ML20072G904
| ML20072G904 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1983 |
| From: | Silberg J CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20072G908 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8306290214 | |
| Download: ML20072G904 (12) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4
p Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of-
)
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC
)
Docket Nos. 50-440
- _al.
)
50-441 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, et (Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
APPLICANTS' ANSWER IN SUPPORT OF NRC STAFF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY
DISPOSITION ~
OF ISSUE NO. 13 On May 31, 1983, the NRC Staff
(" Staff") filed a Motion for Summary Disposition of Issue No.13.
Issue No. 13 concerns the risk of damage to safety-related targets at Perry Nuclear Power Plant ("PNPP") from turbine missiles.
The Staff as the basis for its motion references SER Supple-ment No. 3 (April 1983) ("SSER 3").
SSER 3 explains in detail why the Staff considers the turbine missile issue to be resolved for the purpose of issuing operating licenses for PNPP.
In SSER 3 the Staff establishes requirements for a turbine maintenance program for PNPP.
The program requirements are designed to prevent the generation of turbine missiles from either stress corrosion cracking failures or destructive over-speed failures of the PNPP turbines.
8306290214 830627 PDR ADOCK 05000440 G
. In order to prevent stress corrosion cracking turbine failures, the program requires inservice volumetric (ultrasonic) inspections for stress corrosion cracking at intervals no greater than approxi-mately three years, or every other refueling outage.
In order to prevent destructive overspeed failures, the program requires periodic testing of the overspeed protection system and testing and inspection of turbine steam valves.
As stated in SSER 3, Applicants will be required to follow the turbine maintenance program established by the Staff as a license condition.
In addition, Applicants will be required as a condition of their licenses within three years of startup to submit and obtain Staff approval of a turbine maintenance program based on recommendations of General Electric ("GE"), the PNPP turbine manufacturer.
The Staff is allowing three years for Applicants to propose a revised program because the Staff is aware of no turbine rotor which has failed from stress corrosion cracking within three years of startup and because no stress corrosion cracks have been observed in a GE turbine wheel with depths greater than one-half the critical crack depth calculated for that wheel.1!
1/
Intervenor Sunflower Alliance, Inc., et al.
(" Sunflower") in its Memorandum Contra NRC Staff's Motion for Summary Disposition of Issue No. 13, dated June 15, 1983, at 2,
" questions the legal substance" of the Staff's decision to allow Applicants up to three years to submit and obtain Staff approval of a revised turbine maintenance program.
Applicants are puzzled by Sunflower's asser-tion.
The Staff states that it is not aware of any turbine rotor which has failed from crack propagation within three years of l
(continued next page)
[
Applicants support the Staff's Motion for Summary Disposition o f Issue No. 13.
The attached Affidavit of D.P. Timo and L.H.
Johnson in Support of NRC Staff's Motion for Summary Disposition of Issue No. 13 ("GE Affidavit"), together with the attached Affidavit of Edward J.
Turk in Support of NRC Staff's Motion for Summary Disposition of Issue No. 13
(" Turk Affidavit"), confirm that PNPP will be protected against the generation of turbine missiles both from destructive overspeed and stress corrosion cracking.
As described in detail in the GE Affidavit, 118-29, each PNPP turbine-generator has an electrohydraulic Mark II overspeed protection system designed to prevent destructive overspeed of the turbine.
The overspeed protection system consists of a normal overspeed protection system and an emergency overspeed protection system, which are two essentially independent and redundant systems.
Id. at 117.
There has never been a destructive overspeed turbine failure with the Mark II or any other GE nuclear unit turbine control system.
Id. at 18.
1/
startup and that, within that three year period, no cracks have been observed in GE turbine wheels with depths greater than l
one-half the critical crack depth.
Sunflower offers no evidence to refute the accuracy of these statements.
While Sunflower characterizes the Staff's statements as " undocumented,"
Sunflower does not explain how the Staff would prove a negative to Sunflower's satisfaction.
Neither does Sunflower explain why these statements are not an adequate basis for the Staff's decision to allow Applicants three years to submit a revised program.
Sunflower thus raises no genuine issue of material fact with respect to the t'me for submitting a revised turbine maintenance program.
l l
l t
i
. The Turk Affidavit, at 114-5, outlines Applicants' commit-ment to a program for testing of the overspeed protection system and testing and inspection of turbine steam valves.
Applicants have committed to a testing regime more conservative than the monthly testing required by the Staff.
Id. at 14.
Applicants have also committed to a detailed program for testing and inspec-tion of turbine steam valves.
Id. at 15.
This program, which is essentially identical to the Staff's requirements in SSER 3, includes weekly exercising of turbine steam valves as well as periodic dismantling and inspection of such valves.
Id.
The GE Affidavit, at 1137-49, also describes the nuclear wheel evaluation procedure which GE has developed as the basis for recommending inspection intervals for stress corrosion cracking.
The evaluation procedure involves several steps.
First, the critical crack depth is estimated for each wheel using linear elastic fracture mechanics.
Id. at 1140-47.
Second, ini-tial crack depths are determined.
Id. at 148.
Even though the PNPP units are not yet inservice, it is conservatively assumed that cracks will initiate in the fourth and fifth stage low pres-sure wheels on startup.
Id.
Third, an estimate of the time for cracks to grow to a limiting crack depth (the critical crack depth or 2-1/2", whichever is smaller) is made.
Id. at 149.
Finally, a recommended inspection interval is chosen based on calculations that no existing crack will reach teh critical size before the next inspection.
Id. at 17.
l
. On the basis of its wheel evaluation procedure, GE recom-mends inspection intervals of three years for all Unit 1 wheels and six years for all Unit 2 wheels.
Id. at f55.
The actual calculated intervals were longer for both units but were rounded down to correspond to ne projected refueling outage schedule.
Id.
The GE calculations and recommendations show that the inspection intervals required by the Staff in SSER 3 are conservative, in the case of Unit 2 by more than a factor of two.
In its response to the Sta,ff's motion, at 1, Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy ("OCRE") argues that the motion is pre-mature since the Staff has not reviewed an analysis to be sub-mitted by GE on turbine missile probabilities.
The issue is not, however, whether additional information is to be submitted by Applicants (or their vendors) and reviewed by the Staff.
The issue is whether OCRE shows that there is a genuine issue of material fact to be litigated.
The Staff's motion shows that there are no safety issues to be litigated on turbine missiles at Perry.
This conclusion is amply supported by the affidavits accompanying Applicants' Answer.
That Applicants will be submitting further information which may lead to a relaxation of the inspection intervals imposed by the Staff in SSER 3 is simply irrelevant.
This situation is analogous to the resolution of " unresolved generic safety issues," where the applicant may justify operation (or construction) of the facility notwithstanding the anticipated submittal of further analysis of the particular safety issue.
. Virginia Electric Power Company (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-491, 8 N.R.C. 245 (1978).
~
OCRE argues, at 2, that "new data and research on a newly emerging problem may disclose information invalidating the Staff's assumptions and conclusions".
It is always the case that new data and research may emerge.
If OCRE's analysis were to be adopted, no issue could ever be resolved.
OCRE has given no indication that new information sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact (or indeed any new information) is likely to emerge.
OCRE then cites to excerpts from two GE seminars on nuclear turbines.
OCRE concludes from this information that crack growth rates "are faster than previously assumed" and that the " exact mechanism (for cracking] is not understood".
Response at 2-3.
Applicants are at a loss to understand the relevance of the fact that GE now recognizes that cracks may grow faster than "previously assumed".
Since OCRE does not allege that GE's current analysis is based on its "previously assumed" crack growth rate, OCRE's comment is irrelevant.
Similarly, although GE may have stated in May 1982 that the " exact mechanism (for stress corrosion cracks]
is not understood", the conservative analytical techniques descri-bed in the GE affidavit envelop the phenomenon, whether or not the mechanism causing it is fully understood.
OCRE next argues that the data base is inadequate to draw the conclusions drawn by the Staff.
The GE Affidavit however shows that the Staff's conclusions are quite conservative for GE turbines.
No failures from stress corrosion cracking in GE turbines have
A
. ever occurred, GE Affidavit at 16, let alone within the three year period identified by the Staff and criticized by OCRE.
And no indications of probable stress corrosioh cracking greater than one-half inch (far below the critical crack depth) have been found in any BWR turbines of the kind installed at Perry, regardless of the number of years they have operated.
OCRE then attacks the Staff for " violating its own policy."
Response at 3-4.
OCRE's complaint seems to be that SSER 3 adopts a mechanism different from that used in a Regulatory Guide and the Standard Review Plan.
Since the Staff is bound by regulation and statute, not by other regulatory positions, OCRE is raising a non-issue, and clearly one which has no bearing on genuine issue of material fact.2!
OCRE's further speculation that the Staff is engaged in some nefarious plot "to relieve the financial burden on OL applicants" is no more than irresponsible rhetoric.
2/
OCRE's reference (unsupported by affidavit or other evidentiary basis) to a presentation by Heasler lacks any relevance to Perry.
Apart from the paucity of data identified by Heasler (four instances of operating speed failure), none involved nuclear units and none involved GE turbines.
OCRE has failed to explain why its one sentence quote has any relevance to Perry.
It would also appear from a comparison of the Heasler instances to Bush, "A Reassess-ment of Turbine-Generator Failure Probability", 19 Nuclear Safety 681 (1978), that all of these failures occurred during factory or preoperational tests.
3/
Ironically, OCRE's original basis for its turbine missile con-tention was the change in position which the Staff first announced in the SER.
OCRE now claims that this change in position was improper.
l
. In her affidavit, Ms. Hiatt argues that OCRE "cannot present at this time facts essential to justify its opposition to the Staff's Motion".
The reasons advanced in support of this pro-position are so far-fetched that they insult the intelligence of the Licensing Board.
OCRE first alleges that it would like to present a direct case on this issue and is trying to find expert witnesses and consultants.
OCRE filed its turbine missile conten-tion on August 18, 1982.
It has had some eleven months to " actively pursu [e] the acquisition of expert consultants and witnesses."
If OCRE has been unable to find competent technical assistance in the last eleven months, there is no assurance that it will have any better luck in the future.
OCRE has provided the Board with no reasons to expect that technical assistance will be forthcoming (or on what time schedule) or to explain why OCRE could not have obtained technical assistance during the preceding eleven months.A/
Ms. Hiatt then argues that OCRE has only recently received certain documents which it requested from the NRC Staff on April 5, 1983 and from Applicants on April 21, 1983, and that OCRE has not had adquate time to review these documents.
If OCRE has a problem, it is one of its own making.
The turbine missile conten-tion was admitted by the Board on October 29, 1982.
A discovery schedule set by the Board on January 5, 1983 established January 31, 1983 as the last day for initial discovery requests.
Tr. 800-1.
4/
Applicants note that in opposing OCRE's motion to admit a late-filed turbine missile contention, we pointed out the lack of any showing that OCRE had the technical expertise to aid in developing a sound record.
OCRE's present filing bears out Applicants' earlier concerns.
. OCRE wait,ed until-January 31, 1983 to file its first discovery request on Issue 13.
The Staff and Applicants answered on March 1 and 8, 1983, respectively.
OCRE did not submit any follow-up discovery.5/
OCRE's leisurely pace in undertaking discovery on this issue should not be allowed to defer the timely resolution of the Staff's summary disposition motion.
Ms. Hiatt's final argument is that " justice and Commission precedent demand that intervenors be given the time needed to prepare properly their case on Issue #13."
OCRE's argument and its citation to Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station), ALAB-212, 7 AaE.C. 986 (1974), both miss the mark.
In San Onofre, the Appeal Board held that the
" totality of the circumstances" justified a continuance.
Id. at 992.
However, the circumstances in San Onofre are a far cry from those which OCRE faced.
In San Onofre, the Appeal Board gave particular weight to the extremely short time -- seven weeks --
between the intervenors' admission to the proceeding and the start of evidentiary hearing.
Id.
The Appeal Board also noted that six safety issues (some " highly complex") were involved.
Id.
In San Onofre intervenors encountered obstacles in obtaining I
discovery.
Id. at 993.
If OCRE had any discovery obstacles, l
they were of its own making, especially by waiting until the last possible day to file its initial discovery request.
In f
5/
The Board set a deadline for follow-up discovery of seven days from the receipt of first-round answers.
Tr. 801.
t
. San Onofre, a deferral request worked no substantial prejudice on other parties.
Id.
Here, Applicants have been working hard to meet the regulatorily established schedules to answer the Staff's motion.
OCRE's attempt to defer would leave Applicants' position on the record, while giving it some undefined period to contem-plate the Staff's motion.
The final factor which the San Onofre Appeal Board found persuasive was that applicant there had sought
-- and obtained -- a deferral on one of the very same issues.
Id. at 994.
That situation is, of course, not present here.
The only argument that OCRE can make for " justice" is that it would like to delay a resolution of the Staff's motion.
OCRE has had more than ample opportunity to develop its case here.
Having failed to do so over the last eleven months, a further delay should simply not be tolerated.
In conclusion, there is no genuine issue of material fact to be heard with respect to turbine missiles at PNPP.
Nor has OCRE provided good cause for further delay in resolving this issue.
The Staff's Motion for Summary Disposition of Issue No.
13 should be granted.
Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE By:
A JAYS 2 ILBERG," P.C.
MIC E
A.
SWIGER Counse for Applicants 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 DATED: June 27, 1983 (202) 822-1000
June 27, 1983 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
)
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC
)
Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, et al.
)
50-441
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that copies of the foregoing " Applicants' Answer in Support of NRC Staff Motion for Summary Disposition of Issue No. 13" were served by deposit in the United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid, this 27th day of June, 1983, to all those on the attached Service List.
Id-1 6
JA ILBERG DATED:
June 27, 1983
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 4
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
')
~
)
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC
)
Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY
)
50-441
)
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Units 1 and 2)
)
t SERVICE LIST Peter B.
Bloch, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Jerry R.
Kline Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. Glenn O.
Bright James M. Cutchin, IV, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Executive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Legal Director Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Christine N.
Kohl, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Ms. Sue Hiatt Appeal Board OCRE Interim Representative U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8275 Munson Avenue Washington, D.C.
20555 Mentor, Ohio 44060 Dr. John H. Buck Terry J. Lodge, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing 824 National Bank Building Appeal Board Toledo, Ohio 43604 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Donald T. Ezzone, Esquire Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Gary J. Edles, Esquire Lake County Administration Center Atomic Safety and Licensing 105 Center Street Appeal Board Painesville, Ohio 44077 i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 John G. Cardinal, Esquire Prosecuting Attorney Atomic Safety and Licensing Ashtabula County Courthouse Board Panel Jefferson, Ohio 44047 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
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