ML20072U386

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Discusses 741206 Response to IE Bulletin 74-14 Re BWR Relief Valve Discharge to Suppression Pool.Due to Recent Mods to Suppression Pool Structures,Automatic Performance of Insps Not Necessary
ML20072U386
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 04/01/1983
From: Mills L
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To: James O'Reilly
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
REF-SSINS-6820 IEB-74-14, NUDOCS 8304110296
Download: ML20072U386 (2)


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e TENNESSEEFVALLEY AUTHORITY

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$ CH ATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Stgeet Tower II AI~U

.] eno 5 April 1, 1983 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II ATTN: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

RO BULLETIN 74 BWR RELIEF VALVE DISCHARGE TO SUPRESSION POOL -

50-259, -260, -296 - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT By letter from Norman C. Moseley of U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to J. E. Watson of TVA dated November 15, 1974, we received Regulatory OperationsBulletin 74-14 regarding BWR relief valve discharge to suppression pool. A requirement of that bulletin was to conduct a visual internal and external inspection of suppression pool structure for damage after an extended safety relief valve discharge to the suppression pool. In our response to the bulletin, reference TVA letter from J. E. Gilleland to N. C. Moseley dated December 6, 1974, we committed to begin conducting the visual inspection.

Since that con:mitment was made extensive modifications have been made to the units 1, 2, and 3 suppression pool structures and to the main steam relief valve discharge lines, supports, and bracing.

Recently on Browns Ferry unit 1 we had two instances of extended relief valve discharge.

After each of the extended blowdowns a visual inspection was made of the suppression pool and main steam relief valve discharge lines, bracing, and supports. Neither of these inspections revealed any structural damages.

Based on the modifications that have been made and our inspections following the two instances of blowdowns on unit 1, we do not believe it is necessary to automatically perform a suppression pool visual inspection after each extended relief valve blowdown. These inspections will be made only if there is reason to believe that any damage may ha7e occurred because of physical evidence or the severity of the transient.

8304110296 830401

{DRADOCK05000 An Equal Oppartunity Employer

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' Mr.-James P.'O'Reilly April 1, 1983 Browns Ferry technical specification 4.7.A.2.k requires shutdown of the reactor and inspection of the suppression pool if the temperature of the pool water exceeds 1300 F during an extended relief valve blowdown. Based on the above discussion, this 3

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requirement was removed from the unit 2 specifications by amendment No. 85 to' unit 2 license No. DPR-52. We will propose removal of this same requirement from the units 1 and 3 specifications as part

of the next reload license amendment.

Untilithe technical specifications for units 1 and 3 are revised we 4

will. perform the' required inspection on those units, provided the torus temperature exceeds the 1300 F limit. The inspection will not. be performed if the torus temperature does not exceed 1300 F.

If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 858-2725.

To-the best of my knowledge, I declare'the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, ager 4

Nuclear Licensing cc:

Mr. R. J. Clark t

Browns Ferry Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7914 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 i

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