ML20073J286

Forwards Pilgrim Alliance ,Restating Problems Inadequately Addressed at 821116 Public Hearing,Including Notification Problems & Fire Protection Inadequacies.Util & NRC Must Resolve Safety Questions Satisfactorily

ML20073J286
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	03/09/1983
From:	Tsongas P SENATE, ENERGY & NATURAL RESOURCES
To:	Kammerer C NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA)
Shared Package
ML20073J222	List: ML20073J286
References
NUDOCS 8304190257
Download: ML20073J286 (10)

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Room 2003F JFK Federal Building Government Center Boston, MA 02203 March 9, 1983 Mr. Carlton Kammerer Director Office of Congressional Affairs Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Kammerer:

I am writing to you again at the request of the Pilgrim Alliance, residents of Duxbury and other area communities, regarding the safety of the Pilgrim I nuclear power plant.

A member of my staff was present at the public hearing held on November 16, 1982, by the Board of Selectmen of Ply-mouth to discuss the means by which Boston Edison was comply-ing with'the NRC order for modification of Pilgrim I.

The enclosed self-explanatory letter I have received from the Alliance restates some of the problems which the local residents feel were not adequately addressed at that meeting, including the issue of several recent incidents involving notification problems and fire protection inadequacies.

As I publicly stated in January of last year, my first concern is for the safety of the residents of Massachusetts.

Both the utility and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission owe to the citizenry a full explanation and the satisfactory resolution of all safety questions.

Such cooperation is also essential to the future of the nuclear industry.

In fulfilling your purpose to assure the safe use of nuclear facilities and materials, I am certain that you will give the enclosed correspondence every appropriate consideration.

Sincerely, ODA PAUL E. TSONGAS United States Senator PET /ptt Enclosure 8304190257 830411 PDR ADOCK 05000293 U

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Ay gs January 27, 1983 f

Senator Paul Tsongas Russell Senate Office Building Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Tsongas:

On November 16, 1982, the Pilg im Alliance attended a public hearing by the Board of Selectmen at the Plymouth Town Hall. Also in attendance were representatives of the Nuclear Regulatory Connission and Boston Edison conpany.

The purpose of the hearing was to learn how Boston Edison was complying with the NRC order for modification of Boston Edison's operating license for Pilgrim I, as related to the S550,000 fine for gross mismanagement and safety violations at Pilgrim I.

In preparation for the hearing, the Pilgrim Alliance carefully scrutinized the NRC's safety inspection reports-of Boston Edison. After reviewing these reports, we were outraged that there were continuing problems unresolved and new violations had occurred. At this hearing, the Pilgrim Alliance was prepared to present a series of questions specifically pertaining to the NRC's safety reports. However, insufficient time was allowed to present these questions and the responses to questions presented were inadequate. We were told that the NRC would provide us with answers to these questions. As of this date, we have not received any response.

1. We remain concerned that the NRC is continuing to allow the plant to operate while correcting deficiencies.

2. New Yiolations dnd deficiencies continue to occur.

(Refer to enclosed material.)

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3. There are still major problems with fire protection and plant operation.

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We believe the NRC owes the people of Plymouth an immediate response to these issues. Furthermore, we demand

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rectify these problems and preven Sincerely, n.

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.lgrim Alliance Concerns (continued) kvc=ber 16, 1982 lac / Selectmen' shearing Notification Problems

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Based on Boston Edison Company's past perforcance, its poor enageant and safety practices, members of the.'ilgrim Alliance have previously expressed concern that BI;Co may not properly notify the liRC and appropriate State agencies in the event of an unusual occurence at Pilgrim I.

In reviewing the NRC repoits avaihble to us, we found four incidents in recent months that dramtice the validity of on-going concern over Idison's reliability in this area:

1) At an IRC Region I office management meeting on C-5-82, it was stated by IRC staff that uDuring the recent Traveming Incore Probe incident of June 3,1932, the lac 1:as not adequatc..ty kept infonned of opera-tions data by the comunicator located at the '.echnical Support Center,"

2) Prompt notification by telephone to the lac within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and written confirmtion on the first working day was not received for the B-1-G2 incident involving re-circuhtion pump speed problens. This was classi-fied as a Violation-Severity Level 4 (IV)

3) Prompt notification by telephone to the 120 within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> & written confimation on the first 1.orking day was not received for the 6-3-82 incident involving the failure of one of two alarm systems for a dry-nell suppression chamber systan; this was also chssified as Severity

. Level IV violation.

4) NRC operations center ics not notified within an hour of an event occuring 9-1-82 which involved an actuation of the reactor pmtection systen. This violation tas classified as Severity Level 5.

Aside from these four viohtions, we found tio other incidents which bring into question EECo's willingness to report problems at the nuclear station.

One of these cases led to the lac's criticism of the Company for failing to obtain NRC approval for changing the position of a torus dewatering valve. The lac also criticized LICo for failing to conduct a pmper safety evaluation of this pro-cedure. This infraction was discovered in May of this year.(5-17-82)

What assurances do we have that these unreliable notification practices vill not reoccur? Uhen can we expect improvements in this area?

Walls In late 1981, ten masonary walls were found to be structurally unsound and would not maintain structural stability during a seismic event, high energy pipe break, outside containment, or tornado de-pressurizat' ion. The failure of these walls would seriously impair the ability of the station to achieve safe shutdown by eliminating the redundancy of the core standby cooling system. These problems were 'due to design and construction error.

Have all of these walls been modified to insure structural stability?

If not, when will this take place?

What steps will be taken to

1) insure stability is achieved?

2) Why did it take 9 years to discover these unstable walls?

3) What action will take place to prevent recurrence?

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,4 3 sed Suppression System for Fire Protection Coverage for the Cable-

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i 11-9-81 BeCo management declared'the carbon dioxide gaseous fire extinguishing system for the cable-spreading room inoperable.

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acnt system would not be in place until late 1982.

EeCo stated to the NRC that it would initiate fire patrols, revise procedures to address interim fire fighting methodologies, and supplement training of key fire watch personnel.

Wo are concerned that such a vital fire suppression system c,ntinues to ba lacking in an area vital to safe reactor operation.

In reviewing cafety inspection reports by NBC inspector J. Johnson from 5/10/82 through 9/6/82, numerous incidents have occurred at Pilgrim I indicative of peer fire protection procedures, including violations, deviations, cud incidents inconsistent with NRC regulations.

Tho fe11 ewing incidents are classified as severity level V violations to NRC technical specification 6.8.D which requ ires written procedures i

for a fire protection program to be established, implene.nted, and naintained.

10 i) 6-24-82 fire door #153 of the radwaste control building was blocked open without permissien of the watch engineer or without establishment jl ef fire patrol

2) 6-29-82 transient combustibles were moved into the radweste and ld i control building fan reem without adequate controls.

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contains electrical cabling of safety systems A,B,Knd equipment for

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the control room efficiency air filtration system

3) 6-8-82 to 7-1-82 fire door #4 in the turbine-building was unmonitored l

by acc&ss control other incidents include:

4) 5-19-82 security force personnel assigned to fire brigade inconsistent with NRC guidelines

5) 5-24-82 security watchman posted as fire watch in auxiliary boiler reen 4

exhibited questionable level of attention I

6) 7-19-82 several 8&fetyerelated fire doors were not locked, monitored by alara, or inspected daily by the watch engineer

7) 8-18-82 a propane explosion occurred in a respirator tesy machine in the retube building

8) 8-29-82 two fire doors in auxilliary bay and turbine buildings closed inappropriately

9) 8-31-82 an operator assigned to fire watch intended to leave his area y

for another assignment without regard for his fire watch duty i

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~',W g rim Alliance Concerns (continued) v3 paye.::ber 16, 1982 IaC/ Select =en's Hearing n

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In.a report to the U.S. Congress on abnomal occurrences at the nation's

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nuclear p] ants, the lac cited a problet involving the accu:auhtion of mussels or shellfish in the cooling system pipes at Pilgrim I.

According to this report, issued in the fall of 1981, design errors and mussel buildup had made a heat ex-changer inoperable at the plant, (August 28,1981).

Can the lac please explain the significance of mussel growth in the cool-ing system? Can this growth be controlled in the future? If chlorine is to be used to reduce the mussel concentrations, what will 'be the effect of increased chlorine use on marine life outside the intake or discharge canals at Pilgrim I?

Shouldn't fishing in this canal area be restricted or banned until the effects of chlorine and other che=icals used to kill mussels are found to be safe?

We understand that a swbr pmblem has occurred at the San Onofre nuclear reactor in California. Uhat steps is the utility company taking there to reduce barnacle buildup??

Haywood Tyler Pumns A major scandal has recently surfaced in the nuclear industry regarding the use of emergency core cooling system pumps produced by the Haywood Tyler Co.

A House Subcommittee chaired by Rep. 2d l'erkey of Masstchusetts has heard sworn' testimony from fomer employees of the company who ch.rged that their employer regularly cut corners and skirted federal regulations in manufactu:dng its pro-ducts, and that the pumps could not be relied upon to perfom in a real etergency.

Are there any Haynood Tyler pumps in use at Pi3 rin I? 1.f so, la ve they 6

been tested recently to see if they're defective?

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.. t acsin ffa jP On J une 11, 1982, spent resin. was found on the 1'

1) roof of the turbine building i

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2) roof of the reactor building

3) roof of the off-gas building l

4) roof of the re-tube building I

5) and on the ground within the site controlled areaN.

Analysis of the resin was identified as Cobalt 60 with a half life of 5 years, Cesium 137, with a. half life of 30 yes s, Cesium 134, with a half life of 2.05 years and Manganese 54, with c half life of

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303 days.

The licensee believes the resin was released from the reactor building ventilation exhaust system prior to the repair of defective filters in this system in September, 1981.

Cuestion Vihy did it take EECo 10 months to discover this spent resin consisting of long-lived radionuclides?.

Eow do we know that additional $$$ $TYY Y did not occur and what was found was only part of the release?

Was the town of Plymouth notified? We'believe that local officicls should. have been notified due to the potential threat these radionuclides i.e. Cobalt 60 effects the ovaries and present to our environment, Cesium 137 effects the muscles and reproductive organs.

Vihy doesn't EECo regularly check on a frequent basis all onsite i

areas?

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