ML20072H019
| ML20072H019 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 05/26/1983 |
| From: | Beckham J GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20072H009 | List: |
| References | |
| NED-83-304, NUDOCS 8306290265 | |
| Download: ML20072H019 (4) | |
Text
r Georgta Power Corrpany 333 Piedmou Avenue 9
At!anta. Georg a 30308 Telephone 404 526-7020 g y ";M,.I Ma'i,ng Add'ess ARAI' Post Offte Box 4545 g
Acanta. Georg a 30302 gdg p(( : l6 Georgia Power j
lt e SOGwern elect!C S/ Stem J. T. Beckham, Jr.
Vce Presidert and Gerara! Manager Nuclear Genesat.cn NED-83-304 May 26, 1983 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
REFERENCE:
Office of Inspection and Enforcement RII: JP0 Region II - Suite 2900 50-321, 50-366 101 Marietta Street, NW I&E Inspection Report Atlanta, Georgia 30303 83-07 ATTENTION:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly GENTLEEN:
Georgia Power Company (GPC) submits the following information in response to I&E Inspection Reports 50-321/83-07 and 50-366/83-07 concerning the routine inspection conducted by Mr. R. V. Crlenjak at Plant Hatch.
VIOLATION A:
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that procedures controlling the operation of safety-related systems be implemented and maintained.
Contrary to the above, on February 23, 1983, the inspector discovered that:
1.
Procedure H P-1-1500, Primary Containment Atmospheric Control System was not being properly implemented in that:
a.
Adjustable wrenches about (10 inches in length) were attached to the keys of key lock switches C61-534A & B in such a way as to hold the switches against the spring return.
This action overrides a high reactor pressure ( 840 psi) shutting signal to the 2" vent valves 1T48-F340 & IT48-F341.
HP-1-1500 in no way authorizes the action of using a mechanical override on the key lock switches.
b.
The chift foreman's (now known as shift supervisor) permission was not obtained prior to override with switches C61-534A & B as required by HP-1-1500, Section G Note.
2.
Procedure HP-34, Rules for Performing Procedures, was not being implemented in that:
a.
Paragraph B.2.
requires that verbatim compliance is mandatory.
HP 1500 was not being performed verbatim as stated above.
b.
Paragraph B.3. requires that if the procedure cannot be performed as written, stop and change the procedure.
HP-1-1500 was not stopped nor changed such that verbatim compliance could be met.
8306290265 830616 PDR ADDCK 05000321 G
PDR 1
k Georgia Power m U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II - Suite 2900 May 26, 1983 Page Two VIOLATION A (Continued) c.
Paragraph B.4.
requires individuals to notify your immediate supervisor of any procedure problems.
This was not done in that the shift supervisor did not know about the unauthorized use of mechanical override or that the override was in progress.
3.
Procedure HP-9, Procedure Writing, Use and Control, was not implemented in that no SRO change nor PRB review of a procedure change was obtained as required by HP-9.
The use of the wrenches to override spring force on switches constitutes an unauthorized procedure change.
4.
Procedure HP-1-1500 was not properly maintained in that the Section G Note, indicates that the switches C61-354A & B were to override a LOCA signal. These switches do not override a LOCA signal.
This is a Severity Level IV violation.
RESPONSE
Admission or denial of alleged violation: The violation occurred.
Reason for violation:
Personnel did not follow established controls as specified in plant procedures.
Corrective steps which have been taken and results achieved:
The adjustable wrenches that were attached to the keys of key lock switches C63-534A & B were removed.
Personnel involved in the incident were f
reprimanded for not following existing procedural controls.
To avoid further violations, Training Directive (0-83-09) was issued to licensed personnel on shift.
This directive emphasized the proper utilization of procedural controls, especially in reference to mechanical overrides of spring return switches.
Procedure HP-1-1500, Primary Atmospheric Control System, was revised to contain the proper information in the Section G note.
The HP-1-1500 revision was issued and implemented on April 28, 1983.
i Corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations:
Actions already taken are sufficient to avoid further violations.
Date when full compliance will be achieved:
Full compliance was achieved on February 23, 1983, when the adjustable wrenches being used to override key lock switches C61-534A and B were removed.
l ixns
E Georgia Power d U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II - Suite 2900 May 26, 1983 Page Three VIOLATION B:
Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that procedures controlling the operation of safety-related systems be implemented.
Plant procedure HNP-1-lll7, RHR service water, data package 1, requires that Division II manual isolation valve (IEll-F309D) be locked open and that RHR service water strainers be operated one on-line/one off-line per RHR rervice water loop.
Contrary to the above, on February 18, 1983, the Division II manual isolation valve was found by the inspector to be unlocked and on February 24, 1983, all four (2 per loop) RHR service water strainers were found by the inspector to be on line.
This is a Severity Level V violation.
RESPONSE
Admission or denial of alleged violation: The violation occurred.
Reason for violation:
Personnel misinterpreted the requirements of Plant Hatch procedure HP-1-lll7, Residual Heat Removal Service Water, in that they believed both lo? N of RHR service water could be on-litie at the same time, due to a mis *.r.terpretation of the valve lineup sheet.
Corrective steps which have been taken and results achieved:
The RHR service water valve lEll-F3090 (Division II Manual Isolation Valve) was locked as required.
The RHR service water strainers were returned to proper operation by taking one loop of strainers off-line.
Operations personnel were issued Training Directive 0-83-10 on May 9.
This directive described the violations cited in this I & E Report and emphasized valve locking requirements.
Procedures H P-1-lll7 and FNP-2-Ill7 were revised to clarify RHR service water system valve line-up requirements.
These procedure revisions were approved and implemented by March 28, 1983.
Corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations:
Valve handwheels at the intake structure that are required to be locked are being painted bright orange.
This will aid operations personnel in verifying valve line-up requirements.
Date when full compliance will be achieved:
Full compliance was achieved on February 24, 1983, when the RHR service water strainers were returned to proper operation.
70077$
Georgia Power b U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II - Suite 2900 May 26, 1983 Page Four If you have any further questions, please contact this office.
Yours very truly, f
=^
W. T. Beckham, Jr.
M3B/nb xc:
J. T. Beckham, Jr.
H. C. Nix, Jr.
J. P. O'Reilly (NRC-Region II)
Senior Resident Inspector 1
700775