ML20076C391
| ML20076C391 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1991 |
| From: | Withers B WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORP. |
| To: | Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20076C393 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-91-041, EA-91-41, WM-91-0090, WM-91-90, NUDOCS 9107220004 | |
| Download: ML20076C391 (17) | |
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WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION act o ww Pree.cient ano cn i r ** **
July 13. 1991 kh 91-0090 Mr. R. D. Martin, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Coernis sion Region IV 611 Ryan Pik..a Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington,'.X 76011
Reference:
- 1) Letter dated May 10, 1991, from R. D. Martin,
- NRC, to B. D. Withers WCNOC
- 2) Letter kM 91-0074 dated June 4,
- 1991, from B. D. Vithers, WCNOC, to R. D. Martin, NRC
Subject:
Docket No.
50-482:
Response to Apparent Violation of 10 CFR 50.7 Gentlemen
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Enclosed is a detailed response to Reference 1 which requested that Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCh0C) address five concerns raised by the NRC as a result of the Secretary of Labor's Final Decision and order issued March 21, 1991, in the case of James E. Wells, Jr v,
Kansas Gas and Electric Company (85 ERA-0022).
Reference 2 documented a thirty day extension for VCNOC's response.
An additional extension was discussed in a telecon on July 9, 1991 between Mr. H. K. Chernoff, WCNOC and Mr. A. T. Howell, NRC.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me or Mr. H. K. Chernoff of my staff.
Very truly yours.
-- J Bart D. Withers President and Chief Executive Officer BDV/jra Enclosure cc L. L. Gundrum (NRC), w/e A. T. Howell (NRC), w/e D. V.
Pickett (NRC), w/e Document Control Desk (NRC), w/e hg;.
O Ba'i 411 i Bursngeon, KS 86630 / Phone (316) 3M-8831
)l FTR An Eoww Opportray Enesprer IWCWT l
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Enclosuru to VM 91-0090 Page 1 of 15 Wolf Cnnk !bcloar Operating Corporation's Response to
!bclear Rcqulatory Camtission, Region IV, Intter 16. FA 91-041, tuted May 10, 1911
%e following is Wolf Crmk !bclear Operating Corporation's (WCrOC) rusponso to !bclear Regulatory Cmmission, Region IV, Letter 16. EA 91-041 dated !by 10, 1991, regarding whether, as a rusult of a Final Decision ard Onler of the Socrutary of labor on Mart:h 21, 1991, in the case of Jams E. Wells, Jr.
- v. Kansas Gas and Electric Capany (Caso !b. 85-ERA-0022), nE should to held to have violated 10 CFR 50.7.
'1ho 11RC raiscd four numterui concorrm and an additional unntantend concem and rtquestod that WC!OC addruss such concerns in a response. Each concern is addrussed separately beltu.
'Ittia case prusantly is on appeal to the U. S. Court of Appoals for the Tonth Ctruult (Caso ib. 91-9526). Consequently it would be prmuturu to nnder a decision as to whether n E violated 10 CFR 50.7 until after conclusion of judicial tuview of Om Secretary of labor's Order.
JeC Cxrwurn 7b.1: 'Itn act of dincrimimtirn occaraxi in Janmry 1985, hns unn tour axnths after 14C inmrx1 a tutico of Violaticn to nE arxi ptr5xml a $64,000 civil punity innad cn the pruvious Secretary of Inbor findirq that nE hx1 dincrimimttxi against willn Wxn it finxi him in 1983 (83-I W 12).
GE first terminated Wells as a contract anployee at Wolf Creek on August 4, 1983. 11e wss terminatcd as a rusult of a culmination of events during the course of his thrue nraths at the Wolf Creek site, 1118 inability to cooperate with people in and outside his work group, specifically with his load and the mnager of Quality Assuranco, his general performnco on the job, and RE's goal-faith belief that Wells had intentionally ndsrepresento1 his qualifications on EE docutentation were the factors loading to his termination.
Af ter lengthy adatinistrative and court pmceedings, and on diruction of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, nE reinstated Wells as a contract mpicyee on Q:tober 30, 1984. By that tine, Wolf Creek Generating Station was at the stage of construction cmpletion when all security provisions wens to have been inplannted, inchriing those relating to access screening.
Reganiing access screening, DE cmmittod, in its physical security plan, to emply with Section 4.3 of tho Anerican National Standards Institute's Stardard for Industrial Security for !bclear Ibser Plants (the "NISI Standani") which provided in portinent part:
Precedures shall to mployed for mking a determination of the acceptability of candidates for nuclear plant unploynent and the continuing acceptability of mployees with regard to their trustwrthiness. 'Ihese procedures shall includa, as a minh.am, the following provisions.
. (2) examination by a licensed psychiatrist or
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Enclosure to WM 91-0090 Page 2 of 15 physician, or other person professionally traincd to identify aterrant behavior, either prior to mploynent or prior to assignment to a rosition allwing access without escort, for the purpose of observing and disqualifying persons displaying indications of motional instability such that them is ruasonable doubt the person could discharge his duties in a ccrgetent mnner...."
She ANSI Standard was mbodied in }U&E's Mministrative Policy im-105 and its Security Screening Proceduru AtH 10-006.
In order for FE&E to comply with its ccamittrent to the IRC, it had to subject Wells in late 1984 to examination by a certificd psychologist inasmuch as Wells' job requirud that he work in the protected area of the plant. On October 30, 1984, Wells not with the psychologist selected by n E, and he took the Minnesota Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) test. 1krause of Wells' behavior during the interviw, and because of his l
atypical MMPI test scorus, the psycholcgist asked that Wells retake the 1
MMPI on !bvcunber 2,1984. The second MMPI test scores also were atypical, and Walls' behavior at the second intarviw causcd the psychologist further concom.
As a result of the two interviews and the two MMPI tests, the psychologist recomended that }U&E only provisionally hire Wells. Because provisional hiring was not en option permittcd by }U&E policies or the standards and guides on which they are lased, a FC&E mpresentative told the psycholcgist that provisional hiring was bnpossible and that Wells would either have to be rucamended for unescorted access or escortcxi. She psychologist then ruquested additional, background informtion on Wells which FU6E provided on January 3, 1985.
Based upon the two interviws, results of the two MMPI tests, and a mview of the background infornation supplied by }G&E, the psychologist expresad his opinion on January 11, 1985, that Wells should not to grantad unescorted access at Wolf Creek. As it had in other previous cases, IE&E Iulicd on the psychologist's opinion and terminated Wells.
WCtm does not dispute that the IRC issued a Notice of Violation to }E&E on Septaber 27, 1984, as a result of the Secretary of Ialer's June 14, 1984, Order holding that IE&E discriminated against Wells when it terminatcd his services as a contract mployee on August 4,1983, tbr does WCroc dispute that }E&E terminated Wells' services as a contract employee for a second tine on January 11, 1985, approxim tely 1r nonths after the IRC issued its Ibtice of Violation. - However, the seccn; armination was based on ?U&E's good-faith reliance upon the opinion of the psychologist that Wells should not be granted unescorted access to the plant. FU&E's policy had teen not to hire or retain any person demnd to be ineligible for unescorted access at the plant. Had E E made an exception to its policy and disregarded the psychologist's opinion, }U&E would have violated its ccumitannt to comply with the ANSI Standard and, as subsequently recognized by the IRC, IE&E likely would have been subject to an enforconent action by the tRC.
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s Enclosuru to HM 91-0090 Page 3 of 15 On January 20, 1987, lardo W. Zech, Jr., then Chaintan of the talc, wrote to the then Secrutary of Intor, William E. Brock, III, stating the imC's concerns with the Departmnt of lator's Administrative Inw Jtdge's recamendation (in nis Decmter 5,1986, Recanended Decision and Ortier follcwing EE's secord tennination of Wells) that nE " grant unescort(d access to Wells at the (Wolf Creek) nuclear plant." Stating the position of all the comtissioners except Cmmissioner Asselstino, Chaintnn Zech said:
EE is ruquind to have an imC-approved physical security plan in accortlance with 10 C.F.R. 73.55 to provide high assurance to protect against the thrmt of radiological sabotage, mis includes scrmning programs to assure that persons granted unescorttd access to die facility are reliable ard trustworthy. We failurn to ecmr>1v with tin terms of the Wolf Crmk security plan nov subiect nB to telC pnforn ment action.
[Dt1phasis supplied)
Copies of Chaintan Zech's letter and Cmmission Asselstine's separate letter are attached (Attachnents 1 ard 2).
l Despite the proximity in tim betwen imC's issuanco of its !btice of Violation and GE's subsequent tennination of Wells, the two events woru unrelated. We tennination occurred in an orderly fashion follcwing nE's nontal access screening policies, nE took the appropriate action at the appropriate tim, given the fact that, in the psychologist's expert opinion, Wells should not have been granted unescorttd access at Wolf Crock.
M4C Orxern m), 2: 'Its Secmtary's Final Dacinim arri Onler in 85-FRA-0022 1rxilcatre Omt nE acttxt willfully, i.e., " eider krums or uhowsi nxiless diarixptd for Owi antter of dwatier its carthet was pmidhited," Wwn it failed to (msure that acarrate tackgruturl infornutica on Wills ma provhkx1 to a psydologist involwxi in evaluating M311s for urumoart4xi aoouns to tlva plant.
('Ittis informatics was encial in that the psydelogist miled upm it in ruoaanruding Out Mr. Wils to ckrtled unescorted accom, aid RE's stated runaan for tmuinating Mr. Wulls ma the fact that in en rxyt approved fut unescortAri accans.)
We " accurate background infontation on Wolls" which was the subject of the Secretary of labor's Order, and consequently the subject of this concern, dealt with whether or not Wells had attended a college variously described as " John C. Calhoun University," " John C. Calhoun College," ard " John C.
Calhoun Stat.e Cmmunity College."
(For brevity, the college will be ruterred to here as "Calhoun College" unless a norn specific designation is nquired in the discussion of this issue. )
It also dealt with whether Wells received any college credit hours or equivalent college cridit hours frun Calhoun College.
In order to address this concern, it is necessary first to sunnorize certain f acts concerning Wells' attendance or non-attendance at Calhoun College ard his receipt of college cruilts therefrun.
In April 1983, Wells was
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Enclosum to WI 91-0090 Page 4 of 15 nterviend as a potential contract utployee at Wolf Creek.
1118 services win to te provided by Volt Infontation Sciences, Inc.,1bchnical Services Divisicn. Wells had pmviously provided to Volt a resuno including his oducation and mploynent history. She resunn listrd 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> cmiit in Electrical Systans at J. C. Calhoun University in !!untsville, Alabana, in 1977.
(A copy of Wells' rustmo for Volt is attachal as Attachnent 3. )
Wells' reprusentations as to his education and mploptent history wru a factor in the decision to retain Wells' services at Wlf Creek.
As a condition of his continuing mploynent at Walf Cnek, Wells was required to sutrnit to and successfully pass a security tackgrourd investigation to to conducted by Equifax Services. ib initiate the tackground investigation, IU&E personnel asked Wells to cmplete a Pe"sonal 111 story Data Shoot fonn in June 1983. A section on the fonn sought l
infontation rogarding "Illucational flistory (Acadmtic): Colleges."
l Inst. ructions for the fonn stated, " Colleges: List the nane, address and I
dates you have attended." On the fann, Wells wrote:
" John C. Calhoun 20 lirs. (crodit) (cmiit towards Elect. Degne) (1977)."
(A copy of the pertinent page of this fonn is attachoi as Attachannt 4. )
Wells later contended at a Departwnt of Iabor hearing that he was nerely following instructions fmn 10&E personnel when he indicatcd cmiits fmn Calhoun College. 110 wever, other persons who atterdad the sann noeting minnbar Wells raising a question concoming what to do about cmiits he mceived fmn a particular school while in the service, and problans ho had previously encounterud getting transcripts fmn his college cencerning hours i
he had acquirud theru.
Wells also canpleted on June 3,1983, a FS&E Qualification Record which, although not utilized in tackground investigat. ions, was utilized in docunenting, recording and issuing certifications of personnel in the 10&E Ouality Assurance section. Wells indicated on this docunent that he Imd attended J. C. Calhoun University in 1977 and received "20 lirs. Cridit, Cmiit For/7twanis Elect. "
(A copy of this fonn is attachcd as Attachnnnt 5.)
During the course of its background investigation, Equifax Services was unable to verify Wells' representations as to his college experience.
l On August 2,1983, a neeting was held anong four 1G&E representatives and l
Wells for the purpose of resolving outstanding concerns ruganting Wells' atterdance at Calhoun College. Wells adattttrd that he tad never attended Calbun College, but he said that he had a document which would show that if he weru to attend, he would be given cmiit tcwards a degrie. As a result of this statment, Wells' supervision concluded that Walls earlier had misrupresented his educational qualifications to than. Wells was tenninated two days later, on August 4, 1983.
Appmxinately two weks after his tenttination, Wells pmvided to 10&E a copy of a docunent intended by him to verify his representations concerning
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Enclosure to WM 91-0090 Page 5 of 15 Calhoun Collogo. We docunent was undated, and purportedly was frun " John C. Calhoun State Connunity College" in Decatur, Alatam, saying that it would provide Wells the c5portturity to obtain the equivalent of 20 quarter hours enriit towants an associate degrue in Missile and Munitions
'Ibchnology.
(A copy of this docunent is attachod as Attachannt 6. )
nIuifax Services finally suhnitted to EE its backgrourxi investigation on Wells on August 23, 1983. We report indicated that B;uifax was unable to verify that Wells had attended Calhoun College or had received 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> college crulit frun Calhoun College.
In the Socmtary of Labor's Onder of March 21, 1991, the Socrutary refers to
- inaccurate infontion" in the B;uifax repart.
(Onder, page 16. ) We Secretary also held that GE "did not tell Dr. Schalon about infonction (Wells) had supplied which would have explained an appatunt disempancy in (Wells) educational background."
(Order, Enge 6. )
It is and always has toen EE's and WClOC's contention that Fquifax Services' inability to verify Wells' attendance at or crutits frun Calhoun College was not " inaccurate" or a "discIvpancy." Wells mpresented on thme separate docunents--his resunn to volt, his Personal History Data Sheet, and his Qualification Reconi, that he attended Calhoun College and timt he ruceived 20 hcura crulit towards an electrical degroo therefrun.
In fact, he never attended Calhoun College, and he never received 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> collcye credit or equivalent college crulit. By Wells' own admission, he could only have received equivalent college credit if he attended Calhoun College, and F.e never attended that college.
WClOC agrees that an attorney for EE provided DIuifax Services' tackground report on Wells to Dr. Schalon. WCtOC also agrees that the EE attomey did not provide to Dr. Schalon Wells' clarification of his unploynent history representations. However, the tackground infontion was provido-i to Dr. Schalon only after Dr. Schalon had conducted two MMPI tests and two interviews with Wells, arri af ter Dr. Schalon specifically requested the tackground infonmtion frun EE. At nost, EE might be criticized for an oversight in providing that snn11 part of the tackground infornation dealing with Wells' educational experience, and in not providing what Wells contended was clarification of his educational experience representations.
E E certainly had no intention to taint Dr. Schalon's opinion with this infoamtion.
Finally, NC?OC does not believe the "incorruct infonstion" was crucial to Dr. Schalon in Inndering his opinion that Wells should be donlod unescorted access. %eru were many other factoru which, by themelves, justified Dr.
Schalon in reaching the sano opinion. %ose factors were enunerated succinctly in E E's " Post-Hoaring Brief and Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" pwvided to the Secretary of Iabor in Case Number 85-ERA-0022 on February 9,1987. Rather than restating those factors here, a copy of that portion of EE's Brief is attached (Attachnent 7).
Enclosure to WM 91-0090 Page 6 of 15 MC Cturum It). 3: GE's actima againnt Walls ar y havu hul a rutantial dill _ ling effect cm the willingnons of otham amployut at M)1f Crunk to ruino canourns about quality arri cxmpilanau.
WCroC believes that any actions EE took with rugard to Wells did not have a chilling offeet on the willingness of others mployed at Wolf Cruek to raise concerns about quality and cmpliance. DE tenninated Wells on January 11, 1985, based upon its good-faith reliance upon a certified psychologist's professional opinion that Wells should not be granted unescorted access at the plant, me termination was neither for Wells' previous identification to GE of concerns at the plant (in 1983) nor was it in rutallation for Wells' filing a cmplaint because of his termbation frun work on August 4,1983.
1 In her 1991 Order, the Secretary of Inbor found (1) that nE's furnishing certain background infonction to the psychologist was in violation of the Secretary's June 14,1984, Order, (2) that such action violated the mpicyee protection provision of the energy reorganization action of 1974, as amnded (42 U.S.C. Section 5851 (1982]), ard (3) that nE consequently
' discriminated against Wells when it 'tenninated him in January 1985. %e Secretary did not find that nE's second termination of Wells was either because he had registered sme concerns in 1983 or because he had earlier filcd a discrimination emplaint against nE.
In fact, the Secretary found that Wells had failed to prove that n E used the paychologist's determination as a pretext for terminating Wells.
!btwithstanding WCf0C's belief that BE's tenninating Wells was unrelated to his identification _of concerns at the plant, WCNOC will respond to the NRC's concern by detailing belcw the myriad neans available to workers at Palf Cruek to raise concerns about quality and empliance, and the ways in which the workers were and are infonned and encouraged to raise such concerns.
1)
-Corrective Action Methods:
For mny years the EE Nuclear Departent ard subsequently WCNOC have had numerous nmns available for mployees to use in identifying both hardware and supcmetic concerns and probluns. Specific procedures addressing these provisions have includait AIE 01-057: (Corrective Work Requests) 21s procedure is the controlling document for reporting and correcting in-plant hardware problems, and has been in continuous offect since March 1983. W ese provisions are available to all Wolf Creek personnel.
KP-2145 and NE 01-058: (!bn-Conformnce Reports)
Wese procedures (NE 01-058 - fran March 1984 to August 1986; and KP-2145 frun August 1986 to date) control hardware probims with itms in the warehouse. % ese provisions are available to all Walf Creek personnel.
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Enclosure to W4 91-0090 Page 7 of 15 1 A 01-033: (Defect / Deficiency Reports and Reportability Evaluation Rcquests) his procedure provides the mthods to docunent conditions thought to be potentially mportable to the NRC. %ese provisions are available to all Wolf Creek personnel and have been in continuous effect since January 1982.
IUP-1210: (Progranntic Deficiency Reports) his corporate procedure provides the mthod to docunent prob 1ms related to the quality program (both developient and implmentation). his empany wide procedure was develcped in 1987 and has been continuously available to all Wolf Creek personnel since June 1987. Prior to 1987, individual organizations wre required to develop their own individual corrective action procedures.
- Other Procedures:
In addition to the procadures listed above, various organizations had developed corrective action procedures unique to their specific work activities. We reporting docunents of these "in-house" procedures wem generally available (by procoduru requirment or by application) to the individuals of that work group.
Examples of these lower level corrective action documents includes o Wolf Creek Event Reports (Operations) o Operationa Event Reports (Operations) o Interoffice Cormspondence (t@E) o Maintenance 12xiification Information Bulletins (Maintenance) 2)
Quality First Program
%e Quality First Program was instituted by }U&E in 1984 and has been carried on by NCIOC. We program provides an avenue for mployees and contractors to disclose safety-related concerns. Disclosure my be m de by using a 24-hour hotline, requesting an interview with the Quality First representative, or by completing a disclosure fom at temination of sploynent. We Quality First representative is normlly available during the day shift to moet with a concerned individual on a pre-arranged or walk-in tasis.
Concerns and concerned individual identities are treated as confidential infonmtion. Certain disclosures, ho wver, must be made to affected.mnagment. Any identified preguminatic or hardware deficiencies are corrected through the cmpany's corrective action program. We Quality First Program requires that any concerns of retaliation against an individual for identifying a quality problm to supervision or managanent or to the NRC te brought to the attention of legal counsel for proper resolution.
Enclosure to W. 91-0090 Page 8 of 15 persons mporting concerns for Quality First attention my nquest that they be notified of the results of investigations and corructive actions required to Insolve any identificd deficiencies. The Quality First Pityram is described in WC!E's General Proceduru KGP-1211, Quality First Progm m.
3)
Policies and Training:
NCrE's policies (Aininistrative Policy III.4, nnployee Concerns; im-109, nnployee Work Cmplaints; and IR-170, imC Investigations and Inspections) mphasize that mployees bear responsibility for openly discussing their concerns with and inunilately mporting adverse program and equiptent conditions to their supervisor. 1he capany fully expects first line supervisors to sincoruly and objectively work with employees to rusolve their concerns.
If unployees are not l
reasonably satisficd with the supervisor's resolution, they my take the problan up through the chain of ccmmnd or to ifuman Resourtes or Quality First, as appropriate.
NCtm policy prohibits supervision or managamnt frun discouraging mpicryee disclosure of concerns either within the canpany or to an outside agency. 1he canpany will not tolerate rutaliation against an u mloyee seeking concern resolution through internal organizations or through the lac.
ihe above principles have been and continue to be formily conveyed to all workers at Wolf Creek by way of IC&E's, and ncw WCtE's, General Dnployee Training (GET) Orientation Courses.
In order to obtain and mintain unescortcd access to the plant site protected area, all workers are required to receive this training initially upon umloymnt at Wolf Creek.
In addition, they are required to zuceive annual requalification training which includes a reinforcumnt of the above l
principles. All sployees must pass a graded examination at the end of each such training session.
Training in-the area of concern reporting includes an explanation of the various means of concern reporting available to mployees including chain of ccnerd, Quality First, and tac. 1he Quality First Program is explained as described above.
Trainers anphasize that mployees my contact the tEC at any tim to register a concern. The m ployees are given a copy of NRC Form-3, and they are told how to contact NRC offices either on site or in Arlington, Texas.
D@loyees also are told that laws exist to protect than if they chose to mport concerns to the NRC, and that their unployer my not fire thm or discriminate against than for registering a concern.
Finally, copies of 10C Form 3 are posted on bulletin bcards throughout the site.
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Enclosure to WM 9 h0090 Page 9 of 15 4)
Plant Manager's Ikusletters:
Recent Plant Itmager's nusletters have encouragcd Wolf Cmek prsonnel to documnt their concerns and provide than to supervision arx1 nanagment. Aktitional discussion was providcd indicating that disciplinary actions soldczn are necessary for honest ntistakes that am prmptly mported.
PeC Cmmrn te, 4: 'an carduct of the paydelogical evalmtim ard On tun of On rutults by IGE in unking accusa detunnimtima ratin qtnatima aluut un validity of the decisima ard On rullahtlity of On prunm.
The psychologist who adntinistemd the MMPI tests to Wells and evaluated hiin for IC&E was selected by IC&E pursuant to an agrmitent betwen counsel for Wells and counsel tor }U&E bascd on the fact that the psychologist was independant and had not previously perfontrd screening for IC&E. The psychologist was a certified psychologist in Idasas, on the Counsel for tutional Register of Ibalth Service Providers and Psycic}ogy, a Diplmat in the Anerican Acadmy of Behavior Medicine, arvi a Diplmat in the International Acadsty of Professional Counseling and Psycho-therapy.
He mcehui his Ph. D. frm the University of Iowa in 1966, and frun then through 1985, he had had an extensive and varied practice. lie had Imd teacning appointmats and had published nunemus articles, and he had administertd several thousand MMPI tests prior to those adntinistorxd to Wells.
Prior to any indication that Wells would be sent to the psychologist for screening, the pcychologist was invited to Wolf Cruek to sw the f acilities and types of work going on them, and he was given a copy of the ?BC's Draf t Regulatory Guide and Value/Inpact Statment Standard Fornet and Content Guide for Access Authorization Plans for thclear Pwer Plants. A site visit was an appropriate and necessary neans for a psychologist to understand the context of and inportance of a semaning procuiure used to deterntine whether individuals should be granted unescorted access to a nucimr plant.
l 1E&E purposely did not tell the psychologist, in advance of his evaluation of Wells, that Wells previously had bmn tenninated by }G&E or the resons l
for such tennirution. Ibd }L&E intended to taint the psychologist's opinion, it very easily could have done so by advising the psychologist, in advance of the evaluations, of Wells' past mploynent history at Wolf Crock. Because of Wtlls' atypical MMPI test scores and because of the psychologist's serious concerns about Wells' msronses and behavior during i
the evaluations, the psychologist asked }$&E to provide tackground l
infon:ation on Wells.
It was only after the psychologist requested this l
Infornation and after the psychologist had raised initial concerns about I
Wells, that FL&E provided the requested infouration which the Secretary of I
Labor later demni to be inaccurate.
Af ter revitving Wells' background infornation, of which the " inaccurate" infornation about Walls' non-attendance at Calhoun College was a very snall l
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Enclosuru to WM 91-0090 Page 10 of 15 i
part, and considering this tackground informtion in light of the conclusions the psychologist pruviously had reached, the psychologist memnended that Wells not be granted uneworted access at Vblf Cmek. 11e conmunicated his opinion in the formt requirud by KG&E and, as contmplated by the NRC Draft Regulatory Guide, without providing other data or informtion to the empmy. As it had in all previous cases, m&E relied on the psychologist's opinion and terminatcd Wells.
If the tac is concerned about m&E's nethod of conducting psychological evaluations in general, NCroC offers the following. Utis case was unique, and it was harriled a bit diffemntly than typical pm-mploymnt evaluations i
at Wolf Creek. KG&E, with consent of counsel for Wells, used a diffemnt psychologist to conduct the evaluations and MMPI tests of Wells in order to assum that no issues of potential bias against Mr. Wells would be raiscd.
At the tino, KG&E followed its Security Screening Procedure, ACH 10-006, in conducting evaluations to determine whether individuals should be granted j
unescorted access at Wolf Creek. We procedure was designed to emply with the Anerican !btional Standard of Industrial Security for Nuclear Power Plants (ANSI N18.17, 1973).
It provided for an Access Screening Cooniinator (an mployee of the Security section of the ccmpany) to process the required paperwork, review the results for acceptability, reconnend access clearance and naintain the required files. We procedure required screening and/or i
eAamination by a psychologist or clinical psychologist trained to detect any motional instability or aberrant behavior and an appropriate signed certification of acceptability provided by the trained professional.
It provided for a background investigation conducted by an luostigative agency which included inquiries into an individual's prwious mployment history, education, criminal reconi, cruilt, military service moord, and personal references.
Upon obtainir.g all the above infornation, the Access Screening Coordinator would ruview the results for acceptability in accordance with ANSI N18.17 and forward thm with his roomnendation to the Plant Manager or his designee for approval / disapproval. Upon review of this infonmtion, the Plant Manager or his designee would nake the final determination as to whether unescorted access to Wolf Creek would be granted.
We NRC previously has had occasion to evaluate KG&E's access screening process.
In Inspection Report STN 50-482/85-17 datcd June 10, 1985, the imC inspector reviewed KG&E's psychological evaluation and background investigations processes and found no violations or deviations.
It is inportant to note that the Secretary of Iabor rejected nest of the Mministrative law Judge's criticisms of the mnner of which KG&E condut.ced the evaluation of Wells. We Secretary stated at page 8 of her Order:
We AIJ cited the follcwing factors which led him to that conclusion (that KG&E's contention that it relied solely on the advice of the psychologist was not " plausible"): Respondent (EG&E) departed frun its usual practice of giving MMPI tests at the plant when it sent Cmplainant (Wells) to the Wichita Clinic to be tested; Cmplainant's
Enclosure to HM 91-0090 Page 11 of 15 test was supervised at the clinic by the psychologist; Carplainant's appointnent for the test ws mde by the mnager of hininistrative Services who " closely nonitored the test results (,)" R. D. and O. at 11; an unsigned nmorardum of October 30, 1984, over Dr. Schalon's nano zuccumnding against unescorted access shomd a *Iush to judgment [, }"
id.; infornation concerning cotplaints and disciplinary actions against Cmplainant weru provided to Dr. Schalon, and he relied on these
+
together with the backgIUund report.
Id. at 7.
I find that these factors either alp not sumortal by the record or are not rnasonably informd frm evidence in the mcord.
(Dtphasis supplied. )
i In addition, the Secrutary rejected the Ahninistrative Iow Judge's findings that EE departed frm it usual practices in setting up and conducting the psychological testing of Wells, that Dr. Schalon supervised Wells' test nore closely than other psychologists supervised tests of other pmspective mployees of nE, and that_ Dr. Schalon was acting in ind faith and in collusion with n E.
.(Order, pages 9-13.)
%ere is nothing to indicate EE's onlinary conduct of its accors screening pmgram was unrullable or that any decisions mde in that process were l
invalid. Decause of the unusual circunstances of the Wells case, nE node a gocd faith effort to assure that an inrApendent and unbiased decision as to-unescorted access would be m de. We Secretary of labor felt that BE did not succeed in that effort because E E supplied Wells' background infornation to the psychologist without also providing Wells'
" clarification" fmn Calhoun College. Howver, it should not bo inferrud frun the Secretary's decision that EE's norm 1 access screening process was in any way deficient.
letC Camam *). 5: %e edaquacy ami mliabil.ity of the ethods employud by WCN]C today to evaluato suployoun for ursencarted acoass.
'Ine EE and WCNr Access Authorization Program has undergono procedural and mnagment changes since the termination of Wolls in January 1985.
In April e
1990, a new Access Screening group in the Human Resources Department was formed to m nage access authorization.
It was cmposed of an administrator, two professional support persennel, a clerk and a collection site person.
I Before formation of the Access Screening group, one professional witnin the cmpany's Employnent Group handled access screening natters with limited supervision, and a separate professional in the Diploynent Gmup provided oversight for a collection site person who was a contract mployee. With the NRC's enactmnt of 10 CFR Part 26 in 1989, HCNJC recognized the need for additional managment oversight and staffing in the access screening area, 7
and satisfied this need by form tion of the Access Screening group.
L
% e Access Screening group extensively revised the Access Authorization Program in 1990 and early 1991, creating a new administrative procedum (HR-L 350) substantially nodeled af ter the draft NUMAR': " Industry Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant. Access Authorization Pru-aus, " Rev. 89-01.
In usiny
Paclosuru to VM 91-0090 Page 12 of 15 the draf t IMARC Guidelines as the tusis for the Access Authorization Program, VCE ensund that the program would be consistent with access authorization programs of other U. S. nuclear plants. We nw VCE Access Authorization Program ensures that all iniividuals aru treated fairly and equally thruugh implutnntation of contmllcd procodures, with Quality Assurance oversight ard input.
We new program enhances the accuracy of infontation relied upon in the screening process by 11guiring independent verification of all mterial in an applicant's file prior to a recomendation for or against unescorted access. This verification process is documented on Form KZF-104,
- Access Scrmning Check List," (included as a part of administrative procujuru HR-350). no proccdure and check list mquires one person to verify data cmpleteness, a second person to verify cmpleteness, and a third person to verify proper ccnpletion of the fom. For example: Applicant "A" states that he graduawd frun Kansas State lhtiversity. We first verifier checks to see that transcripts are received, that they cover all education listed by Applicant "A," and checks social security nunter for positive identification. We sccond verifier perfoms the sanu activities and mkes suru there is no disagrurent with the first verifier's firviings. % e third verifier examines Form KZF-104 and mkea suru that the first two verifiers have empleted the fom and that their informtion is consistent.
We accuracy and reliability of informtion rulled upon in the access screening procesa at ICE has boon further enhanced by inclusion of the Access Screening program within the cmpany's Special Scope Program. %e Special Scope PruJram ensures that contractors (e.g., Iquifax) perfoming access screening investigations for VCE have controlled prootdums that aru in cmpliance with the tcE program, and that they are subject to purchase orders with special quality camtitments. We Special Scope Program results in a high degree of Quality Assurance oversight of the Access Screening Program. Contractors performing backgrourd investigations for VCE am subject to initial and annual audits to ensum compliance with FCE procedums.
We reliability of the voE Access Screening program is further enhanced by requirTd annual internal atriits of the program by an independent Quality Assurance audit team.
l We day-to-day administration of the Access Authorization Program by Access Screening personnel ensures the fairness and reliability of the systan. Any adverse informtion that would preclude unescorted access is comunicated to the applicant, who has an opportunity to explain (1) whether the adverse information pertains to the applicant (identification issues), (2) whether l
there are mitigating circumstances or alternate explanations for the informtion, (3) any additional informtion that might be rulevant in providing proof of reliability and safety in a nuclear environnent. Wis process is conducted by the Administrator Access Scmening or his delegate, and nay be conducted face-to-face or by telephone. We Idministrator Access l
Screening documents the process in writing in the applicant's tackgrourd l
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Onclosure to N4 91-0090 Page 13 of 15 investigation file. We background investigation contractor (e.g., Dquifax) is provided with additional or explanatory infornation provided by the applicant.
At the conclusion of this process, the hininistrator Access Screening nakes a recomendation on access to the Panager !!umn Resources, stating his t
findings frtru the invnstigation. We Manager Human Resources then mkes an independent roccamendation to the Dimetor Plant Operations, who mkes the final decision reganiing eligibility for unescorted access.
Wis day-to-day process ensures that adequate fact-finiing is ccrtpleted before an adverse access decision is nade, giving the applicant an opportunity to discover and explain erroneous infontation. Review by the Manager !!unan Resourros and Director Plant Operations ensums impartial and fair treatment of the applicant through indepmdent examination of the i
applicant's file.
I We psychological ctriponent of the background investigation is perforned by COC Access Semening group in conjunction with a state certified psychologist. %e psychologist is an indopardmt contractor with a diversified clientele, and he provides an unbiascxi and independent asseasnent of an applicant's qualifications for unescortcd access.
We prinary psychological assessnent tcx>l at WCrOC is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Indicator - 2 (MMPI-2). W e MMPI-2 is a broad-band test designed to ascess a number of the najor patterns of personality and motional disorders. An eighth-grade elmentary-school level of reading comprehension is required, as is a satisfactory degme of cooperation and ccmnitnent to the task of completing the inventory. We test provides internal checPs in the event that these general requirutents have not been satisfied. %e MMPI-2 provides objective scores and profiles detennined frun well-<iocunented national nouns.
We MMPI-2 is administerni to all applicants at WCtOC in a unifonn nanner.
Access Screening personnel administer the test at Wolf Cmek Generating Station, and Hunan Resources personnel administer the test at the Wichita C OC office.
If the test results are valid and within the nontal range, unescorted access is reccmrended by the psychologist in the fonn of a written certificate that is naintained in the background investigation file.
l
- If the applicant generates an invalid profile or a profile with clinical l
elevations, the Clinical Analysis Questionnaire (CAQ) test is perfonrad to further evaluate potential for nental health problems. Se CAQ
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sinultaneously measums nornal and pathological trait levels and provides a full, nultidinunsional profile of the individual.
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i Enclosum to VM 91-0090 Page 14 of 15 At the conclusion of the CAQ, the individual is interviewd by the psychologist. After the intervicw, the psychologist nay mquest further infonration fmn FCE Access Screening.
Psychological teste administemi by VCE aru scored and evaluatcd by the psycholcgist's of fiw. When the CAQ and intervicw process is empleted and the psychologist has ruceived and zuviewod all infantion ruquestod fmn l
&cm, he issues the psychological certificate Itcrmurding appruval or disapproval of the irdividual for unescortcd access.
ICE has no input into the certification process beyond providing infontation to the psychologist when rtquestcd. Only infornation fmn the background file can be provided. Because the background file is subject to stringent controls on verification of accuracy and cmpleteness of infornation, the psycholcgist only receives infontation that positively pertains to the applicant and is factual.
%e fitness-for-duty cmponent of the access scruoning process is governed by im-351, Fitness For Duty Program. All applicants at VCE are required to subnit to pre-mploynent, pre-access, randczn ard directtd drug and alcohol testing under the Fitness Por Duty Program. Positive pre-anplopmt and pre-access test results bar employnent or work activities for VCE.
'Ibsts are conducted by a lhtional Institute of Drug Abuse certifiod laboratory.
As a prt of the tackground investigation, a fitness-for-duty " suitable inquiry" is perfonted to ascertain, on a five-year best-of forts basis, whether an applicant has a history of fitness-for-duty problans in past mploynents.
If such a history is established, the Fitness For Duty Program prohibits an individual frun working at or for VCE without proof of ruhabilitation. A joint nanagment and nodical decision is necessary to detennine rehabilitation and suitability tor work at
'E.
An appcel nochanism is proccduralized to alloa a person to chah a a negative fitness-for-duty finding.
%e Fitness For Duty Program is a part of the Quality Prcgram, includal within the Special Scope Program, and therufore subject to stringent internal Quality audit requirments on an annual basis. We Fitness For Duty Pdigcun is also subject to IEC inspection.
In sunnary, the Access Screening Group of the llumm Resources Deprtmmt has proccdure and controls in place to ensure the fair ard 13npirtial processing of personnel for hire and unescort.ed access. W e background investigation and psychological evaluations are perfontrxl by independent contractors.
10E's access program is designed to confonn to the requirutents of 10 CFR Part 26 and generally to the NtNARC guidelines.
Enclosure to N!4 91-0090 Page 15 of J5 Onnelusim Decause the Final Decision and Order of the Secretary of Labor in the Wells case presently is on appeal to the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Cirruit (Case !b. 91-9526), it would pmtature for the Cmmission to decide, tased on the Sec mtary's Order, that n E violated 10 CIR 50.7.
!bvertheless, WC!OC believes it has shcun that the Catmission could decide that IG&E did not violate 10 CFR 50.7, regardless of the Secretary's Order.
We Secrutary did not find (1) that IE&E's January 1985 termination of Wells was because he had registered concerns in 1983, (2) that the termination was in retaliation for Wells' filing a discrimination emplaint against IG&B, or (3) that 1G&E used the psychologist's determination as a pmtext for terminating Wells.
In other words, Wells was not terminated for engaging in protectai activities as established in Section 210 of the Enemy Recrganization Act of 1974, as amnded, or as definal at 10 CFR 50.7.
}D&E terminated Wells because of its good faith reliance on the psychologist's opinion that 9311s should not to granted unescorted access at Wolf Creek. 11ad FL&E disregarded the psychologist's opinion,10&E very likely would have been subject to an enforement action initiated by the Carmission for IG&E's failure to comply with its security plan.
The sole basis for the Secretary's finding of discrimination was the Secretary's finding that IU&E supplied " inaccurate background infonmtion" to the psychologist in advance of the psychologist's reconnandation that Wells should not be granted unescorted access at the plant. % e " inaccurate background information" was a representation by Equifax that it was unable to locate any record of Wells having attended Calhoun College. Wells has admitted that he never attended Calhoun College and never received any credits therufmn. Acconiingly, the tackgmund infonction was not
" inaccurate. " The only reasonable inferunce one could draw fmn reading the three documents prepared by Wells would be that he attended Calhoun College in 1977 and Ivreived 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> emiit in " Electrical Systom' therefmn.
If E E's actions weIn deficient, it was only to the extent that it inadvertently did not also furnish to the psychologist Wells'
" clarification" of the background infonction.
Because Wells was not terminated for raising concerns or for filing a canplaint rtgaItling his earlier termination, theru is no basis for finding that EE's tecnination of Wells msy have had potential chilling effect on the willingness of others at Wolf Creek to raise concerns about quality and compliance. During the tire in question,10&E and WCtOC have had many neans available for wployees to raise concerns, and the coupanies have provided training and other encouragamnt to all mployees to mke their concerns kncwn.
Finally, NCt0C believes that PU&E's and NCt0C's access screening programs for evaluating m ployees for unescorted access have been, and continue to be, adequate and reliable. Accordingly, the Cm mission should find that I
FG&E's actions in late 1984 and early 1985 regarding Wells were not in violation of 10 CFR 50.7.
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