ML20076J256

Forwards Exercise Objectives & Scenario Outline for small- Scale Emergency Preparedness Exercise Scheduled for 830602, in Response to NRC 811026 Exercise Guidelines

ML20076J256
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	03/17/1983
From:	Brons J POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20076J258	List: ML20076J256 ML20076J263
References
IP-LML-687, NUDOCS 8306200403
Download: ML20076J256 (8)

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POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK INDIAN POINT NO. 3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

)O P. O. BOX 215 BUCHANAN. N. Y. t oS11 TELEPHONE: 914 739-8200 March 17, 1983 IP-DiL-687 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

In response to the guidelines for exercises established in your letter of October 26, 1981 I am providing herewith exercise objectives and the scenario outline for the Indian Point No.

3 small scale emergency preparedness exercise scheduled for June 2,

1983.

This small scale exercise will be conducted in accordance with 10CFR50 requirements.

The Peeer Authority intends to test fully, site and Headquarters response to a simulated Emergency Condition at IP-3.

There will be limited participation by New York State and the four surrounding counties.

Because exercise scenario content is handled on a "need-to-know" basis, the Power Authority requests that the attached scenario outline be withheld from public disclosure until the exercise has been completed.

Shculd you or your staff have any questions please feel free to contact: Ms. Linda Lomonaco, Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator (914) 739-8200 Ext.

246 or Mr.

Bob Allen, Training Superintendent (Lead l

Controller) (914) 739-8200 Ext. 221.

Respectfully,

,e John C. Brons Resident Manager LML/dp/dr-02 cc: H.W. Crocker l

T. Kenny (w/out attach.)

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t 1983 SMALL SCALE EXERCISE INDIAN POINT No. 3 Objectives and General Guidelines A.

PURPOSES This ' document provides guidance for the conduct of the 1983 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) observed radiological emergency exercise at the i Indian Point No. 3 Nuclear Power Plant (IP-3).

It shall be used _ by IP-3 and by all participating Federal, State and local agencies.

The scope of this exercise, with some exceptions, will endeavor to demonstrate by actual performance a number of - primary emergency preparedness functions.

At no time will the exercise be permitted to interfere with the safe operation of IP-3 and the plant management may, at their discretion, suspend the exercise for any period of time necessary to ensure this goal.

This exercise will include the appropriate notification to the Consolidated Edison Indian Point No. 2 Nuclear Station (IP-2).

Active participation by the IP-2 organization is not expected.

B.

EXERCISE OBJECTIVES 1.

Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans a.

Evaluate the adequacy and capability of implementation of the Indian Point No.

3 and Headquarters radiological emergency plans, and various pre-selected sections of the N.Y.S.,

Orange, Putnam, Rockland and Westchester County Plans.

b.

Demonstrate the emergency response capabilities of IP-3 and the Headquarters Recovery staff.

c.

Demonstrate the adequacy and capability of the Power Authority to provide communications, command and control and accident assessment activities.

I d.

Demonstrate the capability of the Power Authority to implement their radiological emergency preparedness plans in a manner satisfying NRC acceptance criteria.

2.

Notification Procedures a.

Demonstrate the ability of ' the IP-3 staff to classify actual or potential emergencies in accordance with the IP-3 Emergency Plan Implementation Procedures as to:

Notification of Unusual Event.

Alert Emergency, Site Area Emergency, General Emergency, Recovery.

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Demonstrate the capability of IP-3 to notify the State, local and Federal levels of government in accordance with Federal guidance and established protocols.

Demonstrate the capability of'IP-3 and Headquarters to notify and c.

activate emergency response personnel.

d.

Demonstrate ass appropriate the notification to agencies such as the railroad and Coast Guard by IP-3 personnel.

3.

Emergency Communications a.

Demonstrate the IP-3 communication capabilities among the Control Room, Technical Support -Center (TSC),

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Operations Support Center (OSC),

Recovery Center (RC) and the ability to maintain communications with the Federal Government.

b.

Demonstrate emergency communications capability among Orange, Putnam, Rockland and Westchester Counties, the State, the NRC and IP-3 including the Radiological ' Emergency Communications System (RECS-hot line) and the ENS.

c.

Demonstrate the adequacy of IP-3 and Headquarters emergency communications to:

(1) Transmit instructions to activate essential staff.

1 (2)-Disseminate essential information to assisting f

agencies, j

d.

Demonstrate the ability of IP-3 to coordinate, control and deploy radiological monitoring teams via field communications systems.

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7.

Protective Response a.

Demonstrate the capability of IP-3 emergency response organizations to make decisions regarding appropriate protective action response options for onsite areas. Demonstrate the capability of IP-3 emergency response organization to make recommendations regarding appropriate protective action response options for offsite areas.

, ba Demonstrate IP-3 employee accountabilith following the requirements of the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures.

8.

Ray ological Exposure Control (Onsite) p a.

Demonstrate the decision process for limiting emergency workers.

exposure or b.

, Evaluate the capabilitj of onsite emergency response personnel to

implement access control procedures, i

• s c,s Demongrate methods ~ and resources for distribution of dosimefry,to emergency' workers.

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d.

Demonstrate the capability of emergency personnel for 1

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Fire Support s

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Evaluate availability of onsite fire fighting equipment.

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Demonstrate Fire Brigade team response capabilities, actions taken 1

and results.

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Demonstrate the capability of emergency personnel' to 1

identify requirements, assess an9 implement procedures for,

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-re-entry.

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Demon s tr' ate the capability of' emerg'eycy' personne., to identify requirems.;ts.,

programs 'and policies " govert11ng damage assessment'and Ip overy.

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Demonstrate the useoof the Headquarters Emergency' Plan to support re-entry and rhcovery activities.

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d.

Demonstrate the Adegnacy of the Recovery Center to support re-entry anf recovery activiyies.

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2 IP-3 EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE

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SCENARIO OVERVIEW

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0500 -

Start of Exercise 0520 -

Notification of Unusual Event 0730 -

Plant shutdown should be ordered by this time -

System operator will order load reduction of not greater than 100 MWe/hr due to system conditions 0750 -

Alert Emergency (Nonradiological) 0820 -

Alert Emergency (Radiological) or Site Area Emergency

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'0920 -

General Emergency 1300 -

Release to Environment Secured 1400 -

Time advance for Exercising of Recovery 1630 -

Secured from Exercise 1.

Initial Conditions 0100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> - Rx power 100%, 970 MWe, 220 ppm boron, D @ 225 steps, S/G blowdown valves at 3/4 turn open, CST level 24 ft., RWST level 36.2 ft.,

VC pressure 0.2 psi, all radiation monitors readings

. normal, RCS gross activity 1 uc/ml, no abnormal alarms annunciated on supervisory or flight panels.

The Rx has been critical for 69 days and has been at 100% since the last main turbine stop valve test which was 28 days ago.

This information will be given to players at 0500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br />.

2.

0520 hours0.00602 days <br />0.144 hours <br />8.597884e-4 weeks <br />1.9786e-4 months <br /> - The SRO notifies the S.S. that RCS leakage surveillance SOP indicates an RCS leak rate of 2.8 gpm.

j This leak started at 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br /> just after the RO finished his readings.

The previous RCS leak rate was 1

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0 0.92 gpm average for the past four days.

The SS should i

declare an NUE and have chemist and HP Tech. make arrange-d3

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ments for a V.C. power entry.

Radiation monitors and 2

VC humidity will also indicate an RCS leak Updated Plant Status Sheets will be issued at this time and every ten minutes hereafter.

3.

0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br /> - VC entry should have been made-by this time, if.: entry is not made prior to 0745 hours0.00862 days <br />0.207 hours <br />0.00123 weeks <br />2.834725e-4 months <br /> the players must be prodded.

RCS leakage will be observed from under the lagging on loop 33 cold leg.

This leak can no't be isolated.

(This leak will later increase in magnitude and develop into a double-ended rupture).

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-Once-it is determined that the leak is real and unable

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to be isolated, the SS should order the plant to be

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shutfdown.

Normal load reduction' rate is 100 MWe (this'is approximately 10% Rx power / hour).

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4.

0750 hours0.00868 days <br />0.208 hours <br />0.00124 weeks <br />2.85375e-4 months <br /> - Fire alarm (number to be supplied later) on Fire Alarm panel annunciates indicating a fire in the upper electrical tunnel area.

There is also an alarm (name to be supplied later) annunciated on Supervisory Panel indicating Deluge System operation in the upper electrical tuhnel area.

The SS should order the SRO to sopnd the station fire alarm and have the plant Fire Brigade respond to the fire.

Depending on the report the SS receives from the Fire Brigade, the SS will have to declare either an Alert Emergency

(non-radiologicaU or a Site-Area Emergency.

The fire either threatens og can threaten safety related equipment.

If a Site Area Emergency is declared the SS will have to be told that he made a correct determination of the situation, but for the purposes

1. of this drill he is to only declare an Alert Emergency.

The sprinkler system extinguishes the class A fire.

(Note: fire dampers on electrical tunnel exhaust fans do not operate.

Backdraft dampers on these fans remain open).

5.

0820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br /> - Water (from the sprinkler system) that was laying on the electrical penetration for #31 RCP (penetration H-13) cables, causes a short which blows the penetration out of the wall causing an uncontrolled and unmonitored release of radioactivity to the environment through the cable tunnel exhaust fans' plenums.

(If the fans'are running the release rate would be greater; howevdr, the fans would have to have been restarted manually.

These fans trip on high temperature in the cable tunnels.)

The control room s

operators will. hear a muffled explosion through the

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rear door of the control rocm.

The Rxiwill trip due to loss of flow single loop.

WCCPP zone (number to be 4

supplied later) low pressure alarm will annunciate in the control room due to the WCCPP tubing being ruptured by the explosion.

Plant Status Sheets will indicate VC pressure tempcrature, and radiological conditions.

This breach of containment is only an NUE.

An Alert Emergenqr (radiological) or a Site Area Emergency may be declared based upon Tech. Spec release limits.

The electrical tunnels and possibly the 33' elevation of the control building will become radiological controlled areas (if fire door at end of electrical tunnels is shut that will contain the radiogas to the tunnels).

Some radiogas will enter the ABFP Building.

The RCS leakage is continuing and has increased to 12 gpm by this time.

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6.

0920 hours0.0106 days <br />0.256 hours <br />0.00152 weeks <br />3.5006e-4 months <br /> - ECCS is activated due to a low pressurizer pressure signal.

This is a true signal due to #33 cold leg double-ended rupture.

General Emergency will be declared at this time.

All ECCS equipment will operate as designed with the following exceptions:

1.

1. 31 Diesel Generator will start but it will trip on overspeed.

(This was an improper overspeed trip setpoint and will have to be adjusted).

2.

Both #31 and #32 RHR pumps fail to start.

Both will start if tried manually.

3.

1. 31 Fan Cooler Unit fails to start.

This FCU will not start until the overcurrent relay is reset on the 480 volt switchgear.

4.

The LOCA caused a Hi-Hi containment pressure signal (VC pressure reached 40 psig at peak) which activated V.C.

spray and phase B containment isolation.

All works as designed except:

a)

MOV-222 (seal water return isolation valve) fails to close.

MOV-222 will not close from Control Room but will close if close contact is pushed in on the M.C.C.

Some fuel clad damage will occur.

The release is still continuing through the electrical penetration.

The release

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will continue until the penetration is sealed.

V.C.

pressure will decrease an average of 0.5 psig per hour.

7.

1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br /> - The penetration should be sealed terminating the release to the environment.

8.

1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> - Time out is taken and clock can be advanced 24 or 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

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