ML20072J073
| ML20072J073 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 05/04/1981 |
| From: | Joseph Kelly BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-01, TASK-03, TASK-1, TASK-3, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290908 | |
| Download: ML20072J073 (169) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:fD r3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _x GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, : JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, C METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and : PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiffs, 80 CIV. 1683
- (R.O.)
-against-THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J. RAY McDERMOTT & CO., INC., :
Defendants. : _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x Deposition of THE BABCOCK & WILCOX
' COMPANY by JOSEPH JOHN KELLY, JR., taken by Plaintiffs oursuant to notice, at the offices of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & H aridle r ,
Esqs., 425 Park Avenue, New York, New York, on Tuesday, May 4, 1981 at 9:50 o' clock in the forenoon, before Charles Shapiro, a Certified l Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of New York. L C 830629090By g % . , PDR ADOCK PDR i T i DOYLE REPORTING. INC. CERTIFIED STENOTYPE REPORTERS 369 LexlNGTON AVENUE WALTER SHAPIRO, C.S.R. New Yong. N.Y. 10o17 CHARLES SHAPIRO. C.S.R. TELEPNoNr 212 - 867-8220 t .
1 2 ; 2 APpea rance s: 3 . 4 KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS. Attorneys for Plaintiffs (i 5 425 Park Avenue J New York, New York 6 BY: RICHARD C. SELTZER, ESQ.
- 7 -and-ANDREW MacDONALD, ESQ.,
8 - of Counsel I 9 10 . DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS. 11 Attorneys for Defendants One Chase Manhattan Plaza i . 12 New York, New York 13 BY: DANIEL F. KOLB, ESQ.
-and-j 14 PATRICIA M. VAUGHAN, ESQ.,
15 of Counsel 16 17 Also Present: ,- 13 DAVID TAYLOR (a.m. only) - 10 20 -000-(. 21 22 23 4 25
1 3 [D
\_J-2 IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED 3 by and between the attorneys for the 4 respective parties hereto that the sealing,
( 5 filing and certification of the transcript 6 of the within deposition be, and the same 7 hereby are, waived; that the transcript 8 may be signed before any Notary Public with 9 the same force and effect as if signed b'efore 10 the Court. t 11 IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED A'ND IGREED 12 that all objections, except as to the form
\~') 13 of the question, are reserved to the time 14 of trial.
15 16 -oOo-17 . 18 JO S E P.H J O HN KE L L Y, J R., 19 having been first duly sworn by the Notary 20 Public (Charles Shapiro), was examined and 21 testified as follows: 22 EXAMINATION BY MR. SELTZER: 23 g Mr. Kelly, how did you first learn f~}
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24 that a transient had taken place at Davis-Besse i 95 on September 24, 19777 l I Lm._
1 Kelly 4 i v 2 A My supervisor informed me of that transient. f 3 Q Eric Swanson? I 4 A Yes. () 5 Q Where were you when Eric told you? 6 A I was at my desk. 7 Q Did he come into your office? 8 A Well, I don't have an office. It's an open , 9 area, several desks around there when he did come 10 up to me, t I 11 Q As best as you can recall, what did 12 he say to you? 13 A Words to the effect that there had been 14 an incident at Davis-Besse and that I had been 15 requested to travel to the site to investigate 16 the sequence of events. 17 Q How soon after the September 24th . 18 transient did Eric come in and give you those 19 instructions? 20 A I don't remember. 4 21 Q What, if anything, did he tell you 22 about the nature of the transient? 23 A I don't recall. I ~ (~ ) ~ 24 Q Did he explain anything about the 25 relative degree of complexity of this transient f i I , , . . . . _ _ _ _ _ .- . . _ _ . . . _ , . , . _.
..._4
1 Kelly 5 O 2 as a way of letting you know why you were being l i 3 sent to Davis-Besse? 4 MR. KOLB: Would you read the question
, 5 back, please.
I 6 (Question read.) 7 A Not that I remember. 8 Q It's a fact, isn't it, that B&W does . 9 not have a practice of sending engineers out to
; 10 reconnoiter every simple feedwater bransient, 11 isn't that right?
12 MR. KOLB: Are you talking about the 13 practice at the time? 14 MR. SELTZER: Right. 15 A To my knowledge, that's right. 16 Q And at that time B&W didn't have a 17 practice of sending engineers out to reconnoiter ~ 18 every turbine trip transient; right? 19 A Right. 20 Q Did you understand at the time that you were being sent out to Davis-Besse that this { 21 22 was more than a simple transient that you were 23 being sent out to review?
)
v 24 A Yes. 25 Q* From what did you gather that
1 Kelly 6 2 understanding? 3 A I don't remember. 4 Q Had you ever been sent on a similar ( 5 mission before that? 6 A No. 7 Q Were you aware of other engineers in 8 your unit that had been sent on such missions? , 9 A No. 10 Q Did you go with anyone to Davis-Besse? 11 A No. 12 Q Did you take anything with you other D' 13 than clothes and a toothbrush? . 14 A Not that I remember. 15 Q You didn't take any manuals, any 16 procedures, any B&W-prepared material?
- 17. A No. , , .
18 Q How did you go? 19 MR. KOLB: Are you referring to the 20 mode of transportation? 21 MR. SELTZER: I can't. imagine what-22 else I could have been referring to. Yes. 23 A Airplane. (Oj
, 24 Q How soon after the. September 24, 1977 25 transient did you arrive atLthe Davis-Besse i
1 Kelly 7 O 2 plant? 2 3 A It was a' couple of days after the transient. 4 Q Less than a week?
-( 5 A Yes.
6 Q How long did you spend in the vicinity 7 of the Davis-Besse plant on that trip? 8 A Two full working days. . 9 Q What is a Joe Kelly full working day? 10 A Ten or 12 hours on site. ', 11 Q So you spent 10 to 12 hours on two 12 consecutive days reviewing the Davis-Besse O 13 transient? 14 A Approximately. 15 Q Let me ask you next to list in the 16 order that you can best recall the people whom 17 you met with during those two. full working days - i 18 that you spent at the Davis-Besse plant or in 19 the vicinity of the Davis-Besse plant ~ during the 1 4 20 visit you made shortly after the_ September l
. 21 transient.
22 A Well, I met with Fred Faist. , 23 Q Is that how he pronounces his last 24 name? ^ 25 A - Y e s .- Faist. 6 k .- l-
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, i-1 b' . Kelly 8
[vD i 2 Q O.K. 3 A Jack Evans, Ivan Green,. Charlie England, J 4 Terry Harpster. They are the only names I can 5 remembar. - G Q Are there other persons that you know 7 you met with but-whose names you don't recall? 8 A Yes. O
-. s 9 Q Could you describe those" individuals 10 as best you con by company affiliation, by job ,e 11 responsibility or 'otherwise?
12 A I met other members of the Toledo Edison 13 site staff. And I also met other members of the 14 B&W site staff. - e* I, - , 15 l . Q How extensiva a' ?.site, staff'did B&W 16 have at the time o f th e Davis-Be s'se transient?
~
17 A I remember meeting abouti a half a dozen. - , 18 Q Was Fred Faist th'o senior &W site 19_ representative at that time?- 20 A Yes.
/ 21 Did the other six people report to
(- ' Q 22 Fred? - 23 - MR. KOLB: - Objection as to form. ' [, 24 Q By "othhr six," I am referring to the
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L 25 - approximately half dozen ,that' yoil said were o t h e r.. -
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2 B&W site staff at the time. 3 MR. KOLB: The'same objection. 4 Q You may answer the question. ( -5 A To the best of my knowledge, yes. 6 Q What responsibilities did those other l 7 six B&W site staff people have, to the best of 8 your understanding? . 9 MR. KOLS: Objection as to form. 10 MR. SELTZER: What is th,e basis of the 11 objection, Dan? 12 MR. KOLB: I am not sure exactly O 13 there are six or even.approximately six in 14 addition to Faist. It may be that Faist 15 was part of the six. I don't ~know. 16 MR. SELTZER: Since he said 17 "approximately six," the addition or - 18 , subtraction of Fred Faist isn't going to
~c change the approximately six.
f i
- - 20 MR. KOLB
- I am not going to confine 21 my objections to the very, most material 22 items it the case. I will just object when i
, 23 the question assumes-fact.
l \( ) 24 BY MR. SELTZER: 25 Q What-were the responsibilities, as you L
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1 1 Kelly 10
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2 understood them, of the approximately six other 3 people who reported to Fred Faist? 4 MR. KOLB: Objection as to form. () 5 Q You may answer when he says that. 6 A One of them was a site secretary, the rest
. 7 were in the advice and consultation role supporting 8 the Davis-Besse start-up. ,
9 Q When you say"a site secretary," is l 10 that somebody who takes dictation ah,d does 11 typing? 12 A Yes.
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13 Q Am I correct in concluding from your 14 testimony that you believe that in addition to 15 Fred Faist, there were approximately five other 16 B&W people on the site staff who performed a 17 supporting role giving advice and consultation on - 18 start-up? 19 MR. KOLB: Are you asking hether 20 all of them, all of the remaining five gave 21 advice and consultation? 22 MR. SELTZER: Yes, I am trying to find 23 that out.
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( ). 24 THE WITNESS: Could I hear the question 25 again, please?
l 1 Kelly 11 ('h
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2 MR. SELTZER: I will restate it. 3 BY MR. SELTZER: 4 Q You said that one person was a site () 5 secretary and he or she did typing. You said 6 that the responsibilities of the others were 7 giving advice and consultation supporting 8 Davis-Besse's start-up activities. 9 Am I correct in concluding that there 10 were five people in addition to Fred Faist who 11 were giving advice and consultation in support of 12 the Davis-Besse start-up activities? 13 A Insofar as I am sure the number five is 14 correct, that's right. From my memory. 15 Q What section of the B&W organization. 4 16 were those advice and consultatien people from? 17 MR. KOLB: Objection as 'to, form. 18 A I don't know. 19 Q At that time do you know ~ f[om B&W's 20 practices what part of the company those people 21 normally would come from? 22 A Yes. 23 Q What part of the company?
) 24 A -The Nuclear Service Department.
25 Q That was Olds' department at that
1 Kelly 12 O 2 time? 3 A Yes. 4 Q What part of Nuclear Service would ( 5 they come from? 6 A Normally? 4 7 Q Yes. - 8 A Field Service. 9 Q Who was in charge of Field Service at . 10 that time? t , 11 A Bill Spangler. 12 Q At that time was there a unit within D
\ 13 Field Service from which people were normally 14 sent to perform the advice and consultation i
15 service in support of start-up activities? 4 i 16 A No, Spangler's unit is the unit that i 17 supplied start-up engineers. . l 18 Q And it's called the Field Service Unit? 19 A I don't know if that's the exact title. 20 That's the function. 21 Q Have you ever been a part of the 22 Field Service Unit? 23 A Yes. 1 24 Q Was the stint that you did at Crystal 25 River work that you did as part of the Field
~_ _ ._-. .-.
1 1 Kelly 13 2 Service Unit? l 3 A Yes. l 4 Q How many people were working with you ( 5 as B&W's site support staff during the Crystal i 6 River start-up? 7 A I don't remember. 8 Q About how many? If it varied, you 9 can give me a range. 10 A I was the first or second B&W', man to report 11 to Crystal River. . 12 The site staffing peaked at O
\- 13 approximately 15 or 20.
14 Q Other than Fred Faist, had you met 15 any of the B&W site staff who were at Davis-Besse 16 prior to your arriving at Davis-Besse? 17 A I don't remember. . 18 Q Among the five people who were working 19 as part of the site support staff and doing 20 advice and consultation work, what advice and 21 consultation roles were they fulfilling, to the 22 best of your understanding? 23 MR. KOLB: Objection as to form. 24 A I don't remember. 25 Q Do you know if any of them had
4 I 1 Kelly 14 0 2 particular jobs that distinguished what he was 3 doing from what any of the other site staff were i i 4 doing? (i 5 A Not that I can remember. 6 Q Terry Harpster was an NRC Region 3 7 representatives right? 8 MR. KOLB: Are you referring to his 9 position at the time of Mr. Kelly's visit? 10 MR. SELTZER: Yes. - 11 Q I think it would be correct for you 12 to assume that until I leave the Davis-Besse 13 event, I am talking about your recollection of 14 what was happening at or about the time of the 15 Davis-Besse transient and.your visit ~ shortly 16 after the transient, and when I use the past 17 tense "was," I mean was Terry Harpster.at that 18 time an NRC Region 3 representative, to the best
~
19 of your understanding? 20 A I remember he was an NRC representative. I 1 21 don't remember what his position was. 22 Q Do you know that Davis-Besse is in 23 what the NRC call.s Region 3? [\
'-l 24 A I don't know.
4 25 Q Do you know what region Crystal River
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1 Kelly 15 l t
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2 is in? 3 A No. 4 Q Do you know that the NRC divides the (, 5 country into regions?
- i 6 A Yes.
- 7 Q You testified in response to my last 8 question that you were aware that the NRC has 9 divided the country into regions.
10 Are you also aware thatr.the NRC has 11 employees whose area of responsibility relates 12 to specific reactors constructed within one region? 13 A I don't remember knowing that at the time, 14 no. - 15 Q Do you know that now? 16 A Yes. 17 Q Did you meet Dick Knopp Nh[en you were 18 out at Davis-Besse? 19 A I don't remember meeting Dick Kno'pp. 20 Q Do you know who he is? 21 A No. 22 Q Do you know by whom he is employed 23 or was employed at that time? 24 A I don't remember. 25 Q For whom did Jack Evans work at that i
1 Kelly 16
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2 time? 3 A Toledo Edison. 4 Q What was his role at Toledo? - ( 5 A He was the Plant Superintendent. 6 Q Terry Murray's boss at that time? 7 A Yes. 8 Q What was Terry Murray's position at 9 the time of the Davis-Besse transient? 10 A I don't know, i 11 Q Are you aware that he was Assistant 12 Plant Superintendent at the time of the Os# 13 Davis-Besse transient? 14 A I may have been. 15 Q Does that refresh your recollection 16 hearing me say that? 17 A Hearing you say the name refresh.es my mind 18 that I met him. I recognize the name as being a 19 Toledo Edison employee. 20 Q You met him during your two-day 21 visit? 22 A Yes.
.23 Q And do you believe that you may have
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24 ' known at the time that he was the Assistant 25 Plant Superintendent? 1
t-1 Kelly 17 O 2 A I may have. 3 Q Is it fair to say that at the time l . 4 you knew what his position was, even if you can't ( 5 recall today what his position was then? I 6 A Yes. 7 Q Who is Ivan Green? 8 A A B&W employee. 9 Q What was his responsibility at the ' 10 time? t 11 A He,was one of the people reporting to Fred ) 12 Faist. l 13 Q Was he one of the approximately half 14 dozen people that you said were other B&W site 15 staff? 16 A Yes. 17 Q Who is Charlie England? , 18 A The same as Ivan Green, a B&W employee 19 reporting to Fred Faist. 20 Q Did Ivan Green have any particular 21 responsibilities that you recall at the 22 Davis-Besse site? 23 A I don't recall what Ivan's responsibilities were. (a\ 24 25 ,Q Did Charlie England have any particular j b
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1 Kelly 18 7 2 responsibilities at the Davis-Besse site other 3 than the general description you have given for 4 all the site employees? ( 5 A I don't recall. 6 Q Which, if any, B&W employees were in 7 the control room during the fir.t half hour of the .
, 8 September 24, 1977 transient?
9 A I don't know. 10 Q Do you believe that anytwere? 11 A I don't recall hearing that any of them were. 12 Q The transient began sometime after O 13 7:00 p.m. on September 24th; right? l 14 A I don't remember the time.
! 15 Q Well, you've got Naval clock time I ' , 16 21:34:20;."the event started at" is your phrase 1
i 17 preceding that. . 18 Could you translate for people who
^
19 haven't been in the Navy what does 21:34:20'mean, 20 what time of-day is that? 1
- 21 A 9:30 p.m.; 9:34:20 p.m.
22 Q Does that refresh your recollection 23 that the transient began after 7:00 p.m. on ! () 24 september 24, 1977? l
. 25 A Yes.
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1 Kelly 19 2 Q Given the start-up activities that 3 were in progress on that day, do you know
! 4 whether any B&W employees were on duty at the
() 5 time of the Davis-Besse transient? 6 A No, I don't know. 7 Q From whatever knowledge you have of i' 8 B&W practice in supporting start-up activities, 9 do you believe that anybody from B&W would have i
, 10 been on duty at that time? (
11 A If they were conducting start-up testing, j 12 there would have been somebody there, yes. 13 Q Where would he have been? 14 A The normal practice would be for him to be 15 in the control room. 1 16 Q Under normal practice, would there 17 be a B&W site person assigned to each , shift 4 18 around the clock? 19 A It would depend on the phase of t'esting. I 20 Q Given the phase of. testing that
,. 21 Davis-Besse was in at the time of the September k
22 24th transient, would it have been B&W's 23 practice to have one B&W site person at least assigned to each shift? ( 24 25 A I don't recall the phase of testing that
1 Kelly 20 [\
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2 Daviu-Besse was in at the time. 3 Q They had not yet gone to full power, 4 had they? k 5 A I don't remember. 6 Q You say in the sequence of events 7 that you wrote the plant was in Mode 1 with power, 8 megawatss-thermal,-equal-to 263. 9 What is Mode 1? 10 MR. KOLB: I think if you are going 11 to refer to an exhibit, it ought to be 12 either marked or indicate -- we ought to 13 have an indication as to what it has been 14 marked before. . 15 MR. SELTZER: It hasn't been marked 16 before. It's a sequence of events 17 attached to Joe Kelly's October.24, 1977 18 memo. We are going to mark it [n a moment. 19 MR. KOLB: Why don't we ma$k it now 20 so we have the number. I take it you are' 21 going to use it to some extent. 22 MR. SELTZER: Yes. 23 BY MR. SELTZER: [b,y/') 24 ~ Q What does Mode 1 refer to? 25 MR. KOLB: Are you using the document
1 Kelly, 21 O 2 to refresh his recollection? 3 MR. SELTZER: No, I am using the words 4 " Mode 1." () 5 MR. KOLB: This is apart from the 6 document, you are just asking about the 7 term, Mode 17 8 MR. SELTZER: Right. 9 MR. KOLB: All right, you can answer 10 that. ', 11 A Mode 1 is a term used to describe the. 12 reactor's critical and above 5 percent reactor a 13 power. 14 Q Is there an upper limit on the power 15 in Mode 17 16 A It would be up to 100 percent power. 17 Q Does Mode 1 refer to a start-up and , 18 test period? 19 A No. 20 Q If a-plant has been operating for 21 five years with a full operating license and has 22 been base loaded for three of those five years, 23 is it considered in Mode 17 24 MR. KOLB: Would you read the question i ! 25 back, please? 1.- i
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1 Kelly 22
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2 (Question read.) A It could be. 3 4 Q Does a plant ever mature out of ( 5 M de 1 while it is still in commercial operation? 6 A No. No. 7 Q Do you know what the rated megawatts 8 thermal is for Davis-Besse 1? g A I don't recall. 10 Q It's a fact, isn't it, th at its rated , 11 megawatts thermal is substantially greater than 12 2637 13 A Yes. l 14 Q You have testified that you met with 15 Jack Evans, who was Plant Manager, and you met with 16 Terry Murray, who reported to Jack. 17 What other members of the. Toledo 18 Edison site staff do you recall meeting with? 19 A I don't remember any other indiv[ duals. 20 Q Is it correct that you believe that 21 you did meet with other individuals? 22 A Yes. 23 Q From the Toledo Edison site staff? [)\ (_ 24 A Yes. 25 Q Is it. correct that you met with plant
l i 1 Kelly 23 ("% 2 operators who were on duty during the event of 3 September 24, 19777 4 A I attended a meeting at which they were () 5 present, yes. 6 Q Do you believe thAt at that meeting 7 all of the operators who were on duty during that g event on the evening of September 24 were present , 9 at the meeting? 10 A I don't remember. L 11 Q There were several operators at the 12 meeting? ~ 13 MR. KOLB: We probably better define 14 "several." 15 Q More than two? J 16 A I don't remember. 17 . Q What is your best recollection? - 18 A I can't picture any faces nor names. I 19 just can't remember how many of them were there. 20 Q This was during the two full working 21 days that you spent in the vicinity of Davis-22 Besse; right? 23 A Yes. 24 Q Where was the meeting with the plant 25 operators?
i l i i Kelly 24 i'~h i
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2 MR. KOLB: This is the meeting where l 3 he recalls that operators were present? 4 MR. SELTZER: I think I just said, 5 where was the meeting with the plant 6 operators? 7 MR. KOLB: You had been questioning 3 about that. I am not sure you put the , g question just that way. 10 MR. SELTZER: I did, t 11 MR. KOLB: Let's just get it clear, 12 are we talking about the meeting that he 13 recalls the operators were present at, is 14 that correct? 15 BY MR. SELTZER: 16 Q Where was the meeting that you 17 attended with the plant operators? . - 18 A In an office in the administration building 19 at Toledo Edison on site. I 20 Q You took notes at that meeting, didn't o1 you? (. 22 A Yes. , 23 Q Who else was present at that meeting [ s_ n4
- - besides you and some of the operators? Fred?
25 A Fred was there. I remember Fred.being there.
f l 1 Kelly 25 ' s 1 . (_) Q Fred Faist, right? 2 A Yes. 3 4 Jack Evans was there.
<I 5 I don't remember anyone else.
6 Q Other than the operators, right? 7 A I don't remember any individual names, 8 correct. . 9 Q . Approximately how many people, total, 1 10 were at that meeting? E 11 MR. KOLB: Including Mr. Kelly himself? 12 MR. SELTZER: No, not including Mr. O 13 Kelly. 14 A Fifteen. 15 Q How long did the meeting last? 4 16 A I don't remember. 17 Q Was it in the morning, the afternoon, - 18 evening, the graveyard shift?
, 19 A It was during daylight hours.
20 Q Was an attendance list passed around 21 at that meeting? 22 A I don't recall. 23 Q since I don't know you very well, I () 24 don't know how talkative you are. 25 Was this a meeting at which you
1 Kelly 26 q
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2 Participated in the conversation? A No. 3 4 Q You contributed nothing to the meeting? 5 A Not that I remember. 6 Q You just sat there taking notes? 7 A Yes. ' 8 Q Was Terry Murray there? , 9 A I don't recall. 10 Q Was Terry Harpster there? , 11 A I don't recall. 12 Q Do you believe any representatives of [~h
\~/ 13 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission were there?
14 A I just can't remember any other f aces in i 15 that crowd. 16 Q Other than you and Fred, is it your 17 recollection that there were other-B&W site . 18 personnel at that meeting? 19 -A I don't remember. 20 MR. SELTZER: I would like to have i , 21 marked as GPU Exhibit 148 five pages 22 belatedly produced by counsel for your 23 company, numbered T10764 through 10768.
/"N (s,_/) 94- (Five-page document, Nos. T10764 25 through T10768, was marked GPU Exhibit 148
1 Kelly 27 (v~1 2 f r. identification, as of this date.) 3 Q Is GUP Exhibit 148 a copy of pages i 4 produced from files that you keep? 5 MR. KOLB: Again you are referring 6 to personal files, files in his immediate 7 office, that type of thing, or just general 8 files? _ g MR. SELTZER: Files that he keeps, 1 i' 10 unrestricted as to whether he,, hides t them 11 under his mattress at home, keeps them 12 under the desk drawers or near his O 13 secretary, I don't care. 14 MR. KOLB: Do you mean to extend those 15 to company files beyond those that he 16 immediately keeps? 17 MR. SELTZER: I don'.t want to be too - 18 restrictive. 19 BY MR. SELTZER: 20 Q In any sense you keep files, is GPU 21 148 taken from files that you keep? , 22 A Yes. 1 23 Q From what file did this exhibit come? 24 A In my desk where I work, I keep manila 25 folders where I file things that are -- that I I
1 Kelly 28 2 want to keep. One of them was labeled -- I don't 3 remember the exact words, but it was something 4 like " Davis-Besse Transient" with a manila folder 5 with this in it. 6 Q Had you previously reviewed the 7 contents of that manila folder or file prior to g last week for purposes of delivering documents . 9 for production in this lawsuit? 1 10 A Yes. 4 11 Q When for the first time did you review 12 the contents of that manila -- did you call it O 13 folder or file? 14 A Folder. 15 Q When prior to last week did you review 16 that manila folder for purposes of producing all 17 or part of its contents in this lawsuit? - 18 A Late last year. 19 Q Had you identified the five pages 20 which are GPU Exhibit 148 late last year as 21 pages that should be produced in this lawsuit? 22 A No. , 23 Q Could you explain why it is that you A t 24 passed over these pages when you reviewed your 25 folder late last year?
1 Kelly 29 (/ 2 A I think I am confused about what " produced" 3 means. I don't know what the word means in the 4 context you are using it. ( 5 Q It means given to the people who are 6 suing your company. The document is produced 7 when your company turns it over to the company 8 that is suing your company, and I am asking you g questions about did you review your files for - 10 purposes of seeing what in the files should be 11 eventually produced or considered for production 12 in the lawsuit?
- 13 Now, you have told me that you reviewed 14 it late last year and that these five pages 15 were not among the pages that you took out of d
16 the folder and suggested to somebody these 17 should be produced. Is that a correct. summary of 18 your prior testimony? 19 MR. KOLB: Is the question whether 20 that's what he said before or is the ( og
- question whether or not that is correct, 22 now that he understands it was produced?
23 MR. SELTZER: I don't care. c
/ 24 A Late last year I delivered the whole file 25 to my counsel, including these.
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1 Kelly 30 I
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2 Q Did you do any reviewing of the 3 contents of the file late last year to determine 4 what should be turned over to the people who 5- are suing Babcock & Wilcox? 6 MR. KOLB: Would you just read the-7 question again, please. 8 Q The question is, late last year, Joe, 9 did you look through the file to see what parts 10 of it or whether all of it should bd, turned over 11 to the company that is suing Babcock & Wilcox? 12 A No. O 13 Q Was the file returned to you sometime 14 between late last year and last week? 15 A No. 16 Q Do you know how it is that we came 17 to receive these five pages just a few-days ago? 18 A No. 19 Q Did you play any role in rAviewing
- 20 . the contents of your file within the last week 21 to see what should be produced?
22 A We are still talking about that single 23 manila folder with that Davis-Besse information , l (~)N (_ 24 in it? l l 25 Q Exactly. '
1_ Kelly 31
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D}. 2 A No. 3 Q Do you know whether all of the 4 documents in that file have now been turned over (, E 5 to the company that is suing Babcock & Wilcox? 6 A I don't know. 7 Q ,You don't know whether even today 8 I've got all of the files, is that right? , 9 A I don't know. 10 Q Do you have any other fi,les that you 11 keep that relate in any way to the Davis-Besse 12 transient?
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13 A Yes. 14 Q What other files? 15 A I can remember information in my 16 chronological file which is a file kept by our 17 secretaries of everything I write. . - 18 Q Is there any other file that you keep 19 that would have material that relates'5r refers 20 in any way to the Davis-Besse september 1977 21 transient? 22 A I have copies of previous testimony that I 23 have given to various commissions that have b) ( 24 investigated Three Mile Island and talked about i 25 Davis-Besse in those, i
r i Kelly 32
,O \q l.
I 2 Q Do you have any other files that 3 contain anything that relates or refers in any
, 4 way to the Davis-Besse September transient?
I 5 A Not that I recall. 6 Q You said that the secretary or 7 secretaries that do typing for your part of the g company keep a chronological file of everything , g that they type for you, is that right? 10 A 'es. Y t 11 Q Do they keep a separate chronological 12 file for you? O l 13 A Yes. 14 Q Do you have any knowledge as to 15 whether that Joe Kelly chronological file was 16 turned over for production in this litigation? 17 MR. KOLB: Can I just for . - 18 clarification, is it a Joe Kelly file or 19 is it a chronological file, a chron for 20 m re than one person? 21 MR. SELTZER: He just said they keep 22 one for him. 23 THE WITNESS: They keep'one for 24 every individual. . 25 MR. KOLB: So we are just talking
d 1 Kelly 33 2 about that portion which is kept for him? 3 MR. SELTZER: .That's all I am asking 4 4 him. 5 MR. KOLB: 0.K. 6 BY MR. SELTZER: 7 Q Was the Joe Kelly chronological file 8 turned over for production to the people that are , 9 suing B&W? . 10 A I don't know. t 11 MR. SELTZER: Dan, do you know? We 12 don't think we have seen that. O 13 MR. KOLB: I will have to check. I 14 don't know from my own personal knowledge. 15 MR. SELTZER: Does your associate 16 know? 17 MR. KOLB Let me see. . . 18 We will have to check on the particular 19 file.. We do,think that all the appropriate i ! 20 files have been examined, but in terms of 21 answering you as to a specific file, we will ( 22 have to check and make double sure before 23 we made any representations. I (~\ 4 (_) 24 MR. SELTZER: O '. K . Could that be done 25 _today?
f 1 Kelly 34 2 MR. KOLB: We will do it as promptly 3 as we can by calling the people who have 4 done that work.
,( 5 MR. SELTZER: All right, because what 6 I would like to propose is, I don't want to 7 protract Joe Kelly's deposition. In fact, 8 I have amtitions of finishing it more ,
9 promptly than I have finished any deposition 10 so far in this case. 1 11 , If such a file exists and can be 12 . air expressed up here, I will pay personally O 13 for it to be shipped here fast so that we 14 could review it tonight and ask questions 15 n it tomorrow, if it has not previously 16 been produced. 17 MR. KOLB: Our objective was also in 18 these last weeks to review everything we 19 could to be certain you did have ' everything , 20 for the same purpose, not protracting the 21 , deposition, and also to have you get 22 everything you are entitled to. .If we 23 missed anything, we will make every () 24 possible effort to get it up.here in time. 25 MR. SELTZER: All right. I appreciate
1 Kelly 35
'C)' '
2 that. 3 I als appreciate the fact that 4 neither of the people who are sitting next 5 to the witness can today represent that this 6 Particular file was produced, which raises 7 some question about whether it was produced. g MR. KOLB: Well, I wouldn't draw _ 9 any conclusions-from that. We have lots of 10 lawyers working on these probiems. .Mrs. 11 Vaughan and I have not'gone personally fg 12 to search all the files.
\ ^~
13 BY MR. SELTZER: g4 Q You say that you have a file with 15 copies of transcripts of the appearances that you 16 have made before various' commissions investigating 17 the Three Mile Island accident; right?- - 18 A Yes. 19 Q I believe that you have testified, 20 .and I would like you to verify that you have 21 testified before the staff of the Kemeny 22 Commission, the full Kemeny Commission, and the 23 staff of the Rogovin group or the NRC special fs l ()si 24 inquiry, is that right? l 25 A Yes.
O u) y, 4 x =
,y a ,a- ,_
i
.; ~-
1 Kelly , 36 i : .
?
~
~ 2 .i Q Have you given any other sworn 3
testimony beiore anybody- else investigating the 4 Three Milir 'IslInd accident? 5 A Yes. 6 Q Who, or what'? 7 A Mr.-Creswell and Mr. Shackelton repr'esenting, g I believe, the NRC. 9 Q Was there a. stenographer taking down 10 the words that you were saying at the time you s , 11 were testifying before them? 12 A It was tape recorded and later transcribed.
- On 13 Q Do you have a copy of that transcript? . ,
, 14 A Y"S*
15 Q Do you know whether that was produced-16 in this lawsuit? - 17 A I don't know. . . 18 MR. SELTZER: I don't believe~we - ' 19 have seen a copy of that'. .Could'we ask
~
20 for'a copy of that, too? og MR. KOLB: We will check on that., too. C 22 although I am' surprised you don't'know 23 , about that.. We will check. 1
-- f3 MR. SELTZER: I am surprised I don't
) 24 25 [ know about it,'too, and that's why I. sense j 'h- .j h
s,
;< f;_ 3l._
1 Kelly 37 (D V 2 we didn't receive a copy from you, Dan. 3 MR. KOLB: Maybe you didn't look hard 4 enough. 5 MR. SELTZER: We looked very hard. 6 MR. KOLB: There are lots of documents 7 here. g MR. SELTZER: I wouldn't have , 9 slept if I had known that that existed 10 and I hadn't seen it. ! 11 BY MR. SELTZER: 12 Q When you testified before creswell
/es N_)\
~
13 and his friend from the NRC, were you sworn to 14 tell the truth? 15 A Yes. 16 Q Have you given any other testimony 17 relating to the Three Mile Island accident? - 18 A No. 19 Q Have you ever appeared bef re an ACRS 20 e mmittee or subcommittee to testify about ( 21 or discuss the Three Mile Island events? 22 A Not that I remember, 23 Q Did you review the transcripts of your
/'N i ) sworn testimony for accuracy?
24 25 A .Yes.
1 Kelly 38 i J. 2 Q Each time you testified you were 3 sworn to tell the truth and the whole truth, is 4 that right? ( 5 A Yes. 6 Q Do you believe that the testimony 7 was truthful at the time you were giving it? 8 A Yes. . 9 Q At the time that your sworn testimony 10 was given, do you believe that you kere 11 testifying then to the best of your recollection? 12 A Yes. - 13 Q In the copies of your testimony that 14 you have maintained, have you made any notes 15 either on the copy or on sheets that you keep i with your copies? 16 .; -17 A Not that I recall. - - 18 Q When you read things, do you normally i; make marks in the margin'or underlining? 20 A No. ( 21 Q When is the last time that you reread 22 all or any part of the testimony that you have 23 previously'given in regard to the Three Mile fu/ 24 Island accident? 25 A Two weeks ago.
-i
__ . - . . . _ _ _ . - - - _ .. . -- - -, -=-
1 Kelly 39 (~ . V) ' 2 Q Were you asked by counsel to review 3 all or any part of the transcript? i 4 MR. KOLB: I will not allow you to i 5 find out what counsel asked him to do. 6 Q Which testimony did you reread? 7 A All of it. 8 MR. KOLS: Mr. Kelly, I think, can 9 amplify a bit on his previous testimony 10 about the testimony he has read, just so 11 you have as full a picture as is required 12 by the way you put your question. 13 .Mr . Kelly? 14 Q Do you want to correct something that 15 you testified to previously? 16 MR. KOLB: I do not mean to suggest
. 17 it's a correction. I would put it more-as 18 an amplification.
19 A Apparently you asked if I reread all or 20 part of my previous testimony and I only heard (L. 21 the "all" part of that question. 22 Just last week I have reread parts 23 o f my testimony. O'N_) 24 Q So that two weeks ago you read the 25 -whole thing from cover to cover in each session
1 Kelly 40
-~\
l \ \x / ' 2 that you previously testified and last week you 3 reread parts of it? 4 A Yes. 5 Q In any of those rereadings did you 6 find portions which contained inaccuracies? 7 A Not that I remember. 8 Q Is it your belief that what you 9 testified to in those depositions is still accurate? 10 MR. KOLB: When you say," accurate" -- 11 Q Accurate to the best of your
3 Q You reviewed what you testified to ' l 4 John Kemeny's Commissioners; right? 5 A Yes. 1 i 6 Q And so you reviewed what we have ! 7 now designated as Exhibit 149; right? ! 8 (Continued on page 47.) s t 9 1 l 10 t ! f
! 11 i
i 12 13 l i 14 j- 15 -
- i l
16 , b
; 17 .
i F 18 19 2 20 22 r 23 25 h 1
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I Kelly 47 1 MR. KOLB: As far as he'can tell, is O\ 2 that the question? 3 MR. SELTZER: Yes. 4 A Yes. 5 MR. KOLB: My reason for interjecting 6 is only obviously we are not going to sit 7 here and read every word and check it. I 8 don't think that is at all necessary. 9 MR. SELTZER: No. t 10 Q Chairman Kemeny posed a. question to 11 you in the middle of page 46 and in.line 9 he 12 begins, " Simply the following factual question:"-- 0 13 do you see where I am reading? f 14 A Yes. 15 Q --
"your memorandum of November 1 has 16 certain suggested procedures on HPI termination.
17 Suppose those had been followed at TMr II? 18 Would that have made a substantial difference in 19 the course of the accident?" 20 "MR. KELLY: The question is if they 21 were to follow these instructions -- 22 " CHAIRMAN KEMENY: Yes. 23 "MR. KELLY: -- yes, that would have O). (_ 24 made a difference, I believe. 25 " CHAIRMAN KEMENY: A favorable
1 Kelly 48
. 2 difference?
3 "MR. KELLY: Yes. 4 " CHAIRMAN KEMENY: A quite substantial
) 5 one?
6 "MR. KELLY: Yes." 7 Were you asked those questions and did 8 you giv'e those answers? 9 A Yes. 10 Q The November 1 me mo r a nd u,,m refers to 11 the memo which you wrote on November 1, 1977; 12 right? O O 13 MR. KOLB: Why don't we get that memo 14 out? I believe it's been marked. 15 Q You wrote a memo on November 1, 1977; e 16 right? 17 A Yes. . 18 Q It is very clear in your mind what 19 memo is referred to here, right, in Kemeny's 20 question to you? o1 A Yes. C. 22 Q Let me show you what's previously 23 been marked as GPU Exhibit 76, which is J. J. ( 24 Kelly's famous memo to Distribution November 1, 25 1977, subject: Customer Guidance on High
1 Kelly 49 l <-) Pressure Injection Operation." 2 3 Mr. Kelly, what I am showing you 4 has previously been marked GPU Exhibit 76. Is 5 this a copy of the November 1 memorandum which 6 you understood the Ch' airman of the Kemeny 7 Commission was referring to? 8 A Yes-. 9 Q In that memorandum you have certain 10 suggested procedures on high pressure injection 11 termination, is that right? 12 A Yes. O 13 Q Those are the two guidelines 14 sublettered (a) and (b) at the bottom'of the 15 memorandum? 4 ., 16 A Yes. ,
. 17 Q And you understood that Chairman 18 Kemeny was asking you whether'it would have made 19 a substantial difference in the course of the 20 Three Mile Island accident if those procedures 21 suggested by you had been followed by the operators 22 at the Three Mile Island plant?-
23 A Yes.- O () r 24 Q You were asked by Mr. Kemeny, the 25 President of Dartmouth College, the Chairman of
-t i
1 Kelly 50 l 2 the Commission, whether following those 3 procedures at Three Mile Island would have made ) 4 a favorable difference in-the course of the 5 Three Mile Island accident, right? 6 A Right. 7 Q You told the Commissioners that you 8 believed it would have made a favorable . 9 difference, is that right? 10 A Yes. t 11 Q What did you mean by your testimony 12 that it would-have made a favorable difference?
}<'%
13 A If the operators would have followed
- 14 subparagraph b in my memorandum of 1 November 1977, 15 they would not have stopped high pressure injection 16 and core uncovery would not have occurred.
i 17 Q If there had been no core.uncovery,. 18- there would not have been the calamity that is 19 now referred to as the Three Mile Island 20 accident, is that correct? 21 A I believe so, yes. L" 22 , Q And that'sLwhy you said it'would make 23 a quite substantial differences right?. , 1 r~N- I
- g. 24 A Yes. '
25 Q In other words, what we know as the i
- ,s_,_ ,- _- . . . . - . - , - - - - . - --
w- - -- + -- < *- --- 4-- + " - - - - ' --
1 1 Kelly 51 2 Three Mile Island accident would not have taken 3 place if the operators at Three Mile Island had 4 followed the procedures which you have ( 5 rec'ommended in your November 1, 1977 memorandum, 6 is that right? 7 MR. KOLB: You are not asking him i 8 whether there would have been an accident 9 . at all, I take it. 10 MR. SELTZER: Whether wh,at is known 11 as the Three Mile Island accident would 12 have happened. . 13 MR. KOLB: Just as it was. 14 MR. SELTZER: In all its terrible 15 ramifications. 16 A I have lost the language of the question. . 17 Q I don't blame you. . t 18 If your recommendations had been i
~
. 19 followed as you have outlined them in your 20 November 1, 1977 memorandum, GPU Exhibit 76, the 21 Three Mile Island accident as it took place on { 22 March 28, 1979 would not have taken place, isn't 23 that right? , l 24 MR. KOLB: Wait.a second. You 25 changed the question. Up to now the
- - - , - ~i
1 Kelly 52 v 2 question has been if the operators at Three 3 Mile Island had followed the procedures or 4 guidelines that Mr. Kelly suggested, what 5 would have happened, that's what you have 6 been questioning about. Now you have 7 changed it to whether or not the Three Mile 8 Island accident would have occurred if his g recommendations had been followed, and that's 10 a different question. If you',mean to 11 dissociate that question from the operators
-- 12 following it, that's quite different. \
13 MR. SELTZER: What's the difference? 14 MR. KOLB The difference'is, you 15 are focusing on more people than the 4 16 operators and in your prior questions and 17 in the questions before the Kemeny 18 Commission, the assumption was that the 19 operators actually elected to follow the 20 procedures. ( 21 There are a lot of things that 22 intervened between the operators possibly 23 following the procedures and Mr. Kelly's [/h
\ 24 recommendation.
25 So you just have to ask the questions
l l
! I Kelly 53 O '
2l as you were and everything is fine,
; 3 because you are talking about the testimony i
4 as he gave it. 5 MR. SELTZER: You must be a r 6 metaphysician. I can't follow those fine 7 distinctions, i 8 MR. KOLB: The difference will be f l 9 of some significance, I suspect, but as far I ( 10 as I was concerned, you were asking 11 perfectly fair questions when you put it 12 the way you did earlier, so I am sure you 13 can ask it that way again. 14 BY MR. SELTZER: 15 Q Chairman Kemeny says, "your memorandum 16 of November 1 has certain suggested procedures 17 on HPI termination. Suppose those had been 18 followed at TMI II?" He doesn't say "who is i 19 going to follow." he says " suppose they had been - 1 20 followed at TMI II," and I take it you understood ( 21 him to be asking, " suppose.they had been:followed 22 on March 28, 1979," right? 23 A Yes. 10 (,) . 24 MR. KOLB: By the operators. 25 Q Now --
1 Kelly 54 O U 2 MR. KOLB: That is right, by the 3 perators? 4 THE WITNESS: Yes. 5 Q If those recommendations had been 6 followed at Three Mile Island Unit II on March I 7 28, 1979, the Three Mile Island accident with core g uncovery, melting of fuel and a shutdown of the 9 plant for every day since then wouldn't have 10 taken place, would it? . 11 MR. KOLB: If they had been followed 12 by the operators. 13 A That's right. 14 Q Have you ever discussed that 15 conclusion that you have reached with anybody 16 other than the Kemeny Commission? 17 MR. KOLB: I take it you don't mean 18 to ask about conversations with counsel. 19 RM R . SELTZER: No, that's sacrosanct 20 and I would never ask you what you said to l' 21 counsel, to any spouse or to any religious
\.
22 leader. . 23 MR. KOLB: Do you have the question 24 in mind? 25 THE WITNESS: No. I
1 Kelly 55 2 BY MR. SELTZER: 3 Q The question is, you reached a 4 conclusion that you have stated to the Kemeny 5 Commission and you repeated it here, namely, that 6 the accident wouldn't have ocettrred if the 7 operators had had and had followed your 8 guidelines. - 9 Have you ever discussed th*at l I l 10 conclusion with anyone else? , l 11 MR. KOLB: He didn't say "had had and 12 had followed the guidelines." He said O 13 "had followed the guidelines." That's 14 different. l l l ' L 15 So why don't you ask the question 16 about his prior testimony and not 17 characterize the prior testimony. 18 To the best'of your knowledge, Q 19 Babcock & Wilcox never. disseminated the guidelines 20 that you stated in your November 1, 1977 21 memorandum prior to the Three Mile Island accident, { 22 did they? 23 MR. KOLS: What do you mean by 24 " disseminate"? 25 Q Let me refer you to testimony that
1 Kelly 56 O\ V 2 you gave on July 7, 1979 in a deposition taken 3 by the staff of the President's Commission on 4 Three Mile Island, and I would like to have you ( 5 take a look at testimony of Babcock & Wilcox by 6 J. J. Kelly, Jr. taken at the Old Forest Road 7 headquarters of B&W on July 7, 1979. 8 Would you turn to page 44, please. , 9 MR. KOLB: I take it we will also 10 mark this in due course? t 11 MR. SELTZER: Only at your request. 12 MR. KOLB: I think it's best to mark (~ . 13 it. 14 MR. SELTZER: I said I will do it. t 15 MR. KOLB: At least those portions 16 that are involved. 17 BY MR. SELTZER: . 18 Q Is what counsel is showing you part I 10 of the testimony which you gave under Nath to the 20 staff of the President's Commission on the Three 21 Mile Island accident? 33 A Yes. 23 Q And is this part of what you have l ([) 24 reread within the last two weeks? 25 A Yes. . f.
1 Kelly 57 2 Q Would you look at the question that 3 begins at line 17 with the words "To the best of 4 your knowledge." Do you see that? l k 5 A Yes. 6 Q You were asked there, "To the best j 7 of,your knowledge, was the substance of either 8 your memo or Bert Dunn's memos communicated to the . 9 operating utilities using B&W's NSSS systems before March 28, 1979. , ( 10 11 " Answer: No. 12 " Question: To the best of your
-O 13 knowledge, was information about those concerns 14 conveyed to the NRC before March 28, 1979? I 15 " Answer: No, not to my knowledge."
16 Were you asked those questions and 17 did you give those answers? - 18 A Yes. 19 Q And I take it from your prior 20 testimony today you believe those answers were 21 accurate at the time you gave them? 22 A Yes. 23 Q And you still believe they were 24 accurate, right? 25 A Yes.
1 Kelly 58 O 2 Q So to the best of your knowledge, 3 B&W had not communicated to operating utilities 4 using B&W NSSS systems the substance of your i 5 November 1, 1977 memo prior to the Three Mile 6 Island accident, is that right? 7 A Yes. 8 Q Yes, they had not? The "yes" is , 9 ambiguous, that's why I am asking you that. 10 A Yes, they had not, to the best,of my 11 knowledge, transmitted the substance of my memo 12 or Bert Dunn's memo before the Three Mile Island 4 ' O 13 accident. 14 MR. KOLB: Do you want to give this an 15 exhibit number? Just beIore we leave it. 16 MR. SELTZER: Fine. We will mark 17 as GPU Exhibit 150 for identification both 18 days of Mr. Kelly's testimony before the 1 - 19 Kemeny Commission staff July 7 and July 13, 20 1979-21 (Transcripts of Mr. Kelly's testimony 22 before the Kemeny Commission staff, July 7 23 and July 13, 1979, were marked GPU Exhibit () 24 150 for identification,~as of this date.) 25 MR. KOLB: Off the record. i
1 Kelly 59 O 2 (Discussion off the record.) 3 BY MR. SELTZER:
)
4 Q Am I correct that your deposition 5 before the Kemeny staff included one face-to face 6 session and one session that was conducted over 7 the telephone? 8 A Yes. . 9 ,Q The July 7 was face to face and the 10 subsequent session on July 13 was oker the a 11 telephone? 12 A Yes. 13 Q Let me just get the ans,wer to the 14 question that caused me to go to the deposition 15 testimony. 16 Other than the testimony you have 17 given today and the testimony that you gave .I 18 before the full Kemeny Commission, have you ever 19 discussed with anybody else your concl$sion that 20 the Three Mile Island accident would not have 21 happened if the operators had had the substance 22 of your memo and had followed the guidelines 23 in your memo? p) i 34 MR. KOLB: Objection as to form, 25 because you are putting something in there 9
1 Kelly 60 b("% 2 he hasn't testified to. 3 MR. SELTZER: What am I putting in 4 there? fI 5 MR. KOLB: You are saying if he had 6 these. prescriptions, that the accident 7 wouldn't have occurred and the testimony up 8 to'now was as to whether they would have 9 followed the p'rescription. 10 MR. SELTZER: I think you are not
,11 listening as carefully as you might to my 12 question, because there was a conjunction.
O 13 I said "had the memo been followed." 14 MR. KOLB: I listened very carefully. i 15 I noticed the conjunction was there and I
, 16 noticed this went beyond what he said 17 precisely, and because of the potential
, 18 significance of all this, I think it is 19 important to remain precise.
20 If y u are g ing to characterize his ( 91 22 testimony, it seems you have to do it accurately. You should ask the question 23 with the background of his testimony as it r -(' 24 is stated on the record. 25
,yv. e -m:9
1 Kelly 61 2 BY MR. SELTZER: 3 Q Y u previ usly testified that to the 4 best of your knowledge B&W had never communicated ( 5_ the substance of your memo before the Three Mile 6 Island accident. You have also testified that 7 if the operators had followed the guid,elines in 8 your memo, the Three Mile Island accident 9 wouldn't have occurred. 10 Have you ever discussed'with anybody 11 else your conclusion that the Three Mile Island 12 accident wouldn't have happened if the operators O 13 had followed your November 1, 1977 guidelines? 14 A I don't recall such a conversation. 15 Q Do you mean that the interchange 16 that you had with Kemeny and his full Commission 17 on July 18, 1979 and the discussion that you are 18 having with me today are the only two times in 19 the history of the world that you have voiced l 20 that conclusion? iL' 21 MR. KOLB: Again we are all talking 22 about this apart from counsel? 23 MR. SELTZER: Right. () 24 MR. KOLB: And so on. 25 Q I really want you to search your
t i Kelly 62 2 memory and let me know, even if you believe that 3 you had the conversation and you can't place with s 4 whom it was, I would like to know that you believe 5 you had such a conversation. 6 A The conversation where I said that if they 7 had followed my prescription, it wouldn't have 8 happened? I just don't remember that. , 9 Q Do you believe that you were ever 10 in a conversation where that subject was 11 discussed? 12 MR. KOLB: When you say "that O 13 subject," are you talking about that 14 specific conclusion or statement? i 15 MR. SELTZER: Right, but I am not 16 limiting the speaker to Mr. Kelly.. 17 Anybody else in the conve rs ation 18 might have come up with the sta[ement and 19 you will still be a participant in the 20 conversation, so I am asking, in any (, 21 conversation where you participated, did the 22 subject come up of had the operators 23 followed Mr. Kelly's guidelines, the Three D) 4%- 24 Mile accident wouldn't have taken place. 25 MR. KOLB: We are not just talking i-.
l l 1 Kelly e 63
\J.
2 about conversations concerning Three Mile t 3 Island and the events; we are talking about 4 that specific conclusion or those words in 5 substance, am'I right? c 6 , MR..SELIZER: I am struggling to try 7 and be as articulate as I can, Dan, and I 8 thought I phrased it exactly the way you , 9 honed it. 3 2 10 MR. KOLB: If we are on' the same wave 11 length, you will have no trouble in
- 12 acknowledging I am correct. \_) -
13 MR. SELTZER: Every time you state it,
; 14 it becomes your words and some wa'f 2 a 1 -
15 little bit different. 16 Let's just hear Charlie Shapiro, who f 17 is good at rephrasing my questions exactly
- 18 as I said them". restate it.
19 (Questio'n read.) 20 MR. KCLB: As reread, you defined the 21 " subject," and you have indicated that 22 you are not confining it to any conversation t 23 in which Mr. Kelly alone made such a n
'y ,) 24 statement,)7oujwant anybody if they made it?
\'
< 25 MR. tiELTZER . Right.
, v i'
1 Kelly 64 O (_) 2 MR. KOLB: And that's what I 3 understand and the only thing I am trying 4 to make sure of, we are not talking about 5 the subject broadly of Three Mile Island 6 or the events, but we are talking about 7 that conclusion as you defined it in your
~
8 own words in the question? . 9 MR. SELTZER: Let me put your and 10 Mr. Kelly's minds at rest. I 11 BY MR. SELTZER: . _, 12 Q Before we finish asking you 13 questions, we will have found out about every 14 conversation in which you have rehashed 15 the events of March 28, 1979, but today, right 16 now, I just want to find out, did you ever have 17 a conversation with anyone in which anybody 18 discussed, had the operators followed the 19 guidelines that you have set forth inhourNovember 20 1 memorandum, GPU Exhibit 76, the accident 21 wouldn't have happened? 22 , A I don't remember a conversation like that. 23 MR. SELTZER: Let's take a recess. fh (_,) 24 (Recess taken.) 25 i.
1 Kelly 65 O BY MR. SELTZER:
, 2 3 Q Have you ever had a discussion with 4 anyone about what would have been the effect on 3
5 the events of March 28th, 1979 if either your 6 guidelines in your November 1 memo had been 7 followed or if the procedures recommended by 8 Bert Dunn in either of his February 1978 . g memoranda had been followed? 10 MR. KOLB By the operators? e 11 MR. SELTZER: By the people who were 12 running the Three Mile Island plant on 13 March 28, 1979. 14 MR. KOLB: Did you mean to include i 15 somebody in that besides operators? , 16 MR. SELTZER: By anybody who had 17 control of the reactor at March 28th, 1979 18 at 4:00 a.m. 19 A Isn't that the same question we ended with 20 r is there something different? 21 Q What-is different is, now I have added 22 Dunn's procedures to yours. That wasn't in the 4 23 question before we broke; right? i A Yes. 24 25 Q And I have also changed the question
1 Kelly 66 2 to say, have you discussed any effect that 3 following either your procedures or Dunn's would 4 have had, so I am not saying have you ever I ' 5 discussed your conclusion, that it would have 6 avoided the accident; now I am broadening the 7 quqstion in two ways: first, to include Dunn's 8 recommendations, and two, to say any effect that . 9 could have followed. 10 Would you like me to rektate the 11 question now? 12 MR. KOLB: You have also changed from O 13 operators to this broader characterization 14 of anybody who was in charge or running the 15 reactor. 16 MR. SELTZER: Right. 17 MR. KOLB: Which is another difference. 18 MR. SELTZER: O.K., three differences. , 19 Q Do you understand Dan Kolb's 20 difference? 21 A Yes. 22 Q Now, the question is: have you ever
.M discussed with anybody what effect it would have N
(~j ( 24 had on events of March 28, 1979 if the people i 25 who were. responsible for running the Three Mile
- - - ..,4,- y , -
mn - - y
1 Kelly 67 O V 2 Island Unit 2 that morning had followed either 3 your guidelines in your November 1, 1977 , 4 memorandum or the recommended procedures 5 contained in Bert Dunn's February 1978 memoranda? 6 A I don't recall any conversations like that, 7 no. 8 Q Let me see if I can refresh your 9 recollection. 10 Do you recall that you had a 11 conversation with Frank Walters and Don Hallman 12 in June 1979 in which you discussed how could it (,s) 13 be that the recommendations that you and Dunn had 14 written down were not sent out to any of the 15 operating plants? 16 MR. KOLB: Is that a question or a 17 statement? - 18 MR. SELTZER: Yes, it's.a question. 19 Q Do you recall that you had such a 20 conversation with Don Hallman and Frank Walters? 21 MR. KOLB: Would you read the 22 question back, please. 23 (Question read.)
) 24 MR. KOLB: My purpose is to have him 25 clearly understand the description of the
- e. .~,
1 Kelly 68 O d 2 conversation that he has been given, and I 3 think that was in the prior statement 4 rather than in the question, and so, if 5 the question is tied to that statement, 6 I would like that statement to be reread. 7 MR. SELTZER: I think it's almost 8 always easier if I just repeat it rather i 9 .than having the reporter spend time trying 10 to find it again. ', 11 BY MR. SELTZER: 12 Q Do you recall that you had a O 13 conversation in or about June of 1979 with Don 14 Hallman and Frank Walters at which you discussed 15 with them how was it that Babcock & Wilcox had . 16 apparently failed to send out the instructions
~
17 along the lines that you had drafted in your 18 November 1, 1977 memorandum and that Bert Dunn had 19 included in his February 1978 memoranda? 20 MR. KOLB: The question is not just 21 did he have any conversation with those 22 people, but did he have a conversation that 23 is just as you described it? Is that right? [) s/ 24 MR. SELTZER: A conversation in which
. l
. 25 what I have described was one of the things l l
l
1 Kelly 69
~
2 that he was discussing. 3 A I remember a conversation with Frank
- 4 Walters and Don Hallman where related type things
( 5 were talked about, yes. 6 Q And you specifically discussed the 7 fact that the guidelines in your November 1977
, 8 memorandum had not been sent out and that the .
9 guidelines in Dunn's two February 1978 memoranda 10 had n'ot been sent out; right? t 11 A Yes. 12 Q In the course of that conversation
\
13 with Don Hallman and Frank Walters, did anybody 14 discuss what effect it might have had 'or would 15 have.had on the events of March 28, 1979 if the 16 people who were running the Three Mile Island
. 17 Unit 2 chat day had followed either your 18 guidelines or Dunn's guidelines?
19 A I don't recall anything like that, no. 20 Q Do you believe that that was discussed 21 by you, Don-and Frank that day? 22 A No. 23 Q At that time in June 1979, which is f) a 24 before you testified before the full Kemeny 25 Commission, did you have a belief-then that if l
1 Kelly 70
%./
2 those who were responcible for running Three Mile 3 Island Unit 2 that day had followed your , 4 guidelines, the Three Mile Island accident ( 5 wouldn't have taken place? 6 A Yes. 7 Q When did you first learn that 8 guidelines such as you had circulated to , 9 " Distribution" on November 1,1977 and which Bert 10 Dunn had circulated to approximately ten people, 11 in February 1978 had not been communicated by B&W 12 to operators of B&W nuclear plants? 13 MR. KOLB: Would you read the 14 question back, please. 15 (Question read.) i 16 MR. KOLB: I will object as to form 17 because the question assumes that no 18 guideline of any type like the 19 guidelines that Mr. Kelly and Mr'.' Dunn had 20 circulated had ever been disseminated, 21 which is di f ferent from the questions you 22 asked before, which related to the actual 23 guidelines. I) Iv' 24 MR. SELTZER: No. Before, I asked-25 about the substance of-either his memo or
i 1 Kelly 71 2 Bert Dunn's. 3 MR. KOLB: Your questions before are 4 your questions before, and the record speaks t (I 5 for itself. "Such as" is different from 6
- what you have asked him before, and I object 7 as to form because you are assuming 8 something that is not in the record.
l . 9 MR. SELTZER: Dan, you have your 10 separate recollection. I am 1,ooking at 11 exactly what I was reading to him before, 12 which was whether the substance of either 13 his memo or Dunn's had been communicated to 14 the operators, and that's what I'am referring 15 to now. 16 MR. KOLB: And I am submitting to-you 17 that "such as" is different f ro m:.
, 18
" substance," and therefore your question is-l 19 inappropriate because it assumes a fact that 20 isn't in the record. -
21 BY MR. SELTZER: 22 Q When you testified under oath this i 23 morning earlier and to the staff of the Kemeny 24 Commission that, to the best of your knowledge, 25 the substance of either your memo or.Bert Dunn's-t e N F - yc+= -w-+-4 % e e e--ee e + w-r+c- ,,v- a-3---y, m-y-
1 Kelly 72 t ,/ ' V) 2 memo was not communicated to operating utilities, 3 what did you mean by that? l 4 A " Substance" to me means that they had taken k 5 either.my words or Bert Dunn's words and 6 transmitted them to the site via a mechanism such 7 as a site instruction. 8 Q And to communicate the substance of , 9 your words or Bert Dunn's,-would you have 10 understood that somebody could haveltaken your , 11 words and put them into slightly different language 12 and still be conveying your.same meaning? 13 A Yes, i 14 Q So as long as your same meaning was 15 being conveyed, that would be communicating the 16 substance of your memo? Is that right? 17 A Yes. '. 18 Q When for the first time did you 19 realize that B&W had apparentl'y failed to 20 communicate to the operators of its nuclear
-21 plants either the contents of or the substance of 22 your November 1, 1977 memo or the contents or 23 substance of Bert Dunn's February 1978 memoranda?
s {j g 24 MR. KOLB: Objection as to form. The 25 question assumes that if the information was
1 Kelly 73 (~ V) 2 not communicated, it constituted a failure 3 with implications that I think go beyond the 4 statements already made. ( 5 Secondly, you assume that B&W has 6 operators at nuclear plants and that's not 7 the fact. 8 ' MR. SELTZER: I certainly didn't mean
. 9 to imply that B&W had operators at all 10 nuclear plants. I am talking',about 11 communicating to B&W-designed plants. ,
12 MR. KOLB: My objections to the word
\' 13 " failure" still stand.
14 MR. SELTZER: 0.K. That is just 15 Bert Dunn's phrase. Bert Dunn referred to 16 it as "an apparent failure." 17 MR. KOLB: The witness should be 18 free to explain his own views as to 19 whether or not it constituted a failure 20 to whatever extent'this information was not 21 communicated. 22 I think we might start over, because
.23 we have had enough clarifications. Now if .g
( 24 you could give the witness the question, 25 and I suggest you do it without loading it
1 Kelly 74 0 2 with the word " failure" and we could 3 probably get on to the substance you are 4 trying to get at much more quickly. ( 5 MR. SELTZER: He already testified 6 that -- 7 BY MR. SELTZER: 8 Q To the best of your knowledge, B&W 9 failed to communicate the substance of either 10 your memo or Bert Dunn's two memos do operators 11 of its nuclear plants; right? _ 12 MR. KOLB: He clearly did not 13 testify that they failed, with the 14 implications of the word " f a i l u r'e . " 15 MR. SELTZER: You are the one who 16 is now loading it up. 17 Q Isn't it a fact that B&W failed to 18 communicate the substance of either your memo or 19 Bert Dunn's?
- 20 A With " substance" being either my exact words 21 or some slight changes to those exact words?
22 Q Yes. 23 A Before Three Mile Island? 24 Q Yes. 25 MR. KOLB: What do you mean by
1 Kelly 75 O. 2 " failure" or " failed"? What implications 3 do you associate with that? 4 MR. SELTZER: Did not. ( 5 MR. KOLB Just "did not." The 6 question is whether they did or did not? 7 MR. SELTZER: No, the question is -- 8 Q Isn't it a fact that prior to the 9 Three Mile Island accident, Babcock & Wilcox, to 10 the best of your knowledge, failed to communicate 11 the substance of either your November 1, 1977 12 memorandum or the contents or substance of either 13 of Bert Dunn's February 1978 memoranda? 14 MR. KOLB: And you are defining 15 " failed" as "did not," right? 16 MR. SELTZER: We are already on the 17 - reccrd with what it means. . 18 MR. KOLB: With that. That's what 19 it means? Is that what it means?' 20 MR. SELTZER: . Dan, you have already 21 asked and I have already responded to your (s-
'22 question. I will not keep interrupting my 23 questions to get in your paraphrasas. -( 24 MR. KOLB: That is what it means?
25 Q. Do.you understand what the word L
4 1 Kelly 76 r~, 2 " failed" means, Mr. Kelly, as I have used it 3 in that question 7 4 A That to my knowledge they were never sent ( 5 out? - 6 Q Yes. 7 A That's right. 8 Q So the answer to my questica is yes? 9 A 'o
.- my knowledge, they were never sent out.
10 Q Yes? ', 11 A Yes. 12 Q when for the first time did you learn O 13 that B&W had failed to send out either the 14 contents or the substance of your November 1, 15 1977 memorandum or Dunn's February 1978 16 memoranda? 17 A I can't remember the first time -I learned 18 that. 19 Q Your November 1, 1977 memorandum was 20 triggered by the Davis-Besse September 1977-21 transient; right? s 22 A Partially. , 23 Q Shortly after the Three Mile Island 24 accident started, you flew up'to the vicinity 25' .o f the plant; right?
1 Kelly 77 A 2 A Harrisburg, yes. 3 g And relatively quickly after you 4 arrived there, within days, you recognized the ( 5 similarity between events that had transpired at 6 Three Mile Island on March 28 and events that you 7 had investigated at Davis-Besse in September 1977,
~
8 isn't that true? 9 MR. KOLB: , Would you read the 10 question back, please. i 11 (Question read.) 12 A Yes.
-i 13 Q At or e. bout the time that you 14 recognized the similarity between the two events, I
15 did you make any attempt then to find out whether 16 your guidelines, the substance of them, which 17 you had created in November '77 or the guidelines 18 written by Bert Dunn in February 1978 had in 19 fact been communicated to B&W operatinhutilities? 20 A I, don't remember such an attempt. 21 Q Did iL occur to you when you 22 recognized the similarities that this event at 23 Three Mile Island should not have taken place if ( 24 the' operators had followed the guidelines in 25 either your November 1, 1977 memorandum or the I
1 Kelly 78 2 guidelines in Dunn's February 1978 memoranda? 3 MR. KOLB: Would you read the question 4 back, please. ( 5 (Question read.) 6 MR. KOLB: Objection as to form. 7 A I don't remember thinking that at the time, 8 no. 9 Q Are you aware that in early April 10 1979 B&W did communicate the substakce of your 11 . November 1, 1977 memorandum and Dunn's February 12 1978 memoranda?
.O V 13 MR. KOLE: Objection as to f o rm .
14 Q You may answer. 15 A Yes. 16 Q How did you learn that? 17 A I don't remember. - 18 Q Did you see the site instruction that 19 was sent out containing those guidelines? 20 A I don't remember. 21 Q Would it be fair to conclude that at 22 least by the time in early April when you learned 23 that B&W was communicating the substance of your ( 24 November 1977 and Dunn's February 1978 memoranda, 25 that you then knew that B&W*had previously failed lL
t 1 Kelly 79 (m.J . 2 to communicate the substance of those memoranda? 3 MR. KOLB Could I hear the question !. 4 again, please. i ( 5 (Question read.) 6 MR. KOLB: Objection as to form. I 7 think the question is unclear. 8 I also take it that " failed" here 9 means "did not"? 10 MR. SELTZER: It means the same as 11 " failed" did when we asked a similar 12 question earlier. 13 A It would be fair to say that I was confused 14 as to why we were just sending them out. 15 Q What do you mean, "why we were just ! e 16 sending them out"? 17 A well, you asked me if I at the t.ime .h ad 18 reached the conclusion that we hadn't previously
~
19 sent them out, and you are asking if I had a 20 feeling about that and whether that was a fair 21 statement and what I was trying to reply is, it 22 would be -- at the time I couldn't have a 23 conclusion that we didn't send them out, but it ( 24 is fair to conclude that I was confused as to 25 why we weren't sending them out at that time.
1 Kelly 80 0 2 That's what I mean. I am not saying 3 that they weren't previously sent out and we were 4 repeating the instructions. I just didn't know. ( 5 Q In GPU Exhibit 148 do you find in 6 there your handwritten notes of a meeting with or 7 attended by the operators of the Davis-Besse 8 plant? 9 A Yes. 10 Q Is that the last page of the exhibit? 11 A The last page is part of it. 12 Q Could you identify which pages of 13 GPU Exhibit 148 are your notes from a meeting 14 held at Toledo Edison with plant operators who 15 were on duty during the Davis-Besse transient? 16 A I am only sure about the last two pages. 17 Q The next to the last page ,is headed 18 what? 19 A "From Dick Knopp to Jack Evans." ~ 20 Q You wrote that? 21 A Yes. l l 22 Q How does it come to pass that you 23 we re writing a sheet that is headed "From Dick () 24 Knopp to Jack Evans"? 25 A I am just taking notes at the meeting.
1 Kelly 81 ! 2 That must have been something that was_said. 3 Q so on the first page of your notes 4 you indicate at about a third of the way down (. 5 " Concerns About." Do you see that? 6 A Yes. 7 Q Were those concerns that were voiced 8 at the meeting which you were then copying down? 9 A I don't remember the words. 10 Q t Is the process that you ,were going 11 through when you were writing the notes which are 12 the last two pages of GPU Exhibit 148 a process of n U 13 recording what was being discussed at the meeting? 14 A Yes. 15 Q So the concerns which you describe 4 16 in the top half of the first page of your notes. 17 are concerns which were voiced at the meeting, 18 is thar right? 19 A Yes. 20 Q one of the concerns was the one that 21 you have numbered 2, "The electromatic relief 22 valve sticking open," is that right? 23 A Yes. 24 .Q And the electromagnetic relief 25 valve is something that people fondly call the
I Kelly 82 2 pilot-operated relief valve, is that right? 3 A Yes. 4 Q And you knew at the time you wrote k 5 these notes that the pilot-operated relief valve 6 at Davis-Besse had cycled several times and then 7 had failed in the open position, is that right? 8 A Yes. 9 Q You also knew at the time you were 10 writing these notes that there was a loss-of-, 11 coolant accident in progress at the Davis-Besse 12 plant between the time that the pilot-operated O'- 13 relief valve failed open-and the operators closed 14 'a block valve system 20 minutes later, is that 15 right? 16 A Yes. l 17 Q Do you believe that the names that 18 are down at the bottom of the page are attendees 19 at the meeting? 20 A I don't remember. 21 Q Would you turn to the second page of 22 your notes. This is.your handwriting? 23 A Yes. r~% (% s; 24 -Q And again these are all notes of 25 items that were being discussed at the meeting?
I I Kelly 83 d(~\ 2 A Yes. 3 Q At the bottom of the page you have a 4 heading "TECO wants." Do you see that? 2 ( 5 A Yes. - 6 Q TECO stands for Toledo Edison Company? 7 A Yes. . 8 Q Could you read the three items that l 9 you have there and in place of the abbreviations ' 10 that you have inserted, could you read what the 11 abbreviations stand for, please? 12 A "TECO wants, No. 1, Open and shut lights
'- 13 on the electromatic relief; No. 2, Interlock to 14 shut the electromatic relief valve on electromatic 15 relief open and reactor coolant system pressure h
16 less than 2100 pounds; and No. 3, An interlock to 17 trip the reactor on on steam and feedwater rupture 18 control system actuation." i' 19 Q What is an interlock? 20 MR. KOLB: As it is used here?
. 21- Q As you understand the word " interlock"
- k. -
22 at the time you were writing these notes. 23 MR. KOLB: Well, I still stand by my () 24 question. Are you talking about as he 25 - understood it as it is used here?
1 Kelly 84
- r~N 2 MR. SELTZER: No, I am not. I am 3 saying, in the fall of 1977 what did Joe 1
4 Kelly understand the word " interlock" means. (' 5 MR. KOLB: In any connection at all, 6 just generally, right? 7 Q You may answer the question. 8 MR. KOLB: Is that right? 9 Q If you have a problem, Mr. Kelly, with 10 my question, please tell me; if noti,I would like 11 you to answer. 12 MR. KOLB: Sometimes counsel can have i
\/ 13 a problem with the question that the witness 14 may or may not perceive.
15 My problem is the word " interlock" 16 here that appears in some notes, and I would 17 think you would be inquiring as .to what it 18 meant in the notes, but for some reason 19 you don't want to do that, you wAnt to 20 inquire generally and go beyond what it 21 says in.the notes, and if you want to do it 22 that way, I think the witness ought to 23 realize you are doing it that way, and I I [\_/) 24 don't know why you won't accept the 25 clarification and get on with it instead of
~~ v,
I Kelly 85 g - ( 2 scrapping about it, but if that's what you 3 want to do, that's what I will do, too. 4 Mr. Kelly, he is asking about the ( 5 word " interlock" as included in the notes 6 or in general. Why don't you answer the 7 question with that thought in mind. 8 A To me " interlock" means an electrical 9 signal that will cause a. response to an action 10 given the first action happens cr it could be a 11 mechanical interlock. It doesn't have to be an 12 electrical interlock. O 13 BY MR.. SELTZER: i i 14 Q In other words, it is a response 15 that is triggered by something else occurring 16 previously? j 17 A It is digital lock-in. Given that the 18 first thing happened, it will as a direct result 19 of that cause something else to happen. 20 Q O.K. In the note that you have at the 21 bottom o f the last page of GPU Exhibit 148, what 22 was going to be caused to happen? 23 A TECO was asking for a reactor trip as a [\
\/ 24 direct result of a steam and feedwater rupture 25 control system actuation.
- a. __ . . _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
l 1 Kelly 86 O 2 Q In other words, if the steam and 3 feedwater- rupture control actuated, there would 4 be an automatic tripping of the reactor? ( 5 A That's what " interlock" means to me, yes. 6 Q In item 2 of what TECO wants, does 7 that mean that if the pilot-operated relief valve 8 were in the open position and the reactor coolant , 9 system pressure fell below 2100 pounds per square 10 inch, the block valve would automatically shut? 11 A Yes., 12 Q Are you aware that such an automatic O M closure of the block valve has been designed 14 into the MK plant in Germany? 15 A No, I am not aware of that. 16 Q Have you heard of the MK plant? 17 A Yes. Muelheim-Kaerlich. . 18 Q Right. You pronounce it better than 19 I can visualize it in my mind. 20 Are you saying that before I said it 21 to you, you had no idea that Muelheim-Kaerlich 22 had an automatic closure of the block valve on 23 pilot-operated relief valve failing open? t ew I don't recall knowing that, no. l (J)
~
24 A 25 Q Do you know of any plant anywhere on i
1 1 1 Kelly 87 O 2 the Planet Earth that has an interlock that 3 would automatically shut the block valve when 4 the pilot-operated relief valve has failed in the l 5 open position? 1 6 A No. 7 Q Do you know of any plant where such an 8 automatic feature has been designed but not yet , , 9 installed? 10 A No. ( 11 Q Do you know of any plant where such 12 a feature has been designed? (') ,. 13 A No. 14 Q Who, if anyone, was supposed to act 15 upon this desire by Toledo Edison Company.to 16 obtain an automatic interlock on its block valve? 17 A I don't remember. . 18 Q As one of the B&W representatives at 19 the meeting, did you take any action subsequent 20 to the meeting to try to obtain an automatic 21 closure-of the block valve for Toledo Edison? 22 A No.- 23 . Q Do you know whether anybody else from p' 24
-gs-] B&W took any action in response to this request 25 by Toledo Edison?
.-. .. = . .. - ..
1 Kelly 88 2 A No. 3 Q Did you ever report to anybody at 4 B&W that Toledo Edison wanted this? 5 A I don't remember. - 6 Q What was your purpose in writing these 7 notes? 8 A My purpose for being there was to develop 9 a sequence of events of what happened during the 10 transient. I was in this meeting to, find out what 11 everyone else had found out about what happened 12 with the sequence of events during the transient. [) N- 13 Q Do these three items on what Toledo 14 Edison wants have anything to do with the 15 sequence of events? 16 A No. 17 Q Why did you bother writing.them 18 down? , 19 A Another purpose of the meeting -- a purpose 20 of the meeting, aside from my reason for being (
.\.
'21 at-the site, was to try and outline action items 22 for restart of the Davis-Besse plant. Some of j
-j 23 .these action items would have been assigned to ;
i f 24 Babcock & Wilcox. 25 so I was writing down whatever looked , l l i h:
1 Kelly 89
.A
]
2 like action items to me. 3 Q Action items for B&W? 4 A Not exclusively, k 5 Q Did you believe that these three items 6 could be action items for B&W7 7 A I don't remember. 8 Q When you got back to Lynchburg and . 9 addressed 30 or more people in training room B, 10 did you outline for those people wha,t Toledo f 11 Edison wanted as possible action items? 12 A I don't. remember doing that, no. 4 C# 13 Q on March 28, 1979 at Three Mile 14 Island the electromagnetic relief valve failed 15 in the open positions-right? 16 A Yes. 17 Q The reactor coolant system. pressure
~ ! 18 fell below 2100 pounds, didn't it?
19 A Yes.
! 20 Q If there had been an interlock to 21 shut the block valve, that would have stopped the 22 loss-of-coolant accident that day, wouldn't it?
23 MR. KOLB: You are calling for an fx ( ) 24 opinion of the witness today on that subj ect,
, x/
25 and it -seems to me that is inappropriate.
I Kelly 90 a 2 You can ask him factual questions as 3 you just did, but in te rms of his opinion 4 as to what would or would not have ( 5 happened seems to me to be inappropriate. 6 You asked him some earlier questions of 7 opinions formed at an earlier time. This 8 is different, though. . 9 Q Three Mile Island did not have an 10 interlock such as the one you descrkbed in item 2 11 at the bottom of the last page of GPU Exhibit, 148, 12 did it? 13 A Not to my knowledge. 14 Q As a result, on March 28, 1979 when 15 the pilot-operated relief valve failed open and 16 the reactor coolant system pressure fell below 17 2100 pounds, there was no device installed in the 18 plant which would automatically close the block 19 valve, was there? 20 A No.
- 21 Q The first item under "What TECO kw 22 Wants" was an open and shut light for the pilot-23 operated relief valver right?
h (~j ( 24 A Yes. 25 Q What is your understanding of what ,
.-, >a.
s 4 1 Kelly 91 A ' U 2 , type of control panel indication the Toledo' 3 Edison operators had on September 24, 1977 for the 4 pilot-operated relief valve? (f 5 A My understanding is that they had a -- 6 lights that would indicate the signal going to 7 tee power-operated relief valve, either a signal 8 to open'or a signal to shut. . - 9 Q. When you say "a signal," you mean i 10 an electric signal? , I _ s 11 A Yes. 12 Q Did it ' require energy to the pilot-13 operated relief valve to' -open it? 14 A '
-Yes.
15 Q When the' valve was deenergized, as 16 it wired'on September 2'4, 1977 so9that it should-l 17 shut? ' - 18 MR. KOLB:
, Will you read that question
-w.
);
19 again,' pleas,e. s .- y . 20 (Queition read. ) s-
\\
., ; *i .
21 g y MRyg- ' KOLB, s You are asking him whether
'22 he knows'now whether it was wired that way" s.
23 then? .
,y ' r\ . '
I 24 -MR. S Etg ER: Right.
% >! ' , s.
1
'To make 1.t clear, there was a circuitry 25 .Q I y , '-
! 1-1
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I 1 Kelly 92 2 for the pilot-operated relief valve in the 3 Davis-Besse plant on September 24, 1977, am I i 4 right? l 5 A Yes. - 6 Q I think your last inswer was that 7 when power was turned on to the pilot-operated 8 relief valve, the valve would open; right? - 9 A Yes. 10 Q When power is shut off to that valve 11 as it was wired on September 24, 1977, the valve 12 _s was designed to close, isn't that right?
\
13 MR. KOLB: The reason I. asked about 14 what actually was the fact is, you seem to 15 be mixing -- no implication.to' this -- but 16 you seem to be mixing design with what 17 . actually was the fact, and -- - 18 MR, SELTZER: We know the alve 19 failed open. 20 MR. KOLB Right. 21 MR. SELTZER . So it's designed.to 22 close when there.is no power to it, but 23 because of a missing relay, it didn't close () - 24 that day -- it.doesn't always perform.as 25 it.is designed, and I am trying to find out s
l l 1 gelly 93
/~'%
V 2 from Mr. Kelly whether his understanding 3 about how it is designed is as I have 4 described, k 5 MR. KOLB That's my problem. Are you 6 asking him how it was designed or how it 7 was actually wired? 8 MR. SELTZERS Designed and wired. . 9 MR. KOLB: Both. 10 He can answer if he just indicates 11 that -- to the extent of his understanding, 12 what the facts were.
) -
N/ 13 BY MR. SELTZER: 14 Q Joe, what I am trying to get at, 15 and maybe I am not as articulate as I should be, 16 isn't it your understanding that the crosby valve 17 that was in the Davis-Besse plant on September 24 18 was designed and wired so tha* when power was 19 shut off to the pilot-operated relief valve, the 20 valve was supposed to shut?- 21 A Yes. 22 Q T,he light that they had in the control 23 room at Davis-Besse on September 24, 1977 merely , l (7_) 24 showed whether power was on or power was off to l
%J ,
25 the pilot-operated relief valve, isn't-that right?
~ . .
1 Kelly 94 b v 2 A Yes. 3 Q What, if anything different, did 4 you understand Toledo Edison wanted when you wrote f, 5 down that they wanted an open and shut light on 6 the pilot-operated relief valve? 7 A They wanted lights that would indicate the 8" physical position of the valve, as opposed to . 9 signals indicating where the valve should be. 10 Q The signal that just showed whether 11 power was on or whether power was off to the valve 12 was not a reliable signal of whether the valve (O _/ 13 was actually opened or shut, is that correct? 14 MR. KOLB: Are you asking him whether 15 he had that opinion or they did? 16 Q Isn't that what you know and isn't 17 that what you meant in your last answer? 18 MR. KOLB: Well, it's more than one. 19 MR. SELTZER: I will ask one question. 20 Q A light that merely shows whether the 21 power is on or off to a pilot-operated relief (. 22 valve is not a reliable indication of whether n- -
- 23 the valve is atually open or shut, isn't that 4
(n,) 24 true? 25 A It's not always an accurate indication. I 7 ' (
__ . - . - - . .. =_. - __ l 1 Kelly 95 2 don't know what you meant by " reliable," but I 3 would say it's not alwaysglnaccurateJrldication. 4 Q On September 24, 1977, is it your 5 understanding that after the pilot-operated 6 relief valve had cycled several times, later 7 determined to be nine times, it failed in the open 8 position? . 9 A Yes. 10 Q Pressure then fell below the set point 11 for the pilot-operated relief valve to open; 12 right? ) 7_ 13 A Yes. 14 Q When pressure in the reactor coolant - i 15 system fell below the set point for the 16 pilot-operated relief valve to opent the power 17 - to the valve was automatically shut off, isn't 18 that right? 19 A That would be the design, yes. 20 Q And when the power was shut off 21- according to the design, the light in the control 22 room went off, according to design, isn't that 23 right? 24 A.
,_ i It would' indicate the valve was shut.
l
)
(J4 4 25 Q So at Davis-Besse on September 24,
.-,4 -y e - r y -r -
, r-a
1 Kelly 96 O 2 1977, the light in the control room indicated that 3 the valve was shut, even though it had failed 4 in the open position, is that right? 5 A Yes. - 6 Q And it is your understanding that at 7 the meeting that you attended shortly after the 8 Davis-Besse accident, Toledo Edison was asking 9 for a more accurate light to be installed in 10 their control room, is that right? ! 11 A Accurate valve indication, yes. 12 Q Is it your understanding from this O 13 meeting at which you were writing down what you 14 heard that Toledo Edison wanted a more accurate
- 15 indicaulon of the valve position so that the e
16 operators in the control rcom wouldn't be confused 17 by lights that indicated the valve was shut when 18 in fact the valve was open? 19 A Yes. 20 Q Did you take any action to do anything 21 to fulfill Toledo Edison's request for such a 22 more accurate indication of the position of the 23 pilot-operated relief valve? O) t 24 A Nc. 25 Q Do you know whether anybody else from
l l 1 Kelly 97
- C) 2 B&W took any action to fulfill Toledo Edison's i
3 request to get a more accurate indication of the 4 position of the pilot-operated relief valvs? ~ 5 A No, I don't know. - 6 Q When you addressed the 30 or more 7 people in training. room B, did you;tell those 8 people that Toledo Edison had requested a more 9 accurate indication of the position of the 10 pilot-operated relief valve? ', 11 A I don't remember that, no. 12 Q Do you know whether subsequent to the O 13 September 24, 1977 transient Toledo, Edison 14 installed a more accurate indication of the 15 position of its pilot-operated relief valve? 16 MR. KOLB: Would you read the question 17 back, please. - 18 (Question read.) 19 A No. 20 Q You don't know whether they did? 21 A No. That's correct. I do not know whether 22 they installed one or not. 23 Q From your experience with any other 24 B&W' plant, did you know in the fall of 1977 25 whether any other B&W-designed _ plants had a more
i l l
/
1 Kelly 98 O 2 accurate indication of the position of the 3 pilot-operated relief valve than the position 4 light that was installed at Davis-Besse? k 5 A No. - 6 Q Do you know what type of indication 7 of valve position was installed at Cyrstal River 8 at that time? . 9 MR. KOLB: 19777 10 MR. SELTZER: Yes, the f,all of '77. 11 A I don't recall the Cyrstal River design. 12 Q Had you been working on any aspect O 13 of the design for the 205 plants such that in the 14 fall of 1977 you knew what type of indication 4 15 B&W had designed into those plants for the 16 position of the pilot-operated relief valve? 17 MR. KOLB Objection as to form. 18 A I don't remember that either. 19 Q At the timd you were sent Nut to 20 Davis-Besse, you were part of the_ Plant Integration f 21 Units right? 22 A Yes. 23 Q Putting an interlock into the controls (A) %s/ 24 for the block valve would have been a change in l 25 the design of the NSS equipment which was part of l
1 Kelly 99 2 B&W's scope of supply, isn't that right? 3 Let me back up and take it a few -- 4 A Would you repeat that? ( 5 Q You are familiar with the phrase 6 *
" scope of supply"; right?
7 A Yes. 8 Q What does B&W's scope of supply mean , 9 to you? j 10 A It's the equipment that we pro, vide and the 11 procedures that we provide in the base contract 12 that has been bought from us.
/~N.
13 Q It's a fact, is it not, that the 14 pilot-operated relief valve and the block valve 15 are part of the B&W scope of supply? 16 A Normally, yes. 17 Q If there is to be a change.in design 18 of something that is within B&W's scope of supply, i 19 that is something that the Plant Integration 20 Unit works on, isn't that right? 21 MR. KOLB: Are you talking about the 22 custom at the time? 4 23 MR. SELTZER: Yes, gs ( )- 24 A It's possible that Plant Integration would 25 work on a change in design, yes. v --we m w -
1 Kelly 100 2 Q Would a more accurate indication of 3 the position of the pilot-operated relief valve 4 be within B&W's scope of supply? 5 MR. KOLB: Are you including such 6 indication as may appear on the co r.tro l 7 panel? 8 MR. SELTZER: Thank you, that's helpful. , 9 Q Let me focus my question a little 10 more precisely. ( 11 Would the mechanical and electrical 12 connections which would have to be made to or in (T 13 the vicinity of the pilot-operated relief valve 14 in order to indicate its position accurately 15 have been a change in B&W's scope of supply? 16 MR. KOLB: The testimony before was 17 not as to accuracy but greater accuracy, 18 so I would ask you to modify your question 19 in line with that testimony. 20 MR. SELTZER: All right. 21 Q Would a change in wiring or mechanics 22 made to the pilot-operated relief valve or made 23 in the vicinity of the pilot-operated relief j 24 valve in order to indicate its. position more 25 accurately have been a change in design involving
I Kelly 101 0 2 something in B&W's scope of supply? 3 A I don't know. 4 Q Would it have been a design change l 5 that involves NSS components or systems? 4 6 A I don't know. 7 Q The pilot-operated relief valve is 8 an NSS component, isn't it? _ 9 MR. KOLB: Just the valve as such? 10 MR. SELTZER: Yes. E 11 A Yes.
- 1 12 Q And the piping immediately adjacent 7s U 13 to.it is an NSS component, isn ' - it?
14 'A No. 15 Q The tailpipe is not an NSS component? 16 A No. 17 Q Is the pipe between the pilot-operated 18 relief valve and the block valve an NSS 19 component? 20 A There normally isn't any pipe. They are
- 21 normally flanged one against the other.
k 22 Q Did you ever discuss with your boss, 23 Eric Swanson, or with the hec.d of your unit, (O _) 24 Bruce Karrasch, the fact that Toledo Edison
-25 wanted an interlock to close their block valve
- = - - .. . - - - __ . _ _ _ _ _ .
1 Kelly 102 2 automatically? 3 A Not that I recall. a 4 Q Did you ever discuss with Eric l 5 Swanson or Bruce Karrasch the fact that Toledo 6 Edison wanted a more accurate position of the 7 pilot-operated relief valve? 8 A Not that I recall. 9 Q Did you ever mention in any way, shape 10 or form to anybody in the Integration Unit that 11 Toledo Edison had requested some changes in the 12 design of its NSS? O 13 MR. KOLB: Not just those two changes 14 you referred to, but any change at all? 15 MR. SELTZER: No, those two changes. 16 MR. KOLB: All right. 17 A Not that I recall. - 18 Q Did you assume that somebo y else was j 19 going to bring this to the attention o Plant 20 Integration? , 21 A Yes. 22 Q Who did you think was going to do that? 23 A whoever would be assigned the responsibilites (A) 24 for'doing the follow-up work on the site problem 25 report. I don't know a name. i
1 Kelly 103 2 g Is it your understanding that at the 3 time of the Davis-Besse events in September 1977 4 Plant Integration would have been the appropriate (( 5 group at Babcock & Wilcox to deal with such 6 changes in design as are listed in items 1, 2 7 and 3 at the bottom of the last page of GPU 8 Exhibig 1487 9 A No. 10 Q What group at B&W do you think would 11 have been the appropriate group to deal with 12 those design changes? O
- 13 A Control and Instrumentation.
14 Q Isn't it your understanding that Plant 15 Integration would have had to approve these design 16 cnanges? 17 , A Eventually, yes. , 18 MR. SELTZER: Why don't we" break for
~
19 lunch. 20 MR. KOLB: Good. 21 (Lunch recess taken at 1:06 p.m.) 22 23 ID 24 V 25
I 104 l I'T
\_) 2 AF TE RN O O N S E S S I ON i . 3 2:30 p.m.
4 JOS E P H JO HN KE L LY, J R. ( 5 resumed and testified further as follows: 6 EXAMINATION (continued) 7 BY MR. SELTZER: 8 Q What time of day was it when you flew 9 out to Davis-Besse shortly after their September 10 '77 transient? t 11 A I don't remember. 12 Q You said that you spent two full 13 working days of 10 to 12 hours each. 14 What I am trying to find out is, did 15 you fly out the day before and then wake up 16 bright and early and start your first full working 17 day at Davis-Besse? , 18 A Yes.
~
19 Q When you flew in the day b'efore your 20 first full working day, did you talk to anybody 21 at the Davis-Besse plant that afternoon or 22 evening? , 23 A Fred Faist. 24 Q Did you talk to anybody else at the 25 Davis-Besse plant that afternoon or evening?
1 Kelly 105
-s 2 A Not that I remember.
3 Q Did you meet with Fred that afternoon 4 or evening? k 5 A Yes. - 6 g Where? 7 A At the site. 8' Q Where did you and Fred meet at the 9 site? . 10 A There were temporary trailerstthat B&W 11 were occupying at the time. 12 When did you first learn that the Q 13 pilot-operated relief valve, or as you call it the 14 electromatic relief valve, had failed open? 15 A I don't remember. 16 Q To the best of your recollection, 17 did you learn that before you arrived.at the 18 + Davis-Besse plant or aftGr you arrived? 19 A I don't remember. 20 Q Did Fred Faist know that you were 21 coming or was it a surprise? 22 A No, he kne 23 Q. Had a. ired any materials to show l 24 you'upon your arriv
- l. 25 i A Yes.
I i
1 Kelly 106 (')
\-)
2 Q What? 3 A He had printouts from the alarm typer, which 4 types all the alarms, and a postreactor trip ( 5 summary from the computer, and he delogged some 6 reactimeter data. 7 Q Did he have any temperature and 8 pressure plots? 9 A I don't remember. 10 Q Did the computer summarp,show 11 temperature and pressures during the transient? 12 A It does in columas of numbers, yes. 13 Q So from the posttrip summary printed 14 out by the computer, you could see the 15 temperatures and pressures during the transient? 16 A Yes. 17 Q From the computer printouts that Fred 18 had for you the day you arrived, could you see t 19 that the pilot-operated relief valve had failed i 20 open? 21 A I am sorry, are you asking me if I looked 22 at those printouts and it leaped out at me or if 23 I could use those printouts and plot something and (3 q) 24 figure it out? I didn't understand the question. 25 Q Do you recall whether you reached the
I 1 Kelly 107 4 2 conclusion or had previously a' developed 3 conclusion by that, the end of that first arrival 4 day, that the pilot-operated relief valve had t ( 5 failed open? -
- 6 A I don't remember when I found that out.
7 Q Let me ask you a question that you 8 suggested was the second alternative. 9 From the data that was available to 10 you, could you have extracted the fact'that the 11 pilot-operated relief valve had failed open? 12 A Yes. O
\- 13 Q Am I correct that from the data that 14 you had available to you on the day of your 15 arrival, you could see the reactor coolant system 10 pressure fluctuating just above and just below the~
17 pilot-operated relief valve set point?. 18 A I don't remember that, no. 19 Q What is the data that was dvailable 20 to you on that day of arrival which could have '
. 21 indicated to you that the PORV or pilot-operated 22 relief valve had failed open?
23 A The alarm printer records open and shut } h 24 signals to the PORV and you could pick off of , [/ s_ 25 there -- and it gives you the time that the PORV
.. . - - - - - - - , _ ~ _._ _
1 Kelly 108 2 receives these signals, and you could pick off 3 of the time sequence that it cycled very rapidly, 4 that's one piece of in fo rmatio n , and then, using ( 5 the reactimeter data, plot quench tank pressure 6 and see that the quench tank pressure is going up. 7 Q The alarm printout would show nine 8 open and close signals to the pilot-operated 9 relief valve, is th at right? 10 A Nine sounds right, yes.
, (
11 Q And the last signal that it would 12 show would be a signal to close the pilot-operated a 13 relief valves right? 14 A I don't remember what the last one was. 15 Q well, you said that power off was the e 16 signal that would close the valve and power off 17 was also the signal that would show up as a, 18 light in the control room that the val've was 19 closed: right? 20 A Right. 21 Q I think it was your previous testimony 22 that there was that final signal to shut the , 23 valve, isn't that right? O
\_)
24 A Yes. 25 Q so the computer alarm printout would
1 Kelly 109 O 2 show power of f to the pilot-operated relief 3 valve and the valve closed at least as it would 4 be represented on the computer printout; right? ( , 5 A Yes. - 6 Q So then it must be something in the 7 reactimeter data that tells you the computer 8 alarm printout is not an accurate indication of 9 valve position, is that correct? . 10 MR. KOLB: Would you read the question 11 back, please. 12 (Question read.) 13 MR. SELTZER: Let ne withdraw that i 14 and ask you this. 15 Q The computer alarm printout showing 16 that the pilot-operated relief valve had received 17 a close signal was not an accurate ind,ication of 18 the position of the pilot-operated relief valve 19 at the' Davis-Besse plant on September I4, 1977, 20 was it? 21 A Right. It wasn't. It was not. 22 Q You said, however, that by viewing 23 reactimeter data, you could conclude that'the ( ) 24 valve had failed in the open position, is that 25 right?
1 Kelly 110 O 2 A Yes. i ~ 3 Q could you explain that? 4 A If the quench tank pressure is one of the
## 5 signals being recorde1 on the reactimeter every A
6 three seconds, one simply has to plot that 7 versus time and as soon as it comes off of a peg, 8 you can see -- but comes off of zero, you can 9 see that steam is being released into the quench 10 tank, and then if you know the time (the last 11 shut signal was to the PORV and the quench tank 12 pressure continues to rise, then you can draw 13 the conclusion that the PORV did not reseat. 14 Q What does "reactimeter" mean? 15 A Reactimeter is a machine used for data 16 acquisition that B&W was using at that period of 17 time at various start-up sites. It receives 18 signals and just accumulates data. Depending on 19 what signals you input to it, it will ~ record it 20 on magnetic tape. 21 Q And it can record signals from any 22 source that it's wired up to in the nuclear 23 system? I [~) s_/ 24 A Yes. 25 Q Do reactimeters at different plant
1 Kelly 111 (' 2 sites record different data? 3 A Yes. 4 Q In what form is data stored by the 5 reactimeter? ({ - 6 A on magnetic tape. 7 Q To call up that data, do you get a 8 computer printout or a CRT of data? 9 A* It's printed out in columns on paper. 10 (Indicating) , 11 Q Do you have to tell the machine what 12 data you want to see or do you just push a button O) (_ 13 and it prints out all of the data that it has 14 received for any point in time? 15 A No, you tell it which data you want printed 16 out and over what time interval.
'17 Q Does the Davis-Besse reactimeter 18 record hot and cold leg temperatures? '
19 MR. KOLB: Did it at the ti'me? 20 A Did it then? 21 Q Right. 22 A I don't remember. 23 Q To the best of your recollection, did
}
24 it record any reactor coolant system temperatures? i 25 A Yes.
t i Kelly 112 Q 2 Q You are just not sure where those 3 temperatures were being measured? 4 A Correct. ( 5 0 Where else in the reactor coolant 6 system was Davis-Besse wired for thermocouples 7 other than the hot and cold leg? 8 A There are many available signals. I just 9 don't know which ones they had patched up at the 10 time. I don't remember. t 11 Q At all times during the Davis-Besse 12 transient the plant was on forced flow rather s 13 than natural circulation, isn't that right? 14 A Yes. 15 Q As a result, the temperature readings
, 16 anywhere in the reactor coolant system would be 17 within ten degrees of the temperatur'es,taken 18 anywhere else in the reactor coolant system,
~
19 isn't that right? 20 A Yes. 21 Q Did the reactimeter show pressure in 22 the reactor coolant system? 23 A Yes.
#~h U 24 Q Had Fred Faist reviewed the various 25 computer printouts and reactimeter data prior to I
i !
1 Kelly 113 O- 2 your arrival? 3 A Not all of it. 4 Q Some of it he had? ( 5 A Yes. - 6 Q Your notes of the meeting with plant 7 operators have a date of September 28, 1977 on it. 8 Is that the day that you believe you
} 9 attended a meeting with the plant operators and 10 other Toledo Edison and B&W personnel?
11 A Yes. 12 Q Was that on your first full day or 13 your second full day at Davis-Besse? 14 A I don't remember. 15 Q If this was your first full day, it 16 would mean that you arrived on September 27th, 17 is that right? , 18 A If that was my first full day, yes. 19 Q If the meeting were on your~ second 20 full day, it would mean you arrived on September 21 26th; right? 22 A Yes. 23 Q -The earliest that you arrived, then, ( 24 is September 26th, 1977; right? 25 A Yes.
?
1 Kelly 114 ; 2 Q In other words, the earliest that you 3 arrived in the vicinity of the Davis-Besse plant 4 was two days after their September 24th transient? { 5 A Yes. - 6 Q How had Fred Faist obtained access, 7 if you know, to the various computer printouts and 8 reactimeter data that he had? 9 A I don't know. 10 Q I think you testified this morning 11 that there would have been B&W personnel working 12 in the control room during this start-up phase 13 of Davis-Besse's operation; right? 3 14 MR. KOLB: Are you asking him what he 15 said earlier? 16 MR. SELTZER: No, I am asking him -- 17 Q Is it correct that in this, start-up l 18 phase Davis Besse would have had the a'ssistance 19 of B&W personnel in the control room? " 20 A Well, I think I said if there was testing 21 going on, they would be there. And then we got
~
- 22. talking about Mode 1 and things like that. I 23 don't remember.what -- where they were in their
( 24 testing phase.. 25 Q Is it your_ understanding that with the 1 a . . ~ . - . , ,, , -,..,. , . , , ,- ,,, . . --. ,.. , , . . . . . - - . . + . _ ,~..-- - - . . - , . .
I Kelly 115
~
4 O 22 degree of cooperation that you observed between 3 the six or seven B&W people and the Davis-Besse 4 people, that B&W's people would have had easy ( 5 access to computer printouts and reactimeter data 6 generated during and tollowing the September 24th 7 transient? . 8 MR. KOLB: Could I hear the question 9 again, please. 10 (Question read.) 8 11 MR. KOLB: You are asking the witness 12 to surmise from the information that he had 13 or the experiences he had what actually took 14 place, and it seems to me that it is 15 inappropriate. 16 Q During the time that you were 17 visiting for two full days, did you have easy 18 access to any data that you wanted that had been 19 generated in the control room during the transient? 20 MR. KOLB I don't even think that you 21 have established that he asked for.any data. 22 Q Was there any data that you asked for? 23 A Not that I remember. Ih 24 Fred Faist already had his hands on V Q 25 all the data you needed?
. = _ - - . _ . - .
1 Kelly 116 7-~. - U 2 A Yes, either that or he got it. 3 Q When you first got together with Fred 4 Faist on the 26th or the 27th, the day of your (3 5 arrival, did Fred give you a rundown of what he 6 believed had happened during the transient? 7 A I don't remember. 8 Q Did you have to do any sleuthing or , 9 had Faist and the other B&W people pretty well 10 figured out what were the key events that had 11 taken place on September 24th? 12 Do you know what I mean by " key 13 events"? 14 A I was working on" sleuthing." 15 MR. KOLBt It is also two questions. 16 Why don't you break it down. Maybe you 17 could explain what both words me.an, 18
" sleuthing" and -- I guess it's two words 19 in the case of " key events."
20 MR. SELTZER: Thank you. 21 Q By " key events" I mean the pilot-22 operated relief valve failing in the open 23 position, the operators terminating high-pressure fs (} 24 injection in response to rising pressurizer level, 25 and, three, the occurrence of saturation in the
I Kelly 117 b(~h 2 reactor coolant system. 3 And let me ask you, so that there is 4 a solid foundation, as lawyers call it, these
< 5 preliminary questions. -
6 The pilot-operated relief valve failed 7 in the open position on September 24th; right? 8 A Yes. . 9 Q The operators at the Davis-Besse plant 10 terminated high-pressure injection in response 11 to rising pressurizer water level on September 12 24th, didn't they? O 13 MR. KOLB: I take it the questions 14 like this are all based on what he came to 15 understand. l 16 MR. SELTZER: Yes. 17 MR. KOLB: Rather than a direct i 18 verification? 19 MR. SELTZER Right. 20 A They stopped high-pressure injection when 21 pressurizer water level was going up, that's-22 right. 23 Q It's also your understanding that (O
,) 24 saturation occurred in the reactor coolant system 25 on September 24th, is that right?
l i i 1 Kelly 118
, 2 A Yes.
3 Q Why do they call it saturation, not 4 just boiling? (i 5 A saturation is the thermodynamic state of 6 the water when it is being transformed from 7 liquid to gas. 8 Q Does that mean that it has become . 9 saturated with or absorbed so many BTU's that it 10 has the energy to go from a liquid state to a 11 gaseous state? 12 A Yes. - 0 13 Q Did you have to do any analysis 14 yourself to uncover the fact that each of those 15 three events had taken place or did somebody 16 tell you on or shortly after your arrival that 17 th,e s e events had taken place, these Yh;ree key 18 events? 19 MR. KOLB: I object to that. Now that 20 you told us what you think are key events,
, 21 I think it's an inappropriate k
22 characterization. You have to establish 23 ~ that either this witness or somebody thought () 24 they were key events at the time. 25 MR. SELTZER: It is just Richard
,_ _. . , . _ _ - ..-. ..m .. _ _m . , .- ,.
3 :g.- . _ ., ...._._s_.,.. . m_ _ __ _ _3,. _ _ . _ . 8 ,, 1 t . ss 4 / , 1 c .
.\
1 N ' Kelly 119 I
, \. 1
' \ , -
2 . Seltzer. I am just referring to the - 4
.
l< -x s
1 Kelly 120 i
\
(N/ 2 Q When you were writing the sequence 3 of events, when you were sleuthing at Davis-Besse. 4 MR. KOLB: Why use the word 5 " sleuthing"? {, That is just confusing things. 6 i MR. SELTZER: All right. You 7 detective fans know what sleuthing means. 8 MR. KOLB: Can we say when he waF 9 conducting his efforts there on the days 10 which you have identified? . 11 MR. SELTZER: It is my question. I 12 like " sleuthing." 13 MR. KOLB: I objdct to '" sleuthing." 14 MR. SELTZER: 0.K. , 15 Q Do you understand what the question is? 16 MR. KOLB: Do we have.a definition 17 of " sleuthing'? ' f 18 , MR . SELTZER: Yes, doing detective 19 3 w o r k ', trying to: find answers. ~
- t 20 ,
MR. KOLB: Were you doing any 21 detective work? (. 22 THE WITNESS: Yes. 23 MR. KOLB: 0.K. (~h 24 MR. SELTZER: 0.K. V 25 /' Q Now, the question is, among,any od the U, g n'I , c x $ , ss a' s ! l . t
,_; l u. . - - . . . . . - .- .-
1 Kelly 121 e
- 2 events that you may have thought were key events 3 in the Davis-Besse transient, is it a fact that the
! 4 pilot-operated relief valve failing open was a g 5 key event? -
6 A Insofar as I thought anything was a key 7 event? 8 g yes. 9 A Yes. 10 Q Was it your understanding in the fall 11 of 1977 that the termination of high-pressure 12 injection when the pressurizer level was rising n, s_ 13 initially in the September 24th transient was a 14 key event? 15 A Not at the time. 16 Q At the time you wrote your November 1, 17 1977 memo, did you believe that it was a key 18 event? ' 19 ( A Yes. - 20 .Q At the time you were doing your 3: 21' ~ detective work or sleuthing up through the time you; addressed the crowd in training' room B, did i;
\
' 23 -
you believe that the occurrence of saturation or 1 24 boiling in the' reactor coolant system was a key 25 event in the September 24th transient? p h _
. ,,. .. . ,6 ,!. . = ~ - --
i l 1 Kelly 122 2 A Yes. 3 Q Focusing on those three key events, i 4 did you have to do any independent investigation g , 5 to determine that those three key events had 6 taken place or did somebody tell you on or 7 shortly after your arrival that each of those
~
8 events had taken place? 9 , MR. KOLB: When you used the words 10 " key events" in this question, I take it 11 you are using it in the sense that he has 12 testified? 13 MR. SELTZER: Yes. 14 MR. KOLB As to the timing of his 15 formation of the thought that some of the 16 items were key. 17 Q Well, the events had all~taken place
-18 prior to your arrival, isn't that right?
~
19 A Yes. " 20 Q I don't care for purposes of this 21 question when you recognized that they were key,
.- (- 22 but each of those events had already taken 23 place before you arrived and it is those three /~T 24- events which had previously taken place which CI j 25 you subsequently recognized were key that I am
1 Kelly 123 0 2 focusing on. 3 MR. KOLB He subsequently thought 4 were key. 5 Q Now, the question is: for about the 6 fourth or fifth time, not through any fault of 7 yours, did you have to do any sleuthing to uncover 8 the existence and occurrence of any of those 9 three events or did somebody tell you on or 10 shortly af ter your arrival that each of those 11 three events had taken place? 12 Let me take them one by one. x,) 13 Did you have to do any independent 14 detective work to uncover the fact that the 15 pilot-operated relief valve had failed open or 4 16 did somebody just come out and repsrt that to 17 you shortly after your arrival? 18 A I don't remember. 19 Q Did you have to do any independent 20 investigation to determine that the operators 21 had terminated high-pressure injection in i
\-
22 response to the first rise in pressurizer water 23 level? 24 A Yes.
%s 4
25 Q Did you have to do any independent 1
1 Kelly 124 (~%'
- \-
2 detective work to discover that there had been 3 saturation or boiling in the reactor coolant 4 system? 5 A Yes. ({ . 6 Q How did you determine that there had 7 been saturation? 8 A I developed plots of reactor coolant g system temperature and pressure versus time and 10 then superimposed on those plots saturation 11 temperature for the existing pressure of the 12 reactor coolant system and then drew my , 1 (_) s, 13 conclusions looking at the plots (indicating). , 14 Q On which day of your visit did you 15 do that? 16 A I don't remember. 17 Q What did you.say you superimposed? 18 MR. KOLB: Why don't we have it read 19 back? - 20 (Record read.) 21 Q Was this a three-dimensional graph 22 that you drew with time on one axis? 23 A Yes. 24 Q What was on the other axis? (~)h 25 A Several things: pressurizer level, reactor
1 Kelly 125 ( N' 2 coolant system temperature, reactor' coolant system 3 pressure. 4 Q So for every point in time you showed three values? (( 5 . 6 A Yes. 7 Q And then in addition to those three 8 values, you wrote in what temperature would 9 correspond to saturation for the pressure 10 indicated at that time? , 11 MR. KOLB: Would you read the question, 12 please. 13 MR. SELTZER: That's coEfusing. I j 14 will restate it. 15 Q For each set of values that you had, 16 you wrote in an additional value which reflected 17 the saturation temperature for the pressure 18 shown at that point in time, is that right? 19 A Yes. - l 20 Q Where did you get the saturation 21 temperature? 22 A Out of the steam tables. 2 .
;3 Q Where did you obtain a copy of the
) q 24 set of steam tables? 25 A I don't remember. 4
1 Kelly 126 O 2 Q Do you keep that in your head? 3 A ch, no. 4 Q You were surprised to learn that there
,({ 5 had been saturation in the reactor coolant system; 6 right?
7 A Yes. 8 Q While you were still at Davis-Besse, 1 9 I take it you discussed with some of the people 10 there the fact that you had discovered that 11 saturation had occurred in the reactor coolant 12 system on September 24th, is that true? 13 A Yes. ! 14 Q I am going to ask you now about your i I 15 perception of the people you were telling this 16 discovery to and I want you to tell me whether j 17 the people whom you told you had discovered , 18 saturation reacted to what you were te'111ng them 10 as though it was new to them. 20 MR. KOLB: Is this a question or will 21 this be a series of questions in which he 22 is asked whether they said something that 23 indicated that or are you asking for more 24 than that? 25 MR. SELTZER: Well, in words or in
1 Kelly 127 O 2 any way else that people that he works with 3 might have left him with the impression that 4 this was news to them or that -- () 5 MR. KOLB: You mean like they wrote 6 down on a pad and said, "I am surprised," 7 is that what you have in mind, or are you 8 asking for him to read the faces of 9 someone, of a person or the people and tell 10 whether they looked surprised? 11 MR. SELTZER: I am not sure that he 12 is going to recall specific words of a 13 conversation.
, 14 BY MR. SELTZER:
15 Q But was it your understanding that 16 the people whom you were telling that you had 17 discovered saturation to have occurred _on 18 september 24th were hearing that fact'for the
~
19 first time from you? 20 A I don't remember. 21 Q I take it you discussed your discovery (- 22 with Fred Falst? 23 A Yes.
\
i 24 Q Is it your understanding that it was ( 25 news to Fred Faist? - m -a - q r 3 - ---m-r ---
1 Kelly 128 (- l 2 A I don't remember. 3 Q Why were you surprised that there had 4 been saturat:on on September 24th?
- , 5 MR. KOLB
- I don't think he testified 6 that he was surprised that there was 7 , saturation. I think you asked him whether 8 he was surprised when he discovered it.
9 That's different. 10 Q What was the source of your surprise? 11 Why did the fact that there was saturation on 12 September 24th cause you to be surprised? ( , (m, 13 MR. KOLB: I will object as to form 14 for the same reason. 15 A I had not seen that occur before and I 16 thought it was unusual and in that respect, it 17 surprised me. 18 Q There is not supposed to b'e steam in 19 the primary or reactor coolant system df a 20 pressurized water reactor, is there? 21 A Right. 22 Q So this was an unusual occurrence, l l 23 for there to be steam where there wasn't supposed 24 to bes right? 25 A In my mind, yes. i
l l 1 Kelly 129 t'
/ 2 Q Did anybody whom you told about the 3 discovery of saturation or steam in the reactor 4 coolant system try to downplay its significance?
5 A Not that I remember. { 6 Q You said you were surprised at the 7 discovery that there had been boiling in the 8 reactor coolant system. 9 Prior to your going back and reporting 10 in training room B that there had been boiling 11 in the reactor coolant system, do you recall 12 talking to anybody who appeared to share your t' ( 13 surprise over finding steam in the reactor 14 coolant system on September 24th? 15 MR. KOLB: I will have to object, 16 because I think you have changed the 17 testimony in your question. You are 18 assuming something which isn't exactly what 19 he said. - 20 MR. SELTZER: Tell me. 21 MR. KOLB: I think your last questions 22 at least were directed to whether steam in 23 the pressurizer had caused him to be (~ 24 surprised. N}) 25 MR. SELTZER: No, no. i
1 i 1 Kelly 130 I MR. KOLB: 2 Now you are talking about 3 boiling in the RCS which you are equating 4 with saturation. 5 MR. SELTZER: I think you are ( 6 intentionally obfuscating the situation. 7 BY MR. SELTZER: 8 Q There is always supposed to be steam 9 .in the pressurizer, right, Joe? 10 A During normal operations, yes. 11 Q The steam we gave been talking about 12 for the last 15 minutes is steam occurring where 13 it's not supposed to be in the rest of the 14 reactor coolant system; right? 15 A Yes. 16 Q And you were surprised to find steam 17 occurring elsewhere in the reactor coolant 18 system other than the pressurizer? 19 A Yes. ~ 20 Q You reported the occurrence of boiling 21 or steam in the reactor coolant system in the 22 training room B presentations right? 23 A Yes. [/) N 24 Q Prior to that presentation in training 25 '(Continued on following page.)
1 Kelly 131 (~ - 2
~
room B when you told other people that you had 3 found boiling in the reactor coolant system, was 4 it greeted with a great yawn, a show of absolute 5 indifference by the people you discussed it with? ( 6 A I don't recall. 7 Q Is it your. impression as you sit here 8 today that you were the only person from B&W out 9 there who was surprised to find steam had formed 10 in the' reactor coolant system? e 11 THE WITNESS: Would you read that 12 - again, please? n_/ s 13 Q
~
Or do you just not know what the 14 reactions of the others were? 15 A I don't remember anyone else's reaction. 16 Q Do you remember meeting a ybody else 17 out at Davis-Besse who had figured oUt,that there 18 had been saturation before you told th'em that 19 you had discovered saturation? " 20 A I don't remember meeting anyone like that. 21 Q Is there anything in your notes of the ! 22 September 28th meeting that reflects the ! l
,23 occurrence of saturation was discussed at the l
O
%.)
24 meeting? 25 A No. i
1 Kelly 132 O' 2 Q How long did it take you to figure 3 out that there had been saturation? 4 A I suspected it as soon as I developed 5 the plots of RCS temperature and pressure and ( 6 then confirmed it when I superimposed the 7 saturation temperature onto those plots. 8 Q How long did it take you to do that? 9 A I don't remember. 10 Q Prior to your going out,to investigate 11 the Davis-Besse transient, had you ever been 12 told, orally or in writing, that the occurrence 13 of saturation is a symptom of a loss-of-coolant 14 accident? 15 A Yes. 16 Q How had you been so informed? 17 A It was part of my Navy training initially. 18 Q Was there anything in writing at B&W 19 that had restated that point, namely, that 20 saturation is a symptom of a loss-of-coolant 21 accident? 22 A I don't remember. , 23 Q Had you ever participated in 24 simulator training at B&W7 25 A Yes.
1 Kelly 133 O 2 Q Prior to the Davis-Besse transient? 3 A Yes. 4 Q Was there anything in your simulator 5 training that instructed you the occurrence of ( 6 saturation was a symptom of a loss-of-coolant 7 accident? 8 A I don't remember. 9 Q Is there anything that you learned 10 while you were at B&W that taught you that 4 11 saturation in the reactor coolant system is a 12 symptom of a loss-of-coolant accident? O 13 A Ever? a 14 Q Well, prior to Three Mile Island. 15 I better say, prior to Davis-Basse. 16 A Not that I can remember. 17 Q How did you discover that the 18 operators had terminated high-pressure' injection 19 when pressurizer level was rising the f'irst time? 20 A Looking at the plots we have been talking 21 about. L 22 Q Did any of the plots show high-- , 23 pressure injection flow? ['N 24 A Not flow rate, no. L) 25 Q What did they show regarding. 1 e
e 1 Kelly 134 1 2 high-pressure injection? 3 A We just put on the plots an arrow 4 corresponding to the time when the operator stopped ({ 5 high-pressure injection-(indicating). 6 Q You said that you learned from the
, 7 data that you were reviewing that they had 8 terminated high-pressure injection.
9 What data showed you that it had been 10 terminated? t 11 MR. KOLB: Objection as to form. 12 A I don't remember that input. (~1 s.- 13 . Q Let me re-ask the question I asked 14 you a few questions back. ' 15 liou did you learn that the operators 16 had terminated high-pressure injectio when 17 pressurizer water level was first ri~si,ng? 18 A I annotated the parameter plots 'of RCS 19 pressure and temperature and pressurizer level 1 20 with the sequence of events as-I was unraveling 21 it, and one of the arrows I put down there was 20 the operators had stopped high-pressure injection
- . 23 ~ corresponding to the time that that occurred.
24 Q I understand you are telling me that ( 25 .you put an arrow.on your sequence-of-events chart t
, _ ,_ . - . . - - . - - -- - -- <- ~- ~- ~ ^ * ' ~ ' '
1 Kelly 135 r^s -
)
2 to indicate the point in time at which the 3 operators first terminated high-pressure 4 injection. (, 5 A Yes. - 6 Q I also know from reading your 7 sequence of events that you placed that arrow at 8 a point in time that also corresponds to reactor , 9 coolant system pressure beginning to decline. 10 Did you deduce the factithat 11 high-pressure injection must have been turned off 12 at that point in time or did somebody tell you b k- 13 that that is what happened? 14 A I don't remember. 15 Q so you don't know-how you learned 16 that the operators turned off high-pressure 17 injection as pressurizer level was fir,st rising, 18 is that right? 19 A I don't remember how I learned t$at they 20 turned off high-pressure injection, that's right. 21 Q Did you discuss with people out at 22 Davis-Besse during your two full days of work 23 there your discovery that the operators had [') -%) 24 terminated high-pressure injection as pressurizer 25 water level was first rising?-
1 Kelly 136 O 2 A I don't remember. 3 Q How old is Fred Faist? 4 MR. KOLB: How old was he in 1977 or ( 5 how old is he now? - 6 A In either case, I don't know. 7 Q I,s he older than you? 8 A No. 9 Q How old are you? 10 A 37. e 11 Q Did you meet with anybody else other 12 than Fred Faist on the afternoon or evening of 13 the day you arrived? 14 A Not that I remember. 15 Q By September 28, 1977 you knew that j 16 the pilot-operated relief valve had failed in l 17 the open position; right? 18 A Yes. 19 Q Did you understand, then , that the 4 20 failure of the pilot-operated relief valve.to 21- close was-a key event? t - 22 A Yes. 23 Q Why was the failure'of the pilot-24 operated relief valve to close a key event? 25 A It contributed to the sequence of events of 4
-&e y ,, ,v- - -e - - . . ,
1 Kelly 137 O 2 the way the plant responded thermodynamically I 3 to the transient. In my mind that's what I mean 4 by " key event." ( 5 Q I don't want to get into Bo Derek 6 rankings of events, but when you say it 7 contributed to the sequence of events , that tends 8 to minimize it in my mind as just another small 9 blip on a time line. 10 Isn't it a fact that the failure of 11 the pilot-operated relief valve to close at 12 Davis-Besse was one of the most important events 13 in that transient? j 14 A Well, it wasn't the most important concern 1 15 that we had, s 16 I don't know what you mean by "the" , 17 most important event. , 18 Q The transient would have been a much
; 19 simpler transient if there had not been' a 20 failure of the pilot-operated relief valve, isn't 21 that true?
l L 22 A Yes. 23 Q There would have been no saturation [)
\_/
- 24 in the primary cooling system if the' pilot-operated relief valve had shut when it was supposed 25 i y 4 - -
+-r - y. - -
.. s .,
1 Kelly 138 O 2 to shut, isn't that right? 3 MR. KOLB: Assuming everything else 4 remained the same? 5 ( MR. SELTZER: Yes. 6 A Yes. 7 Q The failure in its open position led 8 to a loss-of-coolant accident at Davis-Besse, 9 isn't that right?
- 10 A Yes. ,
11 Q If other things remained the same, 12 and that valve had performed the way it was 13 designed to perform, there would not have been a k4 loss-of-coolant accident on September 24th, isn't 15 that true? 16 A Yes. l 17 Q Is-it an 'everyda/ occurrence to , i 18 have loss-of, coolant accidents in B&W-designed , 19 nuclear plants? ' 20 A No. 21 Q Was the failure of the pilot-operated 22 relief valve in its open position a principal 23 contributor to the loss-of-coolant accident on 24 September 24th? 25 A Yes.
1 Kelly 139 2 Q Prior to the Davis-Besse transient 3 had you ever heard of a pilot-operated relief 4 valve failing to function on a B&W-designed plant? { 5 A Not that I remember. 6 Q Did you believe that was a serious 7 thing to have a loss-of-coolant accident in a 8 B&W-designed plant?' 9 MR. KOLB: Any loss-of-coolant 10 accident or this one? i 11 MR. SELTZER: Any. 12 Q In the fall of 1977, did you s/ 13 understand it was a pretty serious thing to have 14 a loss-of-coolant accident in a B&W plant? 15 MR. KOLB: What does " serious" mean? 16 MR. SELTZER: Damn serious, very 17 serious. , 18 A Loss-of-coolant accidents, as I understand 19 them, in 1977 were very serious events." I didn't 20 consider a stuck-open PORV as a true loss-of-21 coolant accident because it could be isolated. 22 Q For 20 minutes this stuck-open 23 pilot-operated relief valve at Davis-Besse was [^') V 24 not isolated, was it? 25 A That's right.
1 Kelly 140 , rN - U 2 Q For 20 minutes the operators at that 3 plant didn't know they had a stuck-open 4 pilot-operated relief valve, did they? (. 5 A That's right. - 6 Q To your understanding, they believed 7 from indications they had in the control room . 8 from their computer alarm printout and from the 9 panel light showing valve position that the 10 pilot-operated relief valve was closed, isn't 11 that right? 12 MR. KOLB: Can you read the question, b V 13 please. 14 (Question read.) 15 A Prom the alarm printout and from the 16 indication of a light of the valve position, they 17 would have thought it was closed, but part of your
~
18 question said "from other indications in the 19 control room," and they had indication's' in the 20 control room that would have told them it was 21 open. 22 Q From the two indications that you 23 have just mentioned, the computer alarm printout (} 24 and'the light showing valve position, they would 25 have read that the valve was shut, is that right?
1 Kelly 141 2 A Yes. 3 Q Did you make any attempt after late 4 September 1977 to find out to what extent, if at 5 all, there had been prior failures of pilot-({ 4 , 6 operated relief valves? 7 A No. Not that I remember. 8 Q Did you take any steps to encourage 9 anybody else within B&W to investigate prior 10 failures of pilot-operated relief valves? 11 A No. 12 Q This valve had led to a 20-minute
, %- 13 undiscovered loss-of-coolant accident and you 14 took no steps to investigate whether there had 15 been other failures of pilot-operated relief 16 valves?
17 MR. KOLB: Objection as to, form. 18 He distinguished earlier between'a loss-19 of-coolant accident and this typ'e' of ) i l 20 event and you are now just passing over that , 21 and assuming that the two are the same. L 22 Q Would you like to hear the question 1 23 repeated? ! l i 24 A Yes, please. w/ 25- (Question read.)
-~ . _. .- _._. . _ _ . . _ . _ - . _ _ _
1 Kelly 142
-\
2 A That's correct. 3 (Recess taken.) 4 BY MR. SELTZER: 5 Q Have you ever participated in any {' 6 discussion with other B&W personnel regarding why 7 B&W did not do anything to study pilot-operated 8 relie f valve failures after the Davis-Besse event? 9 MR. KOLB: Objection as to form. 10 You didn't ask him whether anybody studied 11 it, you asked whether he studied it. 12 MR. SELTZER: I thought I had asked n/ s_ 13 him what you are implying I didn't. 14 Q Do you know whether anybody at B&W 15 studied pilot-operated relief valve failures 16 after the Davis-Besse transient? 17 A I don't know. , 18 Q Now, let me put the last question. 19 Did you have any discussion's after the 20 Davis-Besse transient-with any B&W people 21 regarding why B&W did not investigate other 22 pilot-operated relief valve failures?. 23 MR. KOLB: Objection as to form, i 24 You are assuming he did not, based on an 25 answer the witness gave that indicated'he I l
1 Kelly 143 fh G 2 didn't know whether they had or not. 3 MR. SELTZER: Fine. 4 MR. KOLB: So the question is ( 5 inappropriate. 6 MR. SELTZER: I will ask it subject 7 to later connection. 1 8 A I don't remember any such conversations. 9 BY MR. SELTZER: 10 Q I take it you know today,that there 11 had been other failures of pilot-oper,ated relief 12 valves to operate as designed which had occurred O 13 prior to the Davis-Besse event, is hat right? 14 A Yes. 15 Q When for the'first time did you 16 learn that there had been other failures of . 17 pilot-operated relief valves to function as 18 designed? 19 A After Three Mile Island. 4 20 Q Is it correct that after the Three 21 Mile Island accident, B&W has recommended to-the 22 operators of its nuclear plants that they install 4 23 devices for more accurate indication of the (,j\ ~ 24 position of the pilot-operated relief valve? 25 A I don't know.
1 Kelly 144 2 Q Are you aware that B&W has developed 3 more accurate ways of monitoring the position 4 of the pilot-operated relief valve since the 5 ( Davis-Besse transient? - 6 A Yes. 7 Q Do you know that at some point in 8 time since the Davis-Besse transient B&W has 9 communicated to the operators of its nuclear 10 plants recommendations regarding better ways to 11 monitor the position of the pilot-operated relief 12 valve? 13 MR. KOLB: Would you read that back, 14 please? 15 (Question read.) 16 A I don't recall that. 17 Q How do you know that B&W h,as 18 developed more accurate ways to monitor the PORV since the Davis-Besse transient?
~
19 20 A I remember a conversation with a' man in 21 the Nuclear Service Department named Jim Veenstra L 22 who talked to me about an acoustic monitor for 23 monitoring positive PORV valve indication { [(- l 24 that B&W was developing, but I don't know if'that 25 was marketed.or how or processed. i e .
+ , -
l l 1 Kelly 145 I (~) 2 Q Do you remember when he discussed that 3 with you? 4 A No. 5 Q Do you remember approximately when? ({ 6 A No. 7 Q When you say it was an acoustic 8 device, do you mean it was a device that would 9 listen for the sound of rushing steam or water 10 through the valve body or the tailpipe to 11 determine whether the valve was open? 12 A Yes. O (- 13 Q on September 28th you attended a 14 meeting with about 15 people at Davis-Besse and . 15 for a while you were plotting temperature, 16 pressure and pressurizer level. 17 What else were you doing'for the 20 18 to 24 hours that you were working out there? 19 MR. KOLB: I do not underst~and that. 20 Will you read it back, please? 21 MR. SELTZER: I am just asking him C 22 what he was doing. 23 MR. KOLB: I want to make sure we (~')
\_/.
24 know whe re we are in time. 25 (Question read.)
I Kelly 146 a O 2 MR. KOLB: What else was he doing on 3 that day, aside from those two things, the 4 meeting and the plotting? (j 5 MR. SELTZER: On those days, plural, 6 two days? 7 MR. KOLB: Both days? 8 MR. SELTZER: Yes. 9 BY MR. SELTZER: i 10 Q I am sure your counsel doesn't mean 11 Plotting in any sinister way. 12 MR. KOLB: Right. 13 A I was reviewing raw data. By that I mean 14 these alarm printouts and things like that that 15 we.were talking about, trying to extract out of 16 this information as much detail as I could as 17 to the sequence of equipment operation and the 18 thermodynamics of the' plant that progrissed
~
19 through the transient. T 20 Fred Faist and I were developing a 21 list of questions or concerns that we felt had 22 to be, answered and we were doing that in 23 conjunction with Lynchburg over telephone calls 24 as to questions we would ask. If the re even was a (} 25 question about it and.it was worthy of a concern, . N, n, s - .r --c-r- ,,r w w + + , ,. +,
, \ k
- 1q 1 Kelly 147 O
V 2,. we would add it to the list. s
' ,.c' 3 That's what I spent the entire two
. is t ?
. s, .
T 4 days doing, was sorting through hard data. By (
! s 5 that I mean pappr copies.of mechanical printouts, g }
ym E 6 of\various sorts, graphs, charts, with the ' 7 exception of this, ceting. s ,
, i s'
^
. 8 Q Weretyou working closely with Fred [ g Fais,t throughout c, hose two days? T F a t A Yes.*
- 10. l 1? 3
'a r, 11 h Q 1 Werehyou discussing the' data that you' N .L \ '
12
..I were reviewing withDred throughout those two 13 dpys?
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+
- 3 J% k AL
' {
}14 Yes. ,
s 15 Q . Wbre you discussing the\ conclusions
- n. x , ,
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;S that you were drawing aboutM he sequence of y 17 events and what events had, transpire'd with Fred N t i y s, a g g ,s .
.18 Faist th ro,ughou t tho s e ,;t*'o k s.N '
, y> ayws ? , 'N
(, I l9 A Yes; \*A t'
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g7- ?' 20 Q Sc you would haye discr.ssed,with7him p . < <s
\. g s 21 that you had dist:ove ed saturatio47 r.
(- 33. - A Yes. 4
- . g i 23 Q And yoe would have discussedswith Fred
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41.g s ' (7 () >, 24 1 Faist that you hapNdiscovered' operator k "A 5
- 4. r I' 25 terminktion^ofhigh-pressure injection in 8 A,
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da s . r i Kelly 148 f 2 response to the first rise in pressurizer water 3 level?
\ ,
4 A Or at the same time as the first rise of ( 5 pressurizer water level. 1 6 Q Yes? 7 A Yes. t 8 Q Are you a licensed operator? 9 A No longer. 10 Q Have you held an NRC nuclear plant 11 license?
~
12 A No. s 13 Q Have you ever had a license to 14 operate nuclear plants? 15 A Yes. 16 Q When and where? 17 A I was qualified to operate Naval. nuclear 18 power plants when I was in the Navy. 19 Q How extensive was your tra[ning 20 before September 24, 1977 in the operation of 21 B&W nuclear plants? 22 A I had read and developed test procedures, 23 I had undergone some simulator instruction on how O ( ,; 24 the plant operates, I read some operating 25 procedures i I observed power ope rations at l
}
L. -
s I Kelly 149 2 Cyrstal River, and I did power escalation testing 3 at Crystel Rivor. !/ 4 1 Q Except.for not having an NRC operator's n: ( 5 licence, do you.believe you had the training to I 6 be a control room operator in the fall of 1977? 7 MR. KOLB: Would you read that back, i j ,,
, 8 please.
9 (Question read.) 10 MR. KOLB: Do you mean was his 5 11 training the equivalent of the full training I 12 of an operator of a B&W plant, is that what O 13 you are saying? 14 MR. SELTZER: No. 15 MR. KOLB: What do you mean? 16 Q I am saying, do you believe you had 17 the mental and physical preparedness and 18 knowledge to be a CRO or control room operator 19 in the fall of 19777 20 MR. KOLB: How is that different 21 -from having the full knowledge that a 22 trained operator had? I don't understand. 23 MR. SFLTZER: " Full knowledge"I will ( '24 take. 25 MR. KOLB: Equivalent to the trained
i 1 Kelly 150 2 operators in the B&W plants? 3 MR. SELTZER: No, I would like my 4 question better than yours. { 5 MR. KOLB: Your question wasn't clear. 6 MR. SELTZER: Read him my question, 7 please. 8 (Question read. ) . 9 A No. 10 BY MR. SELTZER: e 11 Q What were you lacking? 12 A I don't feel I had enough balance of plant 13 training or experience outside of the nuclear 14 steam supply system. I don't believe I had i 15 enough capability or emergency training and I i 16 don't think I would have had -- would have had 17 enough information on how the integrated control
~
18 system worked to feel comfortable with the
~
19 operating. 20 Q Were there B&W site personnel assigned 21 to Davis-Besse on September 24, 1977 who were 22 licensed control room operators? , 23 A I don't know. 2 - 24 Q Was Fred Faist a licensed operator? 25 A No.
l 1 Kejly 151 ) l
'( 2 Q When did you come to the conclusion 3 that the termination of high-pressure injection 4 4 as pressurizer water level was first rising was 5 not the correct thing for the operators to have
{ 'l 6 done? j 7 A I don't remember. 8 Q Do you believe that you had reached 9 that conclusion in your own mind before.you made
< 10 the training room B presentation? s.
11 MR. KOLB: The one to the large group? 12 MR. SELTZER: Right. O' 13 A I had enough doubts to bring it up during 4 ) 14 the discussion. [ a 15 Q Eut you weren't sure that it was the 4 , l 16 appropriate thing for the operators to have i 17 done at the time you brought it up for, discussion 18 in training room B, that is what you aie saying? 19 A Not absolutely, yes. 20 Q Had anybody with whom you had spoken 21' out at the Davis-Besse plant, including Fred (c 22 Faist, taken the position in front of you that 23 they thought there was.no dispute that the 24 ' operators' action in terminating high-pressure [\_)/ . 25 injection as-the pressurizer water level was
. _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . __ . - ,_. _- _ . _ . ~ _ __ . _ . . _ . _. ,.
1 Kelly 152 2 first rising was clearly and unambiguously the 3 wrong thing for the operators to have done? 4 A I don't remember that, no. (; 5 Q Do you recall- anybody else saying 6 to you that they thought that what the operators 7 had done in terminating high-pressure injection i 8 at that time was wrong? 9 MR. KOLB: At any time or at 10 Davis-Besse when he was there? _ 11 MR. SELTZER: Let me phrase it so it 12 is clear. 13 Q At any time before the training room B 14 presentation, do you recall anyone saying to
! 15 you that they believed the operator termination 16 of high-pressure injection as the pressurizer 17 level was first rising was wrong? .
18 A No, I don't remember anyone saying that.
~
19 Q You don't recall anyone saying that 20 at the September 28th meeting at Davis-Besse, 21 is that right? 22 A That's right. 23 Q Would you look at the second page of I V* 24 GPU Exhihit 148, please. 25 What is that?
,. = 7
1 Kelly 153 b i V 2 A It appears to be the cross-section of the 3 pilot-operated relief valve. 4 Q And given its position in this memo, ( 5 would it be your conclusion that this is a 6 cross-section of the Crosby pilot-operated relief 7 valve at the Davis-Besse plant? 8 MR. KOLB: Well, I will not let him 9 deduce. If he knows, he can tell you. 10 A I don't know. 11 Q Am I correct that Davis-Besse has a 12 Crosby pilot-operated relief valve? 13 MR. KOLB: At the time in 19777 14 MR. SELTZER: Yes. 15 A I don't remember. 16 Q Is the valve that is depicted on this 17 page similar in design to the pilot-operated 18 relie f valve that was in Three Mile Island Unit 2
~~
19 on that fateful day in March 19797 20 A I don't know. 21 Q Have you seen a diagram of the TMI-2 22 pilot-operated relief valve? 23 A Not that I remember. 24 MR. SELTZER: I would like to mark as 25 GPU Exhibit 151 a memorandum from Mr. Kelly a
I Kelly 154 i (~N
= 2 to J. A. Lauer, October 24, 1977, the 3 subject: Report on Depressurization j 4 Event, Section 1.
i () 5 (Memorandum from Mr. Kelly to J. A. 6 Lauer dated October 24, 1977, subject: 7 Report on Depressurization Event, Section 1, 8 was marked GPU Exhibit 151 for identification, 9 as of this date.) 10 Q Is GPU Exhibit 151 a copy of a l 11 memorandum which you circulated on or about 12 October 24, 1977? 13 A Yes. I , 14 Q You say that you developed a 15 description of the Toledo Edison event based on i 16 five inputs. 17 Is input No. 4 the two pages of notes , 18 that were part of GPU Exhibit 148? 19 A Yes. l 20 Q Did you take any other notes while 21 you were out there at Davis-Besse? 22 , A Yes. 23 Q Where are they?
~T
[d 24 A The other two pages of this exhibit. 25 MR. KOLB: The witness was pointing J
1 Kelly 155 ( (~')' 2 to Exhibit 148, 3 THE WITNESS: 148, yes, sorry. 4 Q Where is the temperature, pressure, (( j 5 pressurizer level and the saturation line plot 6 that you developed when you were out at Davis-7 Besse? 8 A They are in the site problem report for 9 the event. 10 Q That's SPR 372? 11 A Yes. 12 Q It is not part of GPU Exhibit 151? (- i !
's / 13 A I don't see them in there, no.
14 Q The second and third pages of GPU 15 Exhibit 151 are a sequence of events; right? 16 A Yes. 17 Q Did you write that?
~
18 A Yes. 19 Q Let me show you what has previously 20 been marked as GPU Exhibit 133 for 21 identification, which is the site problem report 22 for the Davis-Besse September 24, 1977 transient, l 23 dated October 11, 1977.
,9
( v'
) 24 Is GPU Exhi.b i t 133 a document which 25 l you recognize as a copy of the site problem 11
l l 1 l Kelly 156 O 2 report for the Davis-Besse September 1977 3 transient as transmitted on October 11, 19777 4 MR. KOLB It would seem to me that i { 5 you would want the witness just to identify 6 the document as apparently that document, 7 that that would be one thing. 8 If you want him to go through here 9 and do a line-by-line check, I am sure it 10 *would take us much longer and probably 11 that would not be possible, so it is just 12 general identification you want without 13 vouching for every word or every mark? 14 MR. SELTZER: Yes.
; 15 A Yes.
16 Q Who was responsible for the overall t 17 preparation of thic SPR, site problem , report? 18 A I don't remember. i 19 Q What group at B&W was generally 20 responsible for the preparation of site problem i 21 reports in 197.7? i (. 22 MR. KOLB: Objection as to form. The 23 question assumes there would be one. group. ( 24 MR. SELTZER: Right. 25 Q You may answer.
, u . , , , , - . , - . , , -.,,-----,_y- , -
,. ~ , ,.,7
1 Kelly 157 O 2 A Nuclear Service. 3 Q What particular group within Nuclear 4 Service? ( 5 A I don't know. - 6 Q Field Services? 7 A I don't know. . 8 Q Did you review the Davis-Besse SPR 9 before it was circulated on October 11, 19777 10 A I don't remember. t 11 Q Who prepared the cover sheet which 12 is on top of GPU Exhibit 1337 s/ 13 MR. KOLB: The first page of the 14 exhibit? 15 MR. SELTZER: Right. 16 MR. KOLB: I just might note for the 17 record that our copies are a bit _ faint. It 18 is not easy to read all of the writing 19 on the first page. By "our," I m'ean those 20 the witness and I have, i 21 MR. SELTZER: Yes. 22 A I can't read the name. I don't know. 23 Q Which name would tell you who had ( 24 prepared the first page? 25 A To my knowledge , 'it would be " Reply and l
1 Kelly 158 O 2 return this transmittal to" and then colon, and 3 then someone signed it there. 4 MR. SELTZER: Off the record. 5 ( (Discussion off the record.) 6 Q Is there somebody name? Pine or 7 Pines in Nuclear Service? 1 8 Was there at that time? 9 A The name doesn't sound familiar to me. 10 would you turn to the page that has Q 11 been numbered in the lower right-hand corner i 12 15 of 85. This looks like somebody infringing
-13 on your turf, labeling this " Basic Sequence of 14 Events."
15 Do you know who was contributing 16 these 13 items as part of the sequence of events 17 included in the SPR, GPU Exhibit 133?. 18 MR. KOLB: I take it that the question 19 can be answered without acceptindyour 20 preamble about someone -- 21 MR. SELTZER: Trespassing. 22 MR. KOLB: -- trespassing? 23 MR. SELTZER: Right. 24 MR. KOLB: Can we do that? 25 MR. SELTZER: I was just referring.to
1 Kelly 159 2 the old forms of pleading, trespass on the 3 turf. 4 MR. KOLB: Can you answer the question 5- without the preamble? (( 6 A I don't remember who wrote this page. 7 Q Do you recall that this page was part 8 of the SPR as it was circulated in October? 9 A I don't remember. 10 Q Do you recognize the handwriting at 11 all? 12 A No, I do not. 13 Q Would you recognize Fred Faist's ( 14 handwriting? 15 A No. 6 16 Q So this could be Fred's and you just 17 wouldn't know it? , 18 A Yes. 19 Q Is GPU Exhibit 133 a documint which 20 you have previously seen? 21 A Yes. (i gg Q Did you get a copy of it in October 23 of 19777 24 A I don't remember getting it. 25 Q When do you. recall reviewing it? l-
1 Kelly 160 0 2 A I must have reviewed it before I wrote 3 my October 24th, 1977 memo to Joe Lauer. 4 Q Why do you say that? 5 A Because I listed it as an input used to ( 6 this, to my sequence of events. 7 Q In preparing your sequence of events, 8 do you believe you used the sequence of events' 9 that appears on page 15 of 85 in GPU Exhibit 133? 10 A I don't remember using this page. 11 Q Will you take a moment to review the 12 contents of that page.
\d) 13 MR. KOLB: Off the record.
14 (Discussion off the record.) 15 A O.K. 16 Q Do the details that are outlined on 17 page 15 of 85 of GPU Exhibit 133 marked for 18 identification accurately record the facts as you 19 were familiar with them from your examination of 20 the Davis-Besse transient? 21 MR. KOLB: The witness has had the f k 22 opportunity to simply read down this page 23 very quickly and if you are asking him for 24 the kind of verification that your question 25 implies, it seems to me he would be wel,1
1 Kelly 161 l 2 advised to make a more extensive study of l 3 it just to be certain. 4 And since we are at about the time i 5 we should be quitting, I suggest we resume ( 6 and take this matter up tomorrow morning. 7 MR. SELTZER: Let me ask as a 8 preliminary -- 9 BY MR. SELTZER: 10 Q was there anything in there as you 11 read it over for a few minutes that struck you as 12 wrong? (3 13 MR. KOLB: That's the same problem. 14 MR. SELTZER: I am still allowed to 15 ask him. 16 MR. KOLB: That's just a different 17 way of putting it. , 18 You will have to give him an
. 19 opportunity to make an extensive' study of 20 it to be certain.
21 Q Do you believe you need an extensive L 22 opportunity to study it in order to answer my 23 question? f)D 24 A I think I would have to review this against. 25 what I came up with in my sequence of events
-c J . ~ , . _ 4'
'l Kelly 162 2 within this to be able to tell you whether I 3 thought this was still accurate.
4 MR. KOLB The witness was comparing (, 5 the document Exhibit 133 to 151. 6 Q Let me just focus on item 9 on page 7 15 of 85, rather than on the entire document. 8 Item 9 says " Pressurizer level 9 indication exceeded 320 inches. Established 10 maximum letdown, no effect on level." 11 Do you see that? I 12 A Yes. 13 Q Is it your understanding that at the 14 Davis-Besse plant on September 24th during their 15 transient the operators did establish maximum 16 letdown?
, 17 MR. KOLB Are you asking him whether 18 he knows that apart from what-he is reading
~
19 here? 20 MR. SELTZER: Yes, of course. 21 MR. KOLB: You say "yes, of course," 22 but you know most of his answers, as we 23 have agreed before, have been based on ('*[
%J 24 information received rather than direct 25 knowledge, and what he received could have
. .. .. - . . . _ . _ , .-- ~
j 1 Kelly 163 2 well included the site problem report. 3 MR. SELTZER: I apologize. 4 BY MR. SELTZER: ( 5 Q Is it your understanding today from l 6 whatever sourcs that during the Davis-Besse 7 transient the operators did establish maximum - 8 letdown? 9 A This is the only source I remember seeing 10 it in, Exhibit 133. u 11 Q You have no independent recollection 12 of that fact? i 13 A No. 14 Q Would you be able to review any of 15 the charts or plots or data that are contained o.
, 16 in the site problem report to verify whether the 17 operators had established maximum letd,own during 18 the transient?
19 A Letdown flow rate and letdown val've positions 20 are not normally regarded as variables. The 21 only source of input for something like that would 4 22 , be somebody writing down what the operator told 23 him.
. 24 Q So from that, which you draw from 25 your experience, are you concluding that this i
~
1 Kelly 164 O v 2 entry in item 9 on page 15 is an entry made by 3 somebody at B&W based on what someona in the 4 Davis-Besse control room had told them? (; 5 MR. KOLB: As I have said before, I 6 don't think you should call upon the witness 7 to deduce. If he knows the answer, whether 8 or not that's how the information was 9 . obtained, he can say so. 10 He has also given you an indication 11 in his prior answer what his general 12 experience was. It seems to me if you 13 want to ask him whether he knows, that's 14 an appropriate question. 15 MR. SELTZER: I think I am entitled 1G to his logical deductions based on his 17 experience. 18 MR. KOLB: I don't think y'ou are 19 entitled to a logical deduction 5s to a 20 specific fact. I think you can ask him 21 about his experience, you can ask him about L 22 specific awareness on his part as to the 23 facts, but you can't have him sit here and [s i/ 24 start to draw conclusions for you from 25 - other information that is not necessarily
I Kelly 165 O 2 the kind of information that he could 3 verify and even if he could verify it, I 4 don't think you are entitled.to a deduction. (l 5 MR. SELTZER: - I am entitled to his 6 understanding of documents which he received 7 in the regular course of business. 8 MR. KOLB: As I say, you can ask him 9 whether he knows where this information
.10 came from, that's perfectly all right.
11 MR. SELTZER: I would appreciate your 12 giving me permission to ask that. I think 13 I am entitled to ask something a little 14 further than that, Dan. i 15 MR. KOLB: That's where we disagree. 16 MR. SELTZER: I know, and I have also 17 done some research on-what the Southern 18 District believes are proper questions, on 19 when it is proper to instruct wi$nesses 20 not to answer, and I know that there is
, , 21 very stern authority saying that your i
4 s 22 personal beliefs as to whether a question is-23 proper or improper is not a proper basis ' () I < 24 for blocking examination unless you think l 25 that this rises to such a level of , l l i.
l i 1 Kelly 166 ! l U,, 2 harassment or infringes on privilege that 3 you want to go for a protective orders the 4 proper procedure in this district is to ( 5 object and your obiection is preserved. 6 MR. KOLB: We plainly disagree on 7 some of these matters. 8 MR. SELTZER: I don't know whether we 9 disagree enough that you are willing to 10 test it in front of Judge Owen. 11 MR. KOLB: I guess you will have to 12 try us.
\
MR. SELTZER: 13 Do you want to go to 14 Court on this? 15 MR. KOLB: I think it depends on what 16 you want to do next. 17 MR. SELTZER: All right, let me ask 18 the question.
~
19 BY MR. SELTZER: 20 Q Is it your understanding that the 21 entry" established maximum letdown" is an entry C 22 which was made based on a communication from 23 someone who was in the control room? 24 MR. KOLB Do you know? ( 25 Q That is your understanding, that's , 1 1
I I 's 1 Kelly 167 il i 2 the question. 1 3 A I don't know where that entry came from. 4 MR. SELTZER: Why don't we just 4 I
.() 5 suspend for the day.
i 6 (Time noted: 4:38 p.m.) , 7 8 - 9 JOSEPH JOHN KELLY, JR. 10 i. j 11 Subscribed and sworn to 1
- 12 before ma this day 13 of 1981. I o
14 15 l 16 i 17 i 18 '
- i i 19 1
20 ; 21 C. 22 1 i 23 i LO 24 25 s l-
g 168 U(~ 2 cggggg;cg;g 3 STATE OF NEW YORK )
- ss.:
4 c0UNTY OF NEW YORK ) 5 6 CHARLES SHAPIRO, I, C.S.R. , a 7
' Notary Public within and for the State of New York, 8
do hereby certify that the foregoing deposition 9 of JOSEPH JOHN KELLY, JR* was ,taken Defore 10 me on TUESDAY, MAY 4, 1981 ; 11 That the said witness was duly sworn 12 before the commencement of_ his testimony and 1 13 that the within transcript is a true record of said 14 testimeny; 15 That I am not connected by blood or 1G marriage with any of the parties herein,nor 17 a interested directly or indirectly in th$ matter in 18 controversy, nor am I in the employ of a'ny of the 19 counsel. 20 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set 21 my hand this I day of MM 1981. 22 O 23
\-
24 jf - CHARLES SHAPIRo, C .R. l 25
169 v I NDE X
.e f WITNESS PAGE Joseph John Kelly, Jr. 3 EXH I B I TS GPU FOR IDENTIFICATION g 148 Five-page document, Nos.
T10764 through T10768 26 149 Transcript of the Proceedings O,s of the President's Commission on the Three Mile Island ~ accident, July 18, 1979, from - the cover through page 63 46 150 Transcripts of Mr. Kelly' ,. testimony before the Kemeny Commission staff, July 7 and July 13, 1979 - 58 151 Memorandum from Mr. Kelly to J. A. Lauer dated October 24, 1977, subject: Report on ~ Depressurization Event, Section 1 154
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