ML20076E414
| ML20076E414 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 05/25/1983 |
| From: | Drummond F LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Jay Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-05.55E, 10CFR-5.55E, 82, W3I83-0186, W3I83-186, NUDOCS 8306010084 | |
| Download: ML20076E414 (5) | |
Text
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LOUISIANA f 242 octAnoNm s1nta POWER & L1GHT/ p o Box 600s. NEW OnLEANS LOUISlANA 70174 * (504) 366-2345 uNONIvsNU May 25, 1983 W3I83-0186 Q-3-A35.07.82 Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission g-bl
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SUBJECT:
Waterford SES Unit No. 3
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Docket No. 50-382
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l Significant Construction Deficiency No. 82
" Bent Control Element Assembly Rods" First Interim Report
REFERENCE:
Telecon dated April 25, 1983 to C. Oberg from M. Livesay
Dear Mr. Collins:
In accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e) we are hereby providing two copies of the Interim Report of Significant Construction Deficiency No. 82,
" Bent Control Element Assembly Rods".
This item was previously identified as PRD 114.
If you have any questions, please advise.
Very truly yours, 0
/7-
/lYn-F. J. Drummond Project Support Manager - Nuclear Attachment FJD/ DEB:keh cc:
- 1) Director 3)
Mr. E. L. Blake Office of Inspection & Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555
- 2) Director 4)
Mr. W. M. Stevenson Office of Management Information and Program Control U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 8306010084 830525
_ b~27 PDR ADOCK 05000382 J
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INTERIM REPORT OF SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 82
" BENT CONTROL ELEMENT ASSEMBLY RODS" INTRODUCTION This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e).
It describes deficiencies observed during the receipt inspection of Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) at the Waterfora 3 Steam Electric Station.
Several CEAs were bowed in excess of specifications. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been previously identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.
DESCRIPTION Visual inspection of CEAs immediately after removal from their shipping containers revealed that many of the rods were bent slightly.
Closer visual inspection revealed that some of the rods exhibited gradual bends over their entire length. The bends appeared to be randomly directed and there-fore not a result of bending or twisting of the assembly during packing or unpacking. A few CEAs were observed to have rods with relatively abrupt bends such that the deflection was as much as 3/4" at the throat
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of the bend. The straightness specification is 0.020 inches per foot and 0.060 inches overall, maximum.
Applicable functional requirements are:
a) 3-second drop time to 90% insertion per Technical Specifications, and b) the CEA must align satisfactorily for insertion into the fuel assembly when held by the CEA mast on the Fuel Handling Machine (FHM).
Combustion Engineering (CE) proposed the following alternate specifications based on the functional requirements: 1) Maximum drag in a fuel assembly should be less than 10-lb. and b) maximum deflection of the bottom end with respect to the FHM gripper (2-f t above the bottom) should be less than 3/32".
Eleven CEAs were observed to have deficiencies during the initial receipt inspection. In a subsequent inspection, four of the eleven CEAs. failed the drag test.
The maximum measured drag was 20,-0,+2.5 lbs.
In the subsequent inspection, a jig was used to position CEA rods such that deflection of the bottom tip with respect to the gripper location could be measured carefully.
All eleven suspect CEAs failed in that one or more rods deflected by more than 3/32" at the bottom. Six additional CEAs which passed the initial inspection were then drag tested and inspected for straightness. All narrowly failed the 3/32" offset inspection. Of 84 (total) CEA rods inspected for straightness, 53 CEA rods or 63% failed the 3/32" criterion.
Two CEAs had rods with substantial deflections and drag: LA-13 had one rod with a deflection greater than 11/32 and a drag of about 10-lb. LA-38 had two rods with deflections greater than 11/32 and a drag of about 20 lb. At CE's request, these CEAs were returned to Windsor for CE's evaluation.
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS Had this deficiency remained uncorrected, the affected CEAs would have required excessive force to operate which might have resulted in a lower negative reactivity insertion rate on a trip than that assumed in the safety analyses.
4 CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN Two CEAs (LA-13 and LA-38) have been returned to the vendor for evaluation.
The vendor will inspect the remaining CEAs at the Waterford 3 site in the near future. A decision on the acceptance, replacement, or repair of the CEAs will be made based on this inspection and further evaluation.
Further information will be submitted. on or before August 16, 1983.
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INTERIM REPORT i
0F SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 82
" BENT CONTROL ELEFENT ASSEMBLY RODS" 1
INTRODUCTION j
This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.55(e).
It describes deficiencies observed during the receipt inspection of Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) at the Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station.
Several CEAs were bowed in i
excess of specifications. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this l
problem has not been previously identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10CFR21.
s DESCRIPTION l
Visual inspection of CEAs immediately after removal from their shipping containers revealed that many of the rods were bent slightly. Closer visual inspection revealed that some of the rods exhibited gradual bends over their entire length. The bends appeared to be randomly directed and there-fore not a result of bending or twisting of the assembly during packing or unpacking. A few CEAs were observed to have rods with reintively abrupt bends such that the deflection was as much as 3/4" at che throat of the bend. The straightness specification is 0.020 inches per foot and 0.060 inches overall, maximum.
l Applicable functional requirements are: a) 3-second drop time to 90% insertion l
per Technical Specifications, and b) the CEA must align satisfactorily for insertion into the fuel assembly when held by the CEA mast on the Fuel I
Handling Machine (FHM).
Combustion Engineering (CE) proposed the following alternate specifications based cn the functional requirements: 1) Maximum drag in a fuel assembly should be less than 10-lb and b) maximum deflection of the bottom end with respect to the FHM gripper (2-f t above the bottom) should be less than 3/32".
Eleven CEAs were observed to have deficiencies during the initial receipt inspection. In a subsequent inspection, four of the eleven CEAs failed the drag test.
The maximum measured drag was 20,-0,+2.5 lbs.
In the subsequent inspection, a jig was used to position CEA rods such that deflection of the bottom tip with respect to the gripper location could be measured carefully.
All eleven suspect CEAs failed in that one or more rods deflected by more than 3/32" at the bottom.
Six additional CEAs which passed the initial inspection were then drag tested and inspected for straightness. All narrowly failed the 3/32" offset inspection. Of 84 (total) CEA rods inspected for straightness, 53 CEA rods or 63% failed the 3/32" criterion.
Two CEAs had rods with substantial deflections and drag: LA-13 had one rod with a deflection greater than 11/32 and a drag of about 10-lb.
LA-38 had two rods with deflections greater than 11/32 and a drag of about 20 lb.
At CE's request, these CEAs were returned to Windsor for CE's evaluation.
SAFETY IMPLICATIONS IIad this deficiency remained uncorrected, the affected CEAs would have required excessive force to operate which might have resulted in a lower negative reactivity insertion rate on a trip than that assumed in the safety analyses.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN Two CEAs (LA-13 and LA-38) have been returned to the vendor for evaluation.
The vendor will inspect the remaining CEAs at the Waterford 3 site in the near future. A decision on the acceptance, replacement, or repair of the CEAs will be made based on this inspection and further evaluation.
Further information will be submitted on or before August 16, 1983.
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