ML20073S535

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 88 to Licenses DPR-32 & DPR-37
ML20073S535
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 04/27/1983
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20073S522 List:
References
NUDOCS 8305090062
Download: ML20073S535 (2)


Text

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t SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 88 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-32 i

AND AMENDMENT NO. 88 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-37 VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 e

DOCKET NOS. 50-280 AND 50-281 I

Introduction By letter dated March 8,1983, Virginia Electric and Power Company (the licensee) proposed amendments to Operating License Nos. DPR-32 and DPR-37 for the Surry Power Station, Unit Nos.1 and 2.

The proposal will change several functional test recuirements for safety-related snubbers in the Technical Specifications.

o Discussion and Evaluation I

Eight paragraphs in the Technical Specifications are revised. Under title C. Functional Tests, paragraphs C. 2 through C 9 are rewritten to cover two aspects.

The first' one' is that representative sampling will be used for functional tests..The second one relates to the action to be taken

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after inoperable snubbers are detected.

For plants with moderate numbers of snubbers h500), a representative j

sample for each functional testing is

  • desirable as. it will provide a good cross section of the snubbers in service.

However, it will be less useful if the same snubbers which were tested in a previous representative sample are to be tested again. Paragraphs C.2.through C.5 are therefore acceptable f

'excent that a sentence to prevent the testing of the same snubbers each time p

has been added. The licensee agrees with this change.

Paragraph C.6 delin-y eates that for every inoperable snubber discovered in the test, an additional

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I sample of 10% of the total snubbers of the same ' type. which was.found to be fnoperable will be tested.

Paragraphs C.8 and C.9 state that engineering evaluation should be conducted to assess whether the cause of a snubber which 9

failed to lockup or to move is a generic one, and whether any damage has incurred on the supported components. They are consistent with the present NRC Standard Technical Specifications and are acceptable.

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. r paragraph C.7 states that for the failure of large snubbers (50 kips or more rated capacity) located in extremely difficult to move areas or in high radiation zones an evaluation is required to determine the failure mode.

If the cause of failure is determined not to be generic, the requirea u

additional 10*; of that category to be tested will be performed in the next functional test.

If the cause of failure is determined to be generic, the a

required additional test will be performed immediately This change does not change the basic NRC position that generic failures are more serious and should be remedied immediately. However, for failures which are not generic, a relaxation of the testing until the next functional test does not pose a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident since the failures are specific to the failed snubber.

The proposed paragraph is acceptable.

Based on our review of the proposed Technical Specifications, we conclude that the proposal is acceptable.

Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in pcwer level and will not result in any significant environmental impact.

Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

Conclusion r

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated,

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do not create the possibility of an accident -of a type different from C

any evaluated previously, and do not involve a significant reduction I

in a margin of safety, the amendments do not involve a significant 4

hazards consideration (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health B

and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such, activities will be conducted in compliance

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with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendments will i

not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and j

safety of the public.

b Date: April 27,1983 1.

Princip?1 Contributor:

H. Shaw I

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