ML20076H233
| ML20076H233 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1983 |
| From: | Daltroff S PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20076H229 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8306160486 | |
| Download: ML20076H233 (3) | |
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PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 M ARKET STREET P O. BOX 8699 PHILADELPHIA. PA.19101 SHIELDS L. DALTROFF ELicTutic PR ctoN May 17, 1983 Docket Nos. 50-277 50-278 Inspection Report Nos. 50-277/82-10 50-278/82-10 50-277/82-14 50-278/82-14 Mr. Richard W. Starostecki, Director Division of Engineering and Technical Programs U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406
Dear Mr. Starostocki:
Your letter of April 18, 1983, forwarded Combined Inspection Reports 50-277/82-10, 50-278/82-10, 50-277/82-14, and 50-278/82-14 These Inspection Reports identify activities at 4
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station which do not appear to be in full compliance with NRC requirements.
These violations are restated below, followed by the Philadelphia Electric Company responses.
.A.1 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XI, Test Control, and the licensee's Quality Assurance Plan (Revision 4, January 1980)
Section 3-MOD-11 require preoperational testing to be performed in accordance with written test procedures.
Special Procedure 518, Revision 0,
" Unit 3 Pre-op for Modification 625F," required in its Prerequisite and Restoration sections that the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) be lined up in accordance with System Procedure S.3.11.F.
System Procedure S.3.11.F, Revision 0, required ADS valve lineup in accordance with Check-Off List S.3.ll.F, Revision 0 which specified that both ADS penetration block valves be open.
P:306160486 830610
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PDR ADOCK 05000277 0
a Mr. R. Starostecki Page 2 Contrary to the above, on July 20, 1992, with performance of Special Procedure 518 on May 12, 1982 being the last authorized manipulation of the Unit 3 ADS penetration block valves, the Unit 3 ADS penetration block valves for containment penetrations N-102R and M-47 were in the closed and tagged closed condition.
This rendered the backup nitrogen supply incapable of operating the ADS valves for Unit 3.
This is a Severitv Level IV Violation (Supplement I).
Response
As stated in the inspection report, the permit was cleared and the valves opened uoon notification by the insnector.
This permit had been necessary to assure primary containment integrity during the previously completed in-containment portion of modification 625F until the external-to-containment part of the modification was completed.
The individual who performed the preonerational test did not correctly complete the valve check off list which was a final step in the test.
Otherwise, the preoperational test was performed satisfactorily.
The individual was reinstructed in and counselled on the procedural controls which govern plant operation and the need to inform plant staff supervision of discrepancies or unexpected conditions.
All operations personnel are expected to receive training in Administrative Procedures by May 19, 1993.
This training program highlights the requirements of the Administrative Procedures in control of plant testing and operations.
A.2 10 CFR 50.72 and Administrative Procedure A-31, Revision 6, April 15, 1981, require licensees to notify the NRC Operations Center within one hour of actuation of Engineered Safety Features.
Contrary to the above, the licensee did not notify the NRC Operations Center until 4:35 p.m.
June 19, 1092, that Hiqh Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System actuations had occurred at Unit 3 at 1:25 p.m.,
June 19, 1992.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Suppl ement I).
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a Mr. R. Starostecki Page 3
Response
Loss of power testing at Peach Bottom is one of the most complex surveillance tests performed.
The test has a large impact on the unit being tested as well as the potential to
' impact the other unit which, in this case, was at full power.
Durina the test on Unit 2, a degraded Unit 3 power supply caused the initiation of the HPCI and RCIC systems.
The HPCI and RCIC injections, which lasted approximately 30 seconds, were terminated after verification that the automatic initiation of the systems had been unnecessary.
Following the event, onerator attention was focused on returning Unit 3 to steady state conditions, determining the cause of the Unit 3 transient, and the return-to-normal portions of the Unit 2 Loss of Power Test.
Therefore, consideration of reportability and notification of the NRC was overlooked for a period of time.
Shift Supervision has been reminded of the requirement for prompt notification.
Additionally, all operations personnel will be instructed in the use of Administrative Procedure A-31.
This training is expected to be comnleted by May 18, 1993.
If you have any further questions pertaining to the above, please do not hesitate to contact the undersigned.
Sincerely, ff f
.V /
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cc:
A.
R.
Blough, Site Inspector Peach Bottom