ML20072L454
| ML20072L454 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 08/24/1994 |
| From: | Kuo P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20072L457 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9408310306 | |
| Download: ML20072L454 (11) | |
Text
,ga arog UNITED STATES f.' ) Rf[,]
NUCLEA" REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20 % 0001 g...../
BALTIMORE G,AS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-317 Gl,'/ERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO.1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.192 License No. DPR-53 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated November 3, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and 1
safety of the public, and (ii) that such activitics will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, 1
and paragraph 2.C.2. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-53 is hereby amended to read as follows:
9408310306 940824 yDR ADOCK 05000317 PDR
2.
Technical Soecifications The Technicil Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.192, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION P
T. Kuo, Acting Director Project Directorate I-l Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
-Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: August 24, 1994
tY *tGb UNITED STATES (if '[r [
E 'l l '*
E NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 sy j
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BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-318 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. UNIT NO. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.169 License No. OPR-69 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (the licensee) dated November 3, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Comission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.2. of Facility Operating License No. DPR-69 is hereby amended to read as follows:
2.
Technical Soecifications
~
1 The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment Nd. 169, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O
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~
P.
T. Kuo, Acting Director Project Directorate I-l Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: August 24, 1994 4
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS ABENDMENT NO.192 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-53 AMENDMENT NO.169 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-69 DOCKET NOS. 50-317 AND 50-318 Revise Appendix A as follows:
Remove Paaes Insert Paaes 3/4 5-5 3/4 5-5 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-3 8 3/4 5-3
3/4.5 IMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)_
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) e.
At least once per REFUELING INTERVAL by:
,1.
' Verifying the Shutdown Cooling System open-pemissive interlock prevents the Shutdown Cooling System suction isolation valves from being opened with a simulated or actual RCS pressure signal of 2 309 psia.
2.
A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
3.
Verifying that a minimum total of 100 cubic feet of solid granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.
4.
Verifying that when a representative sample of 4.010.1 grams of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 3.510.1 liters of 77110 F borated water from the RWT, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to 2 6 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
f.
At least once per REFUELING INTERVAL, during shutdown, by:
1.
Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuation test signal.
2.
Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Test Signal:
a.
High-Pressure Safety Injection Pump.
b.
Low-Pressure Safety Injection Pump.
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 192
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
BASES pipe downward.
In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long tenn core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.
Portions of the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) System flowpath are common to both subsystems. This includes the LPSI flow control valve, CV-306, the flow orifice downstream of CV-306, and the four LPSI loop isolation valves. Although the portions of the flowpath are common, the system design is adequate to ensure reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI System operation following a design basis Loss of Coolant Incident prior to recirculation. The LPSI System design is consistent with the assumptions in the safety analysis.
The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to > 7.0.
The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that as a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and the subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The surveillance requirement for flow balance testing provides assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance
{
of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:
(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. Minimum HPSI flow requirements for temperatures above 365 F are based upon small break LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following an SIAS.
Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation and system leakage uncertainties. The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flow from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve leakage. The OPERABILITY of the charging pumps and the associated flow paths is assured by the Boration System 4
Specification 3/4.1.2. Specification of safety injection pump total developed head ensures pump perfomance is consistent with safety analysis assumptions.
The surveillance requirement for the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System open-pemissive interlock provides assurance that the SDC suction isolation valves are prevented from being remotely opened when the RCS pressure is at or above the SDC System design suction pressure of 350 psia.
The suction CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 192
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
BASES piping to the LPSI pumps is the SDC System component with the limiting design pressure rating.
The interlock provides assurance that double isolation of the SDC System from the RCS is preserved whenever RCS pr. essure j
is at or above the SDC System design pressure.
The 309 psia value specified for this surveillance is the actual pressurizer pressure at the instrument tap elevation for PT-103 and PT-103-1 when the SDC System suction pressure is 350 psia. The Surveillance Test Procedure for this surveillance will contain the required compensation to be applied to this value to account for instrument uncertainties.
This test is performed using a simulated RCS pressure input.
At indicated RCS temperatures of 365 F and less, HPSI injection flow is limited to less than or equal to 210 gpm except in response to excessive reactor coolant leakage. With excessive RCS leakage (LOCA), make-up requirements could exceed an HPSI flow of 210 gpm. Overpressurization is prevented by controlling other parameters, such as RCS pressure and subcooling. This provides overpre!.sure protection in the low temperature region. An analysis has been performed which shor, this flow rate is more than adequate to meet core cooling safety analysi, assumptions. HPSI pumps are not required to auto-start when the RCS is in the MPT enable condition.
The Safety Injection Tanks provide immediate injection of borated water into the core in the event of an accident, allowing adequate time for an operator to take action to start a HPSI pump.
Surveillance testing of HPSI pumps is required to ensure pump OPERABILITY.
Some surveillance testing requires that the HPSI pumps deliver flow to the RCS. To allow this testing to be done without increasing the potential for overpressurization of the RCS, either the RWT must be isolated or the HPSI pump flow must be limited to less than or equal to 210 gpm or an RCS vent greater than 2.6 square inches must be provided.
3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TANK (RWT)
The OPERABILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.
The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, r
?) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition fo11W.g mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.
The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.
e CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 192
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE C0OLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
~
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) e.
At least once per REFUELING INTERVAL by:
1.
Verifying the Shutdown Cooling System open-pemissive interlock prevents the Shutdown Cooling System suction isolation valves from being opened with a simulated or actual RCS pressure signal of 1309 psia.
2.
A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
3.
Verifying that a minimum total of 100 cubic feet of solid granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.
4.
Verifying that when a representative sample of 4.0 1 0.1 grams of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 3.510.1 liters of 77 1 10 F borated water from the RWT, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to t 6 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
f.
At least once per REFUELING INTERVAL, during shutdown, by:
1.
Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuatioa test signal.
2.
Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Test Signal:
a.
High-Pressure Safety Injection Pump.
b.
Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump.
I CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 169
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
BASES Portions of the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) System flowpath are common to both subsystems. This includes the LPSI flow control valve, CV-306, the flow orifice downstream of CV-306, and the four LPSI loop isolatiori valves. Although,the portions of the flowpath are common, the system design is adequate to ensure reliable ECCS operation due to the short period of LPSI System operation following a design basis Loss of Coolant Incident prior to recirculation. The LPSI System design is consistent with the assumptions in the safety analysis.
The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides this protection by dissolving in i
the sump water and causing its final pH to be raised to > 7.0.
The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of RWT water provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post LOCA temperatures.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and the subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. The i
surveillance requirement for flow balance testing provides assurance that
{
proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:
(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses. Minimum HPSI flow requirements for temperatures above 305 F are based upon small break LOCA calculations which credit charging pump flow following a SIAS.
Surveillance testing includes allowances for instrumentation and system leakage uncertainties. The 470 gpm requirement for minimum HPSI flu from the three lowest flow legs includes instrument uncertainties but not system check valve leakage. The OPERABILITY of the charging pumps and the associated flow paths is assured by the Boration System Specifications 3/4.1.2. Specification of safety injection pump total developed head ensures pump perfomance is consistent with safety ant. lysis assumptions.
The surveillance requirement for the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System open-pemissive interlock provides assurance that the SDC suction isolation valves are prevented from being remotely opened when the RCS pressure is at or above the SDC System design suction pressure of 350 psia.
The suction piping to the LPSI pumps is the SDC System component with the limiting design pressure rating. The interlock provides assurance that double isolation of the SDC System from the RCS is preserved whenever RCS pressure is at or above the SDC System design pressure. The 309 psia value CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 169
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
BASES specified for this surveillance is the actual pressurizer pressure at the instrument tap elevation for PT-103 and PT-103-1 when the SDC System suction pressure is 350 psia. The Surveillance Test Procedure for this surveillance will contain the required compensation to be applied to this value to account for instrument uncertainties. This test is performed using a simulated RCS pressure input.
At temperatures of 305 F and less HPSI injection flow is limited to less than or equal to 210 gpm except in response to excessive reactor coolant leakage. With excessive RCS leakage (LOCA), make-up requirements could exceed a HPSI flow of 210 gpm. Overpressurization is prevented by controlling other parameters, such as RCS pressure and subcooling. This provides overpressure protection in the low temperature region. An analysis has been perfonned which shows this flow rate is more than adequate to meet core cooling safety analysis assumptions. HPSI pumps are not required to auto-start when the RCS is in the MPT enable condition.
The Safety Injection Tanks provide imediate injection of borated water into the core in the event of an accident, allowing adequate time for an operator to take action to start an HPSI pump.
Surveillance testing of HPSI pumps is required to ensure pump operability.
Some surveillance testing requires that the HPSI punps deliver flow to the RCS.
To allow this testing to be done without increasing the potential for overpressurization of the RCS, either the RWT must be isolated or the HPSI pump flow must be limited to less than or equal to 210 gpm or an RCS vent greater than or equal to 2.6 square inches must be provided.
3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER TANK (RWT)
The OPERABILITY of the RWT as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA.
The limits on RWT minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWT and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.
The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-3 Amendment No. 169 1
.