ML20073S824

Final Deficiency Rept 83 Re Overpressurization of Standby Liquid Control Sys Pump B.Initially Reported on 821206. Caused by Disconnected Terminal Wire on Relay.No Sys Damage Exists.Item Not Reportable Per 10CFR50.55(e)

ML20073S824
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	05/05/1983
From:	Wells D DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, EF2-63502, NUDOCS 8305100154
Download: ML20073S824 (2)

Text

F. .

Dona!d A. Wells Metre ow N Assucce 13?37 237 % 7 1

. . Edison FMEna- i May 5, 1983 EF2-63502

, Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 2

799 Roosevelt Road ,

Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Subject:

Final Report of 10CFR50.55(e) Item on Standby Liquid Control -

Overpressurized (#83)

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This is Detroit Edison's final report involving an overpressurization prob-lem on a portion of the standby liquid control system at the Fermi 2 site.

This item was originally reported to Mr. H. Wescott's office of NRC Region III by Detroit Edison's Mr. D. Ferencz, Acting Supervisor - Construction Quality Assurance, on December 6, 1982.

This item deals with possible damage to the Standby Liquid Control System Pump B and associated camponents. The problem occurred during a preopera-tional. test when an explosive Squibb Valve (located downstream of the pump) failed to fire open, and a tmporary relief valve (used for preoperational r testing) failed to protect the system from overpressure. This caused the pump discharge pressure to exceed two thousand (2000) psig.

Initial investigation indicated that the failure of the Squibb Valve was due to a disconnected terminal wire on the relay. Further research revealed that the wire to the relay had been disconnected to replace a coil. The relay was subsequently replaced and retested, however, the wire was not reterminated. The responsible technician was under the false impression that the wires were not to be re-landed after testing. The technician has been re-instructed.

Detroit Edison Engineering has ccmpleted an evaluation of all piping and components exposed to the overpressurization. It has not been possible to 1

determine the precise pressure attained during the test, but it is not i likely that a pressure much above two thousand (2000) psig was achieved since the pump was tripped at approximately one thousand (1000) psig, as reported by the Start-Up Test Engineer. If the pressure approached three thousand (3000) psig, the test pressure gauge would have suffered perma-nent damage; three thousand (3000) psig is the maximum pressure the system could withstand with the explosive valves being the limiting ccupo-nents. The gauge was found to be in tolerance after the test, therefore, the system does not appear to have been damaged. The pump manufacturer, Union Pump, rectrimended that a check be made of the pump in operation to 8305100154 830505 PDR ADOCK 05000341 0[

i S PDR MAY 5 1983

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator May 5, 1983 Page Two EF2-63502 note any abnormal conditions (i.e. excessive noise, vibrations) .

Inspections of the pump and its internals revealed no apparent damage. The vibration data for this pump was examined both prior to the subject over-pressurization, and during testing after the overpressure incident. Exami-nation of the data showed smo differences in a point-to-point analysis, but general performance of the pump appears not to be affected. This was further verified by the Systm Test Engineer's observations of systs operation, which appeared no different than earlier observations of this systm. The pump's output capacity was also checked; it verified that the pump's flow output met design requirments.

It is therefore concluded, that no damage exists to the Standby Liquid Control Systm Pump B and associated omponents. This itm is determined to be non-reportable per 10CFR50.55(e) requirements.

If you have questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. G. M. Trahey, Assistant Director - Project Quality Assurance.

Very truly yours, b

L .

j&O 7

DAW /WEM/pn cc: Mr. Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cam 11ssion Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. B. H. Little, Senior Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission 6450 North Dixie Highway Newport, Michigan 48166