ML20072G697
| ML20072G697 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/23/1983 |
| From: | Letsche K KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20072G705 | List: |
| References | |
| ISSUANCES-OL-3, NUDOCS 8306280601 | |
| Download: ML20072G697 (174) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5
JUN 2 71983* $
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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,7 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing B r
ro '
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docke t No. 50-322-oL-S
)
(Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Unit 1).
)
)
)
Chnsolidated Draft Emergency Planning Contentions 4
j June 23, 1983 Herbert H.
Brown Lawrence Coe Lanpher Karla J.
Letsche t
Christophe!
M.
McMurray Michael S.
Miller KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 0306200601 830623 PDR ADOCK 05000322
,s, O
r TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION.................................................
1 I.
SUFFOLK COUNTY CONTENTIONS...............................
3 SC Contention 1:
Command and Control........................
6 SC Contention 2:
Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ")...........
14 SC Contention 3: Ac c id e n t As s e s sme n t........................ 20 SC Contention 4:
Adequacy of Protective Actions............
28 4.A:
Individual Protective Actions.......................
31 4.B:
Sheltering..........................................
32 4.C:
Evacuation..........................................
38 4.C-1: Selective Evacuation.............................
39 4.C-2: Evacuation Time Estimates........................
40 4.C-3: Removal of Obstacles from the Roadway and Provisions for Fuel..............................
57 4.C-4:
Evacuation of Persons with Special Needs........
62 4.C-4(a): People Withou t Access to Ca rs..............
6 4 4.C-4(b):
School Children............................
70 4.C-4(c):
People in Special Facilities..............
77 4.C-4(d):
Handicapped People at Home.................
82 4.C-5:
Relocation Centers..............................
87 4.C-6:
Evacuation of Areas Close to the Plant..........
93 4.D:
Food, Milk, Water and Livestock Control............
95 4
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SC Contention 5:
Emergency Operations Center..............
100 SC Contention 6:
Security.................................
102 SC Contention 7:
Medical and Public Health Support........
106 SC Contention 8:
Communications...........................
107 A.
Initial Notification of Emergency Personnel..........
107 B.
Communications Among Emergency Personnel Following Initial Notification..................................
111 C.
Initial Notification to the Public and to Special Facilities Within the EPZ.............................
115 SC Contention 9:
Public Notification /Information.......... 122 SC Contention 10:
Public Education........................
125 SC Contention 11:
Training................................
132 A.
Initial Training of Emergency Response Personnel...... 132 B.
Retraining of Emergency Response Personnel............
140 C. Drills and Exercises for Emergency Response Personnel. 140 SC Contention 12:
Recovery and Reentry....................
143 i
l SC Contention 13:
State Emergency Plan....................
150 l
II.
SOC CONTENTIONS.......................................
151 SOC Contention 1:
Protection of Disadvantaged l
and Minority Populations..................................
151 A.
School Children......................................
151 B.
Illiterate Persons and the blind.....................
153 C.
The hearing-impaired.................................
154 l
D.
Non-English speaking persons.........................
154 SOC Contention 2:
Loss of Offsite Power..................
155 A.
Inadequate Facilities................................
156.
I B.
Notification at LERO Personnel.......................
156 C.
Notification of the public...........................
157 D.
Implementation of protective actions.................
158 SOC Contention 3:
Loss of Reliable Telephone Service...................................................
162 A.
Public notification..................................
162 B.
Notification of LERO Personnel.......................
163 C.
Implementation of protective services................
164 SOC Contention 4:
Staffing...............................
165 SOC Contention 5:
Bad weather............................
167 A.
Notification of the public...........................
167 B.
Protective actions..................................
168 I
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e UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322
)
(Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Unit 1).
)
)
)
Consolidated Draft Emergency Planning Contentions INTRODUCTION I
Pursuant to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Orders of April 20, 1983
(" Memorandum and Order Denying Suffolk Coun-ty's Motion to Terminate the Shoreham Licensing Proceeding,"
LBP-83-22, 17 NRC
),
May 5, 1983
(" Order Confirming Ad-justment in Schedule to File Contentions" (unpublished)), May 1
12, 1983
(" Order Directing Change of Service on Emergency Plan-ning Submissions" (unpublished)), and June 10, 1983 (" Order Limiting Scope of Submissions" (unpublished)), Intervenors Suffolk County ("SC"), Shoreham Opponents Coalition
(" SOC"),
North Shore Committee ("NSC") and the Town of Southampton !
l j
O 6
submit the following draft emergency planning contentions.
The "LILCO Plan" to which the contentions refer is the so-called "LILCO Transition Plan," consisting of the following documents:
"SNPS Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan,"
Revision 0, with blue-colored inserts identified as "LILCO Transition" (herein referred to as the "LILCO Plan" or the
" Plan");
"SNPS Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Suffolk County, Appendix A Evacuation Plan," with gold-colored inserts (herein referred to as " Appendix A");
"SNPS Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures," Revision O, Volumes I and II, with blue-colored inserts identified as "LILCO Transition" (herein referred to as "OPIPs"); and
" Emergency Procedures -- Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (Revised)" (herein referred to as "Information Brochure").
This submission is organized as follows:
l Section I -- Suffolk County contentionsSection II -- SOC contentions Town of Southampton contentions are contained in a separate filing; NSC joins in the contentions filed by Suffolk County, SOC and the Town of Southampton.
8 D
The shortness of time allowed for the submission of draf t con-tentions made it impossible to consolidate fully the Interve-nors' contentions.
If additional integration of the Interve-nors' contentions is appropriate, it will be accomplished prior to the filing of final contentions.
Similarly, due to time constraints, the Intervenors cannot be certain that all necessary contentions have, in fact, been prepared in draft form.
The Intervenors will endeavor to en-sure that the compilation of contentions is complete by the time for submission of final contentions.
I.
SUFFOLK COUNTY CONTENTIONS Suffolk County's position is that the offsite emergency plan proposed by LILCO, which requires LILCO employees to per-form all necessary command and control functions as well as all other emergency functions (with some assumed assistance from voluntary organizations), cannot be implemented.
LILCO possesses neither the authority nor the capability necessary to prepare or implement a plan that can adequately protect the public in the event of an emergency.
The County believes, therefore, that LILCO has not complied and cannot comply with the requirements of 10 CFR Section 50.47.
The County is submitting draft contentions which focus on particular inadequacies in LILCO's proposed Plan.
These -_
contentions document LILCO's inability to meet the requirements of the NRC's regulations.
The contentions are organized by general subject matter as follows:
Contention 1:
Command and Control Contention 2:
Emergency Planning Zone Contention 3:
Accident Assessment Contention 4:
Adequacy of Protective Actions Contention 5:
Emergency Operations Center Contention 6:
Security Contention 7:
Medical and Public Health Support Contention 8:
Communications Contention 9:
Public Notification /Information Contention 10: Public Education Contention 11: Training Contention 12: Recovery and Reentry Contention 13: State Emergency Plan.
Each contention contains an introduction, followed by several separate sections or subparts which are, in reality, separate contentions.
The contention introductions thus apply to each of the subpart contentions, but for the sake of brevi-l ty, were stated only once.
The same convention was followed with respect to subdivisions contained in the subpart conten-j tions.
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LILCO has recently revised its onsite emergency plan, and the County received a copy on or about June 2, 1983.
The Coun-ty soon will be filing a Motion for Leave to File Contentions on the LILCO Onsite Plan; such contentions will address offsite aspects of onsite issues that were not capable of being liti-gated during the Phase I litigation in the fall of 1982.
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i SC Contention 1:
Command and Control 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.,
requires emer-gency plans to d; scribe "[t]he organizations for coping with radiological emergencies.
including definition of authorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency organization It further requires "[ildentification of the State and/or local officials responsible for planning for, ordering, and control-ling appropriate protective actions, including evacuations when necessary."
Appendix E,Section IV, A.8.
In the LILCO Transi-tion Plan, in place of " State and/or local officials," LILCO employees are identified as being responsible for " planning for, ordering, and controlling" the entire offsite emergency response.
All the command and control functions, as well as all management and coordination of the entire emergency re-sponse, are to be performed by various LILCO employees.
(Plan, at 3.3.1, OPIPs 2.1.1, 3.1.1, 3.6.1).
Thus, the "offsite authorities responsible for coordinating and implementing offsite emergency measures," with whom the LILCO onsite emer-gency coordinator must exchange information (see Appendix E,Section IV.A.2.c.), are fellow LILCO employees.
Suffolk County contends that there cannot and will not be "offsite emergency preparedness that p ovides reasonable l 4
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assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency" at Shoreham be-cause LILCO employees are not able to exercise the command and control responsibilities necessary to plan for, order, manage, coordinate and control appropriate protective actions.
- Thus, the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1),
50.47(b)(1) and Appendix E,Section IV.
Specifically, Suffolk County contends that:
A.
LILCO has no authority to exercise the police power which is delegated to local government officials by State law.
Indeed, New York law explicitly prohibits several of the actions which LILCO proposes to take under the Transition Plan, l
such as:
1.
Directing traffic (see OPIP 3.6.3, at 5-6, and r
Attachments 1 and 4 thereto; see also Appendix A
" Traffic Control," at IV-5 et seg.);
2.
Blocking roadways (id.);
l 3.
Setting up barriers in roadways, or channeling traffic (id.);
4.
Posting tratfic signs on roadways (see Appendix A, at IV-82);
5.
Removing obstructions from public roadways, including the towing of private vehicles (see OPIP 3.6.3, at 1, and Attachment 2 thereto); [
l
6.
Activating sirens and directing the broadcast of emergency broadcast system ("EBS") messages (see OPIP 3.3.4);
i 7.
Making decisions and official recommendations to the public as to the appropriate actions necessary to protect the public health and safety, including directing an evacuation of the general public and/or special facilities, prohibiting traffic, milk and dairy products, and foodstuffs into or out of the ingestion pathway EPZ, and directing recovery / reentry operations (see generally, Plan, Chapters 2 and 3);
8.
Performing law enforcement functions at the EOC, relocation centers, and with fuel allocation locations (see i
OPIP 2.1.1, at 51 and Attachment 2, at 47; OPIP 4.2.1).
See N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law, Section 1114, 1204, 1602 (McKinney);
N.Y.
Exec. Law, Section eti seq. (McKinney); N.Y.
Mun. Home Rule Law, Section 10 (McKinney); see N.Y.
Const. Art. 9 (McKinney).
The single legal authority referenced in the LILCO Plan (see.4.1) does not support LILCO's purported right to exercise such responsibilities, contrary to the requirement of NUREG 0654,Section II.A.2.b.
In fact, LILCO cannot, as a mat-ter of law, exercise such responsibility, and therefore its l
Plan could not and would not be implemented.
l B.
LILCO employees will be unable to exercise command and control effectively or properly because:
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1.
The LILCO employees in command and control posi-l tions will not be familiar with the actual geography, topogra-l l
phy, road network, demography, school and other facility loca-tions, characteristics, and capacities, relationships among --
and jurisidictional limits of -- emergency and volunteer orga-I l
nizations and their capabilities, and other local conditions in and around the EPZ which may affect the adequacy of emergency response to a shoreham accident.
Familiarity with, and complete understanding of, such facts and conditions are essential to the effective management and coordination of emer-gency response.
Those in command and control positions must be able to make prompt and informed decisions dealing with circumstances and events that may not be contemplated or spe-cifically provided for in a written emergency plan.
Many of the local emergency response organization ("LERO") command and control personnel do not reside in the immediate Shoreham vi-cinity.
Even more importantly, they will not be aware of how i
the various entities, institutions, organizations and the popu-lation interact with each other on a day-to-day basis or in an emergency situation.
People from outside the immediate locali-i ty unfamiliar with the internal workings of the community will be unable to fulfill command and control responsibilities ef-fectively. i
I 2.
The LILCO employees in command and control do not have the necessary training or experience to perform the functions assigned to them.
See SC Contention 11: Training.
3.
The LILCO employees in command and control posi-tions may experience a conflict between LILCO's financial and institutional interests and the public's interest, which may substantially hamper their ability to perform the functions assigned to them in a manner that will result in adequate protection of the public.
Specifically, LILCO employees will have an incentive to minimize the perception of the dangers in a particular emergency.
Thus, they will be reluctant to de-clare s general emergency because they wish to avoid the public reaction to such a declaration.
Accordingly, there is no as-surance that correct and appropriate command and control deci-sions will be made by LILCO employees.
4.
In the event of an actual radiological emergen-cy, the LILCO employees in command and control may be reluctant to leave a relatively safe area outside the EPZ to enter into a l
more dangerous area within the EPZ to exercise command and control and supervisory responsibilities.
If they have been properly educated as to the potential dangers involved in per-forming their emergency functions, the LILCO personnel will l
have a substantial disincentive to report to duty.
In l
1 addition, LILCO employees may experience a role conflict that will lead them to attend to the safety of their own families prior to reporting to perform their assigned emergency functions.
The " Emergency Worker Tracker System," which LILCO asserts will " ensure that the immediate families of all emer-gency workers are provided for throughout the incident," (Plan, at 2.1-7 and 2.1-8) has not been developed.
As described by LILCO, however, the proposed " System" is unworkable and would l
l not eliminate role conflict.
5.
The LILCO Plan is premised on the assumption that LILCO employees will be available to implement command and control directives.
However, the LILCO employee work force may be unavailable to perform the duties and emergency response functions assigned to them under the LILCO Plan due to notifi-cation difficulties, mobilization times, labor strikes or work I
stoppages.
As a result, command and control directives would l
not be implemented.
6.
Emergency response personnel will not be indem-nified by LILCO for injuries or liabilities which may be incurred in responding to an emergency or during training drills or exercises.
As a result, emergency response personnel may not follow command / control directives, and thus may not carry out tasks and responsibilities assigned to them under the LILCO Plan.
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C.
In the Transition Plan, LILCO assigns to LILCO em-ployees the responsibility of command and control over the per-sonnel in various support organizations, including unidentified medical personnel, the American Red Cross, Brookhaven National Laboratory ("BNL") personnel, and ambulance / fire / rescue person-nel.
LILCO's attempt to exercise such authority conflicts with the normal chains of command and supervisory responsibilities within these organizations.
It is thus likely to result in personnel failing to carry out tasks and responsibilities uni-laterally assigned to them under the LILCO Plan in that:
i 1.
LILCO has no agreements from these organizations and individuale to follow LILCO's command and control directives.
LILCO has no means of enforcing its assumed au-thority over non-LILCO personnel.
Therefore, LILCO cannot en-sure that the procedures set forth in the Plan, or other proce-dures that may be ordered by LILCO personnel during an emergen-cy, will be followed by non-LILCO employees, particularly in the event that the support organization supervisors or the individual emergency workers decide that a different procedure l
would be better or more appropriate.
Indeed, many support or-ganizations have their own emergency plans and procedures which may differ significantly from the LILCO Plan and implementing procedures.
Furthermore, the LILCO Plan is deficient in failing to include plans and procedures covering the performance of emergency services by the support organizations relied upon in the LILCO Plan.
2.
LILCO is not considered by the public to be a credible source of information.
Therefore, it is likely that orders from LILCO employees will not be obeyed by the volunteer non-LILCO workers relied upon in the Plan.
Accordingly, there is no assurance that the portions of the LILCO plan involving participation of non-LILCO personnel can or will be implemented.
D.
The residents of Suffolk County do not view LILCO as a credible source of information.
As a result, the LILCO em-ployees in command and control positions will be viewed with hostility and suspicion.
The lack of credibility will cause a substantial portion of the public to ignore orders or recommen-dations given to them by LILCO employees who purport to be in
[
command and control.
In addition, the public has not granted LILCO the authority to exercise command and control over its actions and therefore it is likely that orders from LILCO em-playees will not be obeyed.
As a result, there is no assurance that adequate protective measures can or will be taken in che event of an emergency.
SC Contention 2:
Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ")
10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) prohibits the NRC from issuing an operating license absent a finding that emergency preparedness exists for the offsite area surrounding a nuclear power plant.
The Commission must find that the state of emer-gency preparedness provides " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." Id.
A major source of radiation expo-sure in the event of a radiological emergency is that received as a result of direct contact with a radioactive plume and/or from inhalation of radioactive gases and particles within the plume.
Thus, the NRC requires the development of a plume expo-sure EPZ around each plant as the basis for planning for a radiological emergency.
10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(10),
50.47(c)(2) and Appendix E, Sections II.N.2. and IV.
"EPZs are defined as the areas for which planning is needed to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an accident."
NUREG 0654,Section I.D.2.
The "overall objective" is to provide planning and a state of preparedness that will prevent exposure to the public above the EPA's Protective Action Guides
("PAGs").
The PAGS set forth projected dose levels at which protective actions must be commenced.
10 CFR Section.__
l 50.47(b)(10) requires that planning for protective actions must be consistent with Federal guidance-such as the PAGS.
Under the PAGs, protective actions should be commenced in the event of potential exposure of members of the public to one to five roentgen equivalent man (" rems") measures.
NUREG 0654,Section I.D.l.
While EPZs are generally 10 miles in radius, "[t] he exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nu-clear power reactor shall be determined in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteris-tics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries."
10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(2).
LILCO's Plan proposes a plume exposure pathway EPZ of approximately 10 miles in radius.
(See Plan Figure 3.5.1 and Appendix A, Figure 3.)
Suffolk County contends that this EPZ is inadequate in size.
In fact, an EPZ of at least 20 miles is necessary to provide planning and preparedness for those members of the public who may receive doses in excess of PAG levels and thus whose health may be ad-versely affected in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
LILCO's failure to plan for adequate protective measures beyond the 10-mile zone means there can be no reason-able assurance of emergency preparedness as required by 10 CFR I
. -. ~
Section 50.47(a)(1), and that the Plan also fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), for the following reasons:
A SNPS-specific consequence analysis (F.C. Finlayson and Edward P. Radford, " Basis for Selection of Emergency Planning Zones for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, Suffolk County, New York," (Draft), October, 1982) demonstrates that in the event of a core-melt accident at SNPS, there could be doses far in excess of PAG levels at the edge of the 10-mile EPZ.
In the event of an especially severe accident, persons in areas beyond the LILCO (G-mile EPZ would have a 35 percent chance of receiving 200 rems and a 60 percent chance of receiving 30 rems.
(200 rems represents the threshold level for early deaths; 30 rems is the level at which detectable damage to the body occurs).
These consequences are far more severe than those contemplated when the generic 10-mile EPZ was devised (see NUREG 0396; NUREG 0654).
Even in the event of a less severe accident, persons in areas beyond the LILCO 10-mile EPZ would have a 50 percent chance of receiving 10 rems, and a 20 percent chance of receiving 30 rems.
Again, these projected doses are far above PAG levels.
Only at 20 miles is there less than a one percent chance l
l of receiving a 30 rem dose (detectable physical damage) for the I --
spectrum of core melt accidents.
For more severe core melt accidents, at 20 miles there is less than a one percent chance of receiving 200 rems.
Thus, a 20 mile EPZ is necessary in order to provide planning and preparedness for protective actions necessary to mitigate doses that could produce early injuries or death.
In addition, a survey of Long Island residents, as well as studies performed following the accident at TMI, have identi-fled the existence of the " evacuation shadow phenomenon," which is the propensity for people to evacuate from areas perceived to be dangerous, even though such evacuation may not be ordered or recommended.
The evacuation shadow phenomenon is a signifi-cant factor in radiological emergencies due to the public's perception that such emergencies are different from other di-sasters.
A survey of Long Island residents has indicated that in the event of a radiological emergency at SNPS, the evacuation shadow -- or those people who decide to evacuate without having been told to do so -- will be quite large.
In fact, such vol-untary evacuees will outnumber, by many times, the number of persons who will evacuate because they are ordered to do so.
For instance, 31,000 families live within 10 miles of the Shoreham plant.
If there were a recommendation to evacuate. _-
only the 10-mile EPZ around Shoreham, approximately 432,000 families (about half the population of Long Island) would at-tempt to evacuate.
Even if a sheltering recommendation were made only for the population within five miles of the plant, approximately 217,000 families would attempt to evacuate.
A high proportion of the voluntary evacuees will be from the eastern end of Long Island.
Due to their perception that they would be trapped if the wind blew to the east, many east end residents will choose to evacuate in the event of an emergency at SNPS.
An EPZ of at least 20 miles is necessary in order to provide planning and preparedness for the movement and reloca-tion of the large number of people likely to be on the roads in the event of a Shoreham emergency.
This is especially so given the facts that Suffolk County is densely populated, especially to the west of the plant, and that only a limited east-west roadway network is available to accommodate the hundreds of thousands of cars expected to be on the roads in the event of an accident at Shoreham.
The limited east-west road network is particularly significant in light of the narrow peninsula con-figuration of Long Island.
All evacuees, whether voluntary or not, will have no choice but to travel toward the west. -
In light of the known reaction of the public in the event of an emergency, and the resulting effect on transportation in the area, means should be established for all persons within at least 20 miles of the plant to be notified promptly of a radiological emergency.
In this way those who do decide to evacuate will be properly alerted and will be provided with necessary factual information about the emergency and the appropriate response, thereby diminishing somewhat the fear and lack of knowledge that could cause confusion and impede an evacuation.
For the same reason, LILCO should provide adequate educational materials to all persons within 20 miles of Shoreham.
Without such preparedness, there can be no assurance that (a) evacuees from beyond the 10 mile EPZ will not impede the evacuation of those who are ordered to evacuate, resulting in evacuees receiving health-threatening radiation doses; or (b) those who choose to evacuate will be able to do so safely and efficiently.
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B S
SC Contention 3: Accident Assessment 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(9) requires offsite plans to provide that:
Adequate methods, systems, and equip-ment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use.
Part 50, Appendix E similarly requires that "the means to be used for determining the magnitude of and for continually assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials shall be described 10 CFR Section 50, Appendix E at Section IV.B.
See also NUREG 0654,Section II.I.
Appendix E further provides that the plan must include a description of "the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety.
The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring."
Id.
Suffolk County contends that the LILCO Plan fails to com-ply with these requirements.
Specifically:
A.
The LILCO Plan appears to rely exclusively on person-nel from Brookhaven National Laboratory ("BNL") for all offsite accident and dose assessment and projection.
(Plan, Section _, _,
i 3.5B).
The Plan is unclear as to whether the offsite survey team members are BNL employees or Department of Energy (" DOE")
employees working in the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Plan ("FRMAP"); however, all command, control, coordination and dose assessment calculation functions related to offsite accident assessment and the decision to recommend particular protective actions to the LILCO Director of LERO, appear to be assigned to BNL personnel (i.e., the Radiation e
Health Coordinator, Environmental Assessment Coordinator, Dose Assessment Teams and Environmental Survey Coordinator).
(Plan, at Figure 3.5.2 and Section 3.5B; OPIPs 2.1.1, 3.5.1, 3.5.2, 3.5.3 and 3.6.1).
1.
The Plan does not identify by name, title or i
qualification the BNL and/or FRMAP personnel who are expected to perform offsite accident and dose assessment functions and thus fails to comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.A.2.a.
2.
The Plan does not include any agreements with
[
BNL, FRMAP or BNL employees which identify the services to be provided, the criteria for their implementation or the arrange-i i
ments for exchange of information, or which obligate them to 1
perform the functions for which they are relied upon by LILCO.
The Plan thus fails to comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.A.3.
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3.
The Plan does not identify an individual at BNL who will be responsible for assuring continuity of technical, administrative and material resources, and thus fails to comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.A.4.
4.
There is no assurance that BNL is capable of providing continuous services (24-hour) for a protracted period, and thus the Plan fails to comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.A.4.
5.
The Plan does not include expected times of ar-rival of BNL or FRMAP personnel at the emergency operations center ("EOC") or other locations where they are expected to provide emergency services, and therefore fails to comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.C.l.b.
There is thus no assurance that the necessary BNL or FRMAP personnel would be capable of providing necessary accident and dose assessment services on a timely basis.
6.
The Plan relies upon commercial telephone for notification of the necessary BNL personnel (Plan, Attachment 2.2.1, at 2) with no backup communication system being provid-ed.
In the event of an emergency, commercial telephone lines are likely to be overloaded. There is no assurance that the necessary offsite accident and dose assessment personnel will receive timely notification of an emergency, and thus the Plan -
0 4
fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(3), 50.47(b)(G) and Appendix E,Section IV.D.1, and NUREG 0654,Section II.F.1.
B.
The LILCO Plan indicates that the information on fission product releases to be provided by SNPS to LERO is lim-ited to noble gases and iodines.
(Plan, Figure 3.3.3, at 2).
Thus, LILCO has failed to comply with NUREG 0654 Section II.E.4.f, which requires such messages to include the " chemical and physical form of released material, including estimates of the relative quantities and concentration of noble gases, io-dines, and particulates."
(Emphasis added).
Similarly, NUREG 0654 Section II.I.10 requires that means be established for relating the various measured parameters (e.g.,
contamination levels, water and air activity levels) to dose rates for key isotopes (i.e.,
those given in Table 3, page 18) and gross radioactivity measurements.
Provisions shall be made for estimating integrated dose from the projected and actual dose rates and for comparing these estimates with the protective action guides.
The referenced Table 3 lists radionuclides with significant contribution to dominant exposure modes, and includes several radionuclides in addition to noble gases and iodines.
Neither the release information provided by SNPS to BNL or LERO, the dose projections developed by SNPS, nor the dose projections to 23 -
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be calculated by BNL personnel include or take into account isotopes other than noble gases and iodines.
(See OPIPs 3.5.2 and 3.6.1).
Thus, LILCO has failed to comply with this re-quirement of NUREG 0654.
The result is that the dose projections to be used by the Director of LERO in making pro-tective action recommendations to the public will be inaccurate and will be too low (i.e., non-conservative).
1.
An example of a release isotope which should be included in dose projection calculations is Tellurium-132, which may have a life-threatening impact due to external expo-sure and/or inhalation.
It is predicted that 80 percent of the Tellurium inventory would be released in a severe core melt accident; this release isotope is identified as one of the largest health risks.
(See WASH 1400, Appendix VI, Figure 13.1 and Figure 13.2).
The exclusion from the Plan of measurements of key isotopes such as Tellurium-132 (e.g. OPIP 3.6-1) is thus a significant deficiency in the Plan and is contrary to the guidance of criterion NUREG 0654,Section II.I.10.
2.
The equipment used by LILCO to measure thyroid contamination may be incapable of differentiating the required signal from background readings.
A measurement of 75 cpm (Plan, at 3.9-4) may be near the background reading following an accident and the resulting spread of contamination.
- Also, i '
4
9 the instruments, most sensit ve scale (0-500 cpm) is insufficiently sensitive for the accurate measurement of a 75
\\
cpm ( the threshold for requiring hospital care for thyroid).
3.
The instruments selected for thyroid measurement (RM14 with HP270 probe) are not sufficiently sensitive to the energy spectrum of interest in measuring the presence of radioiodine thyroid contamination to insure accurate detection in the presence of potentially elevated background readings.
(OPIP 3.9.2 and Plan, at 3.9-4).
4.
The instrument selected for use in radiation surveys (RO-2A) is not sensitive enough to perform the required low level radiation measurements (OPIP 3.5.1, at 4).
5.
The procedures used for dose assessment projections and downwind surveys (OPIPs 3.5.1, 3.5.2 and 3.5.3), are overly complicated and require unrealistically accurate communications of complex data to obtain the required calculated results.
For example, there is no provision in OPIPs 3.5.1, 3.5.2 or 3.5.3 to deal with missing data, failure of communications, conversion of units or use of conversion factors for alternate equipment. Thus, those procedures will j
not provide a reliable source of data for use in emergency planning. l l
C.
The LILCO Plan does not include a description of the methods used for deriving the values for calculating atmospher-ic transport and diffusion of the plume (see OPIP 3.5.2), and therefore there is no assurance that LILCO has complied with NUREG 0654,Section II.I.S.
D.
The Plan provides for integrated dose calculation up-dates once every hour or once every four hours.
The Plan also provides for analyses of samples at laboratories in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Maplewood, New Jersey; Rockville, Maryland; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and Westwood, New Jersey.
(See Plan, at 3.5-2 to 3.5-4)
The wind speed on Long Island ranges from five to 10 miles per hour 70 percent of the time, which could cause the plume to travel at a rate of speed that would make the proposed intervals between dose updates and the time necessary to obtain analyses results far too long.
Such delays in obtaining accurate dose assessments could lead to in-correct protective action recommendations.
E.
The LILCO Plan identifies preselected sampling loca-tions for areas within 11 miles of the plant.
(Plan, at Table 3.5.1).
The Plan thus fcils to comply with NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.a., which requires the identification of sampling and I
monitoring points for areas up to 50 miles from the plant.
Sampling and monitoring beyond the 10-mile EPZ is required to '
a O
ascertain whether doses beyond the EPZ exceed the PAGs, requiring the initiation of protective actions.
F.
The Plan does not account for the uncertainty and errors in the information supplied by SNPS for the measurements of releases from the reactor.
The Plan is not conservative be-cause it does not account for the nominal factor of 4 uncer-tainty in the radioiodine release measurements used in projections during early phases of an accident.
The Plan also fails to account for the possibility of a release from a non-monitored release point of the reactor containment.
Ac-cordingly, dose projections will not be an accurate or reliable basis for protective action recommendations.
G.
For the reasons set forth in Sections A.
through F.,
the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(9) and with NUREG 0654,Section II.I.8, which requires the identi-fication of an appropriate organization which shall provide methods, equipment and expertise to make rapid assessments of the actual or potential magnitude and locations of any radiological hazards through liquid or gaseous release pathways.
This shall include activation, notification means, field team composition, transportation, communication, monitoring equipment and es-timated deployment times. -
SC Contention 4:
Adequacy of Protective Actions 1/
10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) provides:
No operating license for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a find-ing is made by the NRC that the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency (Emphasis added).
In addition, 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) requires the development of a range of protective actions for the public; guidelines for the choice of protective actions must be consistent with Federal guidance.
Such guidance includes the Manual of Protective Action Guides ("PAGs")
(EPA-520/1-75-001), which sets forth the threshold projected dose levels at which protective actions are to be commenced.
The PAGs are embraced in NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.7 and J.9, and are referenced in the LILCO Plan, at Section 3.6, and OPIP 3.6.1.
NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.9 and J.10, requires that there be established "a capability for implementing protective measures based upon protective guides and other criteria."
(Emphasis added).
A radiological emergency at the Shoreham plant could result in releases of radioactive fission products that would 1/
This contention is co-sponsored by NSC..
subject the population in the 10-mile EPZ to doses substantially in excess of the PAGs.
Specifically, in the event of a severe core melt accident, a person at the outer boundary of the 10-mile EPZ would have a 35 percent chance of receiving a 200 rem dose, and a 60 percent chance of receiving a 30 rem dose.
Even in a less severe core melt accident, there would be a 20 percent chance of his receiving a 30 rem dose and a 50 percent chance of a 10 rem dose.
Persons exposed to these dose levels are likely to experience adverse health effects which in some cases could be life-threatening.
Specifically, 200 rems represent the threshold level for early deaths and 30 rems represent the dose level at which detectable damage to the body occurs.
Cancer incidences and deaths attributable to ra-diation exposure increase in proportion to the increase in dose levels.
Thus, persons within the EPZ will be exposed to dose levels that will result in early injuries, early deaths and in-creased incidences of cancer (about half of which will result in death).
Suffolk County contends that LILCO's Plan does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be implemented to protect the population from the hazards described above.
Thus, Suffolk County contends that: (a) there is no reasonable assurance that the measures proposed in the _ -.
LILCO Plan would, if taken, provide adequate protection from the potential consequences of an emergency at Shoreham; and (b) there is no reasonable assurance that the proposed measures could or would in fact be taken in the event of an emergency.
The contentions which follow are divided into four groups (Individual Protective Actions, Sheltering, Evacuation and Food, Milk, Water and Livestock Control) and set forth the bases for this contention as applied to each protective action as proposed in the LILCO Plan.
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4.A: Individual Protective Actions The use of materials such as toilet paper, bath towels, handkerchiefs, and bed sheets as respiratory filters (Plan, at 3.6-4 and 5) would not provide adequate protection as required under 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1) and 50.47(b)(10) because:
1.
The use of such materials only protects, if at all, against internal exposure by inhalation of radioactive material, and therefore provides no protection from external exposure due to the airborne radioactive cloud or contact with radioactive contaminants and deposited material.
2.
The Plan does not provide fo,r instructions to the public on when or under what circumstances the use of such 4
materials is appropriate.
In fact, under some circumstances the materials would have little if any effect.
Therefore, the public could be misled into believing the use of such materials would adequately protect them from health-threatening doses when in fact it would not.
l 3.
The Plan contains no guidelines for the choice of this protective action during an emergency and no procedures for its implementation, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR i
Section 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.m.
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4.B: Sheltering 1.
At page 3.6-5 of the LILCO Plan, LILCO states:
Th[e] protective action (of selective sheltering] may be ordered at projected doses below the accepted PAGs to minimize radioactive exposure, particularly to preg-nant women and children.
In addition, the Selective Sheltering option may be recommended as an effective option for individuals who could not be safely evacuated.
This would include individuals who have been designated medically unable to withstand the physical stress of an evacuation, as well as those individuals who require constant, sophisticated medical attention.
The Plan fails to set forth guidelines to be used by command and control personnel: (a) in choosing to recommend the protec-tive action of selective sheltering; or (b) in determining the individuals who should or would be subject to such a recommen-dation.
In addition there are no procedures which indicate the means by which such a recommendation would or could be imple-mented.
The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.7., J.9. and J.10.m.
Finally, contrary to the requirement of Part 50, Appendix E,Section IV, the Plan does not contain an analysis of the time required for taking this protective action.
Thus, 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) has not been satisfied because there is no assurance that selective sheltering constitutes an adequate _, _
protective measure that could or would be taken in the event of an emergency at SNPS.
- 2. The LILCO Plan provides that the protective action of sheltering may be recommended (Plan, at 3.6-5), and that it is "the preferred protective action if sufficient protection is offered by sheltering, or if no additional benefit is gained by evacuation."
(OPIP 3.6.1, Section 3.2).
Suffolk County contends that as to the proposed protective action of shel-tering, the LILCO Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.9., because there is no assurance that sheltering, as a protective action, could or would be implemented in the event of an emergency.
The primary basis for this Ocntention is that a substantial portion of the 10-mile EPZ population will not obey a sheltering recommenda-tion.
(a)
A survey of Long Island residents and expe-rience at TMI indicate that a substantial number of the people advised to shelter will choose to evacuate instead.
Their reasons are likely to include the following:
l (i) fear of a radiological emergency, l
heightened by their perception that such emergencies are unlike other disasters; l
(ii) lack of trust in LILCO's interest or ability to be objective in determining and recommending actions that are in the best interests of the public (see SC Contention 1 -- Command and Control); and (iii) lack of adequate and correct informa-tion due to LILCO's flawed public education program (see SC Contention 10 -- Public Education).
(b)
A substantial number of the people advised to shelter, as a practical matter, will be unable to do so be-cause sheltering for these people will not constitute an adequate protection action:
(i)
A large number of the homes and other structures in the EPZ are constructed of wood and have no base-ments.
According to LILCO's shielding factors (Plan, Table 3.6.5) the protection offered by such shelter is limited, at most, to a reduction in dose of only 10 percent from that received with no shelter.
(ii)
Persons who are traveling in their cars or other vehicles at the time of a sheltering recommenda-tion may not be able to reach shelter fast enough to obtain any protection from a release of radioactive fission products.
ve-hicles offer no protection from radioactive doses.
(iii)
Transients who are on beaches, in parks or in other outdoor recreation areas will have no access to shelter.
(iv)
Persons who are in boats in the EPZ will have no access to shelter.
(v)
The Plan does not provide means to shelter adequately children in schools or residents of special facilities.
(c)
Even if an initial announcement of an emer-gency indicates that persons in certain portions of the EPZ need not take any protective action, a survey of Long Island residents and the experience at TMI indicate that a substantial portion of the population, upon learning of the existence of an emergency at Shoreham, will decide to evacuate.
This means that if the event were to escalate and a sheltering recommenda-tion were to be made, the voluntary evacuees would be unable to shelter because they would be in transit in their vehicles.
Thus, they would be subjected to the full exposure of the pass-ing radiation.
i (d)
The basis for protective action decisions set forth in Table 3.6.1 of the Plan are too vague to constitute meaningful criteria, and thus do not conform to the l
guidelines of 10 CFR Section 50, Appendix E,Section IV.B.
For I l l
example, the protective action for projected whole body cases between one and five rems is " seek shelter as a minimum."
The Table does not state whether this means there will be a shel-tering order or one combined with other protective actions.
3.
Even if people were willing and able to follow a shel-tering recommendation, there is no assurance that taking such action would prevent persons in the EPZ from receiving health-threatening radiation doses.
Thus, sheltering should not be considered an adequate protective action in the event of a se-vere emergency at SNPS.
(a)
Those who take shelter in wood frame build-ings without basements will receive 90 percent of the dose they would receive from the plume if they were outside the shelter.
(b)
According to LILCO, the average shielding factor available in the EPZ is 0.7, which means that, on the average, those who follow a sheltering recommendation will l
nonetheless receive 70 percent of the dose they would receive from the plume if they were outside the shelter.
(c)
The cloud doses resulting from a release of radioactive fission products from the Shoreham plant could be so substantial that even taking into account the 30 percent av-erage dose reduction provided by shelter in the EPZ, persons who follow a sheltering recommendation could still receive 36 -
doses that would cause adva.se health effects.
- Thus, sheltering cannot be considered to be an adequate protective action.
(d)
Moreover, the protection offered by shelter decreases rapidly over time.
(e)
The LILCO Plan makes no provision for relo-cation, or for monitoring the radiological exposure, of persons who have taken shelter from a passing plume.
Such relocation and monitoring is necessary to prevent people from receiving substantial doses, in addition to those received while in shel-ters, from ground contamination which will remain even after plume passage..-
t e
4.C: Evacuation Suffolk County cc.ntends that in the event an evacuation is ordered for all or pr.rt of the EPZ, or, in the event of a shel-tering order (see SC Contention 4.B-2 -- Sheltering), thousands of evacuees may be exposed to health-threatening levels of ra-diation because evacuation will take too long and persons in cars or other evacuation vehicles will receive essentially no protection from radiation exposure.
Therefore, partial or complete evacuation of the EPZ would not provide adequate protection to the public as required under 10'CFR Section 50.47(a)(1).
The County's specific concerns fall into the fol-lowing categories:
4.C-1: Selective Evacuation 4.C-2: Evacuation Time Estimates 4.C-3: Removal of Obstacles from the Roadway and Provisions for Fuel 4.C-4: Evacuating Persons with Special Needs 4.C-5: Relocation Centers 4.C-6: Evacuation of Areas Close to the Plant
i 4.C-1: Selective Evacuation The LILCO Plan states at pages 3.6.5 to 3.6.6:
Selective Evacuation may be implemented to evacuate from the affected area of the plume exposure EPZ members of the general public who might have a low tolerance to radiation exposure.
Specifically, this would include pregnant women and children 12 years and under.
The Plan fails to set forth guidelines to be used by command and control personnel: (a) in choosing to recommend the protec-tive action of selective evacuation; or (b) in determining, identifying and locating the individuals who should be subject to such a recommendation.
In addition, there are no procedures which indicate the means by which such a recommendation could or would be implemented.
The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 l
CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 Sections J.7, J.9 and J.10.
In addition, the Plan does not include an analysis of the I
time required for taking this protective action, and thus fails to. comply with 10 CFR Section 50, Appendix E,Section IV, and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.8.
There is thus no assurance that i
under the LILCO Plan, selective evacuation constitutes an adequate protective measure that could or would be taken in the event of an emergency at SNPS. '
i 4.C-2: Evacuation Time EstimatesSection IV of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 specifically requires that "[t]he nuclear power reactor operating license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations."
See also, NUREG 0654, Section J.8. and Appendix 4.
Accurate estimates of the time necessary to evacuate the Shoreham EPZ (or portions thereof) are essential to evaluating the evacuation route system.
In particular, such estimates must be accurate and reliable so that command and control personnel, in considering what protec-tive actions might be ordered for particular persons, can estimate whether, given projected release and dispersion of health-threatening fission products from the Shoreham plant, evacuation can be accomplished before such dispersion takes place.
A decision to order evacuation, if based on inaccurate evacuation time estimates, could result in evacuees being trapped in queues or slow moving traffic inside or outside the EPZ during a release of fission products from the Shoreham plant, thus exposing those evacuees to potentially harmful doses of radiation..
o LILCO has submitted evacuation time estimates for the 10-mile EPZ, which estimates are contained in Appendix A, at V-3, and OPIP 3.6.1, Attachment 4.
LILCO estimates that the time for evacuation will vary from about two to two-and-one-half hours for only the inner EPZ sectors, to a maximum of six hours for evacuation of the entire EPZ under adverse weather conditions.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO's evacuation time estimates are inaccurate, unreliable and, in fact, should be far longer.
The specific deficiencies in the estimates are as follows:
(a)
The LILCO evacuation time estimates mis-leadingly ignore the time required to mobilize people to be ready to evacuate.
The LILCO estimates in Appendix A include only the time involved in the actual evacuation trip out of the i
EPZ.
(Appendix A, Table XIV).
On the other hand, the LILCO 1
estimates in OPIP 3.6.1 unrealistically assume that all persons will be mobilized and on the roads about 20 minutes from receiving notification.
In fact, it will likely take at least from one to more than three hours for people to mobilize before I
they can begin to evacuate.
This mobilization time will be required because:
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(i)
Following activation of the prompt no-tification system, it will take time for people to become aware of the emergency, to become informed of the recommended protec-tive actions and to determine their own course of action.
(ii)
Where possible, most families will seek to evacuate as a unit.
Therefore, mobilization time must include time for travel necessary to assemble family groups, such as travel from work or other locations to home, and from work or home to schools and other locations to pick up children and relatives.
In addition, some persons will seek to go to banks, stores and other such facilities for money and provisions.
(iii)
It will take time for the evacuees to gather necessary provisions before evacuating.
(See "Emergen-cy Procedures:
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station," at 8).
(b)
Travel within the EPZ during the mobiliza-tion period (work /home, home/ school, to banks and stores, etc.)
prior to commencing evacuation will result in heavy traffic congestion due to high demand and conflicting travel flow (i.e., some traffic flow in directions different than pre-scribed evacuation directions).
Mobilization traffic will thus lengthen evacuation times.
LILCO's estimates do not appear to
o take this cause of congestion and resulting evacuation delay into consideration.
(c)
The LILCO plan assumes that in the event of an emergency, all people will know the evacuation zone in which they are located, and the specific evacuation route prescribed by LILCO.
(Appendix A, at V-2; see Plan, at 3.8.1 (EBS mes-sages)).
LILCO relies on its information brochure, telephone book inserts and posters to provide this information to the public.
(Plan, at 3.8-2 to 3.8-4).
However, LILCO's assump-tion that individuals will know their designated zones and pre-scribed routes is erroneous and unrealistic for the reasons listed below.
If LILCO took into account the failure of evacuees to know and to be able to follow the prescribed evacu-ation routes, LILCO's evacuation time estimates would substan-tially increase.
(i)
Survey data show that LILCO is not considered by the public to be a credible source of informa-tion.
Therefore, Suffolk County contends that the public will be likely to disregard or discount any information received from LILCO regarding preparations for a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
(ii)
LILCO does not propose to present its educational materials using an effective array of media.
For 43 -
instance, its program ignores the use of radio and television.
Rather, LILCO appears to rely largely on written material such as its brochure, telephone book inserts and posters to educate the public.
Suffolk County contends that:
a.
A substantial segment of the popu-lation will not read the LILCO materials because they do not understand their significance, they are not interested or concerned, or they are skeptical of LILCO; b.
A segment of the population may read the information when they receive it, but will subse-quently discard or misplace it and will not remember the contents when a radiological emergency occurs; c.
A segment of the population may read the information but not understand it.
(iii)
LILCO's proposed methods for disseminating public education materials are inadequate and will not assure that people read them because:
a.
The materials are not sent to people who live outside the EPZ; b.
Few people read utility bro-chures; c.
Few people read telephone books l
for educational purposes;. - _.
d.
With respect to apartment dwellers, LILCO has left the responsibility of distributing its brochure to individual building managers who may or may not perform that task; e.
Direct mail information will be viewed as junk mail and thrown away; f.
Posters in motels, gas stations, etc. and signs on beaches will not be read by the transient populatian.
Moreover, the maps on the posters and in the telephone book advertisements are inadequate because they do not indicate where the reader is on the map.
Such knowledge is essential for transients to orient themselves and to find a safe evacuation route.
(iv)
The proposed LILCO posters and tele-phone book advertisement do not tell the reader what zone he is in and therefore the reader will not be able to follow or iden-tify his prescribed evacuation route.
(v)
Even if people know the prescribed evacuation routes for the zone in which they live, the LILCO Plan does not assure that people from other locations will know the appropriate prescribed route should an emergency occur while they are not at home.
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(d)
The LILCO evacuation estimates and the com-l puter model from which they are derived not only assume that the public will know the prescribed evacuation routes, but also that all persons will use only those prescribed evacuation routes.
See, for example, Appendix A, at IV-19 which states:
It is essential that each motorist enter the evacuation network on the specified links, and on no other network link.
If the motorist errs in this respect, he may find it impossible to travel toward his assigned destination without disrupting the flow of evacuating automobiles, increasing his own delay and that of many other evacuees.
(See also, Appendix A, at V-2).
In fact, however, LILCO will not be able to ensure that motorists will use only the pre-scribed routes for the reasons set forth below.
Without LILCO's assumption that evacuees will follow prescribed evacua-tion routes, the LILCO evacuation time estimates would increase substantially.
(i)
Evacuees will not know the prescribed routes (,see (c) above), or may intentionally attempt to avoid prescribed routes in order to avoid congestion.
(ii)
To ensure use of prescribed routes, LILCO assumes that its " traffic guides" will be " mobilized and i
in place at their prescribed locations at the outset of the. _ _ _ _ - - -
evacuation process."
(Appendix A, at V-2).
However, the LILCO traffic guides will be unable to arrive at their assigned loca-tions in a timely manner, due to:
a.
The time required to contact all traffic guides.
It will take a significant amount of time to reach a sufficient number of traffic guides because:
(1)
LILCO relies on commercial telephones to notify most of its traffic guides.
(OPIP 3.3.2, at 74-91).
However, in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, commercial telephone lines may be overloaded and thus unavailable for use by LILCO personnel (see SC Contention 8 -- Communications);
(2)
Even if all necessary tele-phone lines are operating, it will take a significant amount of time to telephone 21 people, as each caller must do.
(OPIP l
3.3.2, at 74-91);
(3)
LILCO has designated its l
meter readers to be the primary traffic guides.
(OPIP 2.1.1, at 28).
Meter readers, however, are not equipped with radios 7
or other means of communication when performing their regular l
duties for LILCO and, therefore, will be unable to be contacted while on duty; l __
(4)
During off-duty hours, traf-fic guides may not be at home and therefore will not be con-tacted.
b.
Anticipated traffic congestion from mobilization and evacuation travel; c.
Their need to ensure the safety of their own families prior to responding as part of LERO; and d.
The long distances which some traffic guides will need to travel to get to their staging areas and then to their assigned posts.
(iii)
Even assuming arguendo the legality of the traffic control measures assumed in the LILCO Plan (see SC Contention 1 -- Command and Control),
LILCO's traffic guides, possessing no authority to enforce their objectives (and given LILCO's lack of credibility), will be disobeyed by motorists.
This is especially so in light of the heightened fear and anxi-ety caused by a radiological emergency which is perceived to be different from other emergencies.
(iv)
The LILCO evacuation time estimates also rely on traffic control devices such as roadblocks, pre-scribed turn movements, channelization treatment, one-way roads and blocking lanes on the Long Island Expressway.
(See Appen-dix A,Section IV for listing of traffic control devices which - -
LILCO assumes will be used).
However, LILCO and its " traffic guides" lack legal authority to implement such traffic controls and, in fact, are explicitly prohibited from taking such action under New York State Law.
(See SC Contention 1 -- Command and Control),
Accordingly, LILCO cannot rely on the use of traffic control devices to ensure the use of prescribed evacuation routes.
(v)
The LILCO estimates also assume that
" trail blazer" signs will be installed as permanent roadway hardware to direct the public in the event of an evacuation.
(Appendix A, at IV-82).
In fact, however, Suffolk County contends such signs will not be installed (see Suffolk County Legislature Resolution 456-1982) and, further, that it is unlawful for LILCO to install such signs (see SC Contention 1
-- Command and Control); therefore, LILCO cannot rely on such signs to ensure the use of prescribed evacuation routes.
(e)
The LILCO traffic control plan, as de-scribed in Appendix A, even if assumed arguendo to be lawful, will, in fact, constitute an additional source of congestion I
which has been ignored in LILCO's evacuation time estimates.
If such congestion were taken into account, the LILCO estimates would increase substantially.
The Plan will cause additional congestion for the following reasons:
o (i)
LILCO's estimates assume that its traffic guides will screen all motorists moving in a direction contrary to its prescribed traffic flow to determine whether that person has " good reason" for going in that direction.
(Appendix A, at IV-83; see also, IV-8).
Thus, a traffic guide presumably would stop all such motorists, question them and at-tempt to persuade or order them not to go in their intended di-rections if their reasons for doing so were judged to be not sufficient.
This screening process will impede traffic flow, resulting in congestion and further increasing the evacuation time estimates.
It will also require more traffic guides than LILCO has designated for each traffic post.
Furthermore, screening motorists will increase the risk of hostile confron-tation between the traffic guides and the public (see (ii) below).
(ii)
LILCO's attempted use of traffic i
controls may cause aggressive behavior on the part of those at-tempting to take protective actions.
This aggressive behavior will stem in part from fear of a radiological emergency (which is perceived by the population to be different from other emergencies) and in part from confrontations that will result when motorists wish to travel contrary to the directions of the LILCO traffic guide.
The situation will be aggravated by __-
, ~.
i LILCO's lack of credibility and the view during an emergency that the LILCO traffic guides, being part of the LILCO organi-zation, are part of the cause of the problem in the first place.
LILCO's traffic guides, who will be inexperienced, 1
poorly trained and unknowledgeable in handling such situations, may also react in such a way as to further exacerbate the situ-ation.
Conflicts between motorists and traffic guides will result in traffic congestion, confusion, accidents and possibly injuries.
(iii)
Neither LILCO's traffic guides nor any other LERO personnel have the authority to alter traffic signal lights.
Therefore, traffic guides will attempt to direct traf-fic while signal lights are operating and may also attempt to override the signals by directing motorists to take action con-trary to those dictated by the signal lights.
Such simultaneous and potentially contradictory instructions to mo-torists will cause confusion and congestion, thus further de-laying traffic movement.
(iv)
In some cases, LILCO's prescribed routes direct motorists to travel contrary to their perceptions of the most expeditious way out of the EPZ.
(See, e.g.,
Post
- 19, Appendix A, at IV-56).
This will cause confusion and anx-iety on the part of the motorists and confrontations with traffic guides... _ -
(v)
It is essential that each traffic guide have the capability to communicate directly with those traffic guides at nearby posts in order to coordinate traffic control strategy and to be aware of what traffic conditions may be coming.
LILCO's traffic guides, however, will not have that capability because traffic guides will not have radios, and even if they do they will not have adequate frequencies.
(See SC Contention 8 -- Communications.)
The result of such at-tempted traffic control without adequate means for coordination will result in further congestion.
( f)
Suffolk County contends that large numbers of people outside the EPZ will evacuate voluntarily during a Shoreham emergency, resulting in a much larger number of people l
attempting to evacuate (and thus using the limited capacity of the existing road network) than is assumed by LILCO in its time estimates.
These additional vehicles will create congestion both in the EPZ and in the regions just outside the EPZ, which will cause queuing and impede traffic evacuating from the EPZ.
j While LILCO acknowleges that persons not specifically instruct-ed to evacuate will, in fact, attempt to evacuate (Appendix A, at I-5), the LILCO evacuation time estimates ignore the number of vehicles which will be on the roads due to such voluntary evacuation both from outside the EFZ and from those zones within the EPZ not ordered to be evacuated.
l l.
Suffolk County contends that large numbers of these people will ignore LILCO's instru'ctions and will, in fact, attempt to evacuate though told not to do so.
The,LILCO evacuation time estimates are inaccurate for failing to take into account the numbers and locations of people who will evacuate voluntarily contrary to instructions.
If voluntary evacuation were prop'er-ly taken into accounY, the LILCO estimates would increase sub-4 stantially.
s (g)
Th 'LILCO time estimates assume that "[n]o major vehicle brealidown or other types of incidents [will]
occur which blSek. major routes for an extended time."
(Appen-dix A, at V-2). IThis assumption is unrealistic and leads to an s
under-estimation of the time required for evacuation.
Examples y
of factors which incre'se congestion and thus increase time a
m estimates, and which should have been included in LILCO's s'
i estimates, include:
x 6
f (i)
Anticipated traffic accidents and au-/;
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s tomobile breakdowns, including running outd f gas;
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(ii)
The absence of shoulders ork some pri-i
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mary or secondary routes which will be 'used iduring an evacua-x
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- itoad construc' tion / repair work which
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I (iv)
Abandonment of vehicles under emergen-cy conditions; and (v)
The impact of adverse weather on any of these factors.
(h)
The LILCO evacuation time estimates do not include the times necessary for evacuation of those with special needs who cannot rely on private transportation, such as school children, persons without cars, persons in health
~
ware facilities, the elderly and the handicapped.
Thus, the
\\
_ time estimates are not in compliance with NUREG 0654, Sections
~,
J.10.d. and J.10.1. and Appendix 4, at 4-9 to 4-10.
The individuals in charge of making protective action recommenda-tions must know how long it will take to evacuate this portion of the population.
In addition, the LILCO evacuation time estimates do not take into account the additional congestion to f
be encountered by evacuating motorists that will result from the evacuation of those with special needs.
Such evacuation will involve the use of large numbers of buses, ambulances and trains.
These vehicles will be traveling through the EPZ, in all directions, on prescribed evacuation routes and other roads, making frequent stops.
If special evacuations were i
taken into account, the LILCO estimates would increase substan-L tially. l
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1 (i)
LILCO's evacuation time estimates fail to account for the fact that stress and anxiety induced by a radiological emergency at Shoreham will diminish driving skills and awareness, and impede the processing of information neces-sary for a driver to make decisions and drive properly.
The geography of Long Island, with its narrow, limited land area, may create a feeling of being " closed-in" which may further result in poor driver behavior.
Decreased driver skills and awareness will cause confusion, congestion and accidents and, if properly taken into account, would increase LILCO's evacua-tion times.
(j)
LILCO's evacuation time estimates are so underestimated that an evacuation may be ordered which realis-tically cannot be completed prior to release and dispersion of fission products from the Shoreham plant.
For the reasons stated in subparts (a) through (i) above, evacuees will be caught in queues or delayed in heavily congested traffic within the EPZ.
Under many accident conditions, there will be a dis-persal of radioactive materials while sucn traffic conditions still exist, resulting in unacceptable health-threatening expo-sure to the evacuees.
The automobiles of the evacuees will offer them essentially no protection from the plume. -
(k)
In addition, in the event there is an order to evacuate all or portions of the EPZ, there will be consider-able congestion and queuing in areas just outside the EPZ.
A Shoreham-specific consequence analysis (Finlayson, Radford,
" Basis For Selection Of Emergency Planning Zones For The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, Suffolk County, New York", Oct.
1982) indicates that persons caught in those areas of conges-tion will be exposed to radiation doses far exceeding the PAG levels, and therefore requiring protective actions....
12.C-3:
Removal of Obstacles from the Roadway and Provisions for Fuel In accordance with the requirement that means be developed for the public to take effective protective actions in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham (10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10)), it is necessary that an offsite plan provide
"[ildentification of and means of dealing with potential impediments to use of evacuation routes, and contingency measures."
NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.k.
In the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham and subsequent evacuation (recommended and/or voluntary), it is likely that there will be many instances of automobile accidents and vehicle breakdowns caused by the large number of vehicles on the road, stop-and-go conditions, overheating while idling in queues, driver inattention, failure to obey the rules of the road and other cuch conditions.
In addition, it is l
l likely that many evacuees will not begin the evacuation with a l
full tank of gas.
Many cars may run out of gas, both inside and outside the EPZ, as a result of extended operation times due to congestion, stop-and-go conditions and time spent sit-ting in queues, Such occurrences, along with abandonment of vehicles and construction which may be in progress at the time an evacuation is ordered, will result in obstructions and '
blockages on roadways in use during the evacuation.
Taking such occurrences into account would cause LILCO's evacuation time estimates to increase.
(See SC Contention 4.C.2 -- Evacu-ation Time Estimates).
In addition, it is essential that such obstacles be removed in a timely manner so that evacuation times will not increase even more due to substantial periods of reduced roadway capacity.
Although LILCO has not included the ef fects of accidents, breakdowns and other road blockages in its evacuation time estimates, its Plan does state that removal of obstacles will be performed by road crews (LILCO personnel) using LILCO tow trucks and line trucks.
(Plan, at 4.4-4).
Ir. addition, LILCO also relies on private tow truck operators to provide tow trucks and other emergency road service equipment, as well as drivers, maintenance, fuel and communications.
(Id.)
Appendix A of the Plan (at IV-192), states that a gasoline contingency plan is "under development," and the Plan (at 4.4-4) states that "[gl asoline, diesel fuel, motor oil, etc.
will be provided by Private Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Companies."
Appendix A further states that "[o]nce the method-ology for providing gasoline has been determined, an allocation system will have to be derived specifying the number of gallons allowed, etc."
(Appendix A, at IV-192).,
Suffolk County contends that the LILCO Plan fails to com-ply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654,Section II.J., because LILCO will be unable to provide for obstacles to be removed from the roads, or to provide adequate fuel supplies for evacuees for the following reasons:
(a)
LILCO does not have an adequate number of tow trucks to enable LILCO personnel to remove all potential road obstructions.
(b)
LILCO has no agreements with private tow truck or heavy equipment operators to provide equipment, driv-ers or services and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(3) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3. and C.4.
(c)
LILCO has no agreement with private fuel companies or service stations to provide fuel to evacuees in the event of an emergency and thus, fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(3) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3. and C.4.
l (d)
Even if there were agreements with private tow truck, heavy equipment and fuel companies for the provision of equipnent or gasoline, the drivers and other employees of such companies will first attend to the safety of their families in the event of an emergency.
Therefore, there is no assurance that the personnel relied upon by LILCO will be available to perform the required services in a timely manner. l
(e)
LILCO's vehicles, and those of private 1
companies relied upon by LILCO, are stationed too far away to respond promptly to needs on evacuation routes.
(f)
It will take many hours to notify and mobi-lize the LILCO road crews (see OPIPs 3.3.2 (Procedures 22-24) and 3.6.3) and fuel truck drivers, resulting in additional delay in reaching obstruction sites or fuel dispensation loca-tions.
Delays in mobilization will be caused by:
(i)
The time required to notify road crews and drivers; (ii)
The time required for the road crews and drivers to travel through mobilization and evacuation traf-fic to reach the location of tow trucks, fuel trucks, and other heavy equipment; (iii)
The time required to drive the trucks through congested traffic to designated dispatch locations.
l (g)
Once they have been dispatched to an obstruction location, the tow trucks and other heavy equipment will only be able to move as fast as the traffic flow, which will be extremely slow.
Therefore, they will be unable to respond to the site of an obstruction in the expeditious manner necessary to avoid its having a serious effect on traffic flow and evacuation times.
(h)
Assuming there are fuel trucks and drivers available, and that they can be notified and dispatched to " key locations," there is no assurance that, given congested traffic conditions, the trucks will be able to reach their assigned lo-cations in a timely manner.
(i)
LILCO's Plan makes no provision for the evacuation of persons whose cars break down or are in accidents.
(j)
Neither LILCO nor the private fuel companies it mentions are authorized to distribute fuel along the roadsides as is proposed in the LILCO Plan.
(k)
No provisions have been made to handle queues at fuel allocation sites which may back up into evacuating traffic, thus causing further congestion and delays.
(1)
The LILCO Plan does not provide for securi-ty at fuel allocation sites.
(See SC Contention 6 -- Securi-l ty).
4.C-4:
Evacuation of Persons with Special Needs 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) requires that a range of pro-tective actions be developed for members of the public.
One such protective action for which there must be planning and preparedness is an evacuation of all or part of the EPZ.
LILCO assumes that in the event an evacuation is ordered, most members of the population will attempt to leave using their personal vehicles.
However, a substantial portion of the popu-lation in the EPZ does not own or have access to an automobile or, due to age, handicap or infirmity, cannot operate a vehi-cle.
Still others who reside in special facilities, such as nursing or adult homes or hospitals, would require special means of evacuation transportation such as ambulances.
People with special needs cannot be ignored in the event an evacuation is ordered.
Indeed, NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.d.,.specifi-cally requires that there be planning and preparedness "for protecting those persons whose mobility may be impaired due to such factors as institutional or other confinement."
Unless people with special transportation needs can be evacuated in a timely fashion, they may be subjected to health-threatening l
levels of radiation.
l Suffolk County contends that LILCO's Plan does not provide adequate measures, capable of implementation, for evacuating l-.
o o
those with special needs, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.J.9. and J.10.
In addition, the LILCO Plan does not comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3), 50.47(b)(8) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.,
C.,
H.
and J.,
because organizations capable of performing the functions relied upon by LILCO have not been identified; appropriate letters of agreement with such organi-zations do not exist; and equipment, personnel and facilities necessary to accomplish an evacuation will not be available to LILCO.
An evacuation of the number of persons with special needs which LILCO estimates are in the EPZ would require a large number of buses, ambulances, railroad passenger cars and airplanes.
Most buses located within a reasonable distance of SNPS are under contract to school districts and other entities, and would be required for a school evacuation or early dismiss-al, or otherwise would be in use, and would therefore be unavailable to LILCO.
In addition, there are only 40 ambu-lances located within approximately 12 miles of SNPS.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO's Plan for evacuating persons with special needs cannot be implemented and thus will not provide adequate protection for such persons.
Specifical-ly, Suffolk County notes the following deficiencies in LILCO's Plan:
I. - -...
e s
4.C-4(a): People Without Access to Cars LILCO proposes that people who do not have access to an automobile at the time of an evacuation order will be evacuated by buses running special evacuation routes, with bus stops pur-portedly no more than one-half mile from each such person's home.
(Plan at 3.6-6; Appendix A, at III-35 and III-36, IV-87 to IV-179; OPIP 3.6.4).
However, LILCO's proposal cannot be implemented for the following reasons:
(i)
According to LILCO's estimates, ap-proximately 285 forty-passenger buses are required to transport those able-bodied persons who would need transportation out of the EPZ (see Appendix A, at IV-87 to IV-178; OPIP 3.6.4).
That number of buses will not be available for use by LILCO because:
a.
LILCO has no agreements under which such vehicles will be available (Appendix A, at III-36).
b.
Most buses within a reasonable distance of the EPZ are under contract to school districts or other entities and therefore could not be relied upon by LILCO for use to evacuate persons without access to cars.
c.
Many buses within a reasonable distance of the EPZ have capacities substantially less than 40 passengers..-
_ _ _ -, _ _. ~ _ _ _ _. _ _
t i
(ii)
In fact, however, LILCO will need more than 285 buses because LILCO has substantially underestimated the number of people who will need transportation:
a.
LILCO appears to base its estimates solely on the number of households without cars.
(See Appendix A at III-35).
Its estimates thus ignore the sig-nificant number of people who belong to households with automo-biles, but who may not have access to such vehicles because at the time of an evacuation order, the vehicles are in use by an-other member of the household.
LILCO's proposal for evacuating persons without access'to transportation must include adequate methods of evacuating the members of vehicle-owning households i
i who may not have access to a car.
LILCO's estimates of the number of buses required do not appear to take such people into account.
b.
The LILCO estimates also fail to L
take into account those persons who rely on public transporta-tion to get into the EPZ but who, in the event of an emergency, may not be able to rely on such means to evacuate.
l (iii)
LILCO's proposed evacuation of people l
without access to cars would not provide adequate protection for such people because the evacuation would take too long.
As a result of the time necessary to complete the evacuation, persons may be exposed to health-threatening radiation doses.
O I
a.
Mobilization of the necessary number of LILCO employees expected to drive buses (OPIPs 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and 3.6.4) will require many hours, b.
Even assuming the eventual avail-ability of some buses for LILCO's use, the proposed procedure for contacting bus companies and locating a sufficient number of buses (see OPIP 3.6.4) will require substantial time.
c.
Since many of the bus companies which LILCO may rely upon (see Plan, Attachment 3.11.1) are lo-cated substantial distances away from the staging areas where drivers will be mobilized, transporting bus drivers to the bus company locations and driving the buses to the appropriate zones to begin evacuation (see OPIP 3.6.4) will require substantial time.
d.
Substantial time will also be required for LILCO bus drivers to gain access to the buses
(
(e.g.,
by "utiliz[ing] tool kits to gain entrance into the Bus Company garages" (OPIP 3.6.4, at 6)) and to prepare them for use (e.g.,
obtaining gasoline and checking oil, see OPIP 3.6.4, at 7).
e.
The staggered departures and mul-tiple bus runs necessary under LILCO's plan to evacuate the people in each zone (Appendix A, at IV-87 to IV-178; OPIP O
4 3.6.4, at 11-32), even using LILCO's underestimated figures, will result in lengthy evacuation travel times.
f.
LILCO's " estimated route times" for the evacuation buses in each EPZ zone (OPIP 3.6.4, at 11-32) are unrealistically low, in that they fail to take into account the congested conditions that will exist due to the factors set forth in SC Contention 4.C-2 -- Evacuation Time Estimates.
In addition, the LILCO Plan provides that in the many cases where buses are required to make more than one run, the bus routes will terminate at designated " transfer points."
Of the 285 buses which LILCO estimates it will require, 109 are expected to perform two runs and 14 are expected to perform three runs.
As buses finish the required number of runs, peo-ple who have been deposited at transfer points will be bused from the transfer points to relocation centers.
LILCO's esti-mated route times begin and end with the assumed transfer points.
(See Appendix A, at IV-87 to IV-178; OPIP 3.6.4).
However, contrary to the requirement of NUBEG 0654, Sections II.A.3.,
and C.4.,
LILCO does not have agreements with school districts permitting LILCO to use the schools relied upon in the Plan as transfer points.
In fact, such transfer points are likely to be unavailable for use by LILCO if an emergency were to occur during school hours. Without such transfer points, l
- l
each bus route would have to terminate at a relocation center rather than at a transfer point, resulting in a substantial in-crease in the estimated route times.
Moreover, although OPIP 3.6.4 instructs LILCO employees to inform evacuees at transfer points "that they are outside of the 10-mile EPZ, in fact, four of the 12 transfer points are inside the EPZ, and three are practically on the boundary of the EPZ.
In addition, of the remaining five transfer points, three are located approximately one mile beyond the EPZ bound-ary, and two are approximately two and a half miles beyond the boundary. Under the LILCO Plan, people are likely to be kept waiting, for substantial time periods, before they are trans-ported from transfer points to relocation centers.
Leaving l
people at the seven transfer points within the EPZ will not provide protection for them.
Leaving them at the other five transfer points, all less than five miles beyond the EPZ bound-ary, conflicts with the intent of NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.h., and could result in these people also receiving l
health-threatening doses.
(iv)
The LILCO Plan fails to include evacu-l ation time estimates for the people in the EPZ without access to transportation, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Appen-dix E,Section IV, and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.8.
In fact,._.
1 l
the time necessary to accomplish such an evacuation would be far too long to provide adequate protection for such people.
Evacuation time estimates for this segment of the population must take into account all the facts set forth in section (iii) above.
l I
I i l L
l 4.C-4(b):
School Children The LILCO Plan appears to propose two means of imple-menting a protective action of evacuation with respect to chil-dren who are in schools at the time of an evacuation order:
(1) by recommending that schools implement existing early dis-missal policies so children may return to their homes and evac-uate with their parents (Plan, at 3.3-5, 3.6-6; Appendix A, at IV-182 to IV-185); and (2) by performing a bus evacuation of the children directly from the schools to relocation centers (Plan at 2.1-5, 3.6-5 to 7; Appendix A, at IV-182 to 185; OPIP 1
3.6.5).
Suffolk County contends that the LILCO Plan does not provide an adequate and implementable means of evacuating school children, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0634, Sections II.J.9. and J.10. in that:
(i)
LILCO has no agreements, with the schools or school districts located in the EPZ, to implement the proposed protective measures contained in the Plan, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1) and 50.47(b)(3), and NUREG 0654,Section II.A.3. and C.4.
There is no assurance that the schools or the school districts are able or willing to implement the measures proposed by LILCO.
l
, i
(ii)
The LILCO Plan fails to specify the bases upon which a protective action recommendation of early dismissal (as opposed to sheltering or evacuation) would be made, and thus does not comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.m.
(iii)
LILCO appears to assume that early dismissal will result in children being protected in the event of an evacuation order because they could evacuate with their parents.
(See Appendix A, at II-20).
In fact, there is no as-surance that early dismissal will provide children with adequate protection from health-threatening radiation doses for the following reasons:
a.
Under the LILCO Plan, the deci-sion to implement an early dismissal rests with the schools.
(See Appendix A, at IV-182).
However, the Plan does not provide a means for the appropriate school authorities to obtain the information necessary to permit an informed and l
timely decision.
The Plan also fails to provide indemnifica-tion for the school authorities in the event they make an in-correct decision with respect to an early dismissal.
There-fore, there is no assurance that the schools will be able to, or actually will, make the appropriate decision with respect to l
l early dismissal.
l i
b.
Early dismissal will not result in the timely arrival of children at their homes so they can be protected by their parents because:
(1)
Even under non-emergency conditions it takes hours to implement early dismissals due to the time required to make the necessary decision, to mobilize the necessary personnel and vehicles, and to perform the neces-sary number of bus runs.
Under emergency conditions, the time required to accomplish an early dismissal will be substantially greater.
(2)
Under the LILCO Plan, schools will receive notification of an emergency at the same time as the public (by means of tone alert radios activitated by the EBS announcement (see Plan, at 3.3-4 and 3.3-5)), and therefore early dismissal traffic, including those children ex-pected to walk home, will encounter evacuation and mobilization traffic.
l (3)
The LILCO Plan fails to take into account the role conflict that is likely to be experienced by school bus drivers.
In fact, a substantial number of school i
bus drivers are likely to attend to the safety of their own i
j families before they report, with their buses, to perform their bus driving duties.
Accordingly, there will not be an adequate J g.-
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I number of buses or bus drivers available to implement an early dismissal.
c.
The Plan fails to take into account the role conflict that is likely to be experienced by teachers, other school employees and crossing guards.
In fact, a substantial number of such personnel are likely to attend to the safety of their own families rather than remaining at the schools or at their posts in the event of an emergency.
Ac-cordingly, there is no assurance that adequate personnel will be available to supervise children, including walkers, during the early dismissal process.
d.
The Plan does not provide for prior notification of parents if early dismissal is going to occur.
As a result, many children will be sent home to empty houses, and may be uncared for during the emergency.
e.
The Plan fails to provide a means of dealing with an escalation of the emergency (and accompa-1 nying change in protective action recommendation) that may occur during the lengthy process of early dismissal.
In the event of such an escalation, children are likely to be stranded in schools, or to be em route to their homes (walking or on buses), without available shelter, means of evacuation or other protection.
(iv)
The the LILCO Plan states:
In the event that immediate evac-uation of students to a relocation center were to occur, each school within the ten-mile EPZ is assigned a Relocation Center.
(Plan, at 3.6-7).
However, the Plan fails to identify reloca-tion centers for, or the means or procedures to evacuate, any schools other than those in the Shoreham-Wading River School District.
(Indeed, at IV-183 Of Appendix A, LILCO states that Shoreham-Wading River "is the only district which has the option of relocating its students.")
In addition, the reloca-tion center proposed for the Shoreham-Wading River District is Suffolk County Community College.
LILCO has no agreement with Suffolk County for use of County facilities as relocation centers.
In addition, Suffolk County Legislature Resolution 456-1982 prohibits such use of County facilities.
Accordingly, Suffolk County Community College is not available for use by LILCO as a relocation center.
Thus, the Plan does not comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(3), 50.47(b)(8) or NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3.,
C.4.,
J.9.,
and J.10.
(v)
Furthermore, under the LILCO Plan a timely evacuation of the schools in the EPZ could not be imple-mented because: I l
l l
a.
LILCO has no agreements with bus companies to provide the large number of buses needed to per-form an evacuation, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(3), 50.47(b)(8), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3. and C.4.
Accordingly, there is no assurance that an adequate number of buses will be available for use by LILCO.
b.
Even if such agreements did exist, many of the buses would not be accessible to LILCO em-ployees because they would be in the custody of the normal bus drivers, or the buses would be located substantial distances away.
c.
The LILCO Plan has no provision for supervision of children at schools, on buses or at reloca-tion centers, or for indemnification of school authorities in the event children are injured or contaminated in connection with an. evacuation.
d.
An evacuation of schools, using LILCO employees as bus drivers, would take too long and chil-dren would not be adequately protected from health threatening radiation doses:
(1)
Notification and mobiliza-tion of LILCO bus drivers to staging areas (OPIP 3.6.4) would take hours.
(2)
The procedure for contacting bus companies, locating buses, transporting drivers from staging areas to bus locations, gaining access to and preparing buses for operation, and driving buses to schools to begin evacuation (OPIP 3.6.4) would take hours.
(3)
Evacuating buses would en-counter congestion from other mobilization and evacuation traf-fic, and thus would be substantially delayed in traveling from schools to relocation centers (assuming such relocation centers existed).
(4)
Normal school dismissals require substantial numbers of multiple bus runs as well as staggered dismissal times.
In the event of an evacuation, a huge number of multiple bus runs (requiring several hours) would be necessary to transport all children out of the EPZ.
(vi)
The LILCO Plan does not include evacu-ation time estimates for evacuation of the schools in the EPZ, i
and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, I
Section IV, and NUREG 0654 Section II.J.8.
Such estimates must i
take into account the factors identified in sections (iv) and (v) above..
4.C-4(c):
People in Special Facilities The LILCO Plan proposes to evacuate all hospitals, nursing homes and other special health care facilities in the EPZ using buses, ambulances, the Long Island Railroad ("LIRR") and air-planes.
(Plan, Appendix A at II-28 to 30, III-37, IV-179 to 180, IV-185 to 192; OPIP 3.6.5).
This aspect of the Plan can-not be implemented; accordingly, people in special facilities will not be adequately protected in the event of an emergency.
The Plan thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1),
50.47 (b)(10) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3.,
C.
and J.,
for the following reasons:
(i)
The LILCO Plan does not include agree-ments with the special facilities in the EPZ to implement the evacuation procedures set forth in the Plan, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3),
50.47(b)(8) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3.,
C.4.,
J.9.
and J.10.
(ii)
According to LILCO's estimates (see Appendix A, at IV-189 to 191), it will require approximately 25 l
forty-passenger buses (in addition to the number required to evacuate persons without access to cars and school children),
sufficient ambulances to make approximately 348 ambulance trips, and enough LIRR passenger cars to transport _
l approximately 215 patients, in order to evacuate just the
- nursing and adult homes located in the EPZ.
An additional and i
substantial number of buses, ambulances, LIRR passenger cars and airplanes will be required to evacuate the approximately 630 patients likely to be in the hospitals within (and just outside) the EPZ.
(See Appendix A, at IV-185 to 188). LILCO has no agreements with bus companies, ambulance or rescue services, the LIRR, or airlines to provide such equipment in such quantities.
In fact, there are only 40 ambulances locat-ed within approximately 12 miles of SNPS.
The number of vehi-cles necessary to perform a timely evacuation of the special facilities in the EPZ will not be available to LILCO.
(iii)
The LILCO Plan relies upon volunteer non-LILCO personnel to drive ambulances and to provide the nec-essary medical and paramedical support services in the buses, l
ambulances, railroad cars and airplanes to be used in evacuating special facilities.
LILCO also appears to rely upon LIRR personnel, private airplane crews and employees of an I
unnamed lumber company to perform substantial and essential i
roles in the proposed evacuation.
(See Appendix A, at IV-185 to 192).
The LILCO Plan includes no agreements from any such individuals or entities to perform such services, under LILCO's direction, in the event of an emergency at Shoreham.
In this i i I
respect, the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3.,
C.4.,
J.9.
and J.10.
In addition, the Plan fails to take into account the role conflict that is likely to be experienced by such individuals.
A substantial number of such individuals will attend to the safety of their own families before re-porting to perform' emergency services.
Accordingly, there is no assurance that the number of persons required to perform necessary driving, medical support and other essential support services will be available to implement the proposed evacuation of special facilities.
(iv)
The Plan does not include estimates of the time necessary to evacuate special facilities,.and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50, Appendix E,Section IV, and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.8.
In fact, it will take several hours to notify and mobilize LILCO and non-LILCO emergency 4
workers to staging areas, and to obtain the necessary vehicles and LIRR trains (see OPIP 3.6.5), before evacuation of special 1
facilities could even begin.
Following mobilization, the time necessary to accomplish the evacuation will be far too long to provide adequate protection from health-threatening radiation doses.
Evacuation will take too long as a result of: the large I
number of trips necessary to transport persons individually to <
..n
relocation centers or to LIRR stations; the other mobilization and evacuation traffic congestion which the evacuation vehicles will encounter; and the time necessary to load and unload pas-sengers from ambulances and onto trains or planes.
(v)
LILCO's plan to use the LIRR to evacu-ate up to 845 patients, by converting passenger cars to accom-modate patients on mattresses (Plan, Appendix A, at IV-186), is unworkable and cannot be implemented in a timely manner be-cause:
a.
There is no assurance that any LIRR trains and necessary engineers, much less a sufficient number of them (see Appendix A, at IV-186), will be available at the Port Jefferson and Main Line stations to participate in the proposed evacuation.
b.
LILCO does not have an agreement with a lumber company to provide, on a 24-hour basis, the materials necessary to accomplish the proposed modifications to the LIRR cars.
c.
LILCO does not have an agreement with the LIRR to allow such modifications to its cars.
l d.
It will take a long time to per-form the necessary modifications to the LIRR cars, and the Plan l
l does not provide for personnel to perform such modifications.
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Very limited access and loading e.
, s.
.r conditions?at the Port Jefferson and Main Line stations make l?
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the proposed evacd tion impractical.
l
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The Plan does-not provide for 1
s health care personnel to accompany the patients in.,the ra'ilro,ad' cars, or to mee,t patients and provide necessary support and y
tr'ansportation services at points of disemb'arkation.
(vi)
LILCO has not obtained agreements from the hospitals and other institutions, d'signated to receive the e
evacuated patients, to implement the procedures set forth in the LILCO Plan.
Thus, in this respect, the Plan fails to com-ply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3) and 50.47(b'h(8), a.td NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3.,
C.4.,.J.9' and J 10.
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i 4.Cj4(d):
Handicapped People at Home
,.The LILCO Plan proposes to evacuate handicapped people who are not in special facilities by ambulance.
(OPIP 3.6.5).
This aspect of the LILCO Plan cannot be implemented in a timely manner and therefore will not provide adequate protection to handicapped persons in the EPZ.
Suffolk County contends that this aspect of the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(1), 50.47(b)(1), 50.47 (b)(3) and 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3., C.4. and J.
for the following reasons:
(i)
All handicapped persons in need of special evacuation services will not be known to LILCO and therefore will not be evacuated in the event of an emergency.
The preregistration system proposed by LILCO (Plan, Appendix A, at II-18; see also Information Brochure), will not result in identification of a substantial number of persons who may need assistance in order to evacuate because:
a.
Many people who will require as-sistance will not return the postcards to LILCO.
b.
There is no provision in the Plan t
for verifying the completeness of the LILCO listing to be compiled from the returned postcards..
c.
There is no provision in the Plan for regularly updating the listing.
(ii)
The LILCO Plan does not provide for the assistance and equipment necessary to accomplish an evacua-tion, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1), 50.47(b)(3), 50.47(b)(5) and 50.47(b)(8), and NUREG 06S4, Sections II.A.3e, C.4.,
E.
and J.
Specifically:
a.
The only provision for notifying handicapped individuals of a pending evacuation is by means of a telephone call from the LILCO Home Coordinutor, (OPIP 3.6.5).
This is an inadequate and ineffective means of notifying many handicapped individuals (including, for example, those who are deaf, bedridden, unable to get to a celephone or unable to com-municate on a telephone), and thus LILCO fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) and NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.5. and E.6.
b.
There is no provision in the Plan for assisting handicapped individuals with the preparation nec-essary prior to evacuation (such as locating and packing cloth-ing and medication, notifying relatives or friends).
c.
There will not be an adequate number of personnel available to implement the proposed evacua-tion, in that: t
(1)
The Plan does not provide for sufficient personnel to contact the handicapped persons and to identify reception centers (see OPIP 3.6.5) promptly enough to permit timely evacuation.
(2)
LILCO has no agreements with ambulance, rescue services or other entities to provide the necessary drivers and paramedical or medical assistants to accomplish the evacuation and thus fails to comply with 10 CFE Sections 50.47(b)(1) and 50.47(b)(3), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3.,
C.4.,
J.9.
and J.10.
(3)
LILCO has no agreements with medical personnel to provide the necessary medical support services prior to and during the evacuation and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(1) and 50.47(b)(3), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3.,
C.4., J.9. and J.10.
d.
The necessary number of ambulance or specially equipped vehicles (in addition to those required to evacuate people in special facilities) will not be available to LILCO.
(1)
LILCO has no agreements with l
l ambulance or rescue companies to provide the necessary number of vehicles, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections j
50.47(b)(3) and 50.47(b)(8), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.3.,
l i
C.4., J.9. and J.10.
i _
(2)
There are not a sufficient number of ambulances within a reasonable distance from the plant to make the evacuation of handicapped people in the EPZ possible.
e.
The proposed evacuation would take far too long, and as a result, handicapped people would be likely to receive health-threatening doses of radiation.
(1)
Notification and mobiliza-tion of emergency workers would take hours; (2)
Locating and dispatching the necessary number of vehicles would take hours; (3)
Evacuating vehicles would encounter congestion from other mobilization and evacuation traffic, and thus would be substantially delayed in traveling to the homes of handicapped individuals, and to relocation centers.
f.
The LILCO Plan does not include evacuation time estimates for evacuation of handicapped individuals in the EPZ, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50, Appendix E,Section IV, and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.8.
Such estimates must take into account the factors identified in sections a. through e. above.
I g.
The LILCO Plan does not identify i
relocation centers adequately equipped to handle handicapped individuals, and thus fails to comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(8) and NUREG 0654,Section II.J.
l I
i L
t 4.C-5:
Relocation Centers NRC emergency planning regulations require that "[a] range of protective actions have been developed for the plume expo-sure pathway EPZ," and that "{a]dequate emergency facilities to support the emergency response are provided and maintained."
10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(10) and 50.47(b)(8).
Accordingly, a local offsite emergency plan must include means of relocating evacuees and must provide for relocation centers located at least five miles and preferably 10 miles beyond the EPZ.
NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.g. and h.
Such relocation centers are essential to provide food and shelter to those evacuees who have no alternative places to stay and also to provide radiological monitoring and decontamination for evacueos and their vehicles.
The relocation centers must have sufficient personnel and equipment to monitor evacuees within a 12-hour period.
NUREG 0654,Section II.J.12.
The LILCO Plan calls for the establishment of relocation l
centers outside the EPZ (Plan, at 4.2-1; OPIP 4.2.1).
The facilities to be used are:
Suffolk County Community College BOCES Islip Occupational Center State University of New York at Stony Brook i
)
i I
State University of New York at Farmingdale (backup) 4 St. Joseph's College, Patchoque (backup).
I Suffolk County contends that LILCO will be unable to provide adequate relocation centers and services for evacuees.
The specific deficiencies in this regard are as follows:
(a)
LILCO has no agreements with the owners of the proposed relocation centers above providing that the i
facilities will be available as relocation centers in the event i
of a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
The Plan thus fails to comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.A.3. and C.4.
(b)
The Plan designates Suffolk County Communi-ty College as the relocation center for evacuees from eight of
]
the 19 zones in the EPZ (zones A-E, H-J) and for the children in the Shoreham-Wading River School District.
LILCO estimates the population of these zones to be 18,599 (26,574 in the summer).
(See Plan, Appendix A, at IV-87 to 178).
- However, f
Suffolk County Community College is an entity of the Suffolk County government.
LILCO has no agreement with Suffolk County to use suffolk County Community College as a relocation center.
Furthermore, pursuant to Suffolk County Legislative Resolution No. 456-1982, the Suffolk County Community College will not be available for use in implementing the LILCO Plan.
Therefore, under the LILCO Plan, in fact there is no relocation center 88 -
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designated for a significant portion of the evacuees from the EPZ.
(c)
The primary relocation centers designated by LILCO are well within 20 miles from the Shoreham site, con-trary to the NUREG 0654 Section II.J.10.h.
provision that re-location centers must be "at least 5 miles and preferably 10 miles beyond the boundaries" of the EPZ.
However, both Suffolk County Community College and the State University of New York Stony Brook are only three miles beyond the EPZ.
A Shoreham-specific consequence analysis (Finlayson, Radford, " Basis For Selection Of Emergency Planning Zones For The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, Suffolk County, New York" Oct. 1982), indicates that evacuees who go to those relocation centers may be exposed to harmful levels of radiation.
Furthermore, many evacuees who need relocation services will not use the relocation centers proposed by LILCO because they will perceive those centers as being too close to the Shoreham plant (e.g.,
only 13 miles).
Their reluctance to stop at the designated relocation centers will be reinforced by the number of voluntary evacuees, from the area near the centers, who will be observed leaving the i
area.
Accordingly, LILCO's designated relocation centers, in fact, will not provide the necessary services to evacuees.
i
(d)
LILCO identifies the American Red Cross
(" ARC").as the lead agency responsible for the total operation of the centers.
(Plan, at 2.2-1, 3.6-7 and 4.2-1).
The Salva-tion Army is designated to provide additional support to the ARC. (Plan, at 2.2-2).
LILCO also relies on the ARC for other i
specific actions such as medical support and counseling support.
(Plan, at 4.2-1).
However, LILCO has no agreement with the ARC or the Salvation Army to provide such services.
Therefore, there is no assurance that the personnel necessary to staff the relocation centers will be available.
(e)
The LILCO Plan asserts that,while the ARC will provide some personnel to operate the relocation centers, it-will be relying on groups such as churches, industries and select volunteers to provide additional services.
(Plan at 4.2-1).
In addition, LILCO designates LILCO personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, sanitation, security and traffic control services at the relocation centers.
(Plan, at 4.2-2 to 4.2-4).
The ARC and LILCO will be unable to staff the relocation centers adequately, however, because LILCO person-nel, ARC personnel and other volunteers are likely to attend to the safety of their own families prior to reporting to perform emergency duties.
Furthermore, there are no agreements with the volunteers the ARC would need to supplement its staffing of
, i
the relocation centers.
In fact, the very volunteers relied upon by LILCO to respond to a relocation center are likely to be among the voluntary evacuees who will leave the area around the relocation centers.
( f)
Traffic congestion and long mobilization times will prevent timely staffing of the centers.
In addition, though the relocation centers are not within the EPZ, they are in areas where there will be high percentages of vol-untary evacuation.
The road systems around the relocation centers will therefore be highly congested thus impeding access to the relocation centers by evacuees and emergency staff.
(g)
LILCO provides no estimates of the number of evacuees who may require shelter in a relocaticn center, and the Plan fails to demonstrate that each such facility has adequate space, toilet.and shower facilities, food and food preparation areas, drinking water, sleeping accommodations and other necessary facilities.
Thus, there is no assurance that the relocation centers designated by LILCO will be sufficient to provide necessary services for the number of evacuees that l
will require them.
Moreover, the LILCO Plan fails to take into account the large number of voluntary evacuees who will multi-ply by several times the number of evacuees who must be accom-modated.
(See SC Contention 4.C-2 -- Evacuation Time..
Estimates).
Accordingly, the relocation centers designated by LILCO will be able to accommodate only a small fraction of the number of persons likely to require monitoring, decontamination, sheltering, food and other such services.
(h)
LILCO provides for radiological monitoring and decontamination of the evacuated public at only the four relocation centers designated in the Plan.
(See Plan, at 3.6-7, 4.2-2 to 4.2-4).
In addition, the Plan appears to provide for monitoring and decontamination only of those evacuees who stop at the relocation centers.
Thus, there is no provision for monitoring or decontamination of evacuees and ve-hicles who leave the EPZ but choose not to go to relocation centers.
In order to provide adequate protection to the public as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1), LILCO must provide a means for monitoring and decontaminating all evacuees...
i 4.C-6:
Evacuation of Areas Close to the Plant The LILCO Plan proposes an EPZ consisting of 19 separate zones.
In the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham requiring evacuation of the EPZ, it is LILCO's intended strate-gy to conduct "a systematic area-by-area evacuation downwind of the reactor."
(Plan, Appendix, A at I-5).
LILCO's Plan, how-ever, ignores the fact that the wind shifts quickly on Long Is-land, with average wind speeds of approximately 10 miles per hour.
Under such conditions, a shift in wind direction could quickly direct a plume over an area that was not in the original plume pathway, and thus not included in the initial evacuation order, before that area could be evacuated.
Suffolk County contends that given the existing wind conditions on Long Island, in the event any evacuation due to a radiological emergency is required, LILCO must evacuate no less than the entire EPZ for a radius of five to seven miles around the plant.
Any partial evacuation of only certain zones within a five to seven mile radius would expose the population of the unevacuated zones to the risk of a sudden wind chift and consequent health-threatening exposure to radiation.
In addition, as discussed in SC Contention 4.C-2 -- Evacu-ation Time Estimates, a proposal to evacuate one zone without --
r expecting residents of the bordering zone also to evacuate is unrealistic.
People will not stand by while their immediate neighbors evacuate in response to a protective action recommen-dation, particularly people who live within five to seven miles of the plant.
l l
I.,.....
4.D:
Food, Milk, Water and Livestock Control 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10) requires that protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ " appropriate to the locale" be in place.
The ingestion exposure pathway gener-ally covers an area approximately 50 miles in radius.
10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2).
The purpose of these requirements is to protect the public from consumption of contaminated foodstuffs.
NUREG 0654,Section II.J.ll.
Suffolk County contends that the LILCO Plan fails to com-ply with the necessary preparedness requirements for the inges-
. tion exposure pathway EPZ for the following reasons.
1.
The LILCO Plan does not adequately define re-sponsibility for making protective action decisions with respect to the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ.
For instance, the Plan states that the Director of Local Response is respon-sible for the protective action function (Plan, Figure 3.6.1) while the Health Services Coordinator will provide
" coordination for local resources" (Plan, at 3,6-7).
- However, the responsibility for implementation of the Ingestion Pathway Protective Action Procedure (OPIP 3.6.6) is assigned to the Dose Assessment Staff supported by the Environmental Assessment Coordinator.
Neither Section 3.6 of the Plan nor OPIP 3.6.6 provides adequate guidance pertaining to the division of i
responsibility among these organizations and individuals; nor is there evidence of signed letters of agreements with the re-sponsible offsite organizations.
Thus, the Plan fails to com-ply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.A.l.d.,
A.2.a.,
A.3.
and J.ll.
2.
The Plan fails to take into account protective actions required for the State of Connecticut, portions of which are included in the ingestion exposure pathway.
Neither the Plan nor the procedures identify any individuals in the State of Connecticut responsible for the ingestion pathway pro-tective actions.
3.
OPIP 3.6.6 requires dose projections to be made as a prerequisite to implementing the procedure.
The projections to be made are based on procedures found in OPIP 3.5.2.
However, such projections are inadequate for use in determining ingestion exposure pathway protective actions be-cause the projections are limited in scope to the area only 10 miles from the plant (OPIP 3.5.2; Plan, Section 5.2.7 and At-tachment 3).
Thus, they are inadequate to project doses for l
the ingestion pathway EPZ which extends for 50 miles, l
4.
Certain OPIPs related to protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway are inconsistent, and thus fail j
to provide workable methods for determining appropriate t
i l r l
r
i protective actions as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47 (a)(9) and (a)(10).
For instance, the Plan states that the PAGs for milk are the same as those used for drinking water.
(Plan. at 3.6-3).
In fact, however, the preventive PAGs for milk (Plan, at Table 3.6.2) are different from the preventive PAGs for drinking water. (OPIP 3.6.6, Attachment 4, at 1).
Furthermore, the PAGs for milk and water vary for different isotopes.
Similar confusion exists between other response levels in OPIP 3.6.6 (Attachments 1 and 2) and those listed in the Plan (Tables 3.6.2 and 3.6.3).
With such contradictory and incon-sistent information, there is no assurance the implementing procedures are adequate or capable of being implemented as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(2).
5.
The Plan has no provision or guidance with respect to the disposition of contaminated lactating dairy ani-mals, or for uncontaminated lactating dairy animals should l
uncontaminated stored feed not be available.
(See OPIP 3.6.6, Attachments 7 and 8).
Thus, there is no assurance that the milk or meat products of these farm animals will be kept from public consumption as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2).
l 6.
The Plan calls for withholding contaminated milk from the market to allow radioactive decay of short-lived radionuclides but does not call for its disposal or continued l l
e withholding after the decay period.
The Plan could be interpreted to permit redistribution of the milk after the short-lived items have decayed (OPIP 3.6.6, Attachment 7, at 1).
If so interpreted, the presence of long-lived isotopes would pose a serious health consequence to the public.
Fur-thermore, there are no standards provided to determine what constitutes an adequate decay period and what constitutes short-lived radioisotopes.
Thus there is no assurance of com-pliance with 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2).
7.
The Plan calls for washing contaminated fruit and vegetables and milling and polishing contaminated grains (OPIP 3.6.6, Attachment 7, at 1).
However, the lack of procedures for disposing of the wash water, milling residue and the re-sulting " cleaned" food products poses a serious potential for adverse health consequences.
Thus the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(10) and 50.47(a)(2).
8.
The Plan does not provide for the confiscation of t
l fish from the Long Island Sound which may be contaminated and thus does not consider the necessary range of foodstuffs.
Since one-half of the possible plume trajectories are over the Long Island Sound where there is much commercial and recre-l ational fishing, there must be procedures for monitoring and l
controlling this path to the food chain.
Furthermore, the Plan
! I l
1 e
provides a means for controlling the migration of the fish and/or the contaminated waters in the Sound beyond the 50-mile EPZ.
Without incorporating these considerations in Section 3.6.6 and the related OPIPs, the Plan does not meet the re-quirements 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(10).
9.
The Long Island duck industry must be included for special consideration in the Plan.
There must be proce-dures for putting commercially grown ducks on special feed, controlling the migration of contaminated wild ducks and re-straining the movement of contaminated ducks into the commercial market and food chain.
LILCO's mere listing of the duck raisers in OPIP 3.6.6 does not constitute the proper con-sideration.
The uncertainty of what dietary factor from OPIP 3.6.6, Attachment 6 should be applied to commercially grown and to wild ducks should also be defined.
Without the further de-velopment of duck procedures, the Plan does not comply with 10 CFR Section 50.47(c)(2) and the guidance of NUREG 0654, Section J.
SC Contention 5:
Emergency Operations Center 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(8) requires that "(a]dequate emer-gency facilities and equipment to support the emergency re-sponse are provided and maintained."
Furthermore, NUREG 0654,Section II.H.3.,
requires the " establishment of an emergency i
operations center for use in directing and controlling response functions."
Among other things, the direction and control of response functions requires the following capabilities:
prompt communications among principal response organizations to emer-gency perconnel and to the public (10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(6));
the receipt and analysis of all field monitoring data and coordination of sample media (NUREG 0654,Section II.H.12.);
and early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the EPZ (10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5)).
I The LILCO Plan provides that the SNPS Emergency Operations Center ("EOC") will be located at the LILCO Brentwood Operations Facility.
LILCO states that "[o]n a day to day basis, the facility is operated 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day involved in LILCO business activities."
During an emergency at Shoreham, "a portion of this facility will be utilized as the Local EOC."
" Plan, at 4.1-1).
The EOC will not be activated until "decla-ration of an Alert or higher classification" (id.), or until the Director of Local Response orders its activation.
(OPIP 4.1.1, at 1).
- 100 -
Suffolk County contends that the LILCO Plan does not com-ply with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(b)(5), 50.47(b)(6) and 50.47(b)(8), and NUREG 0654, Sections II.H.3. and II.H.12.,
in that an EOC for use in directing and controlling response functions has not been established.
Until such a facility has been established, equipped and rendered operational, LILCO is unable to perform any of the following functions required by 10 CFR Section 50.47:
A.
Notification of local response organizations and no-tification of emergency personnel by organizations.
B.
Notification and instruction to the populace in the EPZ.
C.
Prompt communications among principal response orga-nizations to emergency personnel and to the public.
D.
Dissemination of coordinated information to the public.
E.
Assignment and monitoring of actual offsite l
consequences of a radiological emergency.
l l
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- 101 -
l l
SC Contention 6:
Security 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(1) requires LILCO to demonstrate that it "has staff to respond and to augment its initial re-sponse on a continuous basis."
LILCO must also "specify the functions and responsibilities for major elements.
. of emergency response," including law enforcement response.
NUREG 0654,Section II.A.2.a.
The LILCO Plan identifies LILCO employees as being respon-I sible for establishing and maintaining security and access control for the EOC, directing traffic into the relocation centers and establishing and maintaining security at the relo-cation aenters.
OPIP 2.1.1, at 51, and Attachment 2, at 47.
The Plan also recognizes that once an area has been evacuated, "it will become necessary to provide security patrols to prevent vandalism or theft in vacated neighborhoods."
- However, rather than assigning responsibility to LILCO personnel for this security function, the Plan assumes that "[ t] he police will be responsible for securing a zone subsequent to the evac-uation of its residents."
(Appendix A, at IV-82).
Suffolk County contends that LILCO will be unable to provide adequate security in evacuated areas, or at the EOC, relocation centers, or other areas where evacuees may congre-l gate, and therefore the Plan fails to comply with 10 CFR l
i
- 102 -
1
l Section 50.47(a)(1).
The specific deficiencies in the LILCO Plan include the folAowing:
A.
LILCO has no authority to exercise the police power which is delegated to local government officials by State law.
Indeed,_New York law prohibits several of the actions which LILCO proposes to take, such as performing law enforcement functions at the EOC and the relocation centers.
Since, as a matter of law, LILCO cannot exercise such responsibilities, those portions of its Plan could not and would not be imple-mented in the event of an emergency at Shoreham, i
B.
Although the LILCO Plan purports to assign to LILCO employees the responsibility for providing security at the EOC and relocation centers, those personnel will have no means of enforcing LILCO's assumed authority over the public, who are not LILCO employees.
Accordingly, under LILCO's Plan there will not be adequate or effective security at the EOC or the relocation centers.
C.
The LILCO employees assigned responsibility for secu-rity will not have received the training necessary to enable them to perform the police functions assigned to them by the LILCO Plan, nor will they have had experience in performing se-curity functions.
(See OPIP 2.1.1, at 51-54, Attachment 2, at 47-50; see SC Contention 11 -- Training).
As a result,
- 103 -
1 r
effective and adequate security measures will not be implemented.
D.
LILCO's low credibility and the fact that the public will be likely to hold LILCO and its personnel responsible for the emergency will cause LILCO's employees to be viewed with hostility and suspicion.
As a result, orders or recommenda-tions given to the public by LILCO employees who purport to be security officers may be ignored, and security measures will be ineffective.
E.
LILCO has no agreements with police departments to f
provide security in evacuated areas.
Thus, despite LILCO's recognition of the necessity for " security patrols to prevent vandalism or theft," (Plan, Appendix A, at IV-82), the Plan in fact fails to provide for such patrols, and therefore fails to comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.J.10.j.
Moreover, the ab-sence of security patrols may cause persons to refuse to evacu-ate -- and therefore become subject to health-threatening radi-ation doses -- so that they can protect their homes and businesses from vandals and thieves.
F.
The LILCO Plan fails to provide for security at certain key areas within the EPZ where security will be essential, including fuel allocation points, staging areas for emergency response personnel and transfer points for evacuees.
- 104 -
Without adequate security in these areas, there is no assurance that adequate protective measures can or will be implemented.
G.
The LILCO plan fails to provide adequate measures to control access to evacuated zones.
(See Appendix A, Figure 8.)
As a result, persons may travel into contaminated areas and receive health-threatening radiation doses.
- 105 -
SC Contention 7:
Medical and Public Health Support 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(9) provides that there must be
"[a]dequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response."
Adequate emergency facilities must include provisions for hospital treatment and transportation to such hospitals for those who may become injured during an evac-uation (recommended or voluntary).
LILCO fails to meet this emergency planning requirement because:
A.
It has not arranged with any hospitals to be avail-able to administer medical treatment to members of the general public who incur injuries or illness as a result of an evacua-tion.
B.
It has not arranged for ambulances to be available to l
transport injured members of the public to such hospitals.
C.
Ambulances will be unable to respond where needed due to severe traffic congestion during an evacuation.
- 106 -
SC Contention 8:
Communications 2/
25.
Initial Notification of Emergency Personnel 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) requires that an offsite emergency plan include procedures for " notification, by the li-censee, of State and local response organizations and for noti-fication of emergency personnel by all organizations.
In addition, Appendix E to 10 CFR Section 50 requires the licens-ee's emergency plan to describe "[t]he communication steps to be taken to alert or activate emergency personnel.
10 CFR Section 50, Appendix E,Section IV.C.
Thus, procedures must be established regarding the " mutually agreeable bases for notification of response organizations" and "for alerting, no-tifying, and mobilizing emergency response personnel."
NUREG t
0654,Section II.E.1. and 2.
Moreover, the licensee must have l
the capability to notify these emergency personnel "within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency."
10 CFR Section 50, Ap-pendix E,Section IV.D.3.
Prompt and reliable notification of emergency personnel depends upon an adequate, dependable and workable communica-tions system.
Without prompt and reliable notification of l
emergency personnel, there will be delays in alerting and 2/
This Contention is co-sponsored by NSC.
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activating emergency personnel and in implementing command and control decisions regarding appropriate protective actions for the public.
Thus, LILCO is required to establish primary and backup means of communications for local response organizations and to ensure that these communication systems are compatible with one another.
NUREG 0654,Section II.F.1.
LILCO must also i
ensure that there will be 24-hour per day notification to, and activation of, the local emergency response network, including 24-hour per day manning of communications links that initiate emergency response actions.
NUREG 0654,Section II.F.1.a.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO's communications system fails to provide assurance that there will be prompt and reli-able notification to emergency response personnel.
The specific deficiencies in LILCO's communications system include the following:
1.
The LILCO Plan' designates the LILCO Customer Service Office (Hicksville) as the primary notification point of the LERO.
(Plan, at 3.3-1).
As such, LILCO Customer Service is responsible for receiving initial and followup noti-fications of an emergency from SNPS, verifying authenticity and content of information contained in the notification messages and notifying key personnel, with the number of emergency per-sonnel to be contacted increasing with the severity of the I
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emergency.
(See Plan, Figures 3.3.2, 3.3.3 and 3.3.4).
However, there is no assurance that LILCO's Customer Service Office is sufficiently staffed, that the personnel assigned to t-that Office areladeqbately trained or that there is adequate
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y equipment availab'le t$ Customer Service to permit the necessary notification in a timely manner, i.e.,
within 15 minutes after 4
an emergency is declared.
See 10 CFR Section 50, Appendix E,Section IV.D.3.
Nor is there adequate backup for the on-duty
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(See Plan, at 3.3-1).
As'a result, LILCO's primary communications rystem for receiving init').alj sA ',
notifications of an emergency, verifying the
.a informatiodreceivedand[otifyingemergencyresponsepersonnel is deficient and provides no assurance that emergency personnel
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will be alerted, notified and/or mobil-ized, or that the siren r
system will be promptJ P activated.
1 2.
'Und,er the LILCO Plan, non-dedicated., commercial telephone lines provide,the primary meabs, of communications I
betweent the SNPS,Centrol Room and/or-the Customer Service Office and'N,assau Cqunty, hospitals, the U.S. Coasti Guard and y
e the Federal Aviation Administration.
(Plan, at 3.4-4;' Figures
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3.3.5 and 3.4.1).
Moreover, until sucir jime as the EOC is ac-s.'
tivated, coamunicati6ns with BNL are limited to commercial
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telephone.
-(See Plad, Figure 3.3.5.) Commercial telephone s
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lines are subject to overload or may be out of service due to adverse weather conditions, repair work or other reasons.
As a result, there is no assurance that there will be prompt notifi-cation to these emergency agencies.
3.
The LILCO Plan provides for notification of key emergency personnel by pager..(Plan, at 3.4-4 and 3.4-5).
There is no assurance, however, that these key personnel can be contacted through the LILCO paging system due to such factors as distance limitation in transmission, the fact that battsries for the pagers must be charged or replaced and tested on a regular basis, unavailability of the individuals equipped with pagers (for example, because of illness or travel out of the paging area) and the fact that the pagers are activated by t
commercial telephone, which, for the reasons noted in subpart 2 above, may not provide an adequate and dependable means of com-munication.
Moreover, the LILCO paging system provides no means for determining whether emergency personnel in fact have received the paged message / notification.
As a result, there is no assurance that key emergency personnel will be alerted, notified and mebilized.
4.
The LILCO Plan also provides for key emergency s.
personnel, after being contacted through the LILCO paging system, to notify, in turn, other emergency personnel using A
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L non-dedicated, commercial telephones.
The number of personnel to be contacted increases with the severity of the emergency.
(See OPIP 3.3.2).
However, as noted in subpart 2 above, commercial telephones are subject to overload or may be out of service.
In addition, some emergency personnel will not be near telephones, or will be using their telephones or, for other reasons, will not ba contacted.
"5ue, there is no assur-ance that there will be prompt notification of these emergency personnel.
For similar reasons, it is unlikely that the LILCO
" Emergency Worker Tracker System" (Plan, at 2.1-7 and 2.1-8),
if ever developed by LILCO, will provide a way for the LERO workers to centact their families.
i B.
Communications Among Emergency Personnel Following
_ Initial Notification 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(6) requires that an offsite plan must provide for " prompt communications among principal re-sponse organizations to emergency personnel and to the public."
Prompt and reliable means of communications are essential not only for alerting and activating emergency personnel, but also to ensure adequate communications among those personnel once they begin to respond to notification of the emergency.
With-out effective communications, there can be no assurance that necessary and recommended emergency actions, including those
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necessary to implement protective action recommendacions, can or will be taken as required by 10 CFR Section 50.47(a)(1).
Suffolk County contends that LILCO's Plan does not provide for adequate, dependable and workable communications among emergency. personnel following notification.
The specific deficiencies in LILCO's communications system are as follows:
1.
The LILCO Plan fails to demonstrate that all nec-essary emergency personnel will be trained adequately in P.he proper use of the communications equipment relied upon by LILCO.
Such training must include the proper use of radio frequencies, the range of coverage available for each frequency and proper radio discipline.
2.
The LILCO Plan fails to demonstrate that there will be an adequate number of emergency personnel available to man communications equipment (communicators); further, the Plan does not provide for trained personnel capable of keeping com-f munications equipment operational (repair technicians).
- 3. The LITCO Plan fails to demonstrate that there will be sufficient and adequate communications equipment to en-sure effective communications among emergency parsonnel.
For example, the portable radios which will be provided to emergen-cy field personnel (Plan, at 3.4-3) operate on battery power and have a limited broadcast range.
These batteries are l
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o effective only for a short time.
The LILCO Plan, however, makes no provisions for recharging radio batteries.
Nor does the LILCO Plan take into account the fact that persons other than emergency response personnel (i.e.,
the public) will have access to the radio frequencies used by LILCO.
Further, the LILCO Plan relies upon a simplex radio system, which limits the range of the portable radios.
As a result, many emergency field personnel will be unable to hear other field personnel wno attempt to communicate on the same frequency.
Thus, radio communications with field personnel will be severely limited.
4.
There is no backup communications system for the five frequency Emergency Radio System which provides communica-i tions between the EOC emergency response coordinators and field emergency response personnel, including field survey teams, traffic guides, road crew and evacuation route spotters, bus staging locations and bus transfer points and ambulance and fire / rescue dispatch stations.
(See Plan, at 3.4-3).
Nor are there any backup frequencies to the five frequencies which com-prise the Emergency Radio System, even though the amount of radio traffic anticipated for an emergency at Shoreham could not be adequately handled by five frequencies.
As a result, there is no assurance that recommended and appropriate emergen-cy actions will be implemented, since command and control
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instructions may not be communicated to emergency response personnel in the field.
5.
Under the LILCO Plan, communications between field personnel and the EOC response coordinators will, in some cases, be relayed through transfer points.
(Plan, at 3.4-3).
As a result, some field emergency response personnel will be unable to communicate directly with the EOC and their respective response coordinators.
Thus, the implementation of emergency actions may be delayed.
6.
The LILCO Plan relies on existing radios in hospitals and ambulance and fire / rescue vehicles for communica-tions between LILCO and such response entities or personnel during an emergency.
Plan, at 3.4-3.
However, the LILCO Emer-gency Radio System will not be compatible with the radio commu-nications equipment used in day-to-day operations by hospitals and ambulance / fire / rescue vehicles; nor will the LILCO system have direct access to the radio frequencies used by hospitals and ambulance / fire / rescue vehicles.
Therefore, LILCO proposes to relay communications between the EOC and such vehicles through dispatch locations.
Id.
However, this precludes direct communications among the EOC and emergency response per-sonnel in the field which may delay the implementation of emer-gency actions.
As a result, there is no assurance that "a
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1 coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists."
NUREG 0654,Section II.F.2.
- 7. The LILCO Plan does not provide for all necessary field emergency personnel to be equipped with portable or mo-bile radios or other communications equipment.
Moreover, those field emergency personnel equipped with radios will be limited to the use of one frequency, without a backup frequency.
As a result, should communication problems develop on a particular frequency, field personnel will be without means of communica-tion to the EOC.
C.
Initial Notification to the Public and to Special Facilities Within the EPZ 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) requires the licensee to establish "means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone.
In addition, Appendix E to 10 CFR Section 50 requires "each nuclear power reactor licensee
[to] demonstrate that administrative and physical means have been established for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ."
The
" design objective" of this prompt public notification system is "to have the capability to essentially complete the initial no-l tification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ l
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within about 15 minutes."
10 CFR Section 50, Appendix E,Section IV.D.3.
See also NUREG 0645,Section II.E.6. and Ap-pendix 3 thereto (minimum design objectives include the
"[clapability for providing both an alert signal and an infor-mational or instructional message to the population on an area wide basis throughout the 10 mile EPZ within 15 minutes" and
"[s] pecial arrangements" to assure "100% coverage within 45 minutes of the population who may not have received the initial notification within the entire plume exposure EPZ").
Prompt notification to the public, including special facilities (schools, hospitals, major employers, nursing homes, medical support hospitals and other health care facilities) and invalid / disabled persons within the EPZ, is important to the effective implementation of appropriate protective actions.
The public must first be alerted to the existence of the emer-gency, and then be given clear instructions with regard to the specific protective actions to be taken.
Suffolk County contends that under LILCO's Plan, there is no assurance that the public will receive notification of an emergency within 15 minutes.
The specific deficiencies in the LILCO Plan are as follows:
1.
Under the LILCO Plan, a system of 89 fixed sirens will be used to alert the public to an emergency at the
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Shoreham plant.
(Plan, at 3.4-5).
However, as a result of the I
deficiencies noted in subparts A and B above, LILCO will be un-able to contact its key command and control pers.onnel in a timely manner, thus delaying the decision to activate the siren system.
Furthermore, the sirens will not adequately alert all sectors of the public to an emergency situation at Shoreham.
The public may be unable to distinguish a test of the sirens from an actual emergency.
In addition, the sirens may, from time to time, go off inadvertently.
As a result, the public may underreact to an actual emergency.
Moreover, even if the sirens function properly, some persons will not hear the sirens (persons with impaired hearing, persons outside the EPZ travel-ing into the EPZ); other persons will not understand the sig-nificance of the sirens, or will not have access to the EBS messages broadcast via radio / television.
As a result, initial notification of, and instruction to, the public (or portions thereof) within the EPZ will be delayed substantially beyond 15 minutes.
Moreover, there is no assurance that such notifica-tion of and instruction to the public will be completed within 45 minutes.
See NUREG 0654,Section II.E.6., Appendix 3.
2.
The LILCO Plan does not provide adequate backup in the event of failure of the LILCO siren system.
LILCO relies upon public address systems or loudspeakers, mounted on
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LILCO vehicles driven by " Route Alert Drivers," to provide backup to the sirens.
(Plan, at 3.3-4 and 3.4-6; OPIP 3.3.4, at 3).
However, the proposal to drive vehicles equipped with loudspeakers through the non-activated siren areas to alert the public is impractical and unworkable.
In the event of an emer-gency requiring immediate evacuation or sheltering, it will take LILCO personnel too long to mount the loudspeakers and drive through the EPZ.
Moreover, as with the siren warning system, some persons will not hear the broadcast message (such as persons with impaired hearing, persons outside the EPZ), and other persons will not understand the broadcast message (such as children, non-English speaking persons).
Route Alert Driv-ers are also required to abandon a route if dosimetry readings exceed specified levels.
(OPIP 3.3.4, at 5, Attachment 1, at 1).
Accordingly, entire segments of the population may never be alerted of the emergency.
3.
The LILCO Plan provides for tone activated alert radios for alerting those organizations with a large number of personnel, such as schools, hospitals, nursing homes and major employers.
(Plan, at 3.3-4, 3.3-5 and 3.4-6 and Table 3.4.1).
Each special facility will be equipped with a tone alert radio which, upon activation by the EBS signal from WALK radio, will automatically broadcast the emergency message.
However, since
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a such notification would generally coincide with notification to the general public, these tone activated alert radios will not provide special facilities with any additional alerting or preparation time.
Moreover, these radios depend upon the EBS signal broadcasting'from WALK radio station.
Should the EBS signal originate from other stations, the radios would not ac-tivate and there would not be automatic transmission of the EBS message.
Further, WALK radio does not broadcast on its AM frequency 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day; nor does WALK radio have a backup to its utility power.
Thus, there is no assurance that tone alert radios will provide adequate notifications of an emergen-cy to special facilities within the EPZ.
4.
Under the LILCO Plan, the evacuation of special facilities (schools, hospitals, nursing homes and other health care facilities) and of invalid / disabled persons from private residences requires the Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator, or his designee (s), to contact the special facilities and individuals to verify that they are aware of the need to evacuate and to determine their specific needs for as-sistance.
(OPIP 3.6.5).
In addition, reception hospitals, am-bulance dispatch stations, bus companies, relocation centers, the ARC, volunteer organizations, an unnamed lumber company and the LIRR must be contacted so that evacuation procedures can be i
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coordinated.
Non-dedicated, commercial telephone lines are to be used in implementing these evacuation efforts.
This does not provide an adequate, workable or dependable means of commu-nication since commercial telephone lines may overload or oth-erwise be out of service (lines may be down due to storm damage or other factors).
5.
Under the LILCO Plan, the U.S.
Coast Guard is relied upon to provide public notification services for the general public on the waters within the 10-mile EPZ and to restrict access to the EPZ during a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
(Plan, at 2.2-2).
Since much of the EPZ covers the Long Island Sound, prompt notification is important b'ecause of the large numbers of boaters and swimmers in those waters.
Prompt notification of the offshore area gains added importance in light of the fact that the wind blows offshore a substantial portion of the time.
Suffolk County contends that the LILCO Plan neither provides for prompt notification to the population on the waters of the EPZ nor assures that access to the EPZ will be restricted during a radiological emergency because:
(a)
LILCO has no agreement with the Coast Guard to provide notification to boaters and swimmers or to prevent access to the watars within the EPZ;
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(b)
Even if there were such agreements, the Coast Guard will take hours to respond, thus preventing timely (15-minute) noti-fication to the public; (c)
The Coast Guard does not have adequate boats and personnel to cover the perimeter of the EPZ.
- Thus, it will be unable to restrict access to the EPZ effectively.
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SC Contention 9:
Public Notification /Information 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5) establishes the requirement that there be means to provide notification and clear
' instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway and that the content of effective messages to the public have been established.
NUREG 0654, Sections II.E.5. and 7.,
further provide that systems for disseminating appropriate information to the public aust be established and that there must exist clear, pre-drafted messages designed to instruct the public regarding specific protective actions.
It is important for the public to have accurate and clear information so that it will be able to take appropriate protective actions.
If information is not provided clearly or is not understood, the public will fail to take appropriate protective actions, resulting in in-creased exposure.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO's Plan does not provide for adequate information to be received by the public during an emergency.
The specific deficiencies in LILCO's public infor-mation scheme are as follows:
A.
The public does not perceive LILCO as a credible source of information.
In particular, LILCO may be viewed hos-tilely as the source of the problem in the first place, or skeptically because it may not be in LILCO's financial interest
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i to disclose all pertinent information.
Therefore, people will tend to disregard or disobey instructions from LILCO.
Failure to take appropriate protective actions will result in increased exposure to the population.
B.
Since people will have discarded, not read or not re-membered the information in LILCO's information brochure and other educational materials (see SC Contention 10 -- Public Education, Subpart C), they will not remember to tune to radio station WALK nor will they remember what zones they live in, what routes they should take, or to which relocation centers they should go.
Therefore, in the event of an evacuation, they will not follow prescribed routes, thus increasing greatly their evacuation times.
C.
The proposed LILCO posters and telephone book adver-tisements do not tell the reader what zone he or she is in, nor do LILCO's proposed EBS messages (Plan Attachment 3.8.1).
Therefore, someone who does not have access to a brochure will not be able to identify his or her zones or follow the appropriate prescribed route out of the zone of danger.
D.
The sample messages in the Plan (Attachment 3.8.1) do l
not provide adequate information because:
1.
Almost all the messages instruct the public that the release is not expected to pose a serious health hazard, 123 -
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6 though LILCO cannot make such a determination in advance of an accident..These messages could cause members of the public to fail to take the emergency seriously when, in fact, the situa-tion is serious.
2.
The messages identify a LILCO employee (Director of LERO) as the source of the information and the protective action recommendation.
However, the public is unlikely to 4
consider a LILCO employee to be a credible source of informa-tion or advice.
E.
Since LILCO will not be perceived as a credible source of information, its proposed rumor control point (Plan, at 3.8-5), manned by LILCO personnel, will not be contacted.
Thus, rumors will continue to flourish uncorrected during the course of the emergency.
F.
While LILCO intends that EBS messages will be broad-cast simultaneously by WALK AM rnd FM, WALK AM does not operate at night.
Therefore, those persons without AM radios (espe-cially people in cars) will be unable to receive adequate in-formation in the event a radiologi. cal accident occurs at night, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(5).
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SC Contention 10:
Public Education The NRC's emergency planning regulations require that the public receive information on a periodic basis on the nature and effects of radiation, protective measures which should be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, methods of public notification and other such information.
10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(7); 10 CFR Section 50, Appendix E,Section IV.D.2.
Public education materials should include written material that is likely to be available in a residence during an emergency.
NUREG 0654, Sections II.G.I. and 2.
In addition, measures must be taken to inform transients of the proper action to be taken during a radiological emergency.
NUREG 0654,Section II.G.2.
It is crucial to any radiological emergency response effort that the public hrve accurate and truthful knowledge of the nature of the thraat, the protective actions available and the effectiveness of sach protective actions.
Otherwise, public confusion and ignorance will hamper the emergency response, thus increasing the danger of exposure.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO's public education pro-gram will not prepare the public adequately for a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
Specific deficiencies in LILCO's pro-gram are as follows:
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A.
LILCO has drafted a public education brochure entitled
" Emergency Procedures: Shoreham Nuclear Power Station."
The content of LILCO's public information brochure is misleading and incomplete.
In particular:
1.
The brochure erroneously states (at page 3) that all leaks of radioactive material will be held inside the con-tainment building.
Such a statement ignores the fact that se-vere accidents can cause radioactive materials to be released into the environment.
2.
The brochure erroneously states (at page 4) that all offsite workers will be in place to help the public when, in fact, LILCO cannot guarantee that this will be so because:
(a)
Offsite emergency workers will first look after the safety of their families; (b)
Offsite emergency workers may take hours to mobilize and be ready at their posts; and (c)
For actions proposed by LILCO pertaining to traffic control, the LILCO offsite workers lack authority to take the actions they are scheduled to take.
3.
With respect to the value of sheltering, the bro-chure states (at page 6) that:
In most cases, nearby residents would be advised to remain indoors.
This provides safety because buildings block the outside radiation.
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This statement is incomplete and misleading because it implies that sheltering will offer complete or adequate protection.
In fact, sheltering will reduce doses by only a fraction and thus not provide adequate protection.
(See SC Contention 4.B --
Sheltering.)
According to LILCO, if one shelters in the typi-cal Long Island home, one will still receive 70 percent of the dose one would recieve if standing outside.
(See OPIP 3.6.1, at 21 E ( footnote) ).
Such a dose will result in severe health consequences in many accident sequences.
Thus, the brochure needs to be amended to make clear that for many accidents, sheltering provides no adequate protection.
4.
The brochure inaccurately implies (at page 7) that a bus or automobile will provide effective protection from radiological exposures.
5.
The LILCO brochure's discussion of radiation effects is limited to natural sources and very low levels of radiation.
It does not adequately address the magnitude of doses that the public might receive during a severe accident (significantly more severe than TMI) nor the health-threatening i
l consequences related to such releases.
Such inadequate disclo-sure of essential facts renders the br,ochure incredible.
Further, the brochure does not discuss adequately the health consequences of exposure to low-level radiation, particularly:
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(a) The physiological effects of various levels of exposure; (b) The increased risk of cancer both to the l
population as a whole and to individuals; and (c) The possibility of genetic defecta in future generations.
Such information is necessary so that the public will be aware of the seriousness of exposure to radiation and take all appropriate protective actions to avoid such exposure.
6.
The LILCO plan does not inform the public that LILCO itself, in the' form of LERO, will be issuing all informa-tion and protective action recommendations, as well as per-forming almost all emergency response tasks.
It is important that the public be aware of the source of all emergency infor-mation so that it may assess and evaluate the information it is receiving.
i 7.
The brochure will not be distributed outside the EPZ and fails to inform those outside the EPZ that they may be exposed to levels of radiation in excess of EPA's Protective Action Guides.
The brochure also does not inform those outside the EPZ that protective actions may be required in some circumstances.
Such information is essential so that people outside the EPZ will be able to take appropriate protective actions if so required.
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8.
The brochure (at page 5) states that the public will be notified long in advance of any actual danger.
This ignores the possiblity that in the case of a fast-moving event (see NUREG 0654, Appendix 1, at 1-16, 17) there may be little time between notification and actual danger; 9.
The brochure does not address the particular needs of persons on the eastern end of the island who, though not in the EPZ, have special concerns about Shoreham.
In particular, people on the eastern end may seek to evacuate and thus will need routing instructions and directions to t
appropriate relocation centers.
In addition, they should be informed of the danger of traveling toward the plant and, po-tentially, toward the plume in the event of a release from the plant.
10.
The brochure does not inform the reader that in the event of an evacuation or after sheltering, he or she should report to a relocation center to be monitored and, if i
necessary, decontaminated.
B.
A survey a Long Island residents revealed that LILCO is not regarded by the public as a credible source of informa-l tion.
Therefore, Suffolk County contends that the public will be likely to disregard or discount all purported educational materials received from LILCO regarding preparations for a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
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o C.
LILCO does not propose to present its educational materials using an effective array of media.
For instance, its program ignores the use of radio and television.
Rather, LILCO appears to rely largely on written material such as its bro-chure, telephone book inserts and posters to educate the public.
Suffolk County contends that:
1.
A substantial segment of the population will not read the LILCO materials because they do not understand their significance, they are not interested or concerned or they are skeptical of LILCO.
2.
Others will read the information when they receive it, but will subsequently discard or misplace it and will not remember the contents when a radiological emergency occurs.
3.
Still others will read the information but not understand it.
D.
LILCO's methods for disseminating public education materials will not assure that people read them because:
1.
People outside the 10-mile EPZ will not receive them.
2.
Few people read utility brochures.
3.
Few people read telephone books for educational purposes.
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4.
With respect to apartment dwellers, LILCO has left the responsibility of distributing its brochure to individual building managers (Plan, at 3.8-2) who may or may not perform that task.
5.
Direct mail information will be viewed as junk mail and thrown away.
6.
Posters in motels, gas stations, etc. and signs on beaches will not be read by the transient population.
E.
The proposed LILCO posters and telephone book adver-tisements do not tell the reader what zone he is in and there-fore the reader could not follow his prescribed evacuation route.
F.
Even if people know the prescribed evacuation routes for the zone in which they live, the LILCO plan does not assure that if such people are visiting other zones they will be able to determine quickly and reliably the prescribed routes by which to evacuate from that zone.
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SC Contention ll:
Training A.
Initial Training of Emergency Response Personnel 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(15) requires that "[r]adiological emergency response training (be] provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency."
In addition, Appendix E to 10 CFR Sa7 tion 50 requires the licensee's emergency plans to provide for: (1) "the training of employees and exercising, by periodic drills, of radiation emergency plans to ensure that employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific emergency response duties"; and, (2) "the participation in the training and drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiation emergency.
10 CFR
^
Section 50, Appendix E,Section IV.F.
LILCO states: "[a] prompt and effective response to a radiological emergency at the Shoreham plant is dependent on the abilities of the individuals who have designated response roles."
The Plan states, further, that it is essential for LILCO to have an effective training program because, according to LILCO, the " knowledge and proficiency" of each individual can only be increased through training-(Plan, at 5.1-1).
Section 50.47(b)(15) requires LILCO to provide training "to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency,"
which, under the LILCO Plan, includes both its own personnel
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e and the personnel of non-LILCO emergency response organizations.
In short, LILCO must assure the training of all
" appropriate individuals."
NUREG 0654,Section II.0.1.
Suffolk County contends that LILCO's Plan fails to demon-strate that adequate training will be provided to emergency re-sponse personnel.
As a result, there is no assurance that these personnel will be capable of providing a prompt and ef-fective response to an emergency at Shoreham.
With respect to the initial training of LILCO and non-LILCO personnel, the specific deficiencies in LILCO's training program include the following:
1.
The LILCO Plan fails to demonstrate that adequate training will be provided with respect to:
(a)
An understanding of the LILCO emergency planning basis and emergency classification system; (b)
Basic principles of radiation, health effects / health physics; (c)
How to deal with problems unique to radiological emergencies, such as the high levels of anxiety and distrust a radiological emergency is likely to provoke, leading to both population overreaction (spontaneous evacuc-tion) and underreaction (failure to evacuate);
- 133 -
(d)
The specific tasks and duties under the Plan and implementing procedures.
2.
The LILCO Plan fails to demonstrate that adequate training will be provided with respect to the details of the Plan and its implementing procedures.
Lesson plans and specific training objectives are not set forth in the Plan.
Moreover, despite references in the Plan to the contrary (see, e.g., OPIP 5.1.1, at 9), there is no training manual for the offsite emergency response personnel, nor does LILCO intend to develop a training manual.
Further, the Plan fails to demon-strate that training methods will encompass changing needs and circumstances and fails to define acceptable standards of per-formance for each response role during initial and requalification training or to specify instructor qualifica-tions.
3.
LILCO is required to " provide site specific emer-gency response training for those offsite emergency organiza-tions who may be called upon to provide assistance in the event of an emergency."
NUREG 0654,Section II.O.l.a.
- Moreover, LILCO is required to provide initial training and periodic retraining to, among others, police, security and fire fighting personnel, first aid and rescue personnel, local support services personnel, and medical support personnel.
NUREG 0654, l
- 134 -
l
Section II.O.4.d.,
f., g. and h.
Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO plans to " offer" emergency response training "to all members of LERO support organizations, including fire and ambulance companies, police, and private groups."
(OPIP 5.1.1, at 3).
i However, unlike its own personnel, LILCO cannot require these non-LILCO personnel to receive training.
Moreover, there is no indication in the LILCO Plan that any emergency response support organizations have_ agreed to have their personnel trained by LILCO.
Nor are there as'9ements by individual emer-gency workers to attend LILCO training-sessions.
In the ab-sence of such agreementa, there is no assurance that an i
adequate number of trained emergency workers will be available to respond to an emergency at Shoreham.
~
4.
With respect to non-LILCO personnel, the training offered by LILCO may be in direct conflict with the training given to the emergency personnel of support organizations, such as the ARC and fire / rescue squads.
As a result, coordination of the emergency response will be significantly impaired.' (
l 5.
LILCO's Plan fails to deal effectively wi h at-trition.
For LILCO personnel, "[a] n initial qualif.ication course will be scheduled each quarter fo'r newly assigned emer-l gency response organization staff designces (OPIF 5.1.1, at 2).
However, toensurethataklpersonnelare j
^
, - 135 -
t w4 l i
NO
O trained in their designated emergency response organization positions, LILCO should make satisfactory completion of its emergency response training program a prerequisite to the hir-ing of-personnel who will be assigned emergency response duties.
6.
With respect to non-LILCO personnel, LILCO's Plan ignores the issue of attrition.
As previously noted, LILCO cannot require non-LILCO personnel to receive training.
Further, LILCO will not know whether personnel in emergency re-sponse support organizations who might have bean trained by LILCO remain with their respective organizations, and thus remain available to respond to an emergency at Shoreham.
As a result, LILCO cannot be assured that adequate numbers of trained, support organization personnel will be available to respond to an emergency at Shoreham.
7.
Training of emergency response personnel, even if arguendo substantially adequate, will not overcome the role conflict that will be experienced by both the LILCO and the non-LILCO emergency response personnel.
In particular, the LILCO. emergency response personnel normally perform job functions unrelated to the'ir assigned emergency functions and lack'the dedication a6d' professional commitment necessary to 1
s minimize this role conflict.
Role conflict will cause
-cy
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1 s ignificant nytb'ers sof emergency personn41 bo look to the needs w
of,their families o'r others for which they have responsibility a
y' t
i.?before they report to their designated emergency respp ee posi-
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tance.
Moreover, thisfactorwillbee5cac[rb~atedbythe fact
.if that many emergdn y personneJJ will be asked to resporid"from a
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relacively safe area outsije the EPZ o o more dangerous area l
> i' within the EPZ./
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)
8' Shere is no assurance that LILCO personnel can
=ddequately p00forr the em,ergency functions and duties they are assigned under the5LILCO Plan.
Tha Plan calls upon LILCO per-( '<.
3y sonnel to perfo'rm emergency functions which, in most instances, f
3 are unrelated to their LILCO job functions.
Foc example, LILCO 1
..g.f o
f#
' meter readers are to serve as traffic guidea,(OPIP 2.1.1, at g
28, Attachment 2 / 'at 24), Customer Relations personnel are to
/
3 I
serve as evacuation route spotters (M., at 32, Attachment 2, at 28), and LILCO maintenance foremen and mechanics are to t
l serve as radiological inoritoring personnel (M., at 17, Attach-ment 2, at 13).
There is no assurance that the LILCO training w'.ll compensate for this lack of job-related experience, espe-l cially when the tasks to be performed may be accompanied by high levels of stress and fatigue involving life-threatening l
situations.
Training alone cannot prepare people for the l
J i
- 137 -
f.
f t
6
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actual stress and trauma that accompany emergency conditions.
Experience is also essential.
(Thus, doctors and police off!.-
cers, for example, are respectively required tc intern as re-sidents and to serve as rookie police officers before their r
training is completed).
Moreover, training that is not regu-i larly applied or used will be ineffective.
Thus, even if their initial training were adequate, LILCO's personnel will forget h,',
what was learned during that training.
Rather than applying or s
/ii using their emergency training, LILCO's personnel will be ex-
't I
pected to perform their regular job functions.
This will mini-mize any benefits gained through the emergency training, espe-cially since that training is only repeated on an annual basis, and there are no incentives for LILCO's personnel to learn or i
to retain the emergency training provided to them.
- 9. Many of the LILCO personnel, including those in command / control and coordinating roles, are not residents of Suffolk County.
Therefore, they lack a sense of the territorial imperative that is a principal motivating factor in emergency response personnel.
Without proper motivation, training will not be effective.
10.
Because many LILCO personnel are not area re-sidents, they will not be familiar with geography, topography,
(
road network, demography, school and other facility locations,
- 138 -
2^
o i
jurisdictional limits of emergency and volunteer organizations 3
a and their capabilities, and other local conditions in and around the EPZ.
Moreover, they will not be aware of the inter-nal workings of the communities within the EPZ.
As a result, i
~
emergency personnel may be unable to deal promptly with, and make correct decisions concerning, unexpected situations or contingencies, such as: traffic accidents at key intersections; 7
obstructions of evacuation routes; or situations where persons refuse to evacuate because they fear that their homes / businesses will be unprotected.
Training alone can never j
serve as a substitute for experience and is even less effective.
t when those expected to manage and coordinate the emergency re' sponse, or implement that response in the field, are unfamiliar with, and may not have a concerted interest in, the area of the emergency.
11.
There is no assurance that LILCO's training pro-gram will be consistent with the LILCO Plan / implementing proce-i dures or that the training program.will adequately reflect changed circumstances or conditions affecting implementation of the Plan.
LILCO's commitment to review annually the training program content (OPIP 5.1.1, at 1) is inadequate and fails to take into account modifications which may be made to the Plan, deficiencies in the Plan that may be identified and other factors.
- 139 -
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i B.
Retraining of Emergency Response Personnel Appendix E to 10 CFR Section 50 requires " periodic retraining programs" to be provided by the licensee.
10 CFR i
Section !9, Appendix E,Section IV.F.
While the LILCO Plan requires each LILCO emergency response worker to participate in an " annual requalification program" (OPIP 5.1.1, at 2), there is no corresponding requirement for non-LILCO emergency re-sponse personnel.
Rather, as with initial training, non-LILCO l
personnel will be invited to participate in LILCO's annual retraining / requalification program, but participation will be wholly voluntary.
As a result, there is no assurance that non-LILCO personnel, even if trained initially, will remain ad-equately trained and ready to respond in a prompt and effective j
manner to an emergency at Shoreham.
I C.
Drills and Exercises for Emergency Response PerConnel 10 CFR Section 50,47(b)(14) requires that "(pleriodic ex-ercises (be] conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills (be] conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and (that] deficiencies iden-tified as a result of exercises or drills (be] corrected."
In addition, Appendix E to 10 CFR Section 50 requires "the conduct of emergency preparedness exercises.
(to] test the adequa-cy of timing and content of implementing procedures and l
l 140 -
4 i
methods, test emergency equipment and comraunication networks, test the public notification system, and ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties."
These exercises are to " simulate an emergency that results in offsite i
radiological releases which would require response by offsite authorities."
NUREG 0654,Section II.N.l.a.
Suffolk County contends that the LILCO Plan provides no assurance that the drills and exercises contemplated by LILCO will satisfy these regulatory requirements because they will not adequately simulate actual conditions likely in the event of an emergency.
The specific deficiencies in LILCO's Plan are as follows:
1.
LILCO will be unable to require participation by the personnel of support organizations in drills or exercises.
As a result, persons whose assistance and expertise may be needed in the event of a radiological emergency, and who are relied upon in the LILCO Plan, may not be adequately trained and there will be no assurance of the emergency preparedness required under the NRC's regulations.
See 10 CFR Section 50.47(b); 10 CFR Section 50, Appendix E.
2.
The LILCO Plan fails to demonstrate that drills and exercises will adequately test the training of emergency response persont.el so as to ensure that personnel are familiar with, and capable of performing, their duties under the Plan.
- 141 -
i
- m..
o 3.
Scenarios for the drills and exercises required by the Plan have not yet been developed by LILCo.
Thus, there is no assurance that drill and exercise scenarios will ade-quately test emergency preparedness.
Moreover, even if these drills and exercises arguendo were to test adequately tha training and performance level of emergency response personnel, there is no assurance that training or performance deficiencies will be corrected.
Exercises test, but do not train, emergency petsonnel.
Thus, retraining should immediately follow the cri-tique of a drill or exercise so as to take into account any identified training deficiencies.
4.
Under the LILCO Plan, post-exercise / drill cri-tiques will be performed primarily by LILCO.
(Plan, at 5.2-3; OPIP 5.1.1, at 8-9).
LILCO, however, will not be able to ade-quately critique its own Plan, including the exercises conducted under the Plan, due to its lack of expertise and ob-jectivity.
Thus, deficiencies in the LILCO Plan and imple-menting procedures may not be identified and corrected.
- 142 -
SC Contention 12:
Recovery and Reentry The LILCO Plan proposes that short-term and long-term re-covery and reentry operations will be performed by LILCO per-sonnel following a radiological emergency at Shoreham (Plan, at 3.10; OPIP 3.10.1). Suffolk County contends that contrary to the emergency planning standards of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(13) and NUREG 0654,Section II.M.,
the LILCO Plan fails to include general plans for recovery and reentry, including the develop-ment of necessary procedures and methods that are capable of being implemented.
A.
LILCO states that "the initiation of Recovery and im-plementation of Reentry is a non-utility decision-making process," (OPIP 3.10.1, at 1).
LtLCO identifes no non-utility entity, with necessary authority, which has agreed to undertake the initiation of the recovery and reentry processes.
Accord-ingly, under the LILCO Plan, with command and control functions assumed by LILCO, recovery and reentry cannot be initiated or implemented.
B.
The Plan states (at 3.10.1):
LERO personnel will continue to moni-tor the affected areas and when radiation levels are such that it is safe to enter the area, will inform the Director of Local Response (a LILCO employee].
The Director of Local Response will then appoint a Re-covery Action Committee to develop a recovery plan for the restoration of the area to its pre-emergency condition.
- 143 -
(Emphasis added).
The LILCO Plan thus merely states that a plan for recovery and reentry will be developed; at this time no such plan exists.
This is contrary to the requirement of 10 CFR Section 50.47(b)(13) that "[gleneral plans for recovery and reentry are developed."
(Emphasis added).
C.
Although the Plan asserts several general types of
" Recovery and Reentry operations" (Plan, at 3.10.1 and 3.10.2),
the Plan fails to identify the persons or organizations who will: determine when such operations are necessary or appropriate; determine if they are adequate; have the capabili-ty of performing the operations; provide the necessary equip-ment; or determine if they are performed properly.
There is no provision in the Plan which identifies when, under what circumstances, how, or according to what criteria, the listed operations are to be performed.
Indeed, the Plan does not state that any of the operations ever would or could actually be performed.
The list of operaticns contained in the Plan does not constitute a " plan" at all; it is merely a compilation of hypothetical actions.
The Plan thus fails to comply with NUREG 0654, Sections II M.l. and II.M.2.
I D.
The Plan fails to identify, by name, title or qualifi-cation, the individuals from FEMA and DOE who are to be appointed to the Recovery Action Committee by the LILCO
- 144 -
Director of LERO.
(See OPIP 3.10.1, at Section 3.0.)
E.
The LILCO and BNL employees who will be appointed to the Recovery Action Committee (see OPIP 3.10.1, at Section 5.1) are not authorized, qualified or capable of exercising the responsibilities which LILCO apparently expects them to fulfill (see OPIP 3.10.1, at Sections 5.2 and 5.3).
Accordingly, the purported recovery and reentry activities could not and would not be implemented.
F.
The Plan fails to assign specific recovery and reentry responsibilities to members of the Recovery Action Committee.
Further, the Plan fails to document that any of the personnel or equipment required for recovery and reentry activities, des-ignated in Sections 5.3.2, 5.3.3, and 5.3.4 of OPIP 3.10.1, will be available to LILCO.
The Plan thus fails to comply with NUREG 0654,Section II.M.2.
G.
The Plan fails to establish a long-term medical moni-toring program for personnel residing in contaminated areas.
Without such a program, appropriate recovery and reentry deci-sions cannot be made.
H.
The Plan fails to include radiological cleanup proce-dures to provide for the physical removal of radionuclides,
- 145 -
stabilization of the radionuclides in place and environment management including consideration of the following particular factors:
1.
The type of surface contaminated 2.
The external environment to which the surface is exposed to 3.
The applicability of weapons fallout data (par-ticles from weapons fallout are typically 100 microns or more in diameter) 4.
The possible radiological hazards to the 1
decontamination operators 5.
The degree level of decontamination required 1
6.
The consequences of the decontamination operation 7.
The costs involved.
In addition, the Plan fails to set forth the anticipated decontamination factors ("DF"), and fails to cite or develop a technical basis for a DF.
(The DF is a measure of l
decontamination effectiveness and is defined as the amount of contaminant per unit surface area before contamination, divided by the amount of contamination after decontamination.)
The Plan also fails to address external factors that affect the ef-ficiency of decontamination operations, including the following:
- 146 -
(a)
Wet and dry deposition (b)
Major weather changes after deposition (c)
Aging physical and chemical actions (d)
Particulate matter size (aersolo expected to be released from a reactor core c.eltdown would be less then 10 microns in diameter)
(e)
Contaminated surface characteristics (f)
Operator or team skill, training and incen-tive.
Finally, the Plan fails to set forth the criteria or j
methods for decontamination of the various types of surfaces which could become contaminated including the f'ollowing :
(a)
Structure contamination (b)
Paved area contamination (c)
Vehicle and equipment contamination (d)
Land area and soil contamination (e)
Water contamination
( f)
Vegetation contamination (g)
Animal contamination (h)
Human contamination.
I.
The Plan fails to address the volumes and forms of ra-dioactive waste that may result from decontamination operations or to provide a method for transportation of the radioactive
- 147 -
l
waste, the routes for such waste transportation or the location of the ultimate waste repository.
J.
OPIP 3.10.1 sets forth " Acceptable Surface Contamina-tion Levels" in disintegrations per minute.
The Plan does not include a method for converting such information into radiation doses to the public.
The Plan also fails to state the dose criteria that will provide the basis for a determination that it is safe for the public to reenter previously evacuted areas, and thus fails to comply with NUREG 0654, Sections II.I.10.,
and II.M.1.
K.
The Plan fails to prescribe the criteria to be uti-lized for evaluating the costs of decontamination measures (including the cleanup of aquifers) as compared to the costs associated with the loss of use of property including homes within Suffolk County as well as the loss of income from agri-culture, businesses, tourism and other income-producing activities.
Such criteria are essential because the coct of decontamination figures as a fundamental aspect in determining the procedures and methods which form the basis for the recov-ery and reentry general plans.
Further, the Plan fails to assign the responsibility for conducting and securing approval for such a cost analysis.
l l
- 148 -
l
L.
The Plan fails to demonstrate that LILCO has the nec-estary financial resources to compensate Suffolk County re-sidents for the costs incurred, and the income lost, as a result of being dislocated from their place of residence and/or employment.
The Plan further fails to demonstrate that LILCO has the required financial resources to provide for the direct costs associated with the necessary recovery and reentry activities, including decontamination during the period until restoration of community life has been completed.
- 149 -
O O
SC Contention 13:
State Emergency Plan There is no New York State emergency plan before this Board to deal with an emergency at the Shoreham plant.
(See Plan, at Attachment 1.4.2).
In addition, the LILCO Plan fails to provide for coordination of LILCO's emergency response with that of the State of New York (assuming, arguendo, such a re-sponse would be forthcoming).
In the absence of a State emer-gency plan for Shoreham, there can be no finding of compliance with 10 CFR Sections 50.47(a)(2), 50.47(b), or NUREG 0654,Section I.E.,
I.F.,
I.H. or II.
l l
I 1
- 150 -
1 i
i l
=
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i II.
SOC CONTENTIONS SOC Contention 1:
Protection of Disadvantaged and Minority Populations 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1) requires LILCO to demonstrate that its plan provides assurance that it will protect the public health and safety.
SOC contends that the Plan does not meet this stan-dard with respect to the following groups: schoolchildren, illit-erate persons and the blind, the hearing-impaired, and the non-English speaking.
A.
Schoolchildren
- 1. Public education 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG-0654 II.G.l.
re-quire emergency plans to provide for periodic, advance dissemination of information to the public regarding nuclear emergencies and responses thereto.
SOC con-tends that the brochure and other printed educational materials which accompany the LILCO Plan will not be read and/or understood by schoolchildren.
Although schoolchildren need not be trained in high-energy phy-sics, they must be given special instruction regarding the importance, purposes, and mechanics of nuclear emergency planning.
- 2. Protective actions
- 151 -
i The LILCO Plan provides that, in the event of a general emergency at Shoreham, schools will be both dismissed according to existing early dismissal plans (Plan at 3.6-6 ) and evacuated by LERO personnel (Plan at
- 3. 6-7 ).
Assuming that LILCO actually means the former, the Plan is insuf ficiently protective of the public health and safety because:
a.
the LILCO Plan neither incorporates not refer-ences the early dismissal plans for each school.
It is thus impossible to tell whether such plans actually exist and, if so, the extent to which they are compatible with the LILCO Plan; b.
at some schools within the plume EPZ the existing early dismissal plans call for students living within close proximity (i.e.,
less than two miles) to the school to walk home.
These children would be exposed to potentially huge radiation doses in the event of a radioactive release f rom Shoreham;
- c. according to surveys, between 30 and 40% of the schoolchildren within the plume EPZ return from school to an empty home because both parents hold daytime jobs (or, in the case of single-parent
- 152 -
I
families, the sole parent holds a daytime job).
Thus, in the event of an early dismissal, these children would be at home alone.
The LILCO Plan makes no provision for evacuating such children.
Moreover, the parents of these children can be expected to leave work in order to return home and evacuate them, causing a significant influx of unnecessary auto traffic into the plume EPZ and extending the duration of the evacuation substan-tially.
- d. Early dismissal procedures, which involve stag-gered departure times and several round trips
( through heavily congested traffic) for school buses, will take hours to implement.
In the case of f amilies that are planning to evacuate, this means that they must delay their departure until the early dismissal procedure is complete.
In the case of families with several children in differ-ent schools, the delayed return home of a single 1
child will effectively force the entire family to remain in the plume EPZ long beyond the evacuation order.
B.
Illiterate persons and the blind The public education materials which would, under the 1
- 153 -
l
LILCO Plan, be distributed within the plume EPZ, could not be read by the illiterate, the blind, or the severly vision-impaired.
The Plan does not indicate that Braille-encrypted materials will be distributed, or that alternative media (such as radio) will be employed to educate the public, and it thus violates 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG-0654 II.B.l.
C.
The hearing-impaired l
The principal means of informing the public of an emergency at Shoreham are the siren system and the broad-casting of emergency broadcast messages over the radio.
Neither method serves to notify the deaf and hearing-im-paired.
LILCO's solution to this problem is to pre-register such persons so that they can be contacted directly by LERO personnel when an emergency is announced. See Appendix A at II-18.
However, the proposed alternate means of making these contacts is by commercial telephone, which deaf per-sons cannot use. Id. Indeed, if pre-registered persons do not answer the phone (or if the phones are not working l
properly), they will not be evacuated. OPIP 3.6.5 op. 2-3.
t Thus, the LILCO Plan provides inadequate protection for the deaf and hearing-impaired, and violates 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6) and NUREG-0 6 5 4 II.E.6 and II.J.10.c.
l D. Non-English speaking persons l
The public education materials which would, under the LILCO Plan, be distributed within the plume EPZ, are
- 154 -
o written exclusively in English.
The Plan therefore fails to provide, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG-0654 II.B.1 and II.J.10 ( c), assurances that all segments of the public will receive suf ficient advance emergency planning information.
In addition, the emergency broadcast messages which are to be transmitted by WALK in the event of an emergency at Shoreham will be delivered exclusively in Eng-lish.
The Plan therefore f ails to provide, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5) and NUREG-0654 II.E.6, assurances that the public will receive current information during the course of an emergency.
SOC Contention 2: Loss of Offsite Power No emergency plan can be j udged adequate unless it takes account of the full range of accidents which might forseeably occur at the facility in question, as well as the forseeable consequences thereof.
Each plan must provide an adequate re-sponse for even "the worst possible accident, regardless of its extremely low likelihood." NUREG-0654 I.
D.
at 7.
A loss of offsite power is not an unlikely consequence of a severe accident at Shoreham.
The LILCO Plan, however, contains no measures for dealing with such a circumstance, and thus does not provide for the protection of the public health and safety.
- 155 -
e A.
Inadequate facilities 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(8) requires the emergency response organization to establish " adequate facilities" to maintain the emergency response.
See also NUREG-0654 II.H.
The LILCO Plan f ails to satisfy this requirement by f ailing to allow for the possibility of a loss of offsite power.
Spe-cifically:
1.
The LILCO Plan does not indicate that the EOC has a backup power supply, nor does it provide for the man-agement of the emergency response f rom another loca-tion.
In the event of a loss of of f site power the EOC would become inoperable and LERO would become unable to implement an emergency response.
2.
The LILCO Plan does not indicate that backup power supplies have been established for staging areas, bus transfer points, receiving hospitals, or relocation centers. In the event of a loss of offsite power, these facilities would become inoperable.
B.
Notification of LERO personnel l
10 CFR S 5 0.4 7 ( b)( 5 ) and NUREG-0654 II.E.2 require l
l that emergency plans provide for the prompt notification of l
- 156
~
l
~
response personnel.
See also Part 50 App. E SS 4C and D.
Notification channels must remain open on a 24-hour basis.
NUREG-0654 II.F.1.a. The LILCO Plan violates this require-ment by not allowing for the possibility of a loss of off-site power.
Specifically:
1.
The LILCO Plan does not indicate that the LILCO Customer Service Office has a backup power supply.
In the event of a loss of offsite power, the LILCO Custo-mer Service Of fice will become inoperable.
Thus, the SNPS Control Room will be unable to notify LERO and initiate the emergency response process. See LILCO Plan at S 3.3.
2.
The LILCO Plan does not indic' ate tha t the EOC has a backup power supply.
In the event of a loss of of fsite power, the EOC will become inoperable, and LERO will be unable to notify emergency personnel in the field.
C. Notification of the public l
10 CFR 5 0.4 7 ( b)( 5 ) requires every emergency plan to provide for early notification and clear instruction to those within the plume EPZ.
These requirements are dis-tinct: the public must be given an early alert signal and a
- 157 -
o follow-up instructional message. See NUREG-0654 App. 3S B(2)(a).
The LILCO Plan violates these requirements by failing to take account of the possibility of a loss of offsite power.
Specifically:
1.
LILCO relies on a system of sirens for providing an immediate alert to the public.
See LILCO Plan at 3.3-4; OPIP 3.3.4.
However, the LILCO Plan does not indicate that the sirens have a backup power supply.
Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, the sirens will not function.
2.
LILCO relies on the transmission of emergency broadcast messages by radio station WALK as the "pri-mary direct communications link to the public af ter activation of the sirens." LILCO Plan at 3.3-6.
But the LILCO Plan does not indicate that WALK has a i
backup power supply.
Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, WALK would cease transmissions.
The LILCO Plan suggests that there is a " backup" system involving CDS radio in New York City.
LILCO l
Plan at 3.3-7.
But this system evidently depende on the transmission capabilities of Long Island radios stations which, like WALK, will become inoperable in the event of a loss of offsite power.
- 158 -
(
a 3.
The LILCO Plan does not indicate that radio station WALK has a backup power supply, or that any other broadcasting facility has the capability to transmit the emergency broadcast signal used to activate the tone alert radios which will allegedly be provided to hundreds of facilities within the plume EPZ.
See LILCO Plan at 3.3 pp 6-7.
In the event of a loss of of f site power, WALK would cease transmissions and would be unable to activate the tone alert radios.
4.
LILCO relies on tone alert radios to provide the extra evacuation time required by large facilities such as factories and schools. See LILCO Plan at 3.3-4,5.
The tone alert radios will evidently operate on AC power rather than on batteries. There' fore, in the event of a loss of of fsite power, the tone alert radios would not function.
5.
Emergency plans must provide formal means for dis-semination of information to the public through the news media.
See NUREG-0654 II.G.3; 10 CFR S 5 0.47 ( b)( 7 ).
LILCO relies on the establishment of an Emergency News Center to satisfy this requirement.
See OPIP 3.8.1.
However, the LILCO Plan does not indicate that the Emergency News Center has a backup power supply or that a backup news f acility has been estab-
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lished.
Therefore, in the event of a loss of offsite power, the Emergency News Center will become inoperable and LILCO's public notification duties will not be satisfied.
D.
Implementation of protective actions 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) requires each emergency plan to provide for protective actions which protect the public health and safety in the event of an accident.
NUREG-0654 II.J.9 requires a demonstration that the protective actions within a plan are capable of being implemented. The LILCO Plan does not satisfy these requirements because it fails to take account of the possibility of a loss of offsite power.
Specifically:
1.
Assuming that an evacuation of the plume EPZ were determined to be the appropriatc grotective action, the LILCO Plan relies heavily on the services of private firms such as ambulance services, LILCO Plan at 3. 7-1, bus companies, OPIP 3.6.4 at 2, and lumber companies, Appendix A at IV-186.
However, in the event of a loss i
l of offsite power these firms and facilities would become inoperable and close.
LERO would thus become unable to utilize those services.
2.
Assuming that an evacuation of the plume EPZ were determined to the appropriate protective action, LERO
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would be responsible for evacuating scores of hospi-tals, nursing homes, and f acilities for the handicap-ped.
However, the LILCO Plan does not indicate that these f acilities have backup power supplies.
In the event of a loss of of f site power, evacuation of these facilities would be either impossible or far more dif-ficult and time-consuming than indicated in the LILCO Plan.
Without functioning elevators, non-ambulatory per-sons could be moved only with extreme difficulty, if at all. Without lighting, nightime evacuation of these f acilities would be all but impossible. Without func-tioning medical equipment, management would attempt some form of limited evacuation on its own.
In any case, this potential circumstance is not taken into account in the LILCO Plan.
3.
Assuming that evacuation of the plume EPZ were j
determined to be the appropriate protective action, the successful implementation of such an action would de-1 i
pend on the functioning of systems and facilities that would in f act be inoperable in the absense of of fsite power.
These include: residential lighting, public streetlights, traf fic signals, and service stations.
[
The LILCO Plan does not indicate that any of ther l
facilities and systems have backup power supp.1 as.
I i
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l t
t-
i I
Therefore, in the event of a less of offsite power, the Plan would not provide for the protection of the public health and safety.
SOC Contention 3: Loss of Reliable Telephone Service SOC contends that the LILCO Plan is inadequate because it i
fails to account in any way for the possibility that a severe accident at Shoreham will be accompanied by the loss or substan-tial impairment of telephone service on Long Island.
In addition to the typical causes of telephone system problems, such as bad weather and temporary repair actions, a public emergency can also interrupt phone nervice.
Substantial interruptions in service are common in areas that are undergoing crises, as residents try to locate f amily members, distant relatives call to express concern, and local emergency workers place unusual demands on the telephone system.
The telephone network on Long Island would probably suf fer a substantial reduction in availability and re-liability were a severe accident to occur at Shoreham, and the f ailure of the LILCO Plan to address, much lesc plan for, this circumstance renders it inadequate in the following respects.
1 A.
Public notification l
10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5) requires every emergency plan to provide for early notification to the public of the exis-
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o tence of an emergency condition at a nuclear power plant.
See also Part 50 App. E $ IV.D. 3 ; NUREG-0654 App. 3 S B(2)(a).
The LILCO Plan pErports to mee t;S this requirement A
largely on the basis of the emergercy broadcast arrangement with radio station WALK. See LILCO Plan at 3.3.-6. However, in the event that the initial notification from the SNPS control room is a general emergency and the recommended protective action is an evacuation, the LILCO Plan provides for the emergency., broadcast system te be activated by cal-ling NALK over commercial telephone lines. OPIP 3.3.4 p2-3.
The use of unreliable commercial telephone lines for this crucial communication renders the LILCO Plan inadequa'te.
B.
Notification of LERO personnel i
10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5) requires every emergency' plan, to contain procedures assuring prompt notification of emergency personnel.
See also Part 50 App. E S IV.C.
A reliable communications system is essential to the integrity of any emergency plan.
SOC contends that the LILCO Plan is inade-quate in that it relies on pagers, and thus an unreliaable commercial telephone network, for contacting the following:
x 1.
Direct'dr of Local Respcn[e (see LILCO Plan at Fig, 3.3.4)
Manager of Local Response Lead Communic'ator Health Services' Coordinator
~
Evacuation Coordinatcr 3
l y
i s.
4, 1
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\\9
.c Support Services-Coordinator (see OPIP 3.3.2 p.4 item c);
L '.
2.
Those individua 's,1 5 ted at OPIP 3.3.2 p.4 item e; 3.
Those individuals listed at OPIP 3.3.2 p.S item g.
4.
Those individuals listed at OPIP 3.3.2.
p.49 el s
j seq.
g
___m C.: Implementation of protective actions x.
.(
l.
'10 CFR 'S '50.4 7 ( b)( 6 ) and NUREG-0654 S II.F re-g quire a showing \\that an emergency plan provides for
~
prompt and ef fective communications among emergency
\\
personnel once-an emergency response is underway.
SOC contends that use of commercial telephone lines during 4
s a nuclear emergency is not a prompt and effective means
.of communicatibns, and that therefore the LILCO Plan is inadequate to the extent that it relies on commercial s
telephone lines;for communications between:
x Staging area managers and the EOC (OPIP 3.3.3 p.2);
h Transfer, point coordinators and the EOC (OPIP 3.6.4 p.6);
s.
Relocation Center ' Managers and the EOC (OPIP 4.2.1
'u p.2);.,
~ '
l l
Bus driver $'ond the Bus Coodinator (OPIP 3.6.4. p.7).
2 ^.
3
- 2. In the event that evacuation of the plume EPZ
% w
., m is determined to be the appropriate protective action, the LILCO Plan calls 'for LERO personnel to communicate q
s s -
a V
- i. -
k N
^
with many members of the public.
SOC contends that the Plan la inadequate to the extent that it relies on commercial telephone lines for communications between the following:
the Home Coordinator and private citizens requiring special evacuations (OPIP 3.6.5. p.2);
the Home Coordinator and receiving hospitals (Id.);
the Health Facilities Coordinator and handicapped facilities (OPIP 3.6.5 p.5-6 ),
Suffolk rsevelopment Center (OPIP 3.6.5 p.6), nursing homes (OPIP 3.6.5 p.6-7), receiving facilities (state hospitals) for nursing home patients ( Appendix A at IV-191), hospitals (OPIP 3.6.5 p.7 ),
receiving facilities for hospital patients (OPIP 3.6.5 p.8);
the School Coordinators and schools (OPIP 3.6.5 p.10-11);
4 the Relocation Center Coordinator and the managers of the facilities to be used for relocation centers; and the Ambulance Coordinator and private ambulance
- services, l'
SOC Contention 4: Staffing A.
10 CFR S 50.47(b)(1) requires that every emergency plan provide for adequate staffing of emergency response organization positions.
The LILCO Plan violates this requirement becauset i
- f
- 1. it provides for only a single Bus Coordinator, who must maintain continuing contact with 290 bus drivers.
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OPIP 3.6.4 p.7 (item 9).
In addition, the Bus Coordin-ator must stay in contact with stagin'g area coordina-tors and bus company operators, among others. OPIP 3.6.4.
p.2; 2.
it provides for only a single Ambulance Coordinator, who must remain in continuous contact with 110 ambu-
?
lance drivers. LILCO Plan Fig. 2.1.1 p.2; 3.
it provides for only a single Home Coordinator, who must not only contact but carry on a conversation with someone in every household in the plume EPZ requiring evacuation assistance.
The number of such households could run into the thousands.
B. NUREG-0 6 5 4 II.A.2.a. requires that the persons who will be filling emergency response organization staff positions be specified (by job title).
The LILCO Plan violates this require-ment because:
1.
it designates only "LILCO Officers" to fill the position of Director of Local Response; OPIP 2.1.1 p.5; 2.
it designates only " Representatives BNL" to fill the positions of Radiation Health Coordinator, Environ-mental Assessment Coordinator, Dose Assessment Staf f Members, Environmental Survey Coordinator, and Survey Team Members; OPIP 2.1.1 pp. 8-23; 3.
it designates only "Various LILCO personnel" to fill
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the positions of Road Crews, Route Alerting Drivers, and Bus Drivers; OPIP 2.1.1 pp30-42.
C. NUREG-0654 II.A.4 provides that emergency response organizations "shall be capable of continuous (24-hour) operations for a protracted pe r iod."
The LILCO Plan violates this requirement by providing only one person to fill. the position of Coordinator of Public Information. OPIP 2.1.1 p. 5 8.
At least three individuals must be assigned 1
for every LERO staff position, because of the need for replacement of staff, and because a high percentage of people will inevitably be unavailable for a given emergency, due to sickness, vacation, etc.
SOC Contention 5: Bad Weather SOC contends that the LILCO Plan is inadequate because it
,i f ails to take account of the possibility that a severe accident L
at Shoreham might occur in tandem with servere adverse weather, i.e.,
heavy snow.
This deficiency violates the applicable stan-dards in several respects.
A.
Notification of the Public Prompt notification of the public is mandated by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(6 ) and NUREG-0654 II.E.6 and II.J.10.
The l
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o means specified by the LILCO Plan far immediate public notification are the siren system and, as a backup, route alerting.
In the event of a heavy snowf all, however, nei-ther of these means will work.
Heavy snow may damage com-mercial telephone lines and provent communications, via pagers, with those LERO personnel responsiole for activating the siren and emergency broadcast systems.
Even if these persons were contacted, they would be unable to travel to the EOC, and from there to initiate the siren and emeraency broadcast systems.
Moreover, during a heavy snowfall, the route alerting system would not constitute a reliable backup to the siren system because route alert drivers would not receive notification of the emergency (due to the inopera-bility of the EOC), would not be able to reach the staging areas (because of impassable roads),
or (for the same reason) would not be able to travel f rom the staging areas along the designated alert routes.
B.
Protective actions Pursuant to 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) the LILCO Plan must designate a range of protective actions appropriate to a variety of circumstances. See also NUREG-0654 II.J.9.
This includes unfavorable weather.
Yet the LILCO Plan's proce-dures for evacuation completely disregard the possibility of the existence of deep snow.
SOC contends that the evacua-i tion procedures outlined in the LILCO Plan would not work
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4 during a heavy snowfall, for the following reasons:
- 1. key LERO personnel would be unable to travel to the EOC, as required by the LILCO Plan at 3.3; 2.
neither traffic guides, road crews, evacuation route spotters, ambulance drivers nor staging area coordinators would be able to travel to the staging areas, as required by OPIP 3.3.3 p.2 and 3.6.3 pp.
5, 6;
- 3. even if the persons listed in #2 above were to reach the staging areas, they would be unable to travel to their assigned posts / routes, as required by OPIP 3.6.3;
- 4. bus drivers and shuttle operators would be unable to travel to staging areas, as required by OPIP 3.6.<4 p.4 and, in any case, would be unable to complete their assigned trips;
- 5. relocation center staff would be unable to travel to the relocation centers; and
- 6. members of the public would be unable to evacuate 1
their homes or places of work.
l l
\\
l
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4 Respectfully submitted, David J. Gilmartin Patricia A. Dempsey Suffolk County Department of Law Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 9
b Lawrence Coe Lanp/
Herbert H.
Brown her Karla J. Letsche Christopher M. McMurray Michael S. Miller KIRKPATRICK, LOCKHART, HILL, CHRISTOPHER & PHILLIPS 1900 M Street, N.W.,
Suite 800 Washington, D.C.
20036 Attorneys for Suffolk County
(
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