ML20072B871
| ML20072B871 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1983 |
| From: | James Smith LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20072B875 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-SSINS-6820 IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, SNRC-901, NUDOCS 8306140607 | |
| Download: ML20072B871 (4) | |
Text
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_owser,, wr N,(h LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COM PANY SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION
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,,.m Direct Dial Number June 8, 1983 SNRC-901 Mr. Harold R.
Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Engineered Safety Feature System-Reset Control Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-322
Dear Mr. Denton:
In reviewing LILCO's compliance with I&E Bulletin No. 80-06,
" Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Reset Controls", NRC Region I identified, in Inspection Report 83-08, certain additional equipment which changed position to normal upon reset of the initiation signal.
LILCO responded to this inspection report via letter SNRC-890, (response to Appendix B) dated 5/17/83.
Letter SNRC-890 and its associated " Response to Appendix B" is included as Attachment A to this letter.
It should be noted that, as stated in SNRC-890,Bulletin 80-06 requires that LILCO " review the drawings for all systems serving safety-related functions at the schematic level to determine whether or not upon the reset of an ESF actuation signal, all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode".
In the development of the original response to this issue (NRC Question 223.88), the term "ESF actuation signal" was utilized in a narrow context by LILCO.
This context was subsequently maintained in LILCO's original responses to follow-up NRC questions 223.99 and 223.100.
Follow-on discussions with the NRC Resident Inspector revealed that this complex issue needed to be further reviewed by LILCO.
In an effort to completely resolve the confusion associated with this complex issue, LILCO has conducted an additional engineering review which included the following:
8306140607 830608 DR ADOCK 05000322 Ylk PDR ll FC 8935.1
June 8, 1983 SNRC-901 Page 2-a)
ESF systems actuated by ESF actuation signals and affected by reset of these signals, b)
ESF systems actuated by non-ESF actuation signals and affected by subsequent reset of these signals, and c)
NON-ESF systems affected by resets of ESF actuation signals This review identified four systems or system modes which contain equipment that would change position if the actuation signals were reset.
These systems are as follows:
1)
Steam Condensing Mode of RHR 2)
Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) System 3)
Reactor Building Standby Ventilation System 4)
Automatic Depressurization System Safety / Relief Valves A description of the equipment and the circumstances under which they change position as well as a justification for the existing system design is included in the revised responses to NRC requests 223.88, 223.99 and 223.100, the text of which is attached.
Revisions are identified by a bar in the right hand margin.
These revised responses (including applicable figures) will be incorporated into the next amendment to Shoreham's FSAR.
As stated in the revised response to question 223.88, a design change is currently being pursued for the Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) system which will preclude reinsertion of the TIP probes upon reset of the ESF actuation signal.
Discussions with General Electric Company indicate that the generic design and engineering work and documentation needed to initiate LILCO implementation requires a 20-30 week lead time. In order not to impact other post fuel load modifications which are presently scheduled as described in letter SNRC-863, 4/14/83, this field modification has been scheduled to be completed by the last quarter of 1984, i
June 8, 1983 SNRC-901 Page 3 The information submitted herewith should'be sufficient to allow the staff to complete its review and consider this issue resolved.
Should you have any question, please contact this office.
Very truly yours, b
J.
L.
Smith Manager, Special Projects Shoreham Nuclear Power Station RWG:bc Attachment cc:
J. Higgins All Parties Listed in Attachment 1
F ATTACHMENT 1 Lawrence Brenner, Esq.
Herbert H.
Brown, Esq.
Administrative Judge Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Karla J, Letsche, Esq.
Board Panel Kirkpatrick, Lockhart, Hill U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Christoper & Phillips Washington, D.C.
20555 8th Floor 1900 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Dr. Peter A. Morris Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Mr. Marc W. Goldsmith Board Panel Energy Research Group U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4001 Totten Pond Road Washington, D.C.
20555 Waltham, Massachusetts 02154 Dr. James H. Carpenter MHB Technical Associates Administrative Judge 1723 Hamilton Avenue Atomic Safety and Licensing Suite K Board Panel San Jose, California 95125 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Stephen B.
Latham, Esq.
Twomey, Latham & Shea Daniel F. Brown, Esq.
33 West Second Street Attorney P.O. Box 398 Atomic Safety and Licensing Riverhead, New York 11901 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Ralph Shapiro, Esq.
Cammer and Shapiro, P.C.
9 East 40th Street Bernard M.
Bordenick, Esq.
New York, New York 10016 David A.
Repka, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Matthew J. Kelly, Esq.
State of New York Department of Public Service James Dougherty Three Empire State Plaza 3045 Porter Street Albany, New York 12223 Washington, D.C.
20008
.