ML20072B305
| ML20072B305 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/06/1983 |
| From: | Jun Lee AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8306130389 | |
| Download: ML20072B305 (5) | |
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t Kt9 L ocyp' en th A. #g/ a ma 83 JUN 10 N133 1:uelear Iegulatory Connissioners June 6, 1981 1717 H. Stroet, N.W.
Pashington, D.C. 20555 MC.'
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enmissioners:
Eow that the ITC Commissioners are in the driver's seat and calling the shots, for the present, on safety-related issues and apparently expan-ding its horizons to focus beyond the realm of the 13C Staff for credible information, perhaps it's appropriate to present some ar6uments for spring hounecleaning.
The history of the nuclear power regulating body reverts back to the infamous days of the AEC when erronous," expert" reports were the rule and rere labeled bona fide, twenty-carat-gold with an official stanp of approval.
The ABC was guilty of all manner of violations on safety by ignoring the icsues and condoning ethical trans6ressions.
This atmosphere set the stage for human attitudes that still prevail lonc after the agency's name was altered to the 13C.
Unfortunately, the nov facade failed to deal with the erosions from within.
Mind-sets and ethical values do not change merely because one garners a new name. When np?ies ~begin to rot in the barrel, it is necessary to remove the rotten ones in e-der to salvage the good onec.
And therein lies the bilemma of the 13C.
After years of reading 13C documents written by the h'FC Staff and attend-Ing nunerous licensing hearings,both of which, excused and overlooked deliberate m.foty violations and cutting safety-grade mateticin, on[must stop and uender if sonething ir aniss or i f they are/ vere suffering from sone vr!,1 defi ci ency.
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The evidence within the EI C's own files clearly reflects that CDU, neong other utilities, was/is guilty of deliberately falsifying records, deliberately sacrificing health and safety of local residents durinc clean-
- p operations at Unit II, deliberately withholding vital GPU operation reports...only releasing said reports after their disecvery, deliberately using coercive tactics to restrain cleanup personnel from reporting safety violations, deliberately aiding personnel in cheating on testing qualifi-cations which are so vital to safety and deliberately ignoring the proper training of. 2500 personnel who were receiving CARE packages instead of taking the necessary exaninations. A most damning record which NFC Staff, thus fe.r, has seen fit to approve.
This raises the mute question: If, as the Staff has indicated repeatedly, the record reveals no new evidence, are we given to understand that Staff uns/is fullvanare of these violations and in spite of this knowledge, they reconnend restart?
P.r. Jack Goldberg, NFC Staff Counsel, states:
"The Staff does not believe thet the Conm.ssion intended the restart proceedings to be a form for the parties to liticate the quality of Licensee's old management organization chich existed at a time which is more than one year prior to the accident at TEI II' and uhich no long exists". (emphasis added) (Docket ro. 50-289, PG 10)
Er. Coldberg, unuittingly, makes the strongest case acainst restart because, indeed, it uns the sane management's sloppiness, old or now, that created the very accident which brought about the litigation proceed $ ncs and raised to nuch controversy about safety.
We are still living with the ills of that "old nanntenent" accident and the daily radioactive releases that now emanate fren Unit II.
The argument of " time" as Coldberg so succinctly describes it, "even1s bis limitations of reality or otherwise biased, evasive actions which "r.
Goldberc, perhaps, can define for us.
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l Mr. Victor Stello's shallou briefing before the NT C Conmissionern en the cpu /3.U. court testimony, statirc: "there is nothing ner" becs clari-fi cati on.
Are ve to understand that ITC Staff was fully auare of the Hartman tes'inony and that the same manacement who condoned and encouraged deliberate falsification of leak rates is now succesting that we put a nuclear reactor bech in the hands of such irresponsible people? In Mr Steelo tellinC un that this is nothing ner? lihat, pray tell, does the UI C Staff have for lunch?
Since the B.W, court testimony on the EPT system has surfaced, the 2 elichility of CPU's personnel,under sworn testimony, is now in jeopardy.
The transcript reveals that GPU personnel have suffered a mental relapse.
'" hey couldn't reca11when, how and why it was or wasn't turned off or on.
This attempt to jugcle testimony from one court to another is a disquietirc "evelation.
" hat reaction could we anticipate from Staff had the intervenors
'*scticed such deception?
This raises the specter of ITC confidentially for th
$+1 stle blouer.
"he, uithin the ITC Staff, blew the whistle on GPU and Bechtel engineers ofte-they reported safety violations.in the cleanup? UHO? By this time rencene should be ahic to perceive the necesrity for a thorouch housecleaning i thin the ITC Staff.
. As if all this isn't enouch, the !H C Staff is escalating time schedules en tre. intervenors who are presenting relevate safety issues before the 9'nesl Board.
Staff took three months to peruse the CPU /B.U. transcripts, "ct rest 2deted Annodts and UCS to tuo weeks.
It should be pointed out that
" ' Staff is not only salaried but has the additional advantace of a secretarial cel to complete all correspondence quickly and efficiently idth dozens of nucicar encineers, conputers and attorneys to put forth every effort to defeat
'Pc two remaininc, effective intervenors against restart.
Either the Staff ie encaring in pettiness or they seek to stanpede the inventicating process
- nte a premature and erronous direction.
This continuous and unnecessary bs?"nssnent of intervenors by Staff must be resisted and halted at once!
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II The consistently biased behavior that is repletive throuchout the try C Staff's verbal and uritten responses is where M ased attitudes and adverse rerults give birth and grow, even in some irstances, beyond the recognition nf sore of the parti cipates.
This malignant embjtn conceived and developed by the ABC, has now reached fruition and requires surgical extraction.
Then hut'ans 3ere sight of ethical values, mandatory approval from their w rs becones all-consuming.
Th$ s unforunate affliction is the NFC's disease.
We Conmission tolerates this at their own peril.
11r. Hendrie met his demise because he condoned and tolerated accomt:modation of the nuclear industry.
The realities are; the NEC Commissioners are responsible for conduct and attitudes that take form in decisions made that vill have an impact on the health and safety of U.S. residents who live within reach of radioactive releases.
13y final comments are directed te the Commission.
The recent decision to bar hearings on the steam generator tubes is a t oublesone choice. For at least five months or more I have been attempting tn cain some reassurances from the Commission or Staff about the characteristic intregity of the steam generator tubes at Unit I (TMI).
Bus far, my efford.s Scve been unsuccessful.
Although Mr. Denton responded to my original inquiry, cri tical questions were never addressed.
The steam generator tubes are cr6cial to safe operation. We nou knor thet low-level radiation, in the form of cesium and strontium, are being 2 elcased from nuclear power plants via the steam generators due to tube breaks
,nd fractures.
The heat exchanger is exchanging more than just heat from the prinary and secondary coolant systems.
Uhen the tubes leak they are exchanging l a di oacti vity.
This raises the question: If Unit I would have gone into omration vith extensive tube damage if the accident at Unit II had not occurted?
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The concerns about Unit I are: At what operatinc level will Unit I be able to operate since tube expansion? Hou nuch pressure can the tw,anded tubes endure without more releases throuch rupturing? What type of netallurgical advice has 'the Commission obtained on the tube expansion
, ocess? It is our evpressed desire that the Commission take a very hard look at the stean Cenerator tubes.
Unless these questions are addressed by responsible individuals:(this does not include TMIA who has proven to be totally inadequate),
rbo are able to bring qualified, unbaised and ethical testimony before the Commission, then I fear the Commission idll be placing an unstable mactor in the hands of unstable management uho may very vell push the
'onctor beyond its ability to custain a safe operationing condition.
The question of thermal shock has not, as yet, been addressed as evtensively as it should be.
The word of CPU is as empty as the inside af n rainbarrel resting in the middle of the Sahara desert.
Again this nuortion requires prcfessional, qualified, unbaised and ethical reports to
,rcertain the viability of Unit I's Shieldinc.
Unless and until the NRC Commissioners are willing to move slowly rd,rudently in restarting this (TMI I) reactor, the risks will be very
" art irdeed and so idll the consequences.
Sincerely, eb a n'e S
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