ML20074A964

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 53 & 21 to Licenses DPR-70 & DPR-75,respectively
ML20074A964
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 05/05/1983
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20074A962 List:
References
NUDOCS 8305170087
Download: ML20074A964 (2)


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UNITED STATES

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

'RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 53 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 AND AMENDMENT NO. 21 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-75 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY, PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPA.4Y, DEU4ARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, AND ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATION STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 Introduction By letter dated May 4,1983, Public Service Electric and Gas Company requested a reduction in the allowable value and trip setpoint of the steam generator water level low low reactor trip on Unit 1 and Unit 2 (i.e., Table 2.2-1 of the Technical Specifications). The basis for the reduction involves:

(a) the addition of insulation to the reference leg of the level measurement instrument with an associated reduction in the level setpoint allowance for heat-up of the reference leg during accidents which increase the containment temperature, and (b) replacement of Barton level transmitter with new Rosemont transmitters, with an associated reduction in transmitter environmental error.

Discussion The setpoint allowance for reference leg heat-up for Unit 1 is to be changed from 8.65 of narrow range ins'trument span to 2% of narrow range instrument spin. The

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.value of 8.6% had been established originally based on the expected heat-up of an uninsulated reference leg during a high energy line break inside containment which relys on actuation of the low low steam generator water level trip and causes containment temperature to rise. This was in response l.

to IE Bulletin 79-21 which identified heat-up of the reference leg as a source of level'setooint error. The revised allowance of 2% is based on the heat-up of an insulated reference leg following the limiting high energy line break accident.

Insulating the reference leg results in a slower reference leg temperature rise (no reduced temperature at the time of back-up by actuation). In this case the back-up trip is the high containment pressure trip. The required setpoint allowance is less at reduced temperature. The l

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2< value has been determined by Westinghouse as appropriat) for the insulated reference leg. The Ticensee indicated in a phone conversation with the staff that all specifications regarding the insulation and identified by Westinghouse have been followed.

Insulation of the Unit 2 reference lees was previously performed in accordance with Westinghouse specifications. A 2% allowance had bee,n approved for Unit 2.

The level' transmitters were changed on the Unit 1 and Unit 2 steam henerators.

Rosemount Model 1153D transmitters have now. been install.'ed. Testing performed at Wyle Laboratories has verified that the.5% environmental error for these instrume'nts is conservative.

Suma rv The licensee has insulated the low low steam generator water level fnstrument reference leg according to specifications provided by Westinghousu. Westinghouse evaluations indicate that a.2% allowance in trip setpoint is apprcpriate for the insulated reference leg. A 2% allowance on the setpoint for Unit 2 (which has insulated reference legs) has been previously reviewed and approved.

We conclude that a 2% allowance is appropriate for the insulated reference i

leg on Unit 1 We also conclude that the.5% transmitter environmental error

. is conservative and therefore acceptable. These two error allowances reduce the low low level trip setpoints for Salem Units 1 and 2 to 8.5% with an allowable Technical Specification value of 7.5%.

Envir:. ental censideration We have ce:e mined :na: the amendments do not au.herize a change in ef'l uen :ypes or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will net result in any signific' ant enviremental impact. Having made this ce:emination, we have further concluded that the amendments inve've an a::icn' wnich is insignificant fr:m the stanc~:: int of enviremental icoact.and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an enviremental insact statement or negative ceclaration and enviren-mental im:act aceraisal need not be prepared in connection with :he issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion I

"We nave concluded, based -on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) because the amendment does-not involve a significant increase in

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the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

does.no: create the possibility of an accident of a type different from

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. any evaluated previously, and does not involve assignificant reduction in a margin of safety, the amendment does not involve a significant L

hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health r

.and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in comp 1Tance with the Comission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health.and safety of the public.

Date:

May 5,1983 g

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