPERABLE status or close its associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; restore one PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours and at or below 301 F within the following l 24 hours. d. With one or both block valve (s) inoperable, within I hour restore the block valve (s) to OPERABLE status or place its associated PORV(s) in override closed. Restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next 72 hours if both block valves are inoperable; restore any remaining inoperable block valve to OPERABLE status within the following 5 days; otherwise, be in at least H0T STANDBY within the next 12 hours and at or below 301 F l within the following 24 hours. e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. Above 301 F. At or below 301 F Specification 3/4.4.9.3 applies. l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-7 Amendment No. 178 I

w -l 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.9' -PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS ~ Reactor Coolant System LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature l and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on. Figures 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2 during heatup, cooldown.. criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing with: a. A maximum heatup of: l Maximum Allowable Heatuo Rate ' RCS Temperature 30 F in any one hour period 70 F to 156 F 40 F in any one hour period > 156 F to 246*F 60*F in any one hour period > 246 F l b. A maximum cooldown of: Maximum Allowable Cooldown Rate RCS Temperature ] 100 F in any one hour period > 200 F 40 F in any one hour. period 200 F to 176 F. a 15 F in any one hour period' < 176 F c. A maximum temperature change of 5 F in..any one hour period, during hydrostatic testing operations above system design pressure. APPLICABILITY: At all times. ACTION: With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the fracture toughness properties of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operations or be in at least H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the RCS T,lhe foilowing 30 hours.and pressure to less than 200 F respectively, within P \\ CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-28 Amendment No. 178

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x 2 r: p'r ' - j+:,-3'r p' '*cr"v.- r:"..+t =.r:r ry.~t~ et.r:r..+ .r r::r~.rt a O~-'~"** O 100 200 300 400-500-600 INDICATED REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE, Tc, 'F .+ FIGURE 3.4.9-2 i CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 2 C00LD0W CURVE, for FLUENCE s 4.0x10" n/ca' REACTOR C00LANT SYSTEM PRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMITS CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-31 Amendment No. 178 l l

~l 3/4.4 REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM 3/414.9: PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE ~ LIMITS i Overoressure Protection Systems' l g LIMITIM COMITION FOR OPERATION ] 3.4.9.3 The.following overpressure protection requirements shall;be met':. !q a. One of the following three overpressure protection systems shall be in place- .)

1. -Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) wjth a trip' a

setpoint below the curve in Figure 3.4.9-3 with their_ q associated block valves open, or -i 2. A single PORV with a trip setpoint'below the curve in Figure 3.4.9-3* with its associated block valve open~ and a - Reactor Coolant System vent'of 1 1.3 square inchesi or j

3.. A Reactor Coolant System.(RCS) vent 12.6 square inches.

b. Two higii pressure safety injection (HPSI) pumps' shall: be.. j disabled by ef ther removing (racking out) their motor circuit 1 ~ breakers from the electrical power supply circuit, or by locking 1 shut their discharge valves. The HPSI loop motor operated valves (MOVs)' shall be prevented c. from automatically aligning HPSI pump flow to the RCS by placing, their handswitches-in-pull-to-override. ~ -l d. No more than one OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump with' suction aligned to the Refueling Water Tank may be used to j inject flow into the RCS and.when used.it must be under manual control and one of the following restrictions shall apply: j 1. The total high pressure safety injection flow shall be l limited to 5 210 gpm OR i .i

2. - A Reactor Coolant System vent of..t 2.6 square inches shall exist.

I e. When not in use, the above OPERABLE HPSI pump shall have its; handswitch in pull-to-lock. l APPLICABILITY: When the. RCS-temperature is 5 301*F and the RCS is vented l

to < 8 square inches.

l + ~ -l When on shutdown cooling, the PORV trip setpoint shall-be 5 443 psia. - Except when required for testing. 'i CALVERT CLIFFS'- UNIT 2 3/4 4-33 Amendment No. 178

3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) ACTION: a. With one PORV inoperable in MODE 3 with RCS temperature _< 301 F l' or in M0DE 4, either. restore the inoperable PORV to 0PERABLE-status.within 5 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through a 2 1.3 square inch vent (s) within the next 48 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status, b. With one PORY inoperable in MODES 5 or 6, either restore the inoperable PORY to 0PERABLE status within 24 hours, or - depressurize and vent the RCS through a > 1.3 square inch vent (s) within the next 48 hours; and maintain tee RCS in this vented-I condition until both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status. c. With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through a t 2.6 square inch vent (s) within 48 hours; maintain the RCS in a vented condition until either one OPERABLE PORY and a vent of t 1.3 square inches has been established or both PORVs have been restored to OPERABLE status. 1 d. In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent (s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vent (s) on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence. j With less than two HPSI pumps' disabled, place at least two HPSI i e. pump handswitches in pull-to-lock within fifteen minutes and disable two HPSI pumps within the next four hours. i f. With one or more HPSI loop MOVs' not prevented from automatically aligning a HPSI pump to the RCS, immediately place the MOV handswitch in pull-to-override, or shut and disable.the affected MOV or isolate the affected HPSI header flowpath within four hours, and implement the action requirements of Specifications 3.1.2.1, 3.1.2.3, and 3.5.3, as applicable. g. With HPSI flow exceeding 210 gpm while suction is aligned to the RWT and an RCS vent of < 2.6 square inches exists, 1. Imediately take action to reduce flow to less than or equal j to 210 gpm." Except when required for testing. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-34 Amendment No. 178

i i 3/4.4 -REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 1 i l l 2500 i ur ~ i- ; ~ ._.v. ,e 1500 g .:tc111nu g a.

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~ RCS TEMP. ' PZR PRESS. ~~ / 64'F 443 PSIA' ~ j -- 7 ---f t= ~r 90'F 443 PSIA E ? / ~ g / 170'F S15 PSIA . _._g[._._. 194'F 583 PSIA j r "-~' 240F 740 PSIA N f f ~ 260.'h 835 PSIA 304'F 1250 PSIA 2. l t: r 0 --~ ~ ~~~ '--- 0 100-200 300 400 500 600 ACTUA1. REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE T,'F e l FIGURE 3.4.9-3 i CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 2, for FLUENCE 5; 4.0x10" n/ca" MAXIMUM PORY OPENING PRESSURE vs TEMPERATURE-CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-36 Amendment No. 178

E.i ^ -3/4.4 REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.10L STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY: 'ASME Code Class 1. 2 and 3 Components' 1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION q 3.4.10.1 The structural integriiy of ASME Code Class 1. '2 and 3 components shall be maintained in accordance with. Specification 4.4.10.1. APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES.- ACTION: =; !a. With the structural integrity of any ASME. Code' Class 1 component (s).not confoming to the above requirements, restore .its limit or isolate the affected component (ponent(s) to within the structural integrity of the affected com s) prior to - increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature more than 50*F above the minimum temperature required by NDT_ considerations. i b. With the structural. integrity of any ASME Code Class 2 component (s) not conforming to the above require:nents - restore the structural' integrity of.the affected component (s) to within. its limit or isolate the affected component (s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200'F. c. With the structural integrity of any ASME Code Class '3 - l component (s) not confoming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity of the affected component (s) to within i its limit or isolate the affected component (s) from service. -i d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are' not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.10.1.1 The structural integrity of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 j components shall be demonstrated: 7 a. Per the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, and b. Per the requirements of the augmented inservice inspection l program specifted.tn Specification 4.4.10.1.2. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-37 Amendment No. 178 'l

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'q - 3/4.4 REACTOR C00LANT SYSTEM - SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)) 13 In_ addition to the requirementsfof Specification'4.0.5.each Reactor- . Coolant Pump flywheel shall-be inspected per the recommendation of. ~ Regulatory Ppsition C.4.b of Regulatory Guide 1.14, ~ Revision 1,. - August 1975 4.4.10.1.2 Auomented Inservice Enspection Procram' for Main Steam and Main-1 Feedwaner Pipina - 'he unencapsu' ated welds greater.than 4-incies in - nomina' diameter in the main steam and main _feedwater piping runs lo' atedj c outside the containment and traversing safety.related areas or located in- - compartments adjoining safety.related areas shall be: inspected per the' j following augmented' inservice inspection program using' the applicable rules, acceptance criteria,_ and repair procedures of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, 1983 Edition'and Addenda;through Summer 1983 _for Class 2 components. Each weld shall be' examined in accordance:with:the above ASME! Code-I . requirements,' except: that 100% of the welds shall be examined. cumulatively, during each 10-year inspection interval ~. ' The welds to be examined during each inspection period shallibe selected to i provide a representative sample.of the conditions of the welds.. -If 1 these' examinations reveal unacceptable structural defects in one ori more welds, an additional 1/3 of the welds shall be examined and the inspection-schedule for the-repaired welds shall revert-back as if a new interval had begun. If additional-unacceptable defects are. detected in the:second ~ sampling. the remainder of 'the welds shall-also be inspected. ] ~ q A _fe + Reactor coolant pump flywheel inspections for the first inservice- -l inspection interval may be completed during. Unit 2 Refueling Outage No. 9 in conjunction with the reactor coolant pump motor overhaul-program. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 .3/4 4-38 Amendment No.:178 l .l y y ym,-- m ~-

3/4.4. REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.11 CORE BARREL MOVEMENT LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.11 Core barrel movement.shall be limited to less than the Amplitude Probability Distribution (APD) and Spectral Analysis (SA) Alert Levels for the appliceble THERMAL POWER level. APPLICABILITY: M0DE 1. ACTION: a. With the APD and/or SA exceeding their applicable Alert Levels, POWER OPERATION, may proceed provided the following actions are taken: 1. APD shall be measured and processcd at least once per 24 hours, 2. SA shall be measured at least race per 24 hours and shall be processed at least once per.7 days, and 3. A Special Report, identifying the cause(s) for exceeding the applicable Alert Level, shall be prepared and submitted to i the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days of detection. .b. With the APD and/or SA exceeding their applicable Action Levels, measure and process APD-and SA data within 24 hours to determine if the core barrel motion is exceeding its limits.. With the core barrel motion exceeding'its limits, reduce the core barrel motion to within it: Action Levels within the next 24 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the following 6 hours. c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable. ...e I CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-39 Amendment No. 178 l i .l -.--- -- -.-- -. ---- -. - - -l

l 3/4.4 REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.11 Routine Monitoring Core barrel movement shall be determined to be less than the APD and SA Alert Levels by using the'excore neutron detectors 'to measure APD and SA at the.following frequencies: a. APD data shall be measured and processed at least once per-7 days. b. SA data shall be measured and processed at least once per 31 day.. F i f CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-40 Amendment No. 178 l

3/4.4-REACTOR C0OLANT SYSTEM' .3/4.4.12 LETDOWN LINE EXCESS FLOW LIMITIM CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.12 The bypass valve for the excess flow check' valve in the letdown 111ne shall be closed. ' APPLICABILITY: N0 DES 1, 2,.3 and 4. i ACTION: With the above bypass valve open, restore the valve to its' closed position within 4 hours or be in at least NOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.12 - The bypass valve for the excess flow check valve in the letdown l line shall be determined closed within 4 hours prior to entering MODE 4 from N0DE 5. i i I i l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-41 Amendment No. 178 l

Y 4 ~ 13/4.4; REACTOR C00UUf7 SYSTEM 3/4.4.133 REACTOR COOLANT ~ SYSTEM VENTS: n ' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION-3.4.13 One Reactor Coolant' System-vent path consisting'of two. solenoid; valves in series shall be' OPERABLE and closed at each of the following locations:

a.. Reactor vessel head 1

. b. : Pressurizer vapor space j q APPLICABILITY: MODES 1-and 2. ACTION: 1 a. With the reactor. vessel head vent path inoperable,~ maintain.the. ~ inoperable vent path closed with. power removed from the actuator. of the solenoid valves in the inoperable vent path, and: y 1. If the pressuri.~er vapor. space vent path is also inoperable,. l restore both inoperable vent paths to 0PERABLE status within 'i 72 hours or be in:at least NOT STANDBY within 6 hours.:or 1 -2. If.the pressurizer vapor space vent path:is OPERABLE,= 'l restore the inoperable reactor vessel head vent ~ path to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least NOT STANDBY. -within 6 hours. b.. With only the pressurizer vapor space vent path; inoperable,, maintain the inoperable vent path closed with power.remov'ed -from . the valve actuator of the solenoid valves in the inoperable vent 1 path, and: -l 1. Verify at least one PORV and its associated flow path is. l OPERABLE within 72 hours and restore the inoperable: pressurizer vapor space vent path to OPERABLE status prior-l to entering M0DE 2 following the next H0T SHUTDOWN of sufficient duration, or 2. Restore the inoperable pressurizer vapor space vent path' to-I 0PERABLE status within 30' days, or be in at least H0T; M STANDBY within 6 hours. i c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. t e i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-42 Amendment No. 178 li l l' =

) 1.' 3/4.4: REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. . SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i 4.4.13.1 Each Reactor. Coolant System vent path shall be demonstrated-OPERABLE by testing each valve in the vent path per Specification'4.0.5.- 4.4.13.2 Each Reactor Coolant System vent path-shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per_ REFUELING INTERVAL by: l 'a. Verifying all manual' isolation valves in each vent path are - locked in the'open position. . b.. Verifying flow through the Reactor Coolant System ' vent' paths with' the vent-valves open. j .) j j i ) -l 1 l i ..? I i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 4-43 Amendment No. 178 l. P .,,..,,n.

m n , SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .l 1 i 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shal1lbe demonstrated OPERABLE *: a. At least'once'per 12. hours by verifying that the following valves' (j are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed:- t h Valve Number Valve Function Valve Position

1..MOV-659-Mini-flow Isolation.

.Open 2. MOV-660 ~ Mini-flow Isolation Open i

3. -CV-306' Low Pressure-SI

'Open Flow Control b. At least once per 31 days by: 1. Verifying-that upon a Recirculation Actuation Test Signal, the containment sump. isolation valves open. 2.u Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or . automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or-otherwise secured in' position.is in its correct position. c. By a visual inspection whichi verifies-that no loose debris (rags, l trash.: clothing, etc.) is present in'the containment which could. be transported to the containment sump and cause. restriction off the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual' inspection shall be perfonned: s 1. For all accessible areas' of the containment prior to. establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2. Of the areas affected within containment at the completion-of containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established. d. Within 4 hours prior to increasing the RCS pressure above 1750 psia by verifying, via local-indication at the valve, that CV-306'is open. _.. ? Whenever flow testing into the RCS is required at RCS temperatures of l. 301 F and less, the high pressure safety injection pump shall-recirculate RCS water (suction from RWT isolated) or the controls of Technical Specification 3.4.9.3 shall apply. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT.2 3/4 5-4 Amendment No. 178

7 .i s n 3/4.5DEMERGENCY CORE C00 LING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - MODES 3 (< 1750 PSIA)'AND 4 LIMITING CONDITION FOR'0PERATION 3.5.3 " As a minimum, one ECCS~ subsystem. comprised of the following shall be-OPERABLE: One' OPERABLE HPSI pump, and. a.- b. An OPERABLE flow path capable of;taking-suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety' Injection Actuation Signal and s automatically transferring suction to the~ containment sump on a-Recirculation Actuation Signal. APPLICABILITY: MODES 3" and'4. l ACTION: 1 a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE, restore at least one ECCS 4 subsystem to OPERABLE status within I hour or be in COLD SHUTD0WN within the next 20 hours, b. In the event-the ECCS is actuated and injects water into 'the RCS, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the-Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days. describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. SURVEILUUICE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated 0PERABLE per the-applicable Surveillance' Requirements of Specification 4.5.2. i i Between 325 F and 301 E., a transition region exists where the .l1 OPERABLE HPSI pump will be placed'in pull-to-lock on a cooldown and - restored to~ automatic status on a heatup. At 301 F and'less, the - l required 0PERABLE HPSI pump shall be in pull-to-lock and will not start automatically. At 301 F and less, HPSI pump use will be l conducted in accordance with Technical' Specification 3.4.9.3. .With pressurizer pressure < 1750 psia. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-7 Amendment No. 178

n., ~ 'I .;- 0 - x 3/4;4; REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM - RASES' l ^ 3/N 4.1 COOLANT LOOPS ~AND COOLANT CIRCULATION -t The plant is designed to operate with both reactor coolant loops and-y associated RCPs in foperation. and maintain DNBR above 1.195..during all-normal operations ~and anticipated transients.- i A single reactor coolant loop with'itsisteam generator filled above-the low. J level trip setpoint provides sufficient heat removal. capability for core - 'i cooling while in' MODES 2 and-3; however, single' failure considerattons-require plant shutdown if component repairs.and/or. corrective-actions cannot be.made within the allowable out-of-service time. In MODES 4:and'5, a single reactor coolant loop or shutdown cooling (SDC)" I loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing. decay heat;7 but single failure considerations require that at least two? loops be. - 0PERABLE. Thus, if-the reactor coolant loops are not OPERABLE, this. specification requires two SDC loops to be OPERABLE. The. operation of one RCP or one SDC pump provides' adequate flow to ensure - mixing, prevents stratification and produces gradual reactivity changes: during boron concentration reductions in the:RCS. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reductions will, therefore, be within the-capability of operator. recognition _and control. l L The restrictions on starting an RCP during MODES 3, 4 and 5 with the RCS temperature < 301 F are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients,' caused J by energy additions from the Secondary System, which could exceed.the' limits of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G (see Bases 3/4.4.9). For starting .l. the RCPs,' the following criteria apply: (1) restrict the water ' volume in 1 the pressurizer (170 inches) and thereby.providing a volume for the primary i coolant to expand'into, and (2)' restrict starting.of the'RCPs to when the-indicated secondary water temperature of each steam generator:is less'than- ' l l or equal to 30 F above RCS temperature, and.(3) limit the initial indicated. pressure of the pressurizer to less than or equal -to 320 psia. 'The limit on initial pressurizer pressure will prevent the PORV' from lifting during. the pressure transient. 3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES The pressurizer code safety. valves operate to prevent-the RCS from being-J pressurized above its-Safety Limit of 2750 psia. Each' safety valve-is designed to relieve approximately 3 x 10 lbs per hour of saturated steam 5 at the valve setpoint.. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during i shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating: CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-1 Amendment No. 178 1 n -;. -. --+.

q 9 L3/4.4 REACTOR'C0OLANT SYSTEM i l BASES -3/4.4'.9. PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITS. . All component's in the RCS are designed to withsta'nd the effects of cyclic I -loads due to system temperature and pressure changes. These cyclic loads. are introduced by normal' load transients,- reactor trips, and STARTUP and shutdown operation..The variousLeategories of: load cycles used for design purposestare provided in Section 4.1.1 of the.UFSAR.' During STARTUP and. shutdown,= the rates.of temperature and pressure changes are limited so that; a = the maximum lspecified heatup and cooldown rates are consistent with'the design assumptions and satisfy the stress limits for cyclic operation.. Operation within the appropriate hcaiup and.cooldown curves assures the . integrity of the reactor vessel against fracture. induced by combinative thermal and pressure stresses. As the vessel is subjected to. increasing. i fluence, the toughness of the limiting material continues to decline,-and even more restrictive Pressure / Temperature limits must be observed. The current limits, F,ipures 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2, are for up to and including.a. l fluence of 4.0x10 n/cm' (E > 1 Mev) at the clad / vessel interface, which corresponds to approximately 30 Effective Full Power Years. The reactor vessel materials have been tested to determine' their initial .i RTor; the results of these tests are shown in Section 4.1.5 of the UFSAR. Reactor operation and resultant fast neutron (E >'1 Mev) irradiation.will' cause an increase in the RT The actual shift in RT of the vessel i material will be establisheI1 periodically during opera., ion. by removing and i t evaluating reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens installed near the inside~ wall of the reactor vessel in the core area. The number of reactor-vessel irradiation surveillance specimens and the frequencies for removing and testing these specimens are provided in UFSAR. 1 Table 4-13 and~ are approved by the NRC prior to implementation in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H. - The shift in the material fracture toughness, as represented by RT 1, is calculated using Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2. -For a' fluence of j 4.0x10" n/cm', the adjusted reference temperature '(ART) value at the 1/4 T position is 177.1*F. At the 3/4 T position the' ART value is 146.8 F. l These values are used with procedures developed in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendix G to calculate heatup and 1 cooldown limits in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part'50, j Appendix G. n To develop composite pressure-temperature limits for the heatup transient, l the isothemal,1/2 T-heatup, and 3/4 T heatup pressure-temperature limits ~ are compared for a given thermal rate. Then the most restrictive pressure-temperature limits are combined over the complete temperature interval. resulting'in a composite limit curve for the reactor vessel _ belt 11ne' for the heatup event. -The composite pressure-temperature limit for the ] j .l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-7 Amendment No. 178 .I j

4 y n; !f [ $3/4:4 REACTOR C00UUff SYSTEM 1 BASE 5'

L

', ' ~ cooldown transient'is developed sinkilarly.- The' Appendix G limits in'- . Figures 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2' assume the following number of RCPs are running: d Heatup. Indicated'RCS Temperature Maximum Number of RCPs' ODeratino- -l 70'F to 308 F 2-i > 308 F L4 L Cooldown Indicated RCS Temperature Maximum Number of RCPs'Operatino y > 350'F -4' 350 F to 150 F-2' -[ <'150 F 0 Both 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix G and ASME, Code Appendix.G-require the development of pressure-temperature limits which are applicable' to inservice hydrostatic tests.' The minimum temperature for the inservice hydrostatic test: pressure can be determined by. entering the' curve-at the j test pressure (1.1 times normal operating pressure).and locating the~ onding temperature. This curve is:shown for a: fluence of corresp? n/cnf on Figures 3.4.9-1 and 3.4.9-2. - lL 4.0x10 Similarly,10 CFR Part 50 specifies'that core critical limits be established-based on material considerations. This-limit-is shown on-the heatup curve, Figure 3.4.9-1. Note that;this limit does not consider the-core reactivity safety analyses that actually controlLthe temperature at - which the core can be brought critical.- The Lowest Service Temperature is the minimum allowabl.e. temperature at? -pressures above 20% of the' pre-operational system hydrostatic test pressure (625 psia). This temperature is defined as equal. to the most limiting-RTm-for the balance of the RCS components plus.100 F, per Article NB'2332 of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The horizontal line between.the minimum boltup temperature and, the Lowest-Service Temperature is defined by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code - as 20% of the pre-operational hydrostatic test pressure. - The change in the-line at 150 F on Figure -3.4.9-2 is: due to a cessation of RCP flow induced l pressure deviation, since.no*RCPs are permitted to operate during a-co:>1down below 150 F. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-8 Amendment No. 178

I 3/4.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM-- BASES 1 The minimum boltup temperature is the minimum allowable temperature at pressures below 20% of the pre-operational system hydrostatic test pressure. The minimum is ' defined as the initial RT,n for'the material of. the higher stressed region of the reactor vessel plus any effects 'for-irradiation per Article G-2222 of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. The initial reference temperature of the reactor vessel and closure head flanges was determined using the certified material test reports and Branch Technical Position MTEB S-2. 'The maximum initial RT,n associated with the stressed region of the closure head flange is 30 F. However, for conservatism, a-minimum boltup temperature of 70*F is l utilized in the analysis to establish the low temperature PORY lift -setpoint. The Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) system consists of administrative controls coupled with low-pressure setpoint PORVs. The administrative controls provide the first line of defense against overpressurization events; the PORVs provide a backup to the administrative controls. The following section discusses the bases for the PORV setpoint and administrative controls. Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection uses a variable PORY setpoint to take advantage of the increased Appendix G limits at higher RCS i temperatures. Reactor Coolant System temperature is measured at the cold l leg Resistance Temperature Detectors (RTDs). This provides an accurate temperature indication during forced circulation, and is also adequate nr natural circulation. However, the Tm RTDs are not accurate when on SDC because they are not in the flow stream. For this reason, the lowest PORV. setpoint is maintained whenever on SDC. This setpoint, which is a independent on RCS temperature, is manually set when SDC is initiated and maintained until forced circulation is established after the RCPs are started. -l The PORY setpoint is chosen to protect the most limiting of the heatup or cooldown Appendix'G limits. Figure 3.4.9-3 shows the maximum PORY opening pressure. This includes corrections for static and dynamic head, and l pressure overshoot to account for PORV response time and the maximum i pressurization rate. The actual PORV setpoint and the Minimum Pressure and l Temperature Enable setpoint are controlled by procedure and account for all associated uncertainties. The design basis events in t'he low temperature region are: l An RCP start with hot steam generators; and, An inadvertent HPSE actuation with concurrent charging. These transients are most severe when the RCS is initially water solid. l Any measures which will prevent or mitigate the design basis events are j sufficient for any less severe incidents. Therefore, this section will discuss the results of the RCP start and mass addition transient analyses. i Also discussed is the effectiveness of a pressurizer steam bubble and a-single PORY relative to mitigating the design basis events. CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-9 Amendment No. 378

7.. B 1 1 ^~ 13/4.4:: REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM j

BASES, l

The RCP start transient is1a severe LTOP challenge that.can quickly exceed - the Appendix-G limits-for a water solid RCS. Therefore, 'during water-solid _ operations. all.four RCPs are tagged out of service-and their motor circuit 4 -breakers are disabled. However,;the transient'is adequately mitigated by.

j restricting three parameters:
1) the initial water volume in the

. pressurizer to 170 inches (indicated), thereby.providing a volume for the -i primary coolant to expand into; 2) the indicated secondary water- -j ' temperature for each steam generator to '30 F above the' RCS temperature; and j

3) the initial pressure of the pressurizer to 320 psia.: -With thesen 1

restrictions ~ 1n place. the transient is adequately controlled without the i assistance of the PORVs' Failure to maintain one;of-the initial-conditions-I could cause the PORVs to open following an RCP start. ] The mass addition transient from HPSI or multiple charging pumps is at j severe LTOP challenge for a water solid system due to PORV response time. To preclude this event from happening-while water solid, all HPSI pumps and ~ two charging pumps are tagged out-of-service during water solid conditions. ') Analyses were perfomed for a mass-addition transient with concurrent. l charging and the expansion of the RCS water volume following loss of decayL j heat removal, assuming one PORV available (due to single-failure criteria).- p This mass addition, detemined at the point when the RCS reached water i solid conditions, must be less than the capability of'a single PORV to 1 limit the LTOP event.. Sufficient overpressure protection results when-the-equilibrium pressure does not exceed the limiting Appendix..G curve pressure..Because the equilibrium pressure exceeds the minimum Appendix G limit for full HPSI flow, HPSI flow is throttled to no more than 210 gpm indicated when the HPSI pump is used.for mass addition. The HPSI flow limit includes allowances for instrumentation uncertainty, charging pump 1 flow addition and'RCS expansion following loss of decay heat removal. The HPSI. flow is injected through only. one HPSI loop MOV to limit instrumentation uncertainty. No more than one charging pump (44 gpm) is allowed to operate during the HPSI mass addition ~. q b Three 100% capacity HPSI pumps are installed at Calvert Cliffs. Procedures will require that two of the three HPSI pumps be disabled (breakers racked out) at RCS temperatures less than or equal to 301 F and that-the remaining. l: HPSI pump handswitch be placed-in pull-to-lock. Additionally, the HPSI pump nomally in pull-to-lock shal1~ be throttled to.less than or equal to 210 gpm when used to add mass to the RCS.. Exceptions are provided for ECCS testing and for response to LOCAs. To provide single failure protection against a HPSI pump mass addition transient, the HPSI loop h0V handswitches must be placed in pull-to. override so the valves do not automatically actuate upon receipt of a SIAS ' signal. Alternative actions, described in the ACTION Statement, are to ~ disable the affected MOV (by racking out its motor circuit-breaker or equivalent), or to isolate the affected HPSI header. Examples'of HPSI header isolation actions include; (1) de-energizing and tagging shut the i CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-10 Amendment No. 178 l .~

~ ~ 1 3/4.4 REACTOR C00LANT SYSTEMi . BASES i iHPSI. header isolation valves; (2)' locking shut and ta(gingiall three HPSI' pump! discharge MOVs; =and-(3) disabling;all three HPSI pumps..

i li

. RCSLtemperature, as used in the applicability ' statement is-~detemined as : follows:. (1) with the RCPs running,-the RCS cold leg temperature is' the i appropriate indication, (2) with the SDC System:in: operation, the SDC temperature indication ~is appropriate, (3) if.neither the RCPs or SDC is' in-operation, the' core exit themocouples are-the appropriate indicators off a RCS. temperature.. The allowed out-of-service times for degraded low temperature overpressure i protection system in MODES'S and 6 are based onLthe guidance provided in 1 Generic Letter 90-06 and the time required to conduct a controlled ' deliberate cooldown, and to depressurize and vent the RCS under the ACTION statement entry conditions. 3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY f The inspection programs for the ASME Code Class 1,-2, and 3 componentsi =' ensure. that the structural ' integrity. of these components will be maintained-at an acceptable level throughout the life of_the plant. To the extent-applicable, the inspection program for these components is in compliance q - with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code '3/4.4.11 CORE BARREL MOVEMENT-This specification is provided to ensure early detection of excessive core. barrel movement if it should occur. Core barrel movement will be detected i by using four excore neutron detectors to 'obtain Amplitude Probability - Distribution (APD) and Spectral Analysis (SA). Baseline core barrel i movement Alert: Levels and Action Levels ~ will.be confirmed during each' reactor-STARTUP.-test program following a core reload.. + Data from these detectors is to be reduced in two foms. ~ Root mean square (RMS) values are computed from the APD of the signal. amplitude. These RMS' magnitudes include variations due both to various.neutronic effects and t internals motion. Consequently, these signals alone can only provide a gross measure of core barrel motion. A more accurate assessment of core barrel motion is contained from the Auto and Cross Power Spectral Densities ~: (PSD, XPSD).. phase (6) and coherence '(COH) of these signals. These dataL -i result from the SA of. the excore detector signals. A modification to the req $[ed monitoring program may be justified by an-- analysis of the data obtained and by an examination of the affected parts during the plant shutdown at-the end of any fuel cycle. i 1 l Y CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-11 Amendment No. 178-l

o-3/4.4 REACTOR C00UUIT SYSTEM BASES 3/4.4.12 LETDOWN LINE EXCESS FLOW _This specification is provided to ensure that the bypass valve for the ' excess flow check valve in the letdown line will be maintained closed during plant operation. This bypass valve is required to be closed to ensure that the effects of a pipe rupture downstream of this valve will not exceed the accident analysis assumptions. 3/4.4.13 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS Reactor Coolant System Vents are provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the Primary System that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling. The OPERABILITY of at least one RCS vent path from the reactor vessel head and the pressurizer vapor space ensures the capability exists to perform this function. The valve redundancy of the RCS vent paths serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power supply or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path. The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the RCS vent systems are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, " Clarification of THI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980. 1 j.- l CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-12 Amendment No. 178 l l

~ S ~ y '3/4.5L' EMERGENCY C0RE C0OLING' SYSTEMS (ECCS)- ) aj ' RASES Portionsof the Low' Pressure S'afety Injection (LPSI) System flowpath are s ~ comon to both subsystems. This includes: the.LPSI flow control valve,- CV-306. the flow orifice downstream of CV-306. and the four LPSI loop isolation valves. Although the portions of-the flowpath are common..the: --system design is adequate to ensure reliable ECCS. operation due.to the.

short period:of LPSI System operation following a design. basis (Loss of:

1

Coolant Incident prior _ to recirculation. 'The LPSI System design isL consistent.with the. assumptions in the safety analysis.

The trisodium phosph' ate dodecahydrate '(TSP) stored in dissolving baskets! j located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility: 1 of. corrosion cracking of certain metal ~ components during operation of the.~ ECCS.following a LOCA. - The-TSP provides this protection by. dissolving in. the :: ump water and causing its final pH to be raised to > 7.0. The '. requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT ' water provides' assurance that the stored TSP will. dissolve-in borated water at the postulated' post LOCA temperatures. J The Surveillance; Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each I component ensure that at.a minimum, the assumptions used in-the safety analyses are met and the subsystem 0PERABILITY is maintained. The surveillance requirement for flow balance-testing provides assurance that; proper'ECCS flows will be maintained in the event' of a LOCA.. Maintenance l of. proper flow resistance.and pressure drop in the piping system to each ) injection point is necessary to:- (1) prevent _ total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance-configuration. -(2) provide the proper flow s alit between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in t1e ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide ~an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal: to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. 4 Minimum HPSI flow; requirements-for temperatures above 301 F are based upon small break l LOCA calculations which credit charging pump' flow following _a SIAS. Surveillance testing includes allowances for. instrumentation and system leakage uncertainties. 'The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from the three' lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve-leakage. The OPERABILITY of the charging punps and the i associated flow paths is assured by the Boration System ' Specifications 3/4.1.2. Specification of safety injection pump total developed head ensures pump performance is consistent with safety analysis-l assumptions. The surveillance requirement for the Shutdown Cooling.(SDC) System open-permissive interlock' provides assurance that-the SDC suction isolation valves are prevented from being remotely opened when the RCS pressure is at - or above the SDC System design suction pressure of 350 psia. The suction piping to the LPSI pumps-is the SDC System component with the limiting design pressure rating. The-interlock provides assurance that double isolation of the SDC System from the RCS is preserved whenever RCS pressure is at or above the SDC System design pressure. The 309 psia value CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 178

,7 ~. + .j n ?3/4.5)1 EMERGENCY-C0RE C0OLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) I . BASE 5-J 'specifiEd for this surveillance is-the' actual pressurizer pressure at the -instrument tap. elevation for PT-103 and'PT-103-1 when the~SDC System. i suction. pressure is 350-psia.- The Surveillance Test Procedure for this-surveillance will contain-the. required compensation to be applied to this value to account for instrument uncertainties. Thisitest is perforined using a simulated RCS pressure input. At indicated RCS temperatures _ of 301 F and-less, HPSI injection flow:is '[ limited to less than or equal'.to 210 gpm except.in res reactor coolant leakage. With excessive RCS. leakage (ponse:to' excessive LOCA). make-up requirements could exceed a HPSI flow of.210 g)m.- 0verpressurization isL j prevented by. controlling other parameters, suc1 as.RCS )ressure and-subcooling.- This provides. overpressure protect 1on in tle low temperature j region. An-analysis has been performed which shows this flow rate is more-than adequate to meet core cooling safety analysis assumptions;.HPSI: pumps-are not required to auto-start when the RCS'is.in the MPT-enable condition. The-Safety-Injection Tanks provide imediate injection of borated water H into the core in-the event of an' accident, allowing adequate time for an operator to take action to start an HPSI pump. Surveillance testing.of HPSI pumps.is required to ensure pump' operability. Some surveillance testing requires that the HPSI pumps deliver flow'to the RCS. To allow this testing to be done without increasing the potential for overpressurization of the RCS..either the RWT must be isolated or the HPSI pump flow must be limited to less than or equal to 210 gpm or an RCS vent greater than.or equal-to 2.6 square inches must be provided.- ) 3/4.5.4 : REFUELING WATER' TANK (RWT) The OPERABILITY. of-the RWT'as part of the ECCS' ensures that a sufficient I supply of borated water is available for injection ~ by the ECCS in the' event- ~ f a LOCA. The: limits on RWT minimum volume'and boron concentration ensure o that 1)' sufficient water is' available withiri containment to pemit. 1 recirculation cooling flow to the core,;and 2) the reactor will remain .subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods-inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for. water not usable because of tank discharge li.ne location or other physical characteristics. _,s ) -CALVERT. CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 178 'l 1 .}}

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