ML20076E135
| ML20076E135 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
| Issue date: | 07/30/1991 |
| From: | Quay T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20076E138 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9108150254 | |
| Download: ML20076E135 (10) | |
Text
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"N UMTED STATES J
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS$10N o
wApetNG TON, D. C. 20666 f
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
SYSTEM ENERGY _ RESOURCES. INC.
SOUTH MISSISSIPPI ELECTRIC POWER ASSOCIATION MISSISSIPPI POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-416 GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STA,T,I,0N, UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.79 License No. NPF-29
- 1..
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) dated June 19, 1989, as revised May 31 and December 7, 1990, and so supplemented February 7, March 4 and April 10, 1991, complies with-the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and f
regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
- B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (I) that the activit'ies authorized by this amendment can be conducted wit'nout endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) ti,at such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
-The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.-
The' issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part-51
-of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
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~2-2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-29 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environments 1 Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 79, are hereby incorporated into this license.
Entergy Operations, Inc. shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M
Theodore R. Quay. Director Project Directorate IV-1 Division of Reactor Projects III, IV, and V Office of Nuclear Reactor Reg.
' ton
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
July 30, 1991
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 79 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-29 DOCKET NO. 50-416 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages.
The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical line; indicating the area of change.
REMOVE PAGES INSERT PAGES 3/4 1-18 3/4 1-18 3/4 1-19 3/4 1-19 3/4 1-20 3/4 1-20 3/4 1-21 D 3/4 1-4 8 3/4 1-4 B 3/4 1-4a B 3/4 1-4a B 3/4 1-4b L
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a REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS I
3/4.1.5' STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION l
i 3.1.5 Two standby liquid control system subsystees shall be OPERABLE.
l APPLICABILITY:
OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2 and 5*.
I 4
ACTION:
a.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2:
4 1.
With-one system subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within-7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
i 2.
With both standby liquid control system subsystems inoperable, except for the condition covered in ACTION a.3, restore at least one subsystem to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or be in l
at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
3.
With the sodium pentaborate concentration Dreater than 15.2 weight percent and the net tank volume greater than or equal to 4281 gallons and less than or equa, to 5088 gallons, verify the sodium pentaborate solution temperature to be greater than or equal to the standby liquid control system solution minimum temperature limit of Figure 3.1.5-1 once per 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and restore the sodium pentaborate solution to within the normal _ operation limits of Figures 3.1.5-1 and 3.1.5-2 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Otherwise, declare both standby liquid control system subsystems inoperable and be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b.
In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5*:
1.
With one system subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 30 days or insert all insertable control rods within the next hour.
2.
With both standby liquid control system subsystems inoperable, insert all insertable control rods within one hour.
SURVEILLANCE-REQUIREMENTS l
l 4.1.5 Each standby liquid control system subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying that; a.
1.
The temperature of the sodium pentaborate solution is greater than or equal to 75*F and less than or equal to 130'F.
L
-2.
The available volume of sodium pentaborate solution is within the limits of Figure 3.1.5-2.
"With any control rod withdrawn Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.
- GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 1-18 Amendment No. 79 l
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I REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVE1LLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 3.
The heat tracing is OPERABLE by detersining that power II available to at leest one division of heat tracing circuitry and the temperature of the pump suction piping is greater than or equal to 75'F and less than or equal to 130*F.
b.
At least once per 31 days by; 1.
Starting both pumps and recirculating doetneralized water to the test tank 2.
Verifying the continuity of the explosive charge.
3.
Determining that the concentration of boron in solution is within the limits of Figure 3.1.5-2 by chemical analysis.*
4.
Verifying that each valve, manual, power operated or automatic, in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
c.
Demonstrating that when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0 $,
the minimum flow re,quirement of 41.2 gpm at a pressure of greater than or equal to 1300 psig is met, without actuation of the pump relief valve.
d.
At least once per 18 months during shutdown by; 1.
Initiating one of the standby liquid control system subsystems, including an explosive valve, and verifying that a flow path from the pumps to the reactor pressure vessel is available by pumping domineralized water into the reactor vessel.
The replacement charge for the explosive valve shall be from the same manufactured batch as the one fired or from another batch which has been certified by having one of that batch successfully fired.
Both system subsystems shall be tested in 36 months.
2.
Demonstrating that the pump relief valve opens within 3% of the system design pressure and verifying t*at the relief valve does not actuate during recirculation to the test tank.
3.
- Demonstrating that all heat traced piping between the storage tank and the reactor vessel is unblocked by pumping from the storage tank to the test tank and then draining and flushing the piping with desineralized wkter.
4.
Demonstrating that the storage tank heater is OPERABLE by verifying the expected temperature rise for the sodium pentaborate solution in the storage tank after the heater is energized.
- This test shall also be performed anytime water or boron is added to the solution or when the solution temperature drops below 75'F.
- This test shall also be performed whenever the suction piping temperature is found to be below 75'r and may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping or total flow path steps such that the entire flow path is included.
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 3/4 1-19 Amendment No. 79
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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES CONTROL ROD PROGRAM CONTROLS (Continued)
The RPCS provides automatic supervision to assure that out-of-sequence rods will not be withdrawn or inserted.
A rod is out of sequence if it does not meet the criteria of the Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (Reference 1) as described in the FSAR.
The RPCS function is allowed to be bypassed in the Rod Action Control System (RACS) if necessary, for example, to insert an in-operable control rod, return an out-of-sequence control rod to the proper in-sequence position or move an in-saquence control rod to another in-sequence position.
The requirement that a second qualified individual verify such bypassing and positioning of control rods ensures that the bases for RPCS limitations are not exceeded.
In addition, if THERMAL POWER is below the low power setpoint, additional restrictions are provided when bypassing control rods to ensure operation at all times within the basis of the control rod drop accident analysis.
The baseline analysis of the rod drop accident is presented in Section 15.4 of the FSAR and the techniques of the analysis are presented in Reference 1.
Analyses applicable to the current cycle are addressed in the appropriate cycle-specific documentation.
The RPCS is also designed to automatically prevent fuel damage in the event of erroneous rod withdrawal from locations of high power density during higher power operation.
A dual channel system is provided that, above the low power setpoint, restricts the withdrawal distances of all non-peripheral control rods.
This restriction is greatest at highest power levels.
3/4.1.5 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM The standby liquid control system provides a backup capability for bring-ing the reactor from full power to a cold, xenon-free shutdown, assuming that the withdrawn control rods remain fixed in the rated power psttern.
To meet this objective it is necessary to inject a quantity of boron which produces a concentration of 660 ppm in the reactor core in approximately 90 to 120 minutes.
To meet the 3% shutdown requirement, the minimum required solution concentra-tion at the design volume of 4530 gallons is 14.4 weight percent.
In order to establish this minimum concentration, it is necessary to have a minimum of 5803 pounds of sodium pentaborate.
There is an additional allowance of 165 ppm in the reactor core to account for imperfect mixing and leakage.
The time require-ment was selected to override the reactivity insertion rate due to cooldown i
following the xenon poison peak and the required pumping rate is 41.2 gpm.
The minimum storage volume is established to allow for the portion below the pump suction that cannot be inserted.
The sodium pentaborate solution is required l
to be maintained above the minimum required concentration and below the maximum allowable concentration on Figure 3.1.5-2.
The temperature requirement l
is necessary to ensure that the sodium pentaborate remains in solution.
The 1.
C.J. Paone, " Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence," GE Topical Report, NE00 11231, January 1977.
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-4 Amendment No.
REACTIV!1Y CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM (Continued) sodium rentabsrate solution volumes specified in ACTION a.3 and Figure 3.1.5-2 are based on a 90'F nominal sodium pentaborate solution teieperature.
With redundant pumps and explosive injection valves and with a highly reliable control rod scram system, operation of the reactor is permitted to continue for short periods of time with the system inoperable or for longer periods of time with c.ie of the redundant components inoperable.
Relief valves are provided on the SLCS pump discharge piping to protect the SLCS pump and piping from overpressure conditions.
Testing of the relief valve setpoint and verifying that the relief valve does not open during steady state operation of the SLCS pumps demonstrates OPERABILITY of the relief valve, The relief valves are ASME Class 2 valves and, as such, have a i 3% tolerence in the opening pressure from the set pressure pe Division 1SubsectionNC-7614.2(b),1974 Edition)rtheASMECode(SectionIII-Surveillance requirements are established on a frequency that assures a high reliability of the system.
Once the solution is established, boron con-centration will not vary unless more boron or water is added, thus a check on the temperature and volume once each 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> assures that the solution is available for use.
Temperature surveillance requirements are established on a frequency that assures a high probability that the solution temperature remains above the saturation temperature as illustrated by Figure 3.1.5-1.
More frequent surveillance is required when operating in the " Limited Operation" region of Figure 3.1.5-1 because of decreased margin to saturation.
Replacement of the explosive charges in the valves at regular intervals will assure that these valves will not fail because of deterioration of the charges.
Compliance with the NRC ATWS Rule 10CFR50.62 has been demonstrated by means of the equivalent control capacity concept using the plant specific minimum parameters.
This concept requires that each boiling water reactor must have a standby liquid control system with a minimum flow capacity and boron content equivalent in control capacity to 86 gpm for 13% weight sodium pentaborate solution (natural boron enrichment) used for the 251-inch diameter reactor vessel studied in NEDE-24222, Reference 2.
The described minimum sys-tem parameters (82.4 gpm, 13.6% weight with natural boron enrichment) provides an equivalent control capacity to the 30CFR 50.62 requiremet.
The techniques of the analysis are presented in a licensing topical report NEDE-31096-P, Reference 3.
2.
" Assessment of BWR Mitigation of ATWS, Volume II," NEDE-24222, December 1979.
3.
L. B. Claasen et al., " Anticipated Transients Without Scram, Response to NRC ATWS Rule 10CFR50.62," G. E. Licensing Topical Report prepared for the BWR Owners' Group, NEDE-31096-P, December 1985.
GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-4a Amendment No.
REACTIVITY CONTHOL SYSTEMS BASES I
STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM (Continued)
Only one subsystem is needed to fulfill the system design basis, and two subsystems are needed to fulfill ATWS rule requirements.
An SLCS subsystem consists of the storage tank, one divisional pump, explosive type valve, and associated controls, and other valves, piping, instrumentation, and controls necessary to prepare and inject neutron absorbing solution into the reactor.
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l GRAND GULF-UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-4b Amendment No.
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